Consolidating birth-death and death-birth processes in structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics of nascent multicellular lineages

The evolution of multicellular organisms involves the emergence of cellular collectives that eventually become units of selection in their own right. The process can be facilitated by ecological conditions that impose heritable variance in fitness on nascent collectives, with long-term persistence depending on the capacity of competing lineages to transition reliably between soma- and germ-like stages of proto-life cycles. Prior work with experimental bacterial populations showed rapid increases in collective-level fitness, with the capacity to switch between life cycle phases being a particular focus of selection. Here, we report experiments in which the most successful lineage from the earlier study was further propagated for 10 life cycle generations under regimes that required different investments in the soma-like phase. To explore the adaptive significance of switching, a control was included in which reliable transitioning between life cycle phases was abolished. The switch proved central to the maintenance of fitness. Moreover, in a non-switch treatment, where solutions to producing a robust and enduring soma-phase were required, the evolution of mutL-dependent switching emerged de novo. A newly developed computational pipeline (colgen) was used to display the moment-by-moment evolutionary dynamics of lineages, providing rare visual evidence of the roles of chance, history and selection. Colgen, underpinned by a Bayesian model, was further used to propagate hundreds of mutations back through temporal genealogical series, predict lineages and time points corresponding to changes of likely adaptive significance, and in one instance, via a combination of targeted sequencing, genetics and analyses of fitness consequences, the adaptive significance of a single mutation was demonstrated. Overall, our results shed light on the mechanisms by which collectives adapt to new selective challenges and demonstrate the value of genealogy-centred approaches for investigating the dynamics of lineage-level selection.

The rules of multiplayer cooperation in networks of communities

Community organisation permeates both social and biological complex systems. To study its interplay with behaviour emergence, we model mobile structured populations with multiplayer interactions. We derive general analytical methods for evolutionary dynamics under high home fidelity when populations self-organise into networks of asymptotically isolated communities. In this limit, community organisation dominates over the network structure and emerging behaviour is independent of network topology. We obtain the rules of multiplayer cooperation in networks of communities for different types of social dilemmas. The success of cooperation is a result of the benefits shared among communal cooperators outperforming the benefits reaped by defectors in mixed communities. Under weak selection, cooperation can evolve and be stable for any size (Q) and number (M) of communities if the reward-to-cost ratio (V/K) of public goods is higher than a critical value. Community organisation is a solid mechanism for sustaining the evolution of cooperation under public goods dilemmas, particularly when populations are organised into a higher number of smaller communities. Contrary to public goods dilemmas relating to production, the multiplayer Hawk-Dove (HD) dilemma is a commons dilemma focusing on the fair consumption of preexisting resources. This game yields mixed results but tends to favour cooperation under larger communities, highlighting that the two types of social dilemmas might lead to solid differences in the behaviour adopted under community structure.

Categorizing update mechanisms for graph-structured metapopulations

The structure of a population strongly influences its evolutionary dynamics. In various settings ranging from biology to social systems, individuals tend to interact more often with those present in their proximity and rarely with those far away. A common approach to model the structure of a population is evolutionary graph theory. In this framework, each graph node is occupied by a reproducing individual. The links connect these individuals to their neighbours. The offspring can be placed on neighbouring nodes, replacing the neighbours-or the progeny of its neighbours can replace a node during the course of ongoing evolutionary dynamics. Extending this theory by replacing single individuals with subpopulations at nodes yields a graph-structured metapopulation. The dynamics between the different local subpopulations is set by an update mechanism. There are many such update mechanisms. Here, we classify update mechanisms for structured metapopulations, which allows to find commonalities between past work and illustrate directions for further research and current gaps of investigation.

Evolutionary Kuramoto dynamics

Biological systems have a variety of time-keeping mechanisms ranging from molecular clocks within cells to a complex interconnected unit across an entire organism. The suprachiasmatic nucleus, comprising interconnected oscillatory neurons, serves as a master-clock in mammals. The ubiquity of such systems indicates an evolutionary benefit that outweighs the cost of establishing and maintaining them, but little is known about the process of evolutionary development. To begin to address this shortfall, we introduce and analyse a new evolutionary game theoretic framework modelling the behaviour and evolution of systems of coupled oscillators. Each oscillator is characterized by a pair of dynamic behavioural dimensions, a phase and a communication strategy, along which evolution occurs. We measure success of mutations by comparing the benefit of synchronization balanced against the cost of connections between the oscillators. Despite the simple set-up, this model exhibits non-trivial behaviours mimicking several different classical games—the Prisoner’s Dilemma, snowdrift games, coordination games—as the landscape of the oscillators changes over time. Across many situations, we find a surprisingly simple characterization of synchronization through connectivity and communication: if the benefit of synchronization is greater than twice the cost, the system will evolve towards complete communication and phase synchronization.

