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Taylor H, Routledge M, Fawcett J, Ross D. Retrospective spatial analysis of cases of COVID-19 in a single military accommodation block corridor, RMAS, January-March 21. BMJ Mil Health 2024; 170:251-254. [PMID: 36229074 DOI: 10.1136/military-2022-002204] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/12/2022] [Accepted: 09/25/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
Shared ablutions and stairwells, corridor cross-ventilation and non-deliberate perflation (natural draft blowing through a space) are potential risk factors for COVID-19 transmission in corridor-based accommodation. This paper uses retrospective spatial analysis to identify potential built environmental risk factors during the January-March 2021 outbreak in Victory College, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.Distance was measured in units of single room spacing. Odds, ORs and 95% CIs were calculated to identify and measure associations between distance from exposure and having COVID-19. Distance response trends were assessed using Pearson's χ2 for trend test. Linear relationships were tested using the t-test or rank-sum test.Stairwells and ablutions were not identified as likely sources of infection for all corridor occupants. Assuming occupants used their nearest ablutions, closer distance among those attributed to using ablutions 2 (one of four sets of ablutions), was identified as a risk factor (p=0.05). Testing distance response by χ2 linear trend testing showed a potential association between nearest adjacent positive room and COVID-19 (p=0.06), strongest if dominant air movement along the corridor length was from the left (p=0.10) compared with the right (p=0.24).Formal qualitative spatial analysis and environmental assessment of ventilation and air movement has a role in outbreak investigation in assessing factors related to the built environment. Environmental investigations would best inform outbreak investigations if undertaken contemporaneously. Pre-emptive and retrospective studies can help inform public health advice to military establishments in business continuity planning for isolation facilities, during outbreaks or in future development of the built environment.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - M Routledge
- Medical Officer, 254 Medical Regiment, Cambridge, UK
- Defence Pathology, Royal Centre for Defence Medicine, Birmingham, UK
| | - J Fawcett
- SHA department, Army HQ, Andover, UK
| | - D Ross
- Parkes Professor, Research and Clinical Innovation, Camberley, UK
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Marr LC, Samet JM. Reducing Transmission of Airborne Respiratory Pathogens: A New Beginning as the COVID-19 Emergency Ends. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 2024; 132:55001. [PMID: 38728219 PMCID: PMC11086747 DOI: 10.1289/ehp13878] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2023] [Revised: 04/10/2024] [Accepted: 04/17/2024] [Indexed: 05/12/2024]
Abstract
BACKGROUND In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, new evidence-based strategies have emerged for reducing transmission of respiratory infections through management of indoor air. OBJECTIVES This paper reviews critical advances that could reduce the burden of disease from inhaled pathogens and describes challenges in their implementation. DISCUSSION Proven strategies include assuring sufficient ventilation, air cleaning by filtration, and air disinfection by germicidal ultraviolet (UV) light. Layered intervention strategies are needed to maximize risk reduction. Case studies demonstrate how to implement these tools while also revealing barriers to implementation. Future needs include standards designed with infection resilience and equity in mind, buildings optimized for infection resilience among other drivers, new approaches and technologies to improve ventilation, scientific consensus on the amount of ventilation needed to achieve a desired level of risk, methods for evaluating new air-cleaning technologies, studies of their long-term health effects, workforce training on ventilation systems, easier access to federal funds, demonstration projects in schools, and communication with the public about the importance of indoor air quality and actions people can take to improve it. https://doi.org/10.1289/EHP13878.
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Affiliation(s)
- Linsey C. Marr
- The Charles E. Via, Jr. Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, USA
| | - Jonathan M. Samet
- Departments of Epidemiology and Environmental and Occupational Health, Colorado School of Public Health, Aurora, Colorado, USA
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3
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Qiu G, Zhang X, deMello AJ, Yao M, Cao J, Wang J. On-site airborne pathogen detection for infection risk mitigation. Chem Soc Rev 2023; 52:8531-8579. [PMID: 37882143 PMCID: PMC10712221 DOI: 10.1039/d3cs00417a] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/07/2023] [Indexed: 10/27/2023]
Abstract
Human-infecting pathogens that transmit through the air pose a significant threat to public health. As a prominent instance, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) that caused the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the world in an unprecedented manner over the past few years. Despite the dissipating pandemic gloom, the lessons we have learned in dealing with pathogen-laden aerosols should be thoroughly reviewed because the airborne transmission risk may have been grossly underestimated. From a bioanalytical chemistry perspective, on-site airborne pathogen detection can be an effective non-pharmaceutic intervention (NPI) strategy, with on-site airborne pathogen detection and early-stage infection risk evaluation reducing the spread of disease and enabling life-saving decisions to be made. In light of this, we summarize the recent advances in highly efficient pathogen-laden aerosol sampling approaches, bioanalytical sensing technologies, and the prospects for airborne pathogen exposure measurement and evidence-based transmission interventions. We also discuss open challenges facing general bioaerosols detection, such as handling complex aerosol samples, improving sensitivity for airborne pathogen quantification, and establishing a risk assessment system with high spatiotemporal resolution for mitigating airborne transmission risks. This review provides a multidisciplinary outlook for future opportunities to improve the on-site airborne pathogen detection techniques, thereby enhancing the preparedness for more on-site bioaerosols measurement scenarios, such as monitoring high-risk pathogens on airplanes, weaponized pathogen aerosols, influenza variants at the workplace, and pollutant correlated with sick building syndromes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Guangyu Qiu
- Institute of Medical Robotics, School of Biomedical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China.
