Raising awareness about measurement error in research on unconscious mental processes

Differential effects of bilateral hippocampal CA3 damage on the implicit learning and recognition of complex event sequences

Learning regularities in the environment is a fundament of human cognition, which is supported by a network of brain regions that include the hippocampus. In two experiments, we assessed the effects of selective bilateral damage to human hippocampal subregion CA3, which was associated with autobiographical episodic amnesia extending ~50 years prior to the damage, on the ability to recognize complex, deterministic event sequences presented either in a spatial or a non-spatial configuration. In contrast to findings from related paradigms, modalities, and homologue species, hippocampal damage did not preclude recognition memory for an event sequence studied and tested at four spatial locations, whereas recognition memory for an event sequence presented at a single location was at chance. In two additional experiments, recognition memory for novel single-items was intact, whereas the ability to recognize novel single-items in a different location from that presented at study was at chance. The results are at variance with a general role of the hippocampus in the learning and recognition of complex event sequences based on non-adjacent spatial and temporal dependencies. We discuss the impact of the results on established theoretical accounts of the hippocampal contributions to implicit sequence learning and episodic memory.

How (not) to demonstrate unconscious priming: Overcoming issues with post-hoc data selection, low power, and frequentist statistics

One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.

Progressing, not regressing: A possible solution to the problem of regression to the mean in unconscious processing studies

How convincing is current evidence for unconscious processing? Recently, a major criticism suggested that some, if not much, of this evidence might be explained by a mere statistical phenomenon: regression to the mean (RttM). Excluding participants based on an awareness assessment is a common practice in studies of unconscious processing, and this post hoc data selection might lead to false effects that are driven by RttM for aware participants wrongfully classified as unaware. Here, we examined this criticism using both simulations and data from 12 studies probing unconscious processing (35 effects overall). In line with the original criticism, we confirmed that the reliability of awareness measures in the field is concerningly low. Yet, using simulations, we showed that reliability measures might be unsuitable for estimating error in awareness measures. Furthermore, we examined other solutions for assessing whether an effect is genuine or reflects RttM; all suffered from substantial limitations, such as a lack of specificity to unconscious processing, lack of power, or unjustified assumptions. Accordingly, we suggest a new nonparametric solution, which enjoys high specificity and relatively high power. Together, this work emphasizes the need to account for measurement error in awareness measures and evaluate its consequences for unconscious processing effects. It further suggests a way to meet the important challenge posed by RttM, in an attempt to establish a reliable and robust corpus of knowledge in studying unconscious processing.

Conscious and unconscious memory and eye movements in context-guided visual search: A computational and experimental reassessment of Ramey, Yonelinas, and Henderson (2019)

Are eye movements unconsciously guided towards target locations in familiar scenes? In a recent eyetracking study, Ramey, Yonelinas, and Henderson (2019) measured eye-movement efficiency (scanpath ratio) and memory judgments when participants searched for targets in repeated and novel scenes. When trials judged new with high confidence were selected, scanpath ratio was lower for old scenes (misses) than for new scenes (correct rejections). In addition, familiarity as measured by recognition confidence did not significantly predict scanpath ratio. Ramey et al. attributed these results to unconscious learning guiding eye movements. In a re-assessment of Ramey et al.'s data, we show that their findings can be accounted for by a single-system computational model in which eye movements and memory judgments are driven by a common latent memory representation. In particular, (a) the scanpath ratio difference between high-confidence misses and correct rejections is a consequence of regression to the mean, while (b) the null correlation between familiarity and scanpath ratio, partly a natural consequence of the low reliability of the scanpath ratio measure, is also reproduced by the model. Two pre-registered experiments confirm a novel prediction of the alternative single-system model. This work offers a parsimonious account of Ramey et al.'s findings without recourse to unconscious guidance of eye movements.

No evidence for contextual cueing beyond explicit recognition

Many studies claim that visual regularities can be learned unconsciously and without explicit awareness. For example in the contextual cueing paradigm, studies often make claims using a standard reasoning based on two results: (1) a reliable response time (RT) difference between repeated vs. new stimulus displays and (2) a close-to-chance sensitivity when participants are asked to explicitly recognize repeated stimulus displays. From this pattern of results, studies routinely conclude that the sensitivity of RT responses is higher than that of explicit responses-an empirical situation we call Indirect Task Advantage (ITA). Many studies further infer from an ITA that RT effects were driven by a form of recognition that exceeds explicit memory: implicit recognition. However, this reasoning is flawed because the sensitivity underlying RT effects is never computed. To properly establish a difference, a sensitivity comparison is required. We apply this sensitivity comparison in a reanalysis of 20 contextual cueing studies showing that not a single study provides consistent evidence for ITAs. Responding to recent correlation-based arguments, we also demonstrate the absence of evidence for ITAs at the level of individual participants. This lack of ITAs has serious consequences for the field: If RT effects can be fully explained by weak but above-chance explicit recognition sensitivity, what is the empirical content of the label "implicit"? Thus, theoretical discussions in this paradigm-and likely in other paradigms using this standard reasoning-require serious reassessment because the current data from contextual cueing studies is insufficient to consider recognition as implicit.