On the evolutionary language game in structured and adaptive populations

We propose an evolutionary model for the emergence of shared linguistic convention in a population of agents whose social structure is modelled by complex networks. Through agent-based simulations, we show a process of convergence towards a common language, and explore how the topology of the underlying networks affects its dynamics. We find that small-world effects act to speed up convergence, but observe no effect of topology on the communicative efficiency of common languages. We further explore differences in agent learning, discriminating between scenarios in which new agents learn from their parents (vertical transmission) versus scenarios in which they learn from their neighbors (oblique transmission), finding that vertical transmission results in faster convergence and generally higher communicability. Optimal languages can be formed when parental learning is dominant, but a small amount of neighbor learning is included. As a last point, we illustrate an exclusion effect leading to core-periphery networks in an adaptive networks setting when agents attempt to reconnect towards better communicators in the population.

The role of evolutionary game theory in spatial and non-spatial models of the survival of cooperation in cancer: a review

Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is a branch of mathematics which considers populations of individuals interacting with each other to receive pay-offs. An individual’s pay-off is dependent on the strategy of its opponent(s) as well as on its own, and the higher its pay-off, the higher its reproductive fitness. Its offspring generally inherit its interaction strategy, subject to random mutation. Over time, the composition of the population shifts as different strategies spread or are driven extinct. In the last 25 years there has been a flood of interest in applying EGT to cancer modelling, with the aim of explaining how cancerous mutations spread through healthy tissue and how intercellular cooperation persists in tumour-cell populations. This review traces this body of work from theoretical analyses of well-mixed infinite populations through to more realistic spatial models of the development of cooperation between epithelial cells. We also consider work in which EGT has been used to make experimental predictions about the evolution of cancer, and discuss work that remains to be done before EGT can make large-scale contributions to clinical treatment and patient outcomes.

Martingales and the fixation time of evolutionary graphs with arbitrary dimensionality

Evolutionary graph theory (EGT) investigates the Moran birth-death process constrained by graphs. Its two principal goals are to find the fixation probability and time for some initial population of mutants on the graph. The fixation probability of graphs has received considerable attention. Less is known about the distribution of fixation time. We derive clean, exact expressions for the full conditional characteristic functions (CCFs) of a close proxy to fixation and extinction times. That proxy is the number of times that the mutant population size changes before fixation or extinction. We derive these CCFs from a product martingale that we identify for an evolutionary graph with any number of partitions. The existence of that martingale only requires that the connections between those partitions are of a certain type. Our results are the first expressions for the CCFs of any proxy to fixation time on a graph with any number of partitions. The parameter dependence of our CCFs is explicit, so we can explore how they depend on graph structure. Martingales are a powerful approach to study principal problems of EGT. Their applicability is invariant to the number of partitions in a graph, so we can study entire families of graphs simultaneously.

Toward a Universal Model for Spatially Structured Populations

A key question in evolution is how likely a mutant is to take over. This depends on natural selection and on stochastic fluctuations. Population spatial structure can impact mutant fixation probabilities. We introduce a model for structured populations on graphs that generalizes previous ones by making migrations independent of birth and death. We demonstrate that by tuning migration asymmetry, the star graph transitions from amplifying to suppressing natural selection. The results from our model are universal in the sense that they do not hinge on a modeling choice of microscopic dynamics or update rules. Instead, they depend on migration asymmetry, which can be experimentally tuned and measured.

Martingales and the characteristic functions of absorption time on bipartite graphs

Evolutionary graph theory investigates how spatial constraints affect processes that model evolutionary selection, e.g. the Moran process. Its principal goals are to find the fixation probability and the conditional distributions of fixation time, and show how they are affected by different graphs that impose spatial constraints. Fixation probabilities have generated significant attention, but much less is known about the conditional time distributions, even for simple graphs. Those conditional time distributions are difficult to calculate, so we consider a close proxy to it: the number of times the mutant population size changes before absorption. We employ martingales to obtain the conditional characteristic functions (CCFs) of that proxy for the Moran process on the complete bipartite graph. We consider the Moran process on the complete bipartite graph as an absorbing random walk in two dimensions. We then extend Wald's martingale approach to sequential analysis from one dimension to two. Our expressions for the CCFs are novel, compact, exact, and their parameter dependence is explicit. We show that our CCFs closely approximate those of absorption time. Martingales provide an elegant framework to solve principal problems of evolutionary graph theory. It should be possible to extend our analysis to more complex graphs than we show here.

Cooperative success in epithelial public goods games

Cancer cells obtain mutations which rely on the production of diffusible growth factors to confer a fitness benefit. These mutations can be considered cooperative, and studied as public goods games within the framework of evolutionary game theory. The population structure, benefit function and update rule all influence the evolutionary success of cooperators. We model the evolution of cooperation in epithelial cells using the Voronoi tessellation model. Unlike traditional evolutionary graph theory, this allows us to implement global updating, for which birth and death events are spatially decoupled. We compare, for a sigmoid benefit function, the conditions for cooperation to be favoured and/or beneficial for well-mixed and structured populations. We find that when population structure is combined with global updating, cooperation is more successful than if there were local updating or the population were well-mixed. Interestingly, the qualitative behaviour for the well-mixed population and the Voronoi tessellation model is remarkably similar, but the latter case requires significantly lower incentives to ensure cooperation.