- Institute of Environmental Engineering, ETH Zürich, Zürich 8093, Switzerland
- Laboratory for Advanced Analytical Technologies, Empa, Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Science and Technology, Dübendorf 8600, Switzerland
| | - Xiaole Zhang
- Institute of Environmental Engineering, ETH Zürich, Zürich 8093, Switzerland
- Laboratory for Advanced Analytical Technologies, Empa, Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Science and Technology, Dübendorf 8600, Switzerland
| | - Andrew J deMello
- Institute for Chemical and Bioengineering, Department of Chemistry and Applied Biosciences, ETH Zürich, Vladimir-Prelog-Weg1, Zürich, Switzerland
| | - Maosheng Yao
- State Key Joint Laboratory of Environmental Simulation and Pollution Control, College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, Peking University, China
| | - Junji Cao
- Institute of Atmospheric Physics, Chinese Academy of Science, China
| | - Jing Wang
- Institute of Environmental Engineering, ETH Zürich, Zürich 8093, Switzerland
- Laboratory for Advanced Analytical Technologies, Empa, Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Science and Technology, Dübendorf 8600, Switzerland
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4
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Madhusudanan A, Iddon C, Cevik M, Naismith JH, Fitzgerald S. Non-pharmaceutical interventions for COVID-19: a systematic review on environmental control measures. PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS. SERIES A, MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL, AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES 2023; 381:20230130. [PMID: 37611631 PMCID: PMC10446906 DOI: 10.1098/rsta.2023.0130] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2023] [Accepted: 06/06/2023] [Indexed: 08/25/2023]
Abstract
The purpose of this review was to identify the effectiveness of environmental control (EC) non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) in reducing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through conducting a systematic review. EC NPIs considered in this review are room ventilation, air filtration/cleaning, room occupancy, surface disinfection, barrier devices, [Formula: see text] monitoring and one-way-systems. Systematic searches of databases from Web of Science, Medline, EMBASE, preprint servers MedRxiv and BioRxiv were conducted in order to identify studies reported between 1 January 2020 and 1 December 2022. All articles reporting on the effectiveness of ventilation, air filtration/cleaning, room occupancy, surface disinfection, barrier devices, [Formula: see text] monitoring and one-way systems in reducing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 were retrieved and screened. In total, 13 971 articles were identified for screening. The initial title and abstract screening identified 1328 articles for full text review. Overall, 19 references provided evidence for the effectiveness of NPIs: 12 reported on ventilation, 4 on air cleaning devices, 5 on surface disinfection, 6 on room occupancy and 1 on screens/barriers. No studies were found that considered the effectiveness of [Formula: see text] monitoring or the implementation of one-way systems. Many of these studies were assessed to have critical risk of bias in at least one domain, largely due to confounding factors that could have affected the measured outcomes. As a result, there is low confidence in the findings. Evidence suggests that EC NPIs of ventilation, air cleaning devices and reduction in room-occupancy may have a role in reducing transmission in certain settings. However, the evidence was usually of low or very low quality and certainty, and hence the level of confidence ascribed to this conclusion is low. Based on the evidence found, it was not possible to draw any specific conclusions regarding the effectiveness of surface disinfection and the use of barrier devices. From these results, we further conclude that community agreed standards for well-designed epidemiological studies with low risk of bias are needed. Implementation of such standards would enable more confident assessment in the future of the effectiveness of EC NPIs in reducing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens in real-world settings. This article is part of the theme issue 'The effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions on the COVID-19 pandemic: the evidence'.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Christopher Iddon
- Department of Civil, Environmental and Geomatic Engineering, University College London, WC1E 6BT, London, UK
| | - Muge Cevik
- Department of Infection and Global Health, School of Medicine, University of St Andrews, KY16 9TF, St Andrews, UK
| | | | - Shaun Fitzgerald
- Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge, CB2 1PZ, Cambridge, UK
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Bunce M, Geoghegan JL, Winter D, de Ligt J, Wiles S. Exploring the depth and breadth of the genomics toolbox during the COVID-19 pandemic: insights from Aotearoa New Zealand. BMC Med 2023; 21:213. [PMID: 37316857 DOI: 10.1186/s12916-023-02909-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2022] [Accepted: 04/13/2023] [Indexed: 06/16/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Genomic technologies have become routine in the surveillance and monitoring of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, as evidenced by the millions of SARS-CoV-2 sequences uploaded to international databases. Yet the ways in which these technologies have been applied to manage the pandemic are varied. MAIN TEXT Aotearoa New Zealand was one of a small number of countries to adopt an elimination strategy for COVID-19, establishing a managed isolation and quarantine system for all international arrivals. To aid our response, we rapidly set up and scaled our use of genomic technologies to help identify community cases of COVID-19, to understand how they had arisen, and to determine the appropriate action to maintain elimination. Once New Zealand pivoted from elimination to suppression in late 2021, our genomic response changed to focusing on identifying new variants arriving at the border, tracking their incidence around the country, and examining any links between specific variants and increased disease severity. Wastewater detection, quantitation and variant detection were also phased into the response. Here, we explore New Zealand's genomic journey through the pandemic and provide a high-level overview of the lessons learned and potential future capabilities to better prepare for future pandemics. CONCLUSIONS Our commentary is aimed at health professionals and decision-makers who might not be familiar with genetic technologies, how they can be used, and why this is an area with great potential to assist in disease detection and tracking now and in the future.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael Bunce
