The primary process and the unconscious: experimental evidence supporting two psychoanalytic presuppositions

Running away from phonological ambiguity, we stumble upon our words: Laboratory induced slips show differences between highly and lowly defensive people

Introduction

Freud proposed that slips of the tongue, including apparently simple ones, always have a sense and constitute « a half-success and a half-failure » compromise resulting from defensive mechanisms.

Material and methods

A total of 55 subjects participated in a French adaptation of the Spoonerisms of Laboratory Induced Predisposition or SLIP-technique including 32 “neutral” and 32 taboo spoonerisms and measures of defensiveness. In accordance with a psychoanalytical and empirically supported distinction, we considered two kinds of defenses: elaborative or primary process and inhibitory or secondary process defenses, which were operationalized with the GeoCat and the Phonological-Nothing (PN) WordList, respectively. The GeoCat is a validated measure of primary process mentation and the PN WordList was shown to measure the defensive avoidance of language ambiguity.

Results

Participants produced 37 slips, with no significant difference in the number of “neutral” and taboo slips. The GeoCat and the N/PN parameters explained 30% of the variance in the production of parapraxes, confirming the defensive logics of slips. When dividing the population into lowly and highly defensive participants (with the Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability scale), primary process mentation appears as a baseline default defense, but only highly defensive participants mobilize an additional inhibitory secondary process type of defense. Taking into account the a priori difference between taboo and “neutral” parapraxes, highly defensive participants made 2.7 times more taboo parapraxes than lowly defensive participants. However, if “neutral” parapraxes in both subgroups followed the same logic as the total group of parapraxes (significant contribution of primary process mentation in lowly defensives and of primary and secondary process mentation in highly defensives), these measures had no contribution to explain the occurrence of taboo parapraxes.

Conclusion

We propose that Motley et al.’s prearticulatory editor, ensuring the censorship over taboo parapraxes, is an external instance of inhibition, proximal to uttering, equivalent to the censorship between the systems Preconscious and Conscious in Freud’s metapsychology. By contrast, the defenses measured in this research are internal, intimate control systems, probing for the censorship between the systems Unconscious and Preconscious, this is, for repression. This study contributes to support a psychodynamic explanatory model for the production of parapraxes.

Processing of a Subliminal Rebus during Sleep: Idiosyncratic Primary versus Secondary Process Associations upon Awakening from REM- versus Non-REM-Sleep

Primary and secondary processes are the foundational axes of the Freudian mental apparatus: one horizontally as a tendency to associate, the primary process, and one vertically as the ability for perspective taking, the secondary process. Primary process mentation is not only supposed to be dominant in the unconscious but also, for example, in dreams. The present study tests the hypothesis that the mental activity during REM-sleep has more characteristics of the primary process, while during non-REM-sleep more secondary process operations take place. Because the solving of a rebus requires the ability to non-contexually condensate the literal reading of single stimuli into a new one, rebus solving is a primary process operation by excellence. In a replication of the dream-rebus study of Shevrin and Fisher (1967), a rebus, which consisted of an image of a comb (German: "Kamm") and an image of a raft (German: "Floß"), resulting in the German rebus word "kampflos" (Engl.: without a struggle), was flashed subliminally (at 1 ms) to 20 participants before going to sleep. Upon consecutive awakenings participants were asked for a dream report, free associations and an image description. Based on objective association norms, there were significantly more conceptual associations referring to Kamm and Floß indexing secondary process mentation when subjects were awakened from non-REM sleep as compared to REM-awakenings. There were not significantly more rebus associations referring to kampflos indexing primary process mentation when awakened from REM-sleep as compared to non-REM awakenings. However, when the associations were scored on the basis of each subject's individual norms, there was a rebus effect with more idiosyncratic rebus associations in awakenings after REM than after non-REM-sleep. Our results support the general idea that REM-sleep is characterized by primary process thinking, while non-REM-sleep mentation follows the rules of the secondary process.

