Metacognition tracks sensitivity following involuntary shifts of visual attention

Product, not process: Metacognitive monitoring of visual performance during sustained attention

The performance of the human visual system exhibits moment-to-moment fluctuations influenced by multiple neurocognitive factors. To deal with this instability of the visual system, introspective awareness of current visual performance (metacognitive monitoring) may be crucial. In this study, we investigate whether and how people can monitor their own visual performance during sustained attention by adopting confidence judgments as indicators of metacognitive monitoring - assuming that if participants can monitor visual performance, confidence judgments will accurately track performance fluctuations. In two experiments (N = 40), we found that participants were able to monitor fluctuations in visual performance during sustained attention. Importantly, metacognitive monitoring largely relied on the quality of target perception, a product of visual processing ("I lack confidence in my performance because I only caught a glimpse of the target"), rather than the states of the visual system during visual processing ("I lack confidence because I was not focusing on the task").

On Metacognition: Overconfidence in Word Recall Prediction and Its Association with Psychotic Symptoms in Patients with Schizophrenia

A two-factor account has been proposed as an explanatory model for the formation and maintenance of delusions. The first factor refers to a neurocognitive process leading to a significant change in subjective experience; the second factor has been regarded as a failure in hypothesis evaluation characterized by an impairment in metacognitive ability. This study was focused on the assessment of metacognition in patients with schizophrenia. The aims of the study were to measure the overconfidence in metacognitive judgments through the prediction of word list recall and to analyze the correlation between basic neurocognition (memory and executive function) and metacognition through a metamemory test and the severity of psychotic symptoms.

METHOD

Fifty-one participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were evaluated. The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) was used to assess the severity of psychiatric symptoms, and the subtest of metamemory included in the Executive Functions and Frontal Lobe-2 battery (BANFE-2) was used to evaluate overconfidence and underestimation errors, intrusion and perseverative response, total volume of recall, and Brief Functioning Assessment Scale (FAST) for social functioning.

RESULTS

The strongest correlation is observed between overconfidence errors and the positive factor of the PANSS (r = 0.774, p < 0.001). For the enter model in the multiple linear regression (r = 0.78, r2 = 0.61; F = 24.57, p < 0.001), the only significant predictor was overconfidence errors.

CONCLUSION

Our results highlight the relevance of a metacognitive bias of overconfidence, strongly correlated with psychotic symptoms, and support the hypothesis that metacognitive defects contribute to the failure to reject contradictory evidence. From our perspective, these findings align with current mechanistic models of schizophrenia that focus on the role of the prefrontal cortex.

Learning to discriminate the eye-of-origin during continuous flash suppression

Helmholtz asked whether one could discriminate which eye is the origin of one's perception merely based on the retinal signals. Studies to date showed that participants' ability to tell the eye-of-origin most likely depends on contextual cues. Nevertheless, it has been shown that exogenous attention can enhance performance for monocularly presented stimuli. We questioned whether adults can be trained to discriminate the eye-of-origin of their perceptions and if this ability depends on the strength of the monocular channels. We used attentional feed-forward training to improve the subject's eye-of-origin discrimination performance with voluntary attention. During training, participants received a binocular cue to inform them of the eye-of-origin of an upcoming target. Using continuous flash suppression, we also measured the signal strength of the monocular targets to see any possible modulations related to the cues. We collected confidence ratings from the participants about their eye-of-origin judgements to study in further detail whether metacognition has access to this information. Our results show that, even though voluntary attention did not alter the strength of the monocular channels, eye-of-origin discrimination performance improved following the training. A similar pattern was observed for confidence. The results from the feedforward attentional training and the increase in subjective confidence point towards a high-level decisional mechanism being responsible for the eye-of-origin judgements. We propose that this high-level process is informed by subtle sensory cues such as the differences in luminance or contrast in the two monocular channels.

When temporal attention interacts with expectation

Temporal attention is voluntarily deployed at specific moments, whereas temporal expectation is deployed according to timing probabilities. When the target appears at an expected moment in a sequence, temporal attention improves performance at the attended moments, but the timing and the precision of the attentional window remain unknown. Here we independently and concurrently manipulated temporal attention-via behavioral relevance-and temporal expectation-via session-wise precision and trial-wise hazard rate-to investigate whether and how these mechanisms interact to improve perception. Our results reveal that temporal attention interacts with temporal expectation-the higher the precision, the stronger the attention benefit, but surprisingly this benefit decreased with delayed onset despite the increasing probability of stimulus appearance. When attention was suboptimally deployed to earlier than expected moments, it could not be reoriented to a later time point. These findings provide evidence that temporal attention and temporal expectation are different mechanisms, and highlight their interplay in optimizing visual performance.