Aspiration dynamics generate robust predictions in heterogeneous populations

Update rules, which describe how individuals adjust their behavior over time, affect the outcome of social interactions. Theoretical studies have shown that evolutionary outcomes are sensitive to model details when update rules are imitation-based but are robust when update rules are self-evaluation based. However, studies of self-evaluation based rules have focused on homogeneous population structures where each individual has the same number of neighbors. Here, we consider heterogeneous population structures represented by weighted networks. Under weak selection, we analytically derive the condition for strategy success, which coincides with the classical condition of risk-dominance. This condition holds for all weighted networks and distributions of aspiration levels, and for individualized ways of self-evaluation. Our findings recover previous results as special cases and demonstrate the universality of the robustness property under self-evaluation based rules. Our work thus sheds light on the intrinsic difference between evolutionary dynamics under self-evaluation based and imitation-based update rules.

Social interaction outcomes can depend on the type of information individuals possess and how it is used in decision-making. Here, Zhou et al. find that self-evaluation based decision-making rules lead to evolutionary outcomes that are robust to different population structures and ways of self-evaluation.

Evolutionary graph theory derived from eco-evolutionary dynamics

A biologically motivated individual-based framework for evolution in network-structured populations is developed that can accommodate eco-evolutionary dynamics. This framework is used to construct a network birth and death model. The evolutionary graph theory model, which considers evolutionary dynamics only, is derived as a special case, highlighting additional assumptions that diverge from real biological processes. This is achieved by introducing a negative ecological feedback loop that suppresses ecological dynamics by forcing births and deaths to be coupled. We also investigate how fitness, a measure of reproductive success used in evolutionary graph theory, is related to the life-history of individuals in terms of their birth and death rates. In simple networks, these ecologically motivated dynamics are used to provide new insight into the spread of adaptive mutations, both with and without clonal interference. For example, the star network, which is known to be an amplifier of selection in evolutionary graph theory, can inhibit the spread of adaptive mutations when individuals can die naturally.

A comparison of the Moran Process and replicator equations for evolving social dilemma game strategies

Social dilemma games are studied to gain insight into why humans cooperate with other unrelated people. The canonical game has cooperation and defection as the two strategies. Cooperation benefits the group, but a self-interested player can always do better by defecting. But if everybody defects, then the entire group loses. This tradeoff between cooperation and defection gives rise to the social dilemma. Social dilemma games need some method to evolve strategy changes between rounds. The two most widely accepted methods are a Moran process or replicator equations. Although both methods can predict how strategies evolve in a player population, no comparison of their performance has yet been made. In this paper we compare them in a public goods game which is an N-player version of prisoner's dilemma (N>2). Our results indicate only one of these methods should be used in future research efforts.

Two-strategy games with time constraints on regular graphs

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful method for modelling animal conflicts. The original evolutionary game models were used to explain specific biological features of interest, such as the existence of ritualised contests, and were necessarily simple models that ignored many properties of real populations, including the duration of events and spatial and related structural effects. Both of these areas have subsequently received much attention. Spatial and structural effects have been considered in evolutionary graph theory, and a significant body of literature has been built up to deal with situations where the population is not homogeneous. More recently a theory of time constraints has been developed to take account of the fact that different events can take different times, and that interaction times can explicitly depend upon selected strategies, which can, in turn, influence the distribution of different opponent types within the population. Here, for the first time, we build a model of time constraint games which explicitly considers a spatial population, by considering a population evolving on an underlying graph, using two graph dynamics, birth-death and death-birth. We consider one short time scale along which frequencies of pairs and singles change as individuals interact with their neighbours, and another, evolutionary time scale, along which frequencies of strategies change in the population. We show that for graphs with large degree, both dynamics reproduce recent results from well-mixed time constraint models, including two ESSs being common in Hawk-Dove and Prisoner's Dilemma games, but for low degree there can be marked differences. For birth-death processes the effect of the graph degree is small, whereas for death-birth dynamics there is a large effect. The general prediction for both Hawk-Dove and Prisoner's dilemma games is that as the graph degree decreases, i.e., as the number of neighbours decreases, mixed ESS do appear. In particular, for the Prisoner's dilemma game this means that cooperation is easier to establish in situations where individuals have low number of neighbours. We thus see that solutions depend non-trivially on the combination of graph degree, dynamics and game.