- Institute of Environmental Science and Research, Kenepuru, Porirua, 5022, New Zealand
- Department of Conservation, Wellington, 6011, New Zealand
| | - Jemma L Geoghegan
- Institute of Environmental Science and Research, Kenepuru, Porirua, 5022, New Zealand
- Department of Microbiology and Immunology, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
| | - David Winter
- Institute of Environmental Science and Research, Kenepuru, Porirua, 5022, New Zealand
| | - Joep de Ligt
- Institute of Environmental Science and Research, Kenepuru, Porirua, 5022, New Zealand.
| | - Siouxsie Wiles
- Bioluminescent Superbugs Lab, Department of Molecular Medicine and Pathology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
- Te Pūnaha Matatini, Auckland, New Zealand.
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6
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Tang JW, Marr LC, Tellier R, Dancer SJ. Airborne transmission of respiratory viruses including severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. Curr Opin Pulm Med 2023; 29:191-196. [PMID: 36866737 PMCID: PMC10090298 DOI: 10.1097/mcp.0000000000000947] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/04/2023]
Abstract
PURPOSE OF REVIEW The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic has had a wide-ranging and profound impact on how we think about the transmission of respiratory viruses This review outlines the basis on which we should consider all respiratory viruses as aerosol-transmissible infections, in order to improve our control of these pathogens in both healthcare and community settings. RECENT FINDINGS We present recent studies to support the aerosol transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, and some older studies to demonstrate the aerosol transmissibility of other, more familiar seasonal respiratory viruses. SUMMARY Current knowledge on how these respiratory viruses are transmitted, and the way we control their spread, is changing. We need to embrace these changes to improve the care of patients in hospitals and care homes including others who are vulnerable to severe disease in community settings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julian W. Tang
- Clinical Microbiology, University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust
- Respiratory Sciences, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK
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Tan KS, Ang AXY, Tay DJW, Somani J, Ng AJY, Peng LL, Chu JJH, Tambyah PA, Allen DM. Detection of hospital environmental contamination during SARS-CoV-2 Omicron predominance using a highly sensitive air sampling device. Front Public Health 2023; 10:1067575. [PMID: 36703815 PMCID: PMC9873263 DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.1067575] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/12/2022] [Accepted: 12/23/2022] [Indexed: 01/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Background and objectives The high transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 has exposed weaknesses in our infection control and detection measures, particularly in healthcare settings. Aerial sampling has evolved from passive impact filters to active sampling using negative pressure to expose culture substrate for virus detection. We evaluated the effectiveness of an active air sampling device as a potential surveillance system in detecting hospital pathogens, for augmenting containment measures to prevent nosocomial transmission, using SARS-CoV-2 as a surrogate. Methods We conducted air sampling in a hospital environment using the AerosolSenseTM air sampling device and compared it with surface swabs for their capacity to detect SARS-CoV-2. Results When combined with RT-qPCR detection, we found the device provided consistent SARS-CoV-2 detection, compared to surface sampling, in as little as 2 h of sampling time. The device also showed that it can identify minute quantities of SARS-CoV-2 in designated "clean areas" and through a N95 mask, indicating good surveillance capacity and sensitivity of the device in hospital settings. Conclusion Active air sampling was shown to be a sensitive surveillance system in healthcare settings. Findings from this study can also be applied in an organism agnostic manner for surveillance in the hospital, improving our ability to contain and prevent nosocomial outbreaks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kai Sen Tan
- Biosafety Level 3 Core Facility, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Infectious Disease Translational Research Programme, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Department of Otolaryngology, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,*Correspondence: Kai Sen Tan ✉
| | - Alicia Xin Yu Ang
- Department of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, National University Hospital, Singapore, Singapore
| | - Douglas Jie Wen Tay
- Biosafety Level 3 Core Facility, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Infectious Disease Translational Research Programme, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
| | - Jyoti Somani