LSD Increases Primary Process Thinking via Serotonin 2A Receptor Activation

Rationale: Stimulation of serotonin 2A (5-HT2A) receptors by lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and related compounds such as psilocybin has previously been shown to increase primary process thinking - an ontologically and evolutionary early, implicit, associative, and automatic mode of thinking which is typically occurring during altered states of consciousness such as dreaming. However, it is still largely unknown whether LSD induces primary process thinking under placebo-controlled, standardized experimental conditions and whether these effects are related to subjective experience and 5-HT2A receptor activation. Therefore, this study aimed to test the hypotheses that LSD increases primary process thinking and that primary process thinking depends on 5-HT2A receptor activation and is related to subjective drug effects. Methods: Twenty-five healthy subjects performed an audio-recorded mental imagery task 7 h after drug administration during three drug conditions: placebo, LSD (100 mcg orally) and LSD together with the 5-HT2A receptor antagonist ketanserin (40 mg orally). The main outcome variable in this study was primary index (PI), a formal measure of primary process thinking in the imagery reports. State of consciousness was evaluated using the Altered State of Consciousness (5D-ASC) rating scale. Results: LSD, compared with placebo, significantly increased primary index (p < 0.001, Bonferroni-corrected). The LSD-induced increase in primary index was positively correlated with LSD-induced disembodiment (p < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected), and blissful state (p < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected) on the 5D-ASC. Both LSD-induced increases in primary index and changes in state of consciousness were fully blocked by ketanserin. Conclusion: LSD induces primary process thinking via activation of 5-HT2A receptors and in relation to disembodiment and blissful state. Primary process thinking appears to crucially organize inner experiences during both dreams and psychedelic states of consciousness.

Is Primary-Process Cognition a Feature of Hypnosis?

The division of cognition into primary and secondary processes is an important part of contemporary psychoanalytic metapsychology. Whereas primary processes are most characteristic of unconscious thought and loose associations, secondary processes generally govern conscious thought and logical reasoning. It has been theorized that an induction into hypnosis is accompanied by a predomination of primary-process cognition over secondary-process cognition. The authors hypothesized that highly hypnotizable individuals would demonstrate more primary-process cognition as measured by a recently developed cognitive-perceptual task. This hypothesis was not supported. In fact, low hypnotizable participants demonstrated higher levels of primary-process cognition. Exploratory analyses suggested a more specific effect: felt connectedness to the hypnotist seemed to promote secondary-process cognition among low hypnotizable participants.

The Operationalization of the Unconscious

This paper presents a brief review of some formal approaches to the modeling of unconscious phenomena. These models allow for the operationalization of the concept of psychodynamic unconscious towards a possible inclusion in the fields of Cognitive Informatics and Cognitive Computing. In particular this paper presents the conceptualization proposed by Ignacio Matte Blanco of the functioning of conscious and unconscious thinking. In his original view the two ways of thinking are conceived as two distinct logics, “symmetrical” and “asymmetrical” logics. In this study the fundamentals of his concepts are identified and re-elaborated in a more formal way, with the aim of developing an operational and dynamic functional structure that evolves over time and that includes the affective value of objects. On this basis a computational implementation of the conscious–unconscious interaction that employs Learning Classifier Systems (LCS) is put forward.

Subliminal unconscious conflict alpha power inhibits supraliminal conscious symptom experience

Our approach is based on a tri-partite method of integrating psychodynamic hypotheses, cognitive subliminal processes, and psychophysiological alpha power measures. We present ten social phobic subjects with three individually selected groups of words representing unconscious conflict, conscious symptom experience, and Osgood Semantic negative valence words used as a control word group. The unconscious conflict and conscious symptom words, presented subliminally and supraliminally, act as primes preceding the conscious symptom and control words presented as supraliminal targets. With alpha power as a marker of inhibitory brain activity, we show that unconscious conflict primes, only when presented subliminally, have a unique inhibitory effect on conscious symptom targets. This effect is absent when the unconscious conflict primes are presented supraliminally, or when the target is the control words. Unconscious conflict prime effects were found to correlate with a measure of repressiveness in a similar previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). Conscious symptom primes have no inhibitory effect when presented subliminally. Inhibitory effects with conscious symptom primes are present, but only when the primes are supraliminal, and they did not correlate with repressiveness in a previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). We conclude that while the inhibition following supraliminal conscious symptom primes is due to conscious threat bias, the inhibition following subliminal unconscious conflict primes provides a neurological blueprint for dynamic repression: it is only activated subliminally by an individual's unconscious conflict and has an inhibitory effect specific only to the conscious symptom. These novel findings constitute neuroscientific evidence for the psychoanalytic concepts of unconscious conflict and repression, while extending neuroscience theory and methods into the realm of personal, psychological meaning.