Wald’s martingale and the conditional distributions of absorption time in the Moran process

Many models of evolution are stochastic processes, where some quantity of interest fluctuates randomly in time. One classic example is the Moranbirth–death process, where that quantity is the number of mutants in a population. In such processes, we are often interested in their absorption (i.e. fixation) probabilities and the conditional distributions of absorption time. Those conditional time distributions can be very difficult to calculate, even for relatively simple processes like the Moran birth–death model. Instead of considering the time to absorption, we consider a closely related quantity: the number of mutant population size changes before absorption. We use Wald’s martingale to obtain the conditional characteristic functions of that quantity in the Moran process. Our expressions are novel, analytical and exact, and their parameter dependence is explicit. We use our results to approximate the conditional characteristic functions of absorption time. We state the conditions under which that approximation is particularly accurate. Martingales are an elegant framework to solve principal problems of evolutionary stochastic processes. They do not require us to evaluate recursion relations, so when they are applicable, we can quickly and tractably obtain absorption probabilities and times of evolutionary models.

Evolution of cooperation in an epithelium

Cooperation is prevalent in nature, not only in the context of social interactions within the animal kingdom but also on the cellular level. In cancer, for example, tumour cells can cooperate by producing growth factors. The evolution of cooperation has traditionally been studied for well-mixed populations under the framework of evolutionary game theory, and more recently for structured populations using evolutionary graph theory (EGT). The population structures arising due to cellular arrangement in tissues, however, are dynamic and thus cannot be accurately represented by either of these frameworks. In this work, we compare the conditions for cooperative success in an epithelium modelled using EGT, to those in a mechanical model of an epithelium—the Voronoi tessellation (VT) model. Crucially, in this latter model, cells are able to move, and birth and death are not spatially coupled. We calculate fixation probabilities in the VT model through simulation and an approximate analytic technique and show that this leads to stronger promotion of cooperation in comparison with the EGT model.

Limits on amplifiers of natural selection under death-Birth updating

The fixation probability of a single mutant invading a population of residents is among the most widely-studied quantities in evolutionary dynamics. Amplifiers of natural selection are population structures that increase the fixation probability of advantageous mutants, compared to well-mixed populations. Extensive studies have shown that many amplifiers exist for the Birth-death Moran process, some of them substantially increasing the fixation probability or even guaranteeing fixation in the limit of large population size. On the other hand, no amplifiers are known for the death-Birth Moran process, and computer-assisted exhaustive searches have failed to discover amplification. In this work we resolve this disparity, by showing that any amplification under death-Birth updating is necessarily bounded and transient. Our boundedness result states that even if a population structure does amplify selection, the resulting fixation probability is close to that of the well-mixed population. Our transience result states that for any population structure there exists a threshold r^⋆ such that the population structure ceases to amplify selection if the mutant fitness advantage r is larger than r^⋆. Finally, we also extend the above results to δ-death-Birth updating, which is a combination of Birth-death and death-Birth updating. On the positive side, we identify population structures that maintain amplification for a wide range of values r and δ. These results demonstrate that amplification of natural selection depends on the specific mechanisms of the evolutionary process.

Extensive literature exists on amplifiers of natural selection for the Birth-death Moran process, but no amplifiers are known for the death-Birth Moran process. Here we show that if amplifiers exist under death-Birth updating, they must be bounded and transient. Boundedness implies weak amplification, and transience implies amplification for only a limited range of the mutant fitness advantage. These results demonstrate that amplification depends on the specific mechanisms of the evolutionary process.

Motion, fixation probability and the choice of an evolutionary process

Seemingly minor details of mathematical and computational models of evolution are known to change the effect of population structure on the outcome of evolutionary processes. For example, birth-death dynamics often result in amplification of selection, while death-birth processes have been associated with suppression. In many biological populations the interaction structure is not static. Instead, members of the population are in motion and can interact with different individuals at different times. In this work we study populations embedded in a flowing medium; the interaction network is then time dependent. We use computer simulations to investigate how this dynamic structure affects the success of invading mutants, and compare these effects for different coupled birth and death processes. Specifically, we show how the speed of the motion impacts the fixation probability of an invading mutant. Flows of different speeds interpolate between evolutionary dynamics on fixed heterogeneous graphs and well-stirred populations; this allows us to systematically compare against known results for static structured populations. We find that motion has an active role in amplifying or suppressing selection by fragmenting and reconnecting the interaction graph. While increasing flow speeds suppress selection for most evolutionary models, we identify characteristic responses to flow for the different update rules we test. In particular we find that selection can be maximally enhanced or suppressed at intermediate flow speeds.

Whether a mutation spreads in a population or not is one of the most important questions in biology. The evolution of cancer and antibiotic resistance, for example, are mediated by invading mutants. Recent work has shown that population structure can have important consequences for the outcome of evolution. For instance, a mutant can have a higher or a lower chance of invasion than in unstructured populations. These effects can depend on seemingly minor details of the evolutionary model, such as the order of birth and death events. Many biological populations are in motion, for example due to external stirring. Experimentally this is known to be important; the performance of mutants in E. coli populations, for example, depends on the rate of mixing. Here, we focus on simulations of populations in a flowing medium, and compare the success of a mutant for different flow speeds. We contrast different evolutionary models, and identify what features of the evolutionary model affect mutant success for different speeds of the flow. We find that the chance of mutant invasion can be at its highest (or lowest) at intermediate flow speeds, depending on the order in which birth and death events occur in the evolutionary process.

