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Larsen BB, McMahon T, Brown JT, Wang Z, Radford CE, Crowe JE, Veesler D, Bloom JD. Functional and antigenic landscape of the Nipah virus receptor binding protein. BIORXIV : THE PREPRINT SERVER FOR BIOLOGY 2024:2024.04.17.589977. [PMID: 38659959 PMCID: PMC11042328 DOI: 10.1101/2024.04.17.589977] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
Nipah virus recurrently spills over to humans, causing fatal infections. The viral receptor-binding protein (RBP or G) attaches to host receptors and is a major target of neutralizing antibodies. Here we use deep mutational scanning to measure how all amino-acid mutations to the RBP affect cell entry, receptor binding, and escape from neutralizing antibodies. We identify functionally constrained regions of the RBP, including sites involved in oligomerization, along with mutations that differentially modulate RBP binding to its two ephrin receptors. We map escape mutations for six anti-RBP antibodies, and find that few antigenic mutations are present in natural Nipah strains. Our findings offer insights into the potential for functional and antigenic evolution of the RBP that can inform the development of antibody therapies and vaccines.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brendan B. Larsen
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutch Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
| | - Teagan McMahon
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutch Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
| | - Jack T. Brown
- Department of Biochemistry, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
| | - Zhaoqian Wang
- Department of Biochemistry, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
| | - Caelan E. Radford
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutch Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
| | - James E. Crowe
- Department of Pathology Microbiology and Immunology, The Vanderbilt Vaccine Center, Department of Pediatrics, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, TN 37232, USA
| | - David Veesler
- Department of Biochemistry, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
- Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
| | - Jesse D. Bloom
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutch Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
- Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
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2
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Carr CR, Crawford KHD, Murphy M, Galloway JG, Haddox HK, Matsen FA, Andersen KG, King NP, Bloom JD. Deep mutational scanning reveals functional constraints and antigenic variability of Lassa virus glycoprotein complex. BIORXIV : THE PREPRINT SERVER FOR BIOLOGY 2024:2024.02.05.579020. [PMID: 38370709 PMCID: PMC10871245 DOI: 10.1101/2024.02.05.579020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/20/2024]
Abstract
Lassa virus is estimated to cause thousands of human deaths per year, primarily due to spillovers from its natural host, Mastomys rodents. Efforts to create vaccines and antibody therapeutics must account for the evolutionary variability of Lassa virus's glycoprotein complex (GPC), which mediates viral entry into cells and is the target of neutralizing antibodies. To map the evolutionary space accessible to GPC, we use pseudovirus deep mutational scanning to measure how nearly all GPC amino-acid mutations affect cell entry and antibody neutralization. Our experiments define functional constraints throughout GPC. We quantify how GPC mutations affect neutralization by a panel of monoclonal antibodies and show that all antibodies are escaped by mutations that exist among natural Lassa virus lineages. Overall, our work describes a biosafety-level-2 method to elucidate the mutational space accessible to GPC and shows how prospective characterization of antigenic variation could aid design of therapeutics and vaccines.