From sensorimotor inhibition to freudian repression: insights from psychosis applied to neurosis

First, three case studies are presented of psychotic patients having in common an inability to hold something down or out. In line with other theories on psychosis, we propose that a key change is at the efference copy system. Going back to Freud's mental apparatus, we propose that the messages of discharge of the motor neurons, mobilized to direct perception, also called "indications of reality," are equivalent to the modern efference copies. With this key, the reading of the cases is coherent with the psychodynamic understanding of psychosis, being a downplay of secondary processes, and consequently, a dominance of primary processes. Moreover, putting together the sensorimotor idea of a failure of efference copy-mediated inhibition with the psychoanalytic idea of a failing repression in psychosis, the hypothesis emerges that the attenuation enabled by the efference copy dynamics is, in some instances, the physiological instantiation of repression. Second, we applied this idea to the mental organization in neurosis. Indeed, the efference copy-mediated attenuation is thought to be the mechanism through which sustained activation of an intention, without reaching it - i.e., inhibition of an action - gives rise to mental imagery. Therefore, as inhibition is needed for any targeted action or for normal language understanding, acting in the world, or processing language, structurally induces mental imagery, constituting a subjective unconscious mental reality. Repression is a special instance of inhibition for emotionally threatening stimuli. These stimuli require stronger inhibition, leaving (the attenuation of) the motor intentions totally unanswered, in order to radically prevent execution which would lead to development of excess affect. This inhibition, then, yields a specific type of motor imagery, called "phantoms," which induce mental preoccupation, as well as symptoms which, especially through their form, refer to the repressed motor fragments.

Unconscious fantasy: a once and future concept

The concept of unconscious fantasy should be retained as fundamental to any psychoanalytic approach. The concept is reexamined in the face of two challenges: today's theoretical pluralism and the recent integration of findings from academic research. The first section reviews post-Freudian theoretical contributions to Freud's original concept, concluding that in its evolved form it is flexible enough to serve multiple perspectives. The second section examines four features identified with primary process thinking, demonstrating that a model of early mentation based on adult dream work cannot be supported by research on early development. However, the contemporary concept of unconscious fantasy is compatible with research findings from child development studies and cognitive neuroscience, permitting psychoanalysts to enter dialogue with those fields. Our contribution is not the posit of a new form of thinking (primary process) but an understanding of how general cognitive processes are enlisted for motivated purposes.

The anatomy of a symptom: concept development and symptom formation in a four-year-old boy

The case of a four-year-old boy with a postural symptom that resolved rapidly in the course of play therapy is presented. Various unconscious fantasies appeared to underlie the symptom. In particular, this case illustrates a young child's sophisticated capacity to abstract a complex relational feature from a set of unconscious fantasies that then became the basis of his symptom. The structure of the boy's symptom is relevant to (1) the question of what constitutes a symptom, (2) the relationship between concept development and symptom formation, and (3) the status of certain primary process mechanisms as they relate to concept development. Proposals are presented to help situate the contributions of psychoanalytic theory with respect to the domain of cognitive psychology, and to illustrate the unique contributions of each domain toward their mutual enrichment.

Finding Freud: a personal tribute on the 150th Anniversary of Sigmund Freud's birthday

OBJECTIVE

To briefly describe my own development from medical student, through junior resident and psychiatry registrar and finally qualified psychiatrist, to feeling the need to undertake psychoanalytic training in order to grapple with the complexities of treatment of personality disorders.