Exploring and mapping the universe of evolutionary graphs identifies structural properties affecting fixation probability and time

Population structure can be modeled by evolutionary graphs, which can have a substantial influence on the fate of mutants. Individuals are located on the nodes of these graphs, competing to take over the graph via the links. Applications for this framework range from the ecology of river systems and cancer initiation in colonic crypts to biotechnological search for optimal mutations. In all these applications, both the probability of fixation and the associated time are of interest. We study this problem for all undirected and unweighted graphs up to a certain size. We devise a genetic algorithm to find graphs with high or low fixation probability and short or long fixation time and study their structure searching for common themes. Our work unravels structural properties that maximize or minimize fixation probability and time, which allows us to contribute to a first map of the universe of evolutionary graphs.

Modeling vaccination decision making process in a finite population

Vaccination is considered as one of the most crucial methods in controlling the spread of infectious diseases. However, it is difficult to predict the expected vaccine coverage level because it depends on human behaviors. We consider deterministic and stochastic models to simulate how individuals choose strategies in the scenario of vaccination. In an infinite population, a system of replicator equations is formulated and the expected level is calculated. Decision making processes in both an unstructured finite population and a structured finite population are discussed. Expected vaccine coverage levels are calculated and analyzed. In a structured finite population, passive decision making process and initiative decision making process are defined. It is also analytically and numerically proved that the passive decision making process can predict a higher vaccine coverage level than the process of initiative decision making.

Demographic noise and cost of greenbeard can facilitate greenbeard cooperation

Cooperation among organisms, where cooperators suffer a personal cost to benefit others, is ubiquitous in nature. Greenbeard is a key mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, where a single gene or a set of linked genes codes for both cooperation and a phenotypic tag (metaphorically called "green beard"). Greenbeard cooperation is typically thought to decline over time since defectors can also evolve the tag. However, models of tag-based cooperation typically ignore two key realistic features: populations are finite, and that phenotypic tags can be costly. We develop an analytical model for coevolutionary dynamics of two evolvable traits in finite populations with mutations: costly cooperation and a costly tag. We show that an interplay of demographic noise and cost of the tag can induce coevolutionary cycling, where the evolving population does not reach a steady state but spontaneously switches between cooperative tag-carrying and noncooperative tagless states. Such dynamics allows the tag to repeatedly reappear even after it is invaded by defectors. Thus, we highlight the surprising possibility that the cost of the tag, together with demographic noise, can facilitate the evolution of greenbeard cooperation. We discuss implications of these findings in the context of the evolution of quorum sensing and multicellularity.

Modeling treatment-dependent glioma growth including a dormant tumor cell subpopulation

Background

Tumors comprise a variety of specialized cell phenotypes adapted to different ecological niches that massively influence the tumor growth and its response to treatment.

Methods

In the background of glioblastoma multiforme, a highly malignant brain tumor, we consider a rapid proliferating phenotype that appears susceptible to treatment, and a dormant phenotype which lacks this pronounced proliferative ability and is not affected by standard therapeutic strategies. To gain insight in the dynamically changing proportions of different tumor cell phenotypes under different treatment conditions, we develop a mathematical model and underline our assumptions with experimental data.

Results

We show that both cell phenotypes contribute to the distinct composition of the tumor, especially in cycling low and high dose treatment, and therefore may influence the tumor growth in a phenotype specific way.

Conclusion

Our model of the dynamic proportions of dormant and rapidly growing glioblastoma cells in different therapy settings suggests that phenotypically different cells should be considered to plan dose and duration of treatment schedules.

Stirring does not make populations well mixed

In evolutionary dynamics, the notion of a ‘well-mixed’ population is usually associated with all-to-all interactions at all times. This assumption simplifies the mathematics of evolutionary processes, and makes analytical solutions possible. At the same time the term ‘well-mixed’ suggests that this situation can be achieved by physically stirring the population. Using simulations of populations in chaotic flows, we show that in most cases this is not true: conventional well-mixed theories do not predict fixation probabilities correctly, regardless of how fast or thorough the stirring is. We propose a new analytical description in the fast-flow limit. This approach is valid for processes with global and local selection, and accurately predicts the suppression of selection as competition becomes more local. It provides a modelling tool for biological or social systems with individuals in motion.

Effects of motion in structured populations

In evolutionary processes, population structure has a substantial effect on natural selection. Here, we analyse how motion of individuals affects constant selection in structured populations. Motion is relevant because it leads to changes in the distribution of types as mutations march towards fixation or extinction. We describe motion as the swapping of individuals on graphs, and more generally as the shuffling of individuals between reproductive updates. Beginning with a one-dimensional graph, the cycle, we prove that motion suppresses natural selection for death-birth (DB) updating or for any process that combines birth-death (BD) and DB updating. If the rule is purely BD updating, no change in fixation probability appears in the presence of motion. We further investigate how motion affects evolution on the square lattice and weighted graphs. In the case of weighted graphs, we find that motion can be either an amplifier or a suppressor of natural selection. In some cases, whether it is one or the other can be a function of the relative reproductive rate, indicating that motion is a subtle and complex attribute of evolving populations. As a first step towards understanding less restricted types of motion in evolutionary graph theory, we consider a similar rule on dynamic graphs induced by a spatial flow and find qualitatively similar results, indicating that continuous motion also suppresses natural selection.

