Salience-Driven Value Construction for Adaptive Choice under Risk

Functional brain network properties correlate with individual risk tolerance in young adults

Background

Individuals differ substantially in their degree of acceptance of risks, referred to as risk tolerance, and these differences are associated with real-life outcomes such as risky health-related behaviors. While previous studies have identified brain regions that are functionally associated with individual risk tolerance, little is known about the relationship between individual risk tolerance and whole-brain functional organization.

Methods

This study investigated whether the topological properties of individual functional brain networks in healthy young adults (n = 67) are associated with individual risk tolerance using resting-state fMRI data in conjunction with a graph theoretical analysis approach.

Results

The analysis revealed that individual risk tolerance was positively associated with global topological properties, including the normalized clustering coefficient and small-worldness, which represent the degree of information segregation and the balance between information segregation and integration in a network, respectively. Additionally, individuals with higher risk tolerance exhibited greater centrality in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which is associated with the subjective value of the available options.

Conclusion

These results extend our understanding of how individual differences in risk tolerance, especially in young adults, are associated with functional brain organization, particularly regarding the balance between segregation and integration in functional networks, and highlight the important role of the connections between the vmPFC and the rest of the brain in the functional networks in relation to risk tolerance.

Attention biases the process of risky decision-making: Evidence from eye-tracking

Attention determines what kind of option information is processed during risky choices owing to the limitation of visual attention. This paper reviews research on the relationship between higher-complexity risky decision-making and attention as illustrated by eye-tracking to explain the process of risky decision-making by the effect of attention. We demonstrate this process from three stages: the pre-phase guidance of options on attention, the process of attention being biased, and the impact of attention on final risk preference. We conclude that exogenous information can capture attention directly to salient options, thereby altering evidence accumulation. In particular, for multi-attribute risky decision-making, attentional advantages increase the weight of specific attributes, thus biasing risk preference in different directions. We highlight the significance of understanding how people use available information to weigh risks from an information-processing perspective via process data.

Individual risk attitudes arise from noise in neurocognitive magnitude representations

Humans are generally risk averse, preferring smaller certain over larger uncertain outcomes. Economic theories usually explain this by assuming concave utility functions. Here, we provide evidence that risk aversion can also arise from relative underestimation of larger monetary payoffs, a perceptual bias rooted in the noisy logarithmic coding of numerical magnitudes. We confirmed this with psychophysics and functional magnetic resonance imaging, by measuring behavioural and neural acuity of magnitude representations during a magnitude perception task and relating these measures to risk attitudes during separate risky financial decisions. Computational modelling indicated that participants use similar mental magnitude representations in both tasks, with correlated precision across perceptual and risky choices. Participants with more precise magnitude representations in parietal cortex showed less variable behaviour and less risk aversion. Our results highlight that at least some individual characteristics of economic behaviour can reflect capacity limitations in perceptual processing rather than processes that assign subjective values to monetary outcomes.

The composition of the choice set modulates probability weighting in risky decisions

Probability distortion-the tendency to underweight larger probabilities and overweight smaller ones-is a robust empirical phenomenon and an important driver of suboptimal choices. We reveal a novel contextual effect on probability distortion that depends on the composition of the choice set. Probability distortion was larger in a magnitude-diverse choice set (in which participants encountered more unique magnitudes than probabilities) but declined, resulting in more veridical weighting, in a probability-diverse choice set (more unique probabilities than magnitudes). This effect was consistent in two, large, independent datasets (N = 481, N = 100) and held for a subset of lotteries that were identical in the two contexts. It also developed gradually as a function of exposure to the choice set, was independent of attentional biases to probability versus magnitude information, and was specific to probability weighting, leaving risk attitudes unaffected. The results highlight the importance of context when processing probabilistic information.