- Department of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, National University Hospital, Singapore, Singapore
| | - Alexander Jet Yue Ng
- Department of Emergency Medicine, National University Hospital, Singapore, Singapore
| | - Li Lee Peng
- Department of Emergency Medicine, National University Hospital, Singapore, Singapore
| | - Justin Jang Hann Chu
- Biosafety Level 3 Core Facility, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Infectious Disease Translational Research Programme, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Collaborative and Translation Unit for Hand, Foot and Mouth Disease (HFMD), Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology, Agency for Science, Technology and Research, Singapore, Singapore
| | - Paul Anantharajah Tambyah
- Infectious Disease Translational Research Programme, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Department of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, National University Hospital, Singapore, Singapore
| | - David Michael Allen
- Infectious Disease Translational Research Programme, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore,Department of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases, National University Hospital, Singapore, Singapore,David Michael Allen ✉
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8
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Adam DC, Martín-Sánchez M, Gu H, Yang B, Lin Y, Wu P, Lau EH, Leung GM, Poon LL, Cowling BJ. Risk of within-hotel transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during on-arrival quarantine in Hong Kong: an epidemiological and phylogenomic investigation. THE LANCET REGIONAL HEALTH. WESTERN PACIFIC 2023; 33:100678. [PMID: 36643735 PMCID: PMC9825110 DOI: 10.1016/j.lanwpc.2022.100678] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/18/2022] [Revised: 11/23/2022] [Accepted: 12/19/2022] [Indexed: 01/08/2023]
Abstract
Background On-arrival quarantine has been one of the primary measures to prevent the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into Hong Kong since the start of the pandemic. Most on-arrival quarantines have been done in hotels, with the duration of quarantine and testing frequency during quarantine modified over time along with other pandemic control measures. However, hotels are not designed with infection control in mind. We aimed to systematically study the potential risk of acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 infection among individuals undergoing hotel quarantine. Methods We examined data on each laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case identified in on-arrival quarantine in a hotel in Hong Kong between 1 May 2020 and 31 January 2022. We sequenced the whole genomes of viruses from cases that overlapped with other confirmed cases in terms of the hotel of stay, date of arrival and date of testing positive. By combining multiple sources of evidence, we identify probable and plausible transmission events and calculate the overall risk of transmission. Findings Among 221 imported cases that overlapped with other cases detected during hotel quarantine with available sequence data, phylogenomic analyses identified five probable and two plausible clusters of within-hotel transmission. Only two of these clusters were recognised at the time. Including other clusters reported in Hong Kong, we estimate that 8-11 per 1000 cases identified in hotel quarantine may be infected by another unlinked case during quarantine, or 2-3 per 100,000 overseas arrivals. Interpretation We have identified additional undetected occurrences of COVID-19 transmission within hotel quarantine in Hong Kong. Although hotels provide suboptimal infection control as improvised quarantine facilities, the risk of contracting infection whilst in quarantine is low. However, these unlikely events could have high consequences by allowing the virus to spread into immunologically naïve communities. Additional vigilance should be taken in the absence of improved controls to identify such events. If on-arrival quarantine is expected to be used for a long time, quarantine facilities could be purpose-built to minimise the risk of transmission. Funding Health and Medical Research Fund, Hong Kong.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dillon C. Adam
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China,Laboratory of Data Discovery for Health Limited (D24H), Hong Kong Science and Technology Park, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
| | - Mario Martín-Sánchez
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
| | - Haogao Gu
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
| | - Bingyi Yang
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
| | - Yun Lin
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
| | - Peng Wu
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China,Corresponding author
| | - Eric H.Y. Lau
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China,Laboratory of Data Discovery for Health Limited (D24H), Hong Kong Science and Technology Park, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
| | - Gabriel M. Leung
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China,Laboratory of Data Discovery for Health Limited (D24H), Hong Kong Science and Technology Park, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
| | - Leo L.M. Poon
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China,HKU-Pasteur Research Pole, School of Public Health, LKS Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China,Centre for Immunology & Infection, Hong Kong Science and Technology Park, Hong Kong, China
| | - Benjamin J. Cowling
- WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China,Laboratory of Data Discovery for Health Limited (D24H), Hong Kong Science and Technology Park, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China,Corresponding author
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9