Does response inhibition occur unconsciously? A systematic review and Bayesian meta-analysis

Consciousness is traditionally considered necessary for response inhibition. Recently, researchers have attempted to explore unconscious response inhibition using the masked go/no-go task. However, their findings were controversial and might have been confounded by the methodology employed. Therefore, we used a three-level Bayesian meta-analysis to provide the first systematic overview of the field of unconscious response inhibition. Finally, 34 studies in 16 articles with a total sample size of 521 were included. In summary, we found only inconclusive evidence of a reaction time slowing effect after excluding studies with conscious no-go experience (mean difference = 8.47 ms, BF10 = 2.71). In addition, the overall effect size of the difference in sensitivity to masked stimuli between the masked go/no-go task and the objective awareness task was small and uncertain (mean difference = 0.09, BF10 = 2.39). Taken together, these findings indicate a lack of solid evidence for the occurrence of unconscious response inhibition. Our findings do not oppose the possibility of unconscious response inhibition, but rather emphasize the need for more rigorous research methodologies in this field.

Conscious awareness and memory systems in the brain

The term "memory" typically refers to conscious retrieval of events and experiences from our past, but experience can also change our behaviour without corresponding awareness of the learning process or the associated outcome. Based primarily on early neuropsychological work, theoretical perspectives have distinguished between conscious memory, said to depend critically on structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL), and a collection of performance-based memories that do not. The most influential of these memory systems perspectives, the declarative memory theory, continues to be a mainstay of scientific work today despite mounting evidence suggesting that contributions of MTL structures go beyond the kinds or types of memory that can be explicitly reported. Consistent with these reports, more recent perspectives have focused increasingly on the processing operations supported by particular brain regions and the qualities or characteristics of resulting representations whether memory is expressed with or without awareness. These alternatives to the standard model generally converge on two key points. First, the hippocampus is critical for relational memory binding and representation even without awareness and, second, there may be little difference between some types of priming and explicit, familiarity-based recognition. Here, we examine the evolution of memory systems perspectives and critically evaluate scientific evidence that has challenged the status quo. Along the way, we highlight some of the challenges that researchers encounter in the context of this work, which can be contentious, and describe innovative methods that have been used to examine unconscious memory in the lab. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Psychology > Theory and Methods Philosophy > Consciousness.

Perceptual and semantic same-different processing under subliminal conditions

Although other types of subliminal integrative processing are widely refuted by recent studies, subliminal same-different processing (SSDP) remains unchallenged to this day. Using shapes, categorical images, and Chinese characters as stimuli, the current study assessed whether SSDP can occur on a perceptual and semantic basis. Although some significant results were found, the effects are much weaker than previous studies, with Bayes factors suggesting that these effects are not reliable. It is therefore concluded that substantiating claims of SSDP requires more reliable evidence than currently available.

Learning to suppress a distractor may not be unconscious

The additional singleton task has become a popular paradigm to explore visual statistical learning and selective attention. In this task, participants are instructed to find a different-shaped target among a series of distractors as fast as possible. In some trials, the search display includes a singleton distractor with a different color, making search more difficult. This singleton distractor appears more often in one location than in the remaining locations. The typical results of these experiments show that participants learn to ignore the area of the screen that is more likely to contain the singleton distractor. It is often claimed that this learning takes place unconsciously, because at the end of the experiment participants seem to be unable to identify the location where the singleton distractor appeared most frequently during the task. In the present study, we tested participants’ awareness in three high-powered experiments using alternative measures. Contrary to previous studies, the results show clear evidence of explicit knowledge about which area of the display was more likely to contain the singleton distractor, suggesting that this type of learning might not be unconscious.

The Pervasive Problem of Post Hoc Data Selection in Studies on Unconscious Processing

Studies on unconscious mental processes typically require that participants are unaware of some information (e.g., a visual stimulus). An important methodological question in this field of research is how to deal with data from participants who become aware of the critical stimulus according to some measure of awareness. While it has previously been argued that the post hoc selection of participants dependent on an awareness measure may often result in regression-to-the-mean artifacts (Shanks, 2017), a recent article (Sklar et al., 2021) challenged this conclusion claiming that the consideration of this statistical artifact might lead to unjustified rejections of true unconscious influences. In this reply, we explain this pervasive statistical problem with a basic and concrete example, show that Sklar et al. fundamentally mischaracterize it, and then refute the argument that the influence of the artifact has previously been overestimated. We conclude that, without safeguards, the method of post hoc data selection should never be employed in studies on unconscious processing.

The Challenge of Inferring Unconscious Mental Processes

Studies of unconscious mental processes often compare a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with a measure of awareness (e.g., a verbal report or forced-choice response) of the critical cue or contingency taken either concurrently or separately. The resulting patterns of bivariate data across participants lend themselves to several analytic approaches for inferring the existence of unconscious mental processes, but it is rare for researchers to consider the underlying generative processes that might cause these patterns. We show that bivariate data are generally insufficient to discriminate single-process models, with a unitary latent process determining both performance and awareness, from dual-process models, comprising distinct latent processes for performance and awareness. Future research attempting to isolate and investigate unconscious processes will need to employ richer types of data and analyses.