Risky choice: Probability weighting explains independence axiom violations in monkeys

Expected Utility Theory (EUT) provides axioms for maximizing utility in risky choice. The Independence Axiom (IA) is its most demanding axiom: preferences between two options should not change when altering both options equally by mixing them with a common gamble. We tested common consequence (CC) and common ratio (CR) violations of the IA over several months in thousands of stochastic choices using a large variety of binary option sets. Three monkeys showed consistently few outright Preference Reversals (8%) but substantial graded Preference Changes (46%) between the initial preferred gamble and the corresponding altered gamble. Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) indicated that gamble probabilities predicted most Preference Changes in CC (72%) and CR (88%) tests. The Akaike Information Criterion indicated that probability weighting within Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) explained choices better than models using Expected Value (EV) or EUT. Fitting by utility and probability weighting functions of CPT resulted in nonlinear and non-parallel indifference curves (IC) in the Marschak-Machina triangle and suggested IA non-compliance of models using EV or EUT. Indeed, CPT models predicted Preference Changes better than EV and EUT models. Indifference points in out-of-sample tests were closer to CPT-estimated ICs than EV and EUT ICs. Finally, while the few outright Preference Reversals may reflect the long experience of our monkeys, their more graded Preference Changes corresponded to those reported for humans. In benefitting from the wide testing possibilities in monkeys, our stringent axiomatic tests contribute critical information about risky decision-making and serves as basis for investigating neuronal decision mechanisms.

Supplementary information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11166-022-09388-7.

The repulsion effect in preferential choice and its relation to perceptual choice

People rely on the choice context to guide their decisions, violating fundamental principles of rational choice theory and exhibiting phenomena called context effects. Recent research has uncovered that dominance relationships can both increase or decrease the choice share of the dominating option, marking the two ends of an attraction-repulsion continuum. However, empirical links between the two opposing effects are scarce and theoretical accounts are missing altogether. The present study (N = 55) used eye tracking alongside a within-subject design that contrasts a perceptual task and a preferential-choice analog in order to bridge this gap and uncover the underlying information-search processes. Although individuals differed in their perceptual and preferential choices, they generally engaged in alternative-wise comparisons and a repulsion effect was present in both conditions that became weaker the more predominant the attribute-wise comparisons were. Altogether, our study corroborates the notion that repulsion effects are a robust and general phenomenon that theoretical accounts need to take seriously.

The Intentional Selection Assumption

There exists a rich literature describing how social context influences decision making. Here, we propose a novel framing of social influences, the Intentional Selection Assumption. This framework proposes that, when a person is presented with a set of options by another social agent, people may treat the set of options as intentionally selected, reflecting the chooser's inferences about the presenter and the presenter's goals. To describe our proposal, we draw analogies to the cognition literature on sampling inferences within concept learning. This is done to highlight how the Intentional Selection Assumption accounts for both normative (e.g., comparing perceived utilities) and subjective (e.g., consideration of context relevance) principles in decision making, while also highlighting how analogous findings in the concept learning literature can aid in bridging these principles by drawing attention to the importance of potential sampling assumptions within decision making paradigms. We present the two behavioral experiments that provide support to this proposal and find that social-contextual cues influence choice behavior with respect to the induction of sampling assumptions. We then discuss a theoretical framework of the Intentional Selection Assumption alongside the possibility of its potential relationships to contemporary models of choice. Overall, our results emphasize the flexibility of decision makers with respect to social-contextual factors without sacrificing systematicity regarding the preference for specific options with a higher value or utility.

The assessment of physical risk taking: Preliminary construct validation of a new behavioral measure