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Dabisch PA, Sanjak JS, Boydston JA, Yeager J, Herzog A, Biryukov J, Beck K, Do D, Seman BG, Green B, Bohannon JK, Holland B, Miller D, Ammons T, Freeburger D, Miller S, Jenkins T, Rippeon S, Miller J, Clarke D, Manan E, Patty A, Rhodes K, Sweeney T, Winpigler M, Altamura LA, Zimmerman H, Hail AS, Wahl V, Hevey M. Comparison of Dose-Response Relationships for Two Isolates of SARS-CoV-2 in a Nonhuman Primate Model of Inhalational COVID-19. J Aerosol Med Pulm Drug Deliv 2022; 35:296-306. [PMID: 36318785 PMCID: PMC9807281 DOI: 10.1089/jamp.2022.0043] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
Background: As the COVID-19 pandemic has progressed, numerous variants of SARS-CoV-2 have arisen, with several displaying increased transmissibility. Methods: The present study compared dose-response relationships and disease presentation in nonhuman primates infected with aerosols containing an isolate of the Gamma variant of SARS-CoV-2 to the results of our previous study with the earlier WA-1 isolate of SARS-CoV-2. Results: Disease in Gamma-infected animals was mild, characterized by dose-dependent fever and oronasal shedding of virus. Differences were observed in shedding in the upper respiratory tract between Gamma- and WA-1-infected animals that have the potential to influence disease transmission. Specifically, the estimated median doses for shedding of viral RNA or infectious virus in nasal swabs were approximately 10-fold lower for the Gamma variant than the WA-1 isolate. Given that the median doses for fever were similar, this suggests that there is a greater difference between the median doses for viral shedding and fever for Gamma than for WA-1 and potentially an increased range of doses for Gamma over which asymptomatic shedding and disease transmission are possible. Conclusions: These results complement those of previous studies, which suggested that differences in exposure dose may help to explain the range of clinical disease presentations observed in individuals with COVID-19, highlighting the importance of public health measures designed to limit exposure dose, such as masking and social distancing. The dose-response data provided by this study are important to inform disease transmission and hazard modeling, as well as to inform dose selection in future studies examining the efficacy of therapeutics and vaccines in animal models of inhalational COVID-19.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paul A. Dabisch
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA.,Address correspondence to: Paul A. Dabisch, PhD, National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 8300 Research Plaza, Frederick, MD 21701, USA
| | - Jaleal S. Sanjak
- Division of Preclinical Innovation, National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, National Institutes of Health, Rockville, Maryland, USA
| | - Jeremy A. Boydston
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - John Yeager
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | | | - Jennifer Biryukov
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Katie Beck
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Danh Do
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Brittany G. Seman
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Brian Green
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Jordan K. Bohannon
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Brian Holland
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - David Miller
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Taylor Ammons
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Denise Freeburger
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Susan Miller
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Tammy Jenkins
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Sherry Rippeon
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - James Miller
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - David Clarke
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Emmanuel Manan
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Ashley Patty
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Kim Rhodes
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Tina Sweeney
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Michael Winpigler
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Louis A. Altamura
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Heather Zimmerman
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Alec S. Hail
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Victoria Wahl
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
| | - Michael Hevey
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Operated by Battelle National Biodefense Institute, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA
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10
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Wei HY, Chang CP, Liu MT, Mu JJ, Lin YJ, Dai YT, Su CP. Probable Aerosol Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through Floors and Walls of Quarantine Hotel, Taiwan, 2021. Emerg Infect Dis 2022; 28:2374-2382. [PMID: 36322955 PMCID: PMC9707602 DOI: 10.3201/eid2812.220666] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/14/2023] Open
Abstract
We investigated a cluster of SARS-CoV-2 infections in a quarantine hotel in Taiwan in December 2021. The cluster involved 3 case patients who lived in nonadjacent rooms on different floors. They had no direct contact during their stay. By direct exploration of the space above the room ceilings, we found residual tunnels, wall defects, and truncated pipes between their rooms. We conducted a simplified tracer-gas experiment to assess the interconnection between rooms. Aerosol transmission through structural defects in floors and walls in this poorly ventilated hotel was the most likely route of virus transmission. This event demonstrates the high transmissibility of Omicron variants, even across rooms and floors, through structural defects. Our findings emphasize the importance of ventilation and integrity of building structure in quarantine facilities.
