Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model

Regulating the product quality of COVID-19 antigen testing reagents: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis under China's legal framework

Personal purchases of novel coronavirus antigen detection reagents (ADRs) for self-detection have contributed to the optimization of medical resources and containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. The recurring occurrence of false testing results in China has generated concerns regarding the quality of ADRs and the testing mechanism for medical devices. Academic viewpoints and remarks on the sensitivity, application possibilities, and product innovation of ADRs may be found in the extant scientific literature. However, the current research does not explore the microscopic product quality concerns that emerge throughout the production and marketing of ADRs. To explore strategic equilibrium circumstances and behavioral evolution processes, an evolutionary game model was developed to include ADR manufacturers, third-party medical device inspection agencies, and regulatory authorities. The results reveal that the quantity of illegal incentives, the cost of regulation, and the loss of government credibility have a major impact on the decisions of regulatory authorities and determine three potential systemic equilibrium states. To maximize social welfare, ADRs should be incorporated into China's medication price monitoring system in order to manage market prices. To cut regulatory expenses, the government should employ blockchain technology for traceable network regulation of ADR product quality. The government should also protect the people's right to free speech and encourage online reporting of adverse incidents caused by ADRs. The conclusions of this article can provide many developing nations with important insights for regulating the quality of ADR products.

Improving the Communication and Credibility of Government Media in Response to Public Health Emergencies: Analysis of Tweets From the WeChat Official Accounts of 10 Chinese Health Commissioners

Background

A significant public health emergency has appeared worldwide since the beginning of 2020. The spread of negative information about COVID-19 on social media poses a challenge and threat to public health disposition and the credibility of government public opinion.

Objective

This study aimed to analyze the rules and characteristics of government media in disseminating information on public emergencies. In addition, find ways and means to improve government media's communication power and credibility.

Method

Based on relevant theories and measures of information econometrics, 10 WeChat official accounts of the Chinese government were taken as examples. The Python crawler tool was used to collect data of 10 WeChat official accounts-related tweets. In addition, this study used various tools, such as ROST, UCINET, and SPSS, for statistical analysis and co-word analysis of the data.

Result

From January 17 to March 31, 2020, 6,612 COVID-19-related tweets were published by 10 WeChat official accounts, which broadcast epidemic overview, epidemic prevention and control, science and disinformation, epidemic assistance, epidemic impact, and negative impact. By analyzing the posting time and content of the tweets, we found that changes in the number of articles posted by the WeChat and changes in content and the progress of the COVID-19 pandemic are nearly synchronized, and most tweets are published at 8:00 am. Furthermore, based on the analytics of high dissemination index and high-frequency words, we propose that there is a significant correlation between the strength of independence and the credibility of the WeChat official account.

Conclusion

The three elements of WeChat communication (value, interest, and moving) and the degree of independent innovation of public numbers impact the communication power and credibility of government media. First, if the articles published by the WeChat official account are valuable, interesting, and moving, the communication power of the WeChat official account would get more powerful. Second, increased ability for independent innovation has a positive impact on enhancing the WeChat official account's credibility. Third, government media can improve its governance effects of public health emergencies by enhancing their communication power and credibility.

Supervision for the Public Health Services for Older Adults Under the Background of Government Purchasing: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Framework

As an important measure to involve services for older adults, the government procurement practices have become a key link for public health services. However, the information asymmetry between public health service purchasers and public health service undertakers triggers a supervision dilemma. Based on this background, this study uses the evolutionary game theory to analyze the symbiotic evolution between local governments and public health service institutions under different reward and punishment mechanisms, explore game evolution, strategy adjustment, and influencing factors of different game subjects, and analyze the necessity and appropriate intensity of dynamic rewards and punishment mechanisms. The results show that: under the static condition, the penalty can change the strategies of local governments to a certain extent, but it is still difficult to achieve complete self-discipline management of public health service institutions. If local governments implement a dynamic reward or penalty mechanism in the supervision process of public health services for older adults, the equilibrium between them tends to be evolutionary stable. For three dynamic mechanisms, a dynamic reward mechanism is more conducive to adopting a self-discipline behavior of public health service institutions, which is helpful to realize the supervision of public health services for older adults. Also, there is a positive correlation between the proportion of public health service institutions who adopt a "self-discipline behavior" strategy and the maximum punishment intensity, and a negative correlation with the reward intensity. This study provides theoretical and decision-making references for governments to explore the promotion and implementation of public health services in older adults.