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Affiliation(s)
- Caleb R. Carr
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
- Department of Genome Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
- Medical Scientist Training Program, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
| | - Katharine H. D. Crawford
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
- Department of Genome Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
- Medical Scientist Training Program, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
| | - Michael Murphy
- Department of Biochemistry, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
- Institute for Protein Design, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
| | - Jared G. Galloway
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
| | - Hugh K. Haddox
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
| | - Frederick A. Matsen
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
- Department of Statistics, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
- Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
| | - Kristian G. Andersen
- Department of Immunology and Microbiology, The Scripps Research Institute, La Jolla, CA 92037, USA
- Scripps Research Translational Institute, La Jolla, CA 92037, USA
| | - Neil P. King
- Department of Biochemistry, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
- Institute for Protein Design, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
| | - Jesse D. Bloom
- Basic Sciences Division and Computational Biology Program, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
- Department of Genome Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
- Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Seattle, WA 98109, USA
- Lead contact
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3
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Hoffmann SA, Diggans J, Densmore D, Dai J, Knight T, Leproust E, Boeke JD, Wheeler N, Cai Y. Safety by design: Biosafety and biosecurity in the age of synthetic genomics. iScience 2023; 26:106165. [PMID: 36895643 PMCID: PMC9988571 DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2023.106165] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Technologies to profoundly engineer biology are becoming increasingly affordable, powerful, and accessible to a widening group of actors. While offering tremendous potential to fuel biological research and the bioeconomy, this development also increases the risk of inadvertent or deliberate creation and dissemination of pathogens. Effective regulatory and technological frameworks need to be developed and deployed to manage these emerging biosafety and biosecurity risks. Here, we review digital and biological approaches of a range of technology readiness levels suited to address these challenges. Digital sequence screening technologies already are used to control access to synthetic DNA of concern. We examine the current state of the art of sequence screening, challenges and future directions, and environmental surveillance for the presence of engineered organisms. As biosafety layer on the organism level, we discuss genetic biocontainment systems that can be used to created host organisms with an intrinsic barrier against unchecked environmental proliferation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stefan A Hoffmann
- Manchester Institute of Biotechnology, University of Manchester, 131 Princess Street, Manchester M1 7DN, UK
| | - James Diggans
- Twist Bioscience, 681 Gateway Boulevard, South San Francisco, CA 9408, USA
| | - Douglas Densmore
- Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Boston University, 610 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215, USA
| | - Junbiao Dai
- CAS Key Laboratory of Quantitative Engineering Biology, Guangdong Provincial Key Laboratory of Synthetic Genomics and Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Synthetic Genomics, Shenzhen Institute of Synthetic Biology, Shenzhen Institute of Advanced Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shenzhen, China
| | - Tom Knight
- Ginkgo Bioworks, 27 Drydock Avenue, Boston, MA 02210, USA
| | - Emily Leproust
- Twist Bioscience, 681 Gateway Boulevard, South San Francisco, CA 9408, USA
| | - Jef D Boeke
- Institute for Systems Genetics, and Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Pharmacology, NYU Langone Health, 435 East 30th Street, New York, NY 10016, USA.,Department of Biomedical Engineering, NYU Tandon School of Engineering, Brooklyn, NY 11201, USA
| | - Nicole Wheeler
- Institute of Microbiology and Infection, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
| | - Yizhi Cai
- Manchester Institute of Biotechnology, University of Manchester, 131 Princess Street, Manchester M1 7DN, UK
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4
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Abstract
The risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research is increasing as biotechnology advances. As open science becomes widespread, we must consider its impact on those risks and develop solutions that ensure security while facilitating scientific progress. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. Increasing the availability of computational tools, datasets, and protocols could increase risks from research with misuse potential. For instance, in the context of viral engineering, open code, data, and materials may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. While preprints accelerate dissemination of findings, their increased use could challenge strategies for risk mitigation at the publication stage. This highlights the importance of oversight earlier in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.