Risk taking is a complex heterogeneous construct that has proven difficult to assess, especially when using behavioral tasks. We present an exploratory investigation of new measure–the Assessment of Physical Risk Taking (APRT). APRT produces a variety of different outcome scores and is designed as a comprehensive assessment of the probability of success and failure, and magnitude of reward and punishment of different types of simulated physically risky behaviors. Effects observed on the simulated behaviors are hypothesized to reflect similar effects on real world physical risks. Participants (N = 224) completed APRT in a laboratory setting, half of whom had a 1.5 s delay interposed between button presses. Exploratory analyses utilizing generalized estimating equations examined the main effects and two-way interactions among five within-subject factors, as well as two-way interactions between the within-subject factors and Delay across four APRT outcome scores. Results indicated that Injury Magnitude and Injury Probability exerted stronger effects than any of the other independent variables. Participants also completed several self-report measures of risk taking and associated constructs (e.g., sensation seeking), which were correlated with APRT scores to assess the preliminary convergent and divergent validity of the new measure. After correcting for multiple comparisons, APRT scores correlated with self-reported risk taking in thrilling, physically dangerous activities specifically, but only for those who did not have a delay between APRT responses. This promising exploratory investigation highlights the need for future studies comparing APRT to other behavioral risk taking tasks, examining the robustness of the observed APRT effects, and investigating how APRT may predict real-world physical risk taking.

Order matters: How covert value updating during sequential option sampling shapes economic preference

Standard neuroeconomic decision theory assumes that choice is based on a value comparison process, independent from how information about alternative options is collected. Here, we investigate the opposite intuition that preferences are dynamically shaped as options are sampled, through iterative covert pairwise comparisons. Our model builds on two lines of research, one suggesting that a natural frame of comparison for the brain is between default and alternative options, the other suggesting that comparisons spread preferences between options. We therefore assumed that during sequential option sampling, people would 1) covertly compare every new alternative to the current best and 2) update their values such that the winning (losing) option receives a positive (negative) bonus. We confronted this “covert pairwise comparison” model to models derived from standard decision theory and from known memory effects. Our model provided the best account of human choice behavior in a novel task where participants (n = 92 in total) had to browse through a sequence of items (food, music or movie) of variable length and ultimately select their favorite option. Consistently, the order of option presentation, which was manipulated by design, had a significant influence on the eventual choice: the best option was more likely to be chosen when it came earlier in the sequence, because it won more covert comparisons (hence a greater total bonus). Our study provides a mechanistic understanding of how the option sampling process shapes economic preference, which should be integrated into decision theory.

According to standard views in neuroeconomics, choice is a two-step process, with first the valuation of alternative options and then the comparison of subjective value estimates. Our working hypothesis is, on the contrary, that the comparison process begins during the sequential sampling of alternative options. To capture this idea, we developed a computational model, in which every new alternative is compared with the current best, so as to better contrast their values. This model provided the best account of choice behavior exhibited by participants (n = 92 in total) performing three variants of a novel multi-alternative decision task. Thus, our findings unravel a covert pairwise comparison process, occurring while participants collect information about alternative options, before they are requested to make their choice. They also provide explanations about when this covert process is implemented (when resampling is too costly), why it is implemented (to better discriminate the best options) and how it can bias decisions (because it favors first-encountered valuable options).

Influence of Expected Reward on Temporal Order Judgment

Perceptual decision-making has been shown to be influenced by reward expected from alternative options or actions, but the underlying neural mechanisms are currently unknown. More specifically, it is debated whether reward effects are mediated through changes in sensory processing, later stages of decision-making, or both. To address this question, we conducted two experiments in which human participants made saccades to what they perceived to be either the first or second of two visually identical but asynchronously presented targets while we manipulated expected reward from correct and incorrect responses on each trial. By comparing reward-induced bias in target selection (i.e., reward bias) during the two experiments, we determined whether reward caused changes in sensory or decision-making processes. We found similar reward biases in the two experiments indicating that reward information mainly influenced later stages of decision-making. Moreover, the observed reward biases were independent of the individual's sensitivity to sensory signals. This suggests that reward effects were determined heuristically via modulation of decision-making processes instead of sensory processing. To further explain our findings and uncover plausible neural mechanisms, we simulated our experiments with a cortical network model and tested alternative mechanisms for how reward could exert its influence. We found that our experimental observations are more compatible with reward-dependent input to the output layer of the decision circuit. Together, our results suggest that, during a temporal judgment task, reward exerts its influence via changing later stages of decision-making (i.e., response bias) rather than early sensory processing (i.e., perceptual bias).