Dynamic landscape models of coevolutionary games

Players of coevolutionary games may update not only their strategies but also their networks of interaction. Based on interpreting the payoff of players as fitness, dynamic landscape models are proposed. The modeling procedure is carried out for Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Snowdrift (SD) games that both use either birth-death (BD) or death-birth (DB) strategy updating. The main focus is on using dynamic fitness landscapes as a mathematical model of coevolutionary game dynamics. Hence, an alternative tool for analyzing coevolutionary games becomes available, and landscape measures such as modality, ruggedness and information content can be computed and analyzed. In addition, fixation properties of the games and quantifiers characterizing the interaction networks are calculated numerically. Relations are established between landscape properties expressed by landscape measures and quantifiers of coevolutionary game dynamics such as fixation probabilities, fixation times and network properties.

Evolutionary games on cycles with strong selection

Evolutionary games on graphs describe how strategic interactions and population structure determine evolutionary success, quantified by the probability that a single mutant takes over a population. Graph structures, compared to the well-mixed case, can act as amplifiers or suppressors of selection by increasing or decreasing the fixation probability of a beneficial mutant. Properties of the associated mean fixation times can be more intricate, especially when selection is strong. The intuition is that fixation of a beneficial mutant happens fast in a dominance game, that fixation takes very long in a coexistence game, and that strong selection eliminates demographic noise. Here we show that these intuitions can be misleading in structured populations. We analyze mean fixation times on the cycle graph under strong frequency-dependent selection for two different microscopic evolutionary update rules (death-birth and birth-death). We establish exact analytical results for fixation times under strong selection and show that there are coexistence games in which fixation occurs in time polynomial in population size. Depending on the underlying game, we observe inherence of demographic noise even under strong selection if the process is driven by random death before selection for birth of an offspring (death-birth update). In contrast, if selection for an offspring occurs before random removal (birth-death update), then strong selection can remove demographic noise almost entirely.

Should tissue structure suppress or amplify selection to minimize cancer risk?

Background

It has been frequently argued that tissues evolved to suppress the accumulation of growth enhancing cancer inducing mutations. A prominent example is the hierarchical structure of tissues with high cell turnover, where a small number of tissue specific stem cells produces a large number of specialized progeny during multiple differentiation steps. Another well known mechanism is the spatial organization of stem cell populations and it is thought that this organization suppresses fitness enhancing mutations. However, in small populations the suppression of advantageous mutations typically also implies an increased accumulation of deleterious mutations. Thus, it becomes an important question whether the suppression of potentially few advantageous mutations outweighs the combined effects of many deleterious mutations.

Results

We argue that the distribution of mutant fitness effects, e.g. the probability to hit a strong driver compared to many deleterious mutations, is crucial for the optimal organization of a cancer suppressing tissue architecture and should be taken into account in arguments for the evolution of such tissues.

Conclusion

We show that for systems that are composed of few cells reflecting the typical organization of a stem cell niche, amplification or suppression of selection can arise from subtle changes in the architecture. Moreover, we discuss special tissue structures that can suppress most types of non-neutral mutations simultaneously.

Reviewers

This article was reviewed by Benjamin Allen, Andreas Deutsch and Ignacio Rodriguez-Brenes. For the full reviews, please go to the Reviewers’ comments section.

Exact numerical calculation of fixation probability and time on graphs

The Moran process on graphs is a popular model to study the dynamics of evolution in a spatially structured population. Exact analytical solutions for the fixation probability and time of a new mutant have been found for only a few classes of graphs so far. Simulations are time-expensive and many realizations are necessary, as the variance of the fixation times is high. We present an algorithm that numerically computes these quantities for arbitrary small graphs by an approach based on the transition matrix. The advantage over simulations is that the calculation has to be executed only once. Building the transition matrix is automated by our algorithm. This enables a fast and interactive study of different graph structures and their effect on fixation probability and time. We provide a fast implementation in C with this note (Hindersin et al., 2016). Our code is very flexible, as it can handle two different update mechanisms (Birth-death or death-Birth), as well as arbitrary directed or undirected graphs.

Structural symmetry in evolutionary games

In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a randomly occurring mutant will fixate in the population. However, in a structured population, this fixation probability may depend on where the mutant arises. Moreover, the fixation probability is just one quantity by which one can measure the success of a mutant; fixation time, for instance, is another. We define a notion of homogeneity for evolutionary games that captures what it means for two single-mutant states, i.e. two configurations of a single mutant in an otherwise-monomorphic population, to be 'evolutionarily equivalent' in the sense that all measures of evolutionary success are the same for both configurations. Using asymmetric games, we argue that the term 'homogeneous' should apply to the evolutionary process as a whole rather than to just the population structure. For evolutionary matrix games in graph-structured populations, we give precise conditions under which the resulting process is homogeneous. Finally, we show that asymmetric matrix games can be reduced to symmetric games if the population structure possesses a sufficient degree of symmetry.