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Affiliation(s)
- James Andrew Smith
- Botnar Research Centre and Centre for Statistics in Medicine, Nuffield Department of Orthopaedics, Rheumatology and Musculoskeletal Sciences, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- National Institute for Health Research Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Jonas B. Sandbrink
- Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
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Velardo F, Prudhomme J, Temime L, Jean K. [Dual-use research on modified pathogens in the laboratory: What framework for what issue?]. Med Sci (Paris) 2022; 38:303-308. [PMID: 35333169 DOI: 10.1051/medsci/2022026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Technological advances in synthetic biology have made in vitro modification, or even creation, of viruses easier and more affordable. Several research studies using synthesis of potential pandemic pathogens led to controversies in the 2010's. More recently, the hypothesis that Covid-19 pandemics could originate from a lab escape is still under debate. In France, a legislative vacuum remains concerning the synthesis of modified pathogens. Initiating a collective reflection process towards setting of a legal framework on this type of work is timely so that research continues to provide profit to society rather than hazard.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fanny Velardo
- École Pasteur, Conservatoire national des Arts et Métiers (Cnam) de Santé publique, 292 rue Saint-Martin, 75141 Paris Cedex 03, France
| | - Julie Prudhomme
- École Pasteur, Conservatoire national des Arts et Métiers (Cnam) de Santé publique, 292 rue Saint-Martin, 75141 Paris Cedex 03, France
| | - Laura Temime
- Laboratoire MESuRS, Conservatoire national des Arts et Métiers (Cnam), Paris, France
| | - Kévin Jean
- Laboratoire MESuRS, Conservatoire national des Arts et Métiers (Cnam), Paris, France
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6
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Nathan C, Hyams K. Global policymakers and catastrophic risk. POLICY SCIENCES 2021; 55:3-21. [PMID: 34873348 PMCID: PMC8637034 DOI: 10.1007/s11077-021-09444-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/15/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
There is a rapidly developing literature on risks that threaten the whole of humanity, or a large part of it. Discussion is increasingly turning to how such risks can be governed. This paper arises from a study of those involved the governance of risks from emerging technologies, examining the perceptions of global catastrophic risk within the relevant global policymaking community. Those who took part were either civil servants working for the UK government, U.S. Congress, the United Nations, and the European Commission, or cognate members of civil society groups and the private sector. Analysis of interviews identified four major themes: Scepticism; Realism; Influence; and Governance outside of Government. These themes provide evidence for the value of conceptualising the governance of global catastrophic risk as a unified challenge. Furthermore, they highlight the range of agents involved in governance of emerging technology and give reason to value reforms carried out sub-nationally.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Keith Hyams
- Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, England, UK
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Musunuri S, Sandbrink JB, Monrad JT, Palmer MJ, Koblentz GD. Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks. mBio 2021; 12:e0186421. [PMID: 34663091 PMCID: PMC8524337 DOI: 10.1128/mbio.01864-21] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/18/2022] Open
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world's vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Jonas B. Sandbrink
- Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- Medical Sciences Division, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Joshua Teperowski Monrad
- Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom
- Department of Health Policy, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom
| | - Megan J. Palmer
- Department of Bioengineering, Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
- Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
| | - Gregory D. Koblentz
- Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA
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Genetic Engineering and Synthetic Genomics in Yeast to Understand Life and Boost Biotechnology. Bioengineering (Basel) 2020; 7:bioengineering7040137. [PMID: 33138080 PMCID: PMC7711850 DOI: 10.3390/bioengineering7040137] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/07/2020] [Revised: 10/26/2020] [Accepted: 10/28/2020] [Indexed: 02/07/2023] Open
Abstract
The field of genetic engineering was born in 1973 with the “construction of biologically functional bacterial plasmids in vitro”. Since then, a vast number of technologies have been developed allowing large-scale reading and writing of DNA, as well as tools for complex modifications and alterations of the genetic code. Natural genomes can be seen as software version 1.0; synthetic genomics aims to rewrite this software with “build to understand” and “build to apply” philosophies. One of the predominant model organisms is the baker’s yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae. Its importance ranges from ancient biotechnologies such as baking and brewing, to high-end valuable compound synthesis on industrial scales. This tiny sugar fungus contributed greatly to enabling humankind to reach its current development status. This review discusses recent developments in the field of genetic engineering for budding yeast S. cerevisiae, and its application in biotechnology. The article highlights advances from Sc1.0 to the developments in synthetic genomics paving the way towards Sc2.0. With the synthetic genome of Sc2.0 nearing completion, the article also aims to propose perspectives for potential Sc3.0 and subsequent versions as well as its implications for basic and applied research.
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Millett P, Rutten P. COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, and Export Controls. Health Secur 2020; 18:329-334. [PMID: 32816590 PMCID: PMC7482123 DOI: 10.1089/hs.2020.0048] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Export controls are intended to prevent the proliferation of materials that could be misused to make biological weapons. They are not intended to stifle critical research and development in the midst of a pandemic. This article explores how and why export controls might apply to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019. It outlines the taxonomic and genetic factors associated with the current approach to export control lists and discusses how they lead to unnecessary ambiguity. The authors describe ways in which the current export control systems might be revised in the short, medium, and long term, including sequence, disease, and function-based approaches.