Flexible combination of reward information across primates

A fundamental but rarely contested assumption in economics and neuroeconomics is that decision-makers compute subjective values of risky options by multiplying functions of reward probability and magnitude. By contrast, an additive strategy for valuation allows flexible combination of reward information required in uncertain or changing environments. We hypothesized that the level of uncertainty in the reward environment should determine the strategy used for valuation and choice. To test this hypothesis, we examined choice between risky options in humans and rhesus macaques across three tasks with different levels of uncertainty. We found that whereas humans and monkeys adopted a multiplicative strategy under risk when probabilities are known, both species spontaneously adopted an additive strategy under uncertainty when probabilities must be learned. Additionally, the level of volatility influenced relative weighting of certain and uncertain reward information, and this was reflected in the encoding of reward magnitude by neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.

Orbitofrontal signals for two-component choice options comply with indifference curves of Revealed Preference Theory

Economic choice options contain multiple components and constitute vectorial bundles. The question arises how they are represented by single-dimensional, scalar neuronal signals that are suitable for economic decision-making. Revealed Preference Theory provides formalisms for establishing preference relations between such bundles, including convenient graphic indifference curves. During stochastic choice between bundles with the same two juice components, we identified neuronal signals for vectorial, multi-component bundles in the orbitofrontal cortex of monkeys. A scalar signal integrated the values from all bundle components in the structured manner of the Theory; it followed the behavioral indifference curves within their confidence limits, was indistinguishable between differently composed but equally revealed preferred bundles, predicted bundle choice and complied with an optimality axiom. Further, distinct signals in other neurons coded the option components separately but followed indifference curves as a population. These data demonstrate how scalar signals represent vectorial, multi-component choice options.

Combinations of low-level and high-level neural processes account for distinct patterns of context-dependent choice

Context effects have been explained by either low-level neural adjustments or high-level cognitive processes but not their combination. It is currently unclear how these processes interact to shape individuals’ responses to context. Here, we used a large cohort of human subjects in experiments involving choice between two or three gambles in order to study the dependence of context effects on neural adaptation and individuals’ risk attitudes. Our experiments did not provide any evidence that neural adaptation on long timescales (~100 trials) contributes to context effects. Using post-hoc analyses we identified two groups of subjects with distinct patterns of responses to decoys, both of which depended on individuals’ risk aversion. Subjects in the first group exhibited strong, consistent decoy effects and became more risk averse due to decoy presentation. In contrast, subjects in the second group did not show consistent decoy effects and became more risk seeking. The degree of change in risk aversion due to decoy presentation was positively correlated with the original degrees of risk aversion. To explain these results and reveal underlying neural mechanisms, we developed new models incorporating both low- and high-level processes and used these models to fit individuals’ choice behavior. We found that observed distinct patterns of decoy effects can be explained by a combination of adjustments in neural representations and competitive weighting of reward attributes, both of which depend on risk aversion but in opposite directions. Altogether, our results demonstrate how a combination of low- and high-level processes shapes choice behavior in more naturalistic settings, modulates overall risk preference, and explains distinct behavioral phenotypes.

A large body of experimental work has illustrated that the introduction of a new, and often irrelevant, option can influence preference among the existing options, a phenomenon referred to as context or decoy effects. For example, introducing a new option that is worse than one of the two existing options in all its attributes but better than the alternative option in some attributes (and thus should not ever be selected) can increase the preference for the former option. Context effects have been explained by high-level cognitive processes—such as comparisons and competitions between attributes—or low-level adjustments of neural representations. However, it is unclear how these processes interact to shape individuals’ responses to context. Here, we show that both high-level cognitive processes and low-level neural adjustments shift risk preference during choice between multiple risky options but in opposite directions. Moreover, we demonstrate that combinations of these processes can account for distinct patterns of context effects in human subjects.