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11
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Oksanen LAH, Virtanen J, Sanmark E, Rantanen N, Venkat V, Sofieva S, Aaltonen K, Kivistö I, Svirskaite J, Pérez AD, Kuula J, Levanov L, Hyvärinen A, Maunula L, Atanasova NS, Laitinen S, Anttila V, Lehtonen L, Lappalainen M, Geneid A, Sironen T. SARS-CoV-2 indoor environment contamination with epidemiological and experimental investigations. INDOOR AIR 2022; 32:e13118. [PMID: 36305066 PMCID: PMC9828560 DOI: 10.1111/ina.13118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2022] [Revised: 08/25/2022] [Accepted: 09/06/2022] [Indexed: 05/02/2023]
Abstract
SARS-CoV-2 has been detected both in air and on surfaces, but questions remain about the patient-specific and environmental factors affecting virus transmission. Additionally, more detailed information on viral sampling of the air is needed. This prospective cohort study (N = 56) presents results from 258 air and 252 surface samples from the surroundings of 23 hospitalized and eight home-treated COVID-19 index patients between July 2020 and March 2021 and compares the results between the measured environments and patient factors. Additionally, epidemiological and experimental investigations were performed. The proportions of qRT-PCR-positive air (10.7% hospital/17.6% homes) and surface samples (8.8%/12.9%) showed statistical similarity in hospital and homes. Significant SARS-CoV-2 air contamination was observed in a large (655.25 m3 ) mechanically ventilated (1.67 air changes per hour, 32.4-421 L/s/patient) patient hall even with only two patients present. All positive air samples were obtained in the absence of aerosol-generating procedures. In four cases, positive environmental samples were detected after the patients had developed a neutralizing IgG response. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in the following particle sizes: 0.65-4.7 μm, 7.0-12.0 μm, >10 μm, and <100 μm. Appropriate infection control against airborne and surface transmission routes is needed in both environments, even after antibody production has begun.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lotta‐Maria A. H. Oksanen
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Department of Otorhinolaryngology and Phoniatrics – Head and Neck SurgeryHelsinki University HospitalHelsinkiFinland
| | - Jenni Virtanen
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Faculty of Veterinary MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
| | - Enni Sanmark
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Department of Otorhinolaryngology and Phoniatrics – Head and Neck SurgeryHelsinki University HospitalHelsinkiFinland
| | - Noora Rantanen
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Department of Otorhinolaryngology and Phoniatrics – Head and Neck SurgeryHelsinki University HospitalHelsinkiFinland
| | - Vinaya Venkat
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Faculty of Veterinary MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
| | - Svetlana Sofieva
- Faculty of Biological and Environmental SciencesUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Finnish Meteorological InstituteHelsinkiFinland
| | - Kirsi Aaltonen
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Faculty of Veterinary MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
| | - Ilkka Kivistö
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Faculty of Veterinary MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
| | - Julija Svirskaite
- Faculty of Biological and Environmental SciencesUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
| | | | - Joel Kuula
- Finnish Meteorological InstituteHelsinkiFinland
| | - Lev Levanov
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
| | | | - Leena Maunula
- Faculty of Veterinary MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
| | - Nina S. Atanasova
- Faculty of Biological and Environmental SciencesUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Finnish Meteorological InstituteHelsinkiFinland
| | | | - Veli‐Jukka Anttila
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- HUS Inflammation CenterHelsinki University HospitalHelsinkiFinland
| | - Lasse Lehtonen
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- HUS Diagnostic Center, HUSLABHelsinki University HospitalHelsinkiFinland
| | - Maija Lappalainen
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- HUS Diagnostic Center, HUSLABHelsinki University HospitalHelsinkiFinland
| | - Ahmed Geneid
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Department of Otorhinolaryngology and Phoniatrics – Head and Neck SurgeryHelsinki University HospitalHelsinkiFinland
| | - Tarja Sironen
- Faculty of MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
- Faculty of Veterinary MedicineUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
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12
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Travel in the Time of COVID: A Review of International Travel Health in a Global Pandemic. Curr Infect Dis Rep 2022; 24:129-145. [PMID: 35965881 PMCID: PMC9361911 DOI: 10.1007/s11908-022-00784-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Purpose of Review
This review critically considers the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global travel and the practice of travel medicine, highlights key innovations that have facilitated the resumption of travel, and anticipates how travel medicine providers should prepare for the future of international travel.
Recent Findings
Since asymptomatic transmission of the virus was first recognized in March 2020, extensive efforts have been made to characterize the pattern and dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 transmission aboard commercial aircraft, cruise ships, rail and bus transport, and in mass gatherings and quarantine facilities. Despite the negative impact of further waves of COVID-19 driven by the more transmissible Omicron variant, rapid increases of international tourist arrivals are occurring and modeling anticipates further growth. Mitigation of spread requires an integrated approach that combines masking, physical distancing, improving ventilation, testing, and quarantine. Vaccines and therapeutics have played a significant role in reopening society and accelerating the resumption of travel and further therapeutic innovation is likely.
Summary
COVID-19 is likely to persist as an endemic infection, and surveillance will assume an even more important role. The pandemic has provided an impetus to advance technology for telemedicine, to adopt mobile devices and GPS in contact tracing, and to apply digital applications in research. The future of travel medicine should continue to harness these novel platforms in the clinical, research, and educational arenas.