How Life History Can Sway the Fixation Probability of Mutants

In this work, we study the effects of demographic structure on evolutionary dynamics when selection acts on reproduction, survival, or both. In contrast to the previously discovered pattern that the fixation probability of a neutral mutant decreases while the population becomes younger, we show that a mutant with a constant selective advantage may have a maximum or a minimum of the fixation probability in populations with an intermediate fraction of young individuals. This highlights the importance of life history and demographic structure in studying evolutionary dynamics. We also illustrate the fundamental differences between selection on reproduction and selection on survival when age structure is present. In addition, we evaluate the relative importance of size and structure of the population in determining the fixation probability of the mutant. Our work lays the foundation for also studying density- and frequency-dependent effects in populations when demographic structures cannot be neglected.

Most Undirected Random Graphs Are Amplifiers of Selection for Birth-Death Dynamics, but Suppressors of Selection for Death-Birth Dynamics

We analyze evolutionary dynamics on graphs, where the nodes represent individuals of a population. The links of a node describe which other individuals can be displaced by the offspring of the individual on that node. Amplifiers of selection are graphs for which the fixation probability is increased for advantageous mutants and decreased for disadvantageous mutants. A few examples of such amplifiers have been developed, but so far it is unclear how many such structures exist and how to construct them. Here, we show that almost any undirected random graph is an amplifier of selection for Birth-death updating, where an individual is selected to reproduce with probability proportional to its fitness and one of its neighbors is replaced by that offspring at random. If we instead focus on death-Birth updating, in which a random individual is removed and its neighbors compete for the empty spot, then the same ensemble of graphs consists of almost only suppressors of selection for which the fixation probability is decreased for advantageous mutants and increased for disadvantageous mutants. Thus, the impact of population structure on evolutionary dynamics is a subtle issue that will depend on seemingly minor details of the underlying evolutionary process.

Evolutionary dynamics describes the spread of individuals with different features within a population. This spreading process can be strongly influenced by the population structure—if a highly successful individual can only displace a few neighbors, it may take more time to spread than an individual that can displace all other individuals from the population. In particular, a population structure can also amplify the evolutionary success of a type. We show that almost all random population structures lead to such an amplification. However, if we change a presumably minor detail of the evolutionary model, almost all random population structures have the opposite effect and suppress the evolutionary success of a type. Thus, it is crucial to consider the underlying assumptions of such models when discussing their possible implications for real biological systems.

Evolutionary graph theory revisited: when is an evolutionary process equivalent to the Moran process?

Evolution in finite populations is often modelled using the classical Moran process. Over the last 10 years, this methodology has been extended to structured populations using evolutionary graph theory. An important question in any such population is whether a rare mutant has a higher or lower chance of fixating (the fixation probability) than the Moran probability, i.e. that from the original Moran model, which represents an unstructured population. As evolutionary graph theory has developed, different ways of considering the interactions between individuals through a graph and an associated matrix of weights have been considered, as have a number of important dynamics. In this paper, we revisit the original paper on evolutionary graph theory in light of these extensions to consider these developments in an integrated way. In particular, we find general criteria for when an evolutionary graph with general weights satisfies the Moran probability for the set of six common evolutionary dynamics.

Evolution of Cooperation on Spatial Network with Limited Resource

Considering the external resource offered by environment is limited, here, we will explore the cooperation on spatial networks with limited resource. The individual distributes the limited resource according to the payoffs acquired in games, and one with resource amounts is lower than critical survival resource level will be replaced by the offspring of its neighbors. We find that, for larger temptation to defect, the number of the dead decreases with the resource amount. However the cooperation behavior is interesting, the lower total resource and intermediate temptation to defect can greatly promote the cooperation on square lattice. Our result reveals that the limited resource contributes most to the cooperation.

Fixation probabilities on superstars, revisited and revised

Population structures can be crucial determinants of evolutionary processes. For the Moran process on graphs certain structures suppress selective pressure, while others amplify it (Lieberman et al., 2005). Evolutionary amplifiers suppress random drift and enhance selection. Recently, some results for the most powerful known evolutionary amplifier, the superstar, have been invalidated by a counter example (Díaz et al., 2013). Here we correct the original proof and derive improved upper and lower bounds, which indicate that the fixation probability remains close to 1-1/(r(4)H) for population size N→∞ and structural parameter H⪢1. This correction resolves the differences between the two aforementioned papers. We also confirm that in the limit N,H→∞ superstars remain capable of eliminating random drift and hence of providing arbitrarily strong selective advantages to any beneficial mutation. In addition, we investigate the robustness of amplification in superstars and find that it appears to be a fragile phenomenon with respect to changes in the selection or mutation processes.