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Affiliation(s)
- Piers Millett
- Piers Millett, PhD, is Vice President for Safety and Security, iGEM Foundation, Boston, MA; and a Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. Paul Rutten, MRes, is a PhD Student, Department of Plant Sciences, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
| | - Paul Rutten
- Piers Millett, PhD, is Vice President for Safety and Security, iGEM Foundation, Boston, MA; and a Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. Paul Rutten, MRes, is a PhD Student, Department of Plant Sciences, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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10
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Sandberg A, Nelson C. Who Should We Fear More: Biohackers, Disgruntled Postdocs, or Bad Governments? A Simple Risk Chain Model of Biorisk. Health Secur 2020; 18:155-163. [PMID: 32522112 DOI: 10.1089/hs.2019.0115] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The biological risk landscape continues to evolve as developments in synthetic biology and biotechnology offer increasingly powerful tools to a widening pool of actors, including those who may consider carrying out a deliberate biological attack. However, it remains unclear whether it is the relatively large numbers of low-resourced actors or the small handful of high-powered actors who pose a greater biosecurity risk. To answer this question, this paper introduces a simple risk chain model of biorisk, from actor intent to a biological event, where the actor can successfully pass through each of N steps. Assuming that actor success probability at each independent step is sigmoidally distributed and actor power follows a power-law distribution, if a biorisk event were to occur, this model shows that the expected perpetrator would likely be highly powered, despite lower-powered actors being far more numerous. However, as the number of necessary steps leading to a biological release scenario decreases, lower-powered actors can quickly overtake more powerful actors as the likely source of a given event. If steps in the risk chain are of unequal difficulty, this model shows that actors are primarily limited by the most difficult step. These results have implications for biosecurity risk assessment and health security strengthening initiatives and highlight the need to consider actor power and ensure that the steps leading to a biorisk event are sufficiently difficult and not easily bypassed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anders Sandberg
- Anders Sandberg, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow; Cassidy Nelson, MBBS, MPH, is a Research Scholar; both are at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
| | - Cassidy Nelson
- Anders Sandberg, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow; Cassidy Nelson, MBBS, MPH, is a Research Scholar; both are at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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11
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Diggans J, Leproust E. Next Steps for Access to Safe, Secure DNA Synthesis. Front Bioeng Biotechnol 2019; 7:86. [PMID: 31069221 PMCID: PMC6491669 DOI: 10.3389/fbioe.2019.00086] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2019] [Accepted: 04/08/2019] [Indexed: 01/19/2023] Open
Abstract
The DNA synthesis industry has, since the invention of gene-length synthesis, worked proactively to ensure synthesis is carried out securely and safely. Informed by guidance from the U.S. government, several of these companies have collaborated over the last decade to produce a set of best practices for customer and sequence screening prior to manufacture. Taken together, these practices ensure that synthetic DNA is used to advance research that is designed and intended for public benefit. With increasing scale in the industry and expanding capability in the synthetic biology toolset, it is worth revisiting current practices to evaluate additional measures to ensure the continued safety and wide availability of DNA synthesis. Here we encourage specific steps, in part derived from successes in the cybersecurity community, that can ensure synthesis screening systems stay well ahead of emerging challenges, to continue to enable responsible research advances. Gene synthesis companies, science and technology funders, policymakers, and the scientific community as a whole have a shared duty to continue to minimize risk and maximize the safety and security of DNA synthesis to further power world-changing developments in advanced biological manufacturing, agriculture, drug development, healthcare, and energy.
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Affiliation(s)
- James Diggans
- Twist Bioscience Corporation, San Francisco, CA, United States
| | - Emily Leproust
- Twist Bioscience Corporation, San Francisco, CA, United States
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