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13
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Jimenez JL, Marr LC, Randall K, Ewing ET, Tufekci Z, Greenhalgh T, Tellier R, Tang JW, Li Y, Morawska L, Mesiano‐Crookston J, Fisman D, Hegarty O, Dancer SJ, Bluyssen PM, Buonanno G, Loomans MGLC, Bahnfleth WP, Yao M, Sekhar C, Wargocki P, Melikov AK, Prather KA. What were the historical reasons for the resistance to recognizing airborne transmission during the COVID-19 pandemic? INDOOR AIR 2022; 32:e13070. [PMID: 36040283 PMCID: PMC9538841 DOI: 10.1111/ina.13070] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/12/2021] [Revised: 05/25/2022] [Accepted: 05/30/2022] [Indexed: 05/05/2023]
Abstract
The question of whether SARS-CoV-2 is mainly transmitted by droplets or aerosols has been highly controversial. We sought to explain this controversy through a historical analysis of transmission research in other diseases. For most of human history, the dominant paradigm was that many diseases were carried by the air, often over long distances and in a phantasmagorical way. This miasmatic paradigm was challenged in the mid to late 19th century with the rise of germ theory, and as diseases such as cholera, puerperal fever, and malaria were found to actually transmit in other ways. Motivated by his views on the importance of contact/droplet infection, and the resistance he encountered from the remaining influence of miasma theory, prominent public health official Charles Chapin in 1910 helped initiate a successful paradigm shift, deeming airborne transmission most unlikely. This new paradigm became dominant. However, the lack of understanding of aerosols led to systematic errors in the interpretation of research evidence on transmission pathways. For the next five decades, airborne transmission was considered of negligible or minor importance for all major respiratory diseases, until a demonstration of airborne transmission of tuberculosis (which had been mistakenly thought to be transmitted by droplets) in 1962. The contact/droplet paradigm remained dominant, and only a few diseases were widely accepted as airborne before COVID-19: those that were clearly transmitted to people not in the same room. The acceleration of interdisciplinary research inspired by the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that airborne transmission is a major mode of transmission for this disease, and is likely to be significant for many respiratory infectious diseases.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jose L. Jimenez
- Department of Chemistry and Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental SciencesUniversity of ColoradoBoulderColoradoUSA
| | - Linsey C. Marr
- Department of Civil and Environmental EngineeringVirginia TechBlacksburgVirginiaUSA
| | | | | | - Zeynep Tufekci
- School of JournalismColumbia UniversityNew YorkNew YorkUSA
| | - Trish Greenhalgh
- Department of Primary Care Health SciencesMedical Sciences DivisionUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK
| | | | - Julian W. Tang
- Department of Respiratory SciencesUniversity of LeicesterLeicesterUK
| | - Yuguo Li
- Department of Mechanical EngineeringUniversity of Hong KongHong KongChina
| | - Lidia Morawska
- International Laboratory for Air Quality and HeathQueensland University of TechnologyBrisbaneQueenslandAustralia
| | | | - David Fisman
- Dalla Lana School of Public HealthUniversity of TorontoTorontoOntarioCanada
| | - Orla Hegarty
- School of Architecture, Planning & Environmental PolicyUniversity College DublinDublinIreland
| | - Stephanie J. Dancer
- Department of MicrobiologyHairmyres Hospital, Glasgow, and Edinburgh Napier UniversityGlasgowUK
| | - Philomena M. Bluyssen
- Faculty of Architecture and the Built EnvironmentDelft University of TechnologyDelftThe Netherlands
| | - Giorgio Buonanno
- Department of Civil and Mechanical EngineeringUniversity of Cassino and Southern LazioCassinoItaly
| | - Marcel G. L. C. Loomans
- Department of the Built EnvironmentEindhoven University of Technology (TU/e)EindhovenThe Netherlands
| | - William P. Bahnfleth
- Department of Architectural EngineeringThe Pennsylvania State UniversityUniversity ParkPennsylvaniaUSA
| | - Maosheng Yao
- College of Environmental Sciences and EngineeringPeking UniversityBeijingChina
| | - Chandra Sekhar
- Department of the Built EnvironmentNational University of SingaporeSingaporeSingapore
| | - Pawel Wargocki
- Department of Civil EngineeringTechnical University of DenmarkLyngbyDenmark
| | - Arsen K. Melikov
- Department of Civil EngineeringTechnical University of DenmarkLyngbyDenmark
| | - Kimberly A. Prather
- Scripps Institution of OceanographyUniversity of California San DiegoLa JollaCaliforniaUSA
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14
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Oliva C, Favato G. From 15 Minutes to 15 Seconds: How the Delta Variant Changed the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19. A Comparative Epidemiological Investigation Using Community Mobility Data From the Metropolitan Area of Genoa, Italy. Front Public Health 2022; 10:872698. [PMID: 35865252 PMCID: PMC9294394 DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.872698] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/09/2022] [Accepted: 06/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The Delta variant became dominant during the second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic due to its competitive advantage, the ability to reduce close contact duration from minutes to seconds, and, consequently, increase the risk of exposure to COVID-19. We used game theory to model the most effective public health response to this new threat. We compared the absolute and relative risk of exposure to COVID-19 before and after the emergence of the Delta variant. The absolute risk of exposure was defined as the product of crowding (people within a six feet distance) and visit duration. Our epidemiological investigation used aggregated and anonymized mobility data from Google Maps to estimate the visit duration for 808 premises in the metropolitan area of Genoa, Italy, in June 2021. The relative risk of exposure was obtained by dividing the risk of exposure of each activity by the lowest value (gas stations = 1). The median absolute risk of exposure to COVID-19 increased by sixty-fold in the first semester of 2021, while the relative risk did not significantly differ from the risk of exposure to the ancestral form of Covid-19 (5.9 in 2021 vs. 2.5 in 2021). The Delta variant represents an evolution of the game against COVID-19, but it is not a game-changer. The best response is to commit to our original strategy based on population-wide vaccination and social distancing. Unilateral deviations from the dominant strategy could offer COVID-19 a fighting chance against humanity.
