Test of a cognitive theory of psychophysics: size discrimination

Reconciling Fechner and Stevens: Toward a unified psychophysical law

How does subjective magnitude, S. increase as physical magnitude or intensity, I, increases? Direct ratings (magnitude scales; partition or category scales) can be fitted by the power function, S = aIb, in which S equals I raised to a power or exponent, b, and multiplied by a measure constant, a. The exponent is typically about twice as large for the magnitude scale (Stevens) as for the corresponding partition or category scale, but the higher exponent may be explained by the overly expansive way people use numbers in making magnitude estimations. The partition or category scale and the adjusted (for the use of number) magnitude scale for a given modality or condition generally agree with the neurelectric scale and the summated just noticeable difference (jnd) scale. A unified psychophysical law is proposed in which each jnd has the same subjective magnitude for a given modality or condition, subjective magnitude increases as approximately a power function of physical magnitude with the exponent ranging from near 0 to 1 (compressive function), and subjective magnitude depends primarily on peripheral sensory processes, that is, no nonlinear central transformations occur. An undue reliance on Weber's law blinded Fechner to the fact that the true psychophysical scale is approximately a power function. Rejecting Weber's law, which is not valid, means that we no longer have to choose between letting the summated jnd scale be a logarithmic function (Fechner's law) and introducing a nonlinear central transformation to make it into a power function (Brentano–Ekman-Teghtsoonian's law). Fechner and Stevens erred equally about the true psychophysical power function, whose exponent lies halfway between that of Fechner (an exponent approaching zero) and that of Stevens. To be reconciled, Fechnerians must give up the assumptions that Webers law is valid and that the jnd has the same subjective magnitude across modalities and conditions; Stevensians must give up the assumption that the unadjusted (for the use of number) magnitude scale is a direct measure of subjective magnitude.

Effects of age on children's intake of large and self-selected food portions

OBJECTIVE

Whether developmental periods exist in which children become particularly sensitive to environmental influences on eating is unclear. This research evaluated the effects of age on intake of large and self-selected portions among children 2 to 9 years of age.

RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Seventy-five non-Hispanic white children 2 to 3, 5 to 6, and 8 to 9 years of age were seen at a dinner meal in reference, large, and self-selected portion size conditions in which the size of an entrée was age-appropriate, doubled, and determined by the child, respectively. Weighed food intake data were collected. Entrée bite size and bite frequency were assessed. Height and weight measurements were obtained.

RESULTS

The effect of age on children's intake of the large portion was not significant. Entrée consumption was 29% greater (p < 0.001) and meal energy intake was 13% greater (p < 0.01) in the large portion condition than in the reference condition. Increases in entrée consumption were attributable to increases in average bite size (p < 0.001). Neither child weight nor maternal weight predicted children's intake of large portions. Self-selection resulted in decreased entrée (p < 0.05) and meal energy (p < 0.01) only among those children who ate more when served the large portion.

DISCUSSION

The results of this research confirm that serving large entrée portions promotes increased intake at meals among 2- to 9-year-old children. These findings suggest that any age-related differences in children's response to large portions are likely to be smaller than previously suspected.

Absolute identification by relative judgment

In unidimensional absolute identification tasks, participants identify stimuli that vary along a single dimension. Performance is surprisingly poor compared with discrimination of the same stimuli. Existing models assume that identification is achieved using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes. The authors propose an alternative relative judgment model (RJM) in which the elemental perceptual units are representations of the differences between current and previous stimuli. These differences are used, together with the previous feedback, to respond. Without using long-term representations of absolute magnitudes, the RJM accounts for (a) information transmission limits, (b) bowed serial position effects, and (c) sequential effects, where responses are biased toward immediately preceding stimuli but away from more distant stimuli (assimilation and contrast).

The dynamics of scaling: a memory-based anchor model of category rating and absolute identification

A memory-based scaling model--ANCHOR--is proposed and tested. The perceived magnitude of the target stimulus is compared with a set of anchors in memory. Anchor selection is probabilistic and sensitive to similarity, base-level strength, and recency. The winning anchor provides a reference point near the target and thereby converts the global scaling problem into a local comparison. An explicit correction strategy determines the final response. Two incremental learning mechanisms update the locations and base-level activations of the anchors. This gives rise to sequential, context, transfer, practice, and other dynamic effects. The scale unfolds as an adaptive map. A hierarchy of models is tested on a battery of quantitative measures from 2 experiments in absolute identification and category rating.