Socioecological regime shifts in the setting of complex social interactions

The coupling between social and ecological system has become more ubiquitous and predominant in the current era. The strong interaction between these systems can bring about regime shifts which in the extreme can lead to the collapse of social cooperation and the extinction of ecological resources. In this paper, we study the occurrence of such regime shifts in the context of a coupled social-ecological system where social cooperation is established by means of sanction that punishes local selfish act and promotes norms that prescribe nonexcessive resource extraction. In particular, we investigate the role of social networks on social-ecological regimes shift and the corresponding hysteresis effects caused by the local ostracism mechanism under different social and ecological parameters. Our results show that a lowering of network degree reduces the hysteresis effect and also alters the tipping point, which is duly verified by our numerical results and analytical estimation. Interestingly, the hysteresis effect is found to be stronger in scale-free network in comparison with random network even when both networks have the same average degree. These results provide deeper insights into the resilience of these systems, and can have important implications on the management of coupled social-ecological systems with complex social interactions.

The duality of spatial death-birth and birth-death processes and limitations of the isothermal theorem

Evolutionary models on graphs, as an extension of the Moran process, have two major implementations: birth-death (BD) models (or the invasion process) and death-birth (DB) models (or voter models). The isothermal theorem states that the fixation probability of mutants in a large group of graph structures (known as isothermal graphs, which include regular graphs) coincides with that for the mixed population. This result has been proved by Lieberman et al. (2005 Nature 433, 312-316. (doi:10.1038/nature03204)) in the case of BD processes, where mutants differ from the wild-types by their birth rate (and not by their death rate). In this paper, we discuss to what extent the isothermal theorem can be formulated for DB processes, proving that it only holds for mutants that differ from the wild-type by their death rate (and not by their birth rate). For more general BD and DB processes with arbitrary birth and death rates of mutants, we show that the fixation probabilities of mutants are different from those obtained in the mass-action populations. We focus on spatial lattices and show that the difference between BD and DB processes on one- and two-dimensional lattices is non-small even for large population sizes. We support these results with a generating function approach that can be generalized to arbitrary graph structures. Finally, we discuss several biological applications of the results.

Lévy flights and cooperation among mobile individuals

Mobility is a general feature of human and animal populations living in physical space. In particular, it has been observed that often these movements are of the Lévy flight type. In this paper we study the effect of such power-law distributed displacements on the evolution of cooperation in simple games played on diluted two-dimensional grids. Using numerical simulations, our results show that unconditional Lévy flights do not favor the evolution of cooperation. However, when Lévy jumps are performed as a reaction to a growing number of defectors in an individual׳s neighborhood, all games studied here, including the harder Prisoner׳s Dilemma, remarkably benefit from this simple heuristics and cooperation can evolve in the population.

Environmental evolutionary graph theory

Understanding the influence of an environment on the evolution of its resident population is a major challenge in evolutionary biology. Great progress has been made in homogeneous population structures while heterogeneous structures have received relatively less attention. Here we present a structured population model where different individuals are best suited to different regions of their environment. The underlying structure is a graph: individuals occupy vertices, which are connected by edges. If an individual is suited for their vertex, they receive an increase in fecundity. This framework allows attention to be restricted to the spatial arrangement of suitable habitat. We prove some basic properties of this model and find some counter-intuitive results. Notably, (1) the arrangement of suitable sites is as important as their proportion, and (2) decreasing the proportion of suitable sites may result in a decrease in the fixation time of an allele.

Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with heterogenous structures

Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections between individuals are more conducive to the spread of cooperative behaviours. In this article we show that such a conclusion largely depends on the individual-level interactions that take place. In particular, averaging payoffs garnered through game interactions rather than accumulating the payoffs can altogether remove the cooperative advantage of heterogeneous graphs while such a difference does not affect the outcome on homogeneous structures. In addition, the rate at which game interactions occur can alter the evolutionary outcome. Less interactions allow heterogeneous graphs to support more cooperation than homogeneous graphs, while higher rates of interactions make homogeneous and heterogeneous graphs virtually indistinguishable in their ability to support cooperation. Most importantly, we show that common measures of evolutionary advantage used in homogeneous populations, such as a comparison of the fixation probability of a rare mutant to that of the resident type, are no longer valid in heterogeneous populations. Heterogeneity causes a bias in where mutations occur in the population which affects the mutant's fixation probability. We derive the appropriate measures for heterogeneous populations that account for this bias.

Understanding the evolution of cooperation is a persistent challenge to evolutionary theorists. A contemporary take on this subject is to model populations with interactions structured as close as possible to actual social networks. These networks are heterogeneous in the number and type of contact each member has. Our paper demonstrates that the fate of cooperation in such heterogeneous populations critically depends on the rate at which interactions occur and how interactions translate into the fitnesses of the strategies. We also develop theory that allows for an evolutionary analysis in heterogeneous populations. This includes deriving appropriate criteria for evolutionary advantage.