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15
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Duval D, Palmer JC, Tudge I, Pearce-Smith N, O'Connell E, Bennett A, Clark R. Long distance airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2: rapid systematic review. BMJ 2022; 377:e068743. [PMID: 35768139 PMCID: PMC9240778 DOI: 10.1136/bmj-2021-068743] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/04/2022] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVES To evaluate the potential for long distance airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in indoor community settings and to investigate factors that might influence transmission. DESIGN Rapid systematic review and narrative synthesis. DATA SOURCES Medline, Embase, medRxiv, Arxiv, and WHO COVID-19 Research Database for studies published from 27 July 2020 to 19 January 2022; existing relevant rapid systematic review for studies published from 1 January 2020 to 27 July 2020; and citation analysis in Web of Science and Cocites. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR STUDY SELECTION Observational studies reporting on transmission events in indoor community (non-healthcare) settings in which long distance airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 was the most likely route. Studies such as those of household transmission where the main transmission route was likely to be close contact or fomite transmission were excluded. DATA EXTRACTION AND SYNTHESIS Data extraction was done by one reviewer and independently checked by a second reviewer. Primary outcomes were SARS-CoV-2 infections through long distance airborne transmission (>2 m) and any modifying factors. Methodological quality of included studies was rated using the quality criteria checklist, and certainty of primary outcomes was determined using the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) framework. Narrative synthesis was themed by setting. RESULTS 22 reports relating to 18 studies were identified (methodological quality was high in three, medium in five, and low in 10); all the studies were outbreak investigations. Long distance airborne transmission was likely to have occurred for some or all transmission events in 16 studies and was unclear in two studies (GRADE: very low certainty). In the 16 studies, one or more factors plausibly increased the likelihood of long distance airborne transmission, particularly insufficient air replacement (very low certainty), directional air flow (very low certainty), and activities associated with increased emission of aerosols, such as singing or speaking loudly (very low certainty). In 13 studies, the primary cases were reported as being asymptomatic, presymptomatic, or around symptom onset at the time of transmission. Although some of the included studies were well conducted outbreak investigations, they remain at risk of bias owing to study design and do not always provide the level of detail needed to fully assess transmission routes. CONCLUSION This rapid systematic review found evidence suggesting that long distance airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 might occur in indoor settings such as restaurants, workplaces, and venues for choirs, and identified factors such as insufficient air replacement that probably contributed to transmission. These results strengthen the need for mitigation measures in indoor settings, particularly the use of adequate ventilation. SYSTEMATIC REVIEW REGISTRATION PROSPERO CRD42021236762.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daphne Duval
- COVID-19 Rapid Evidence Service, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK
| | - Jennifer C Palmer
- COVID-19 Rapid Evidence Service, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK
- MRC Integrative Epidemiology Unit, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
- Population Health Science, Bristol Medical School, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
| | - Isobel Tudge
- COVID-19 Rapid Evidence Service, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK
| | | | - Emer O'Connell
- COVID-19 Advice and Guidance, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK
| | - Allan Bennett
- Biosafety, Air, and Water Microbiology Group, Research and Evaluation, UK Health Security Agency, Porton, UK
| | - Rachel Clark
- COVID-19 Rapid Evidence Service, UK Health Security Agency, London, UK
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16
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Jimenez JL, Peng Z, Pagonis D. Systematic way to understand and classify the shared-room airborne transmission risk of indoor spaces. INDOOR AIR 2022; 32:e13025. [PMID: 35622715 DOI: 10.1111/ina.13025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/19/2022] [Revised: 03/16/2022] [Accepted: 03/17/2022] [Indexed: 05/22/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Jose L Jimenez
- Department of Chemistry and CIRES, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, USA
| | - Zhe Peng
- Department of Chemistry and CIRES, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, USA
| | - Demetrios Pagonis
- Department of Chemistry and CIRES, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, USA
- Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry, Weber State University, Ogden, Utah, USA
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