CONCLUSIONS

My encounter with the concepts developed by the Viennese physician, Sigmund Freud, as represented by a number of significant teachers and clinicians was a formative experience in my early career. My subsequent development as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst was highly influenced by the understandings of human mental development and function set in train by Freud's clinical findings and ground-breaking thinking in the early 20th century. It is hoped that registrars-in-training and young psychiatrists may be particularly interested in how things 'once were' in NSW Mental Health Services which permitted this course of development.

Anxiety, attributional thinking,and the primary process

In earlier publications, experimental evidence was provided for the existence of the primary vs. secondary process mental organization posited by Freud. A well-established cognitive categorization test based on attributional and relational similarity was found to map on to primary and secondary principles of mental organization respectively, thus offering the opportunity to test hypotheses drawn from psychoanalytic theory independent of the clinical situation. In prior work, primary process shifts occurred under three different conditions--all predicted by psychoanalytic theory: (1) when stimuli were (subliminal) unconscious; (2) when participants were 3-5 years of age; and (3) when tasks were implicit. In the current study, a fourth condition is examined dealing with the relationship of conscious anxiety to primary and secondary processes. In a naturalistic study, 120 patients waiting in medical center waiting rooms rated how anxious they felt on a 10-point scale and then completed a version of the categorization test alluded to above. Those who reported any anxiety at all showed a significant shift toward primary process categorization over those participants who rated themselves as calm. The implications of this fourth finding are discussed with respect to signal anxiety and symptom formation.

The psychoanalytic assumption of the primary process: extrapsychoanalytic evidence and findings

No evidence for an assumption of a theory can be gained by data derived from methods dependent on that theory. Three experiments, using methods independent of psychoanalysis, test the psychoanalytic posit that primary process exists as a formal mental mode distinct from secondary process. The three experiments, using a nonpsychoanalytic index for primary process, test for a preponderance of primary process organization in three areas in which Freud observed primary process: (1) in unconscious mental states and during implicit tasks; (2) in the mental productions of preschool children; and (3) in anxiety states, as these are typically associated with unconscious conflict. All three experiments show significant results in favor of the primary process. Further, the three experiments taken together, because they account for seemingly disparate data, lend further credence to the original assumption. These positive results suggest that primary process may be more important than even Freud suspected. Perhaps it is the basic mental organization in many nonhuman mammals and some birds. Primary process organization may also underlie aspects of such basic psychological operations as generalizations in conditioning and assessments-in-action, as opposed to judgments proper, about how one would act. Finally, primary process may play a key role in drive activity. Three types of experiments are proposed to test these far-reaching applications of the primary process concept.

The social character of thinking

What Freud called "the reality principle," or judgment, presumes on the part of the child who has arrived at judgment the implicit grasp of a complex of concepts: truth and falsity, belief, subjective and objective, the objectively real, my perspective and yours. Work in both philosophy and infant research points to the essential importance in the development of judgment of a triangulating situation that involves particular sorts of communications between two creatures and an external object that interests them both. In this light Bion's theory of thinking is critically examined and the meaning of primary process and fantasy is discussed.

The priority of primary process categorizing: experimental evidence supporting a psychoanalytic developmental hypothesis

Earlier work has provided experimental evidence for the existence of the primary and secondary process mental organization posited by Freud and has demonstrated that primary process effects are the more active unconsciously (Brakel et al. 2000). Primary and secondary processes were assessed by a categorization test in which qualitatively different principles could be used. In new experiments using the same stimuli, another significant implication of Freud's model was tested: that primary process mental organization has developmental priority. In these experiments, which studied 559 participants ranging in age from 3 to 80, it was found (1) that primary process mentation predominates in preschoolers; (2) that it is not until around age 7 that primary process organization is supplanted by secondary process organization; and (3) that after age 7 the predominance of secondary process organization remains remarkably stable throughout the life span.