Clinical diagnosis of prolonged states of impaired consciousness in adults

Unconsciousness or unresponsiveness in akinetic mutism? Insights from a multimodal longitudinal exploration

The clinical assessment of patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) relies on the observation of behavioural responses to standardised sensory stimulation. However, several medical comorbidities may directly impair the production of reproducible and appropriate responses, thus reducing the sensitivity of behaviour-based diagnoses. One such comorbidity is akinetic mutism (AM), a rare neurological syndrome characterised by the inability to initiate volitional motor responses, sometimes associated with clinical presentations that overlap with those of DoC. In this paper, we describe the case of a patient with large bilateral mesial frontal lesions, showing prolonged behavioural unresponsiveness and severe disorganisation of electroencephalographic (EEG) background, compatible with a vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS). By applying an unprecedented multimodal battery of advanced imaging and electrophysiology-based techniques (AIE) encompassing spontaneous EEG, evoked potentials, event-related potentials, transcranial magnetic stimulation combined with EEG and structural and functional MRI, we provide the following: (i) a demonstration of the preservation of consciousness despite unresponsiveness in the context of AM, (ii) a plausible neurophysiological explanation for behavioural unresponsiveness and its subsequent recovery during rehabilitation stay and (iii) novel insights into the relationships between DoC, AM and parkinsonism. The present case offers proof-of-principle evidence supporting the clinical utility of a multimodal hierarchical workflow that combines AIEs to detect covert signs of consciousness in unresponsive patients.

Food as Love: Ethical and Moral Dilemmas in Withdrawal of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration in the Minimally Conscious State

Supportive Palliative Care and Hospice professionals frequently attend to Minimally Conscious State (MCS) patients near the end of life and in so doing, face decisions over maintenance or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Although both withholding and withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) in such circumstances are considered by experts in ethics and law to be acceptable, not all families nor health care professionals agree. This paper will explore basic aspects of serious brain injuries, especially MCS, the psychological role of food in interpersonal relationships, and lessons from clinical ethics that can help in goals of care discussions about withdrawal of ANH.

Possible Tacrolimus-Related Neuropsychiatric Symptoms: One Year After Allogeneic Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation: A Case Report

Tacrolimus is a calcineurin inhibitor (CNI), an immunosuppressive agent used to prevent graft versus host disease following allogeneic hematopoietic cell transplantation (HCT). Side-effects of tacrolimus treatment include neuropsychiatric symptoms, for example, affective disturbances, psychosis, and akinetic mutism. The onset of side-effects is independent of tacrolimus blood concentration and can occur years after treatment initiation. To our knowledge, case-reports describing tacrolimus-induced neuropsychiatric symptoms following HCT are sparse. This article reports the case of a 60-year-old woman with T-cell prolymphocytic leukemia, who developed memory loss, affective disturbances, and delusions, 1-year after HCT, and tacrolimus treatmentinitiation. Upon hospital admission, she was motionless and mute, albeit easily roused. The routine physical examination was without pathological findings. Blood work and microbiological analyses of blood and cerebrospinal fluid were normal. The neuroimaging showed chronic structural changes without relation to the debut of neuropsychiatric symptoms. Tacrolimus was discontinued on suspicion of tacrolimus-induced neuropsychiatric symptoms. The patient recovered within 48 hours of discontinuation. She was switch to prednisone treatment, and there has been no reemergence of neuropsychiatric symptoms since.

Persistent vegetative state: an overview

Background

Disorder of consciousness diagnosis, especially when is classified as persistent vegetative state (without misestimating the other diagnosis classifications), in the intensive care is an important diagnosis to evaluate and treat. Persistent vegetative state diagnosis is a challenge in the daily clinical practice because the diagnosis is made mainly based upon the clinical history and the patient behavior observation. There are some specific criteria for this diagnosis, and this could be very tricky when the physician is not well trained.

Main body

We made a literature review regarding the persistent vegetative state diagnosis, clinical features, management, prognosis, and daily medical practice challenges while considering the bioethical issues and the family perspective about the patient status. The objective of this overview is to provide updated information regarding this clinical state’s features while considering the current medical literature available.

Conclusions

Regardless of the currently available guidelines and literature, there is still a lot of what we do not know about the persistent vegetative state. There is a lack of evidence regarding the optimal diagnosis and even more, about how to expect a natural history of this disorder of consciousness. It is important to recall that the patients (despite of their altered mental state diagnosis) should always be treated to avoid some of the intensive care unit long-stance complications.

Prognostic models for prolonged disorders of consciousness: an integrative review

Disorders of consciousness (DoC) are acquired conditions of severe altered consciousness. During the past decades, some prognostic models for DoC have been explored on the basis of a variety of predictors, including demographics, neurological examinations, clinical diagnosis, neurophysiology and brain images. In this article, a systematic review of pertinent literature was conducted. We identified and evaluated 21 prognostic models involving a total of 1201 DoC patients. In terms of the reported accuracies of predicting the prognosis of DoC, these 21 models vary widely, ranging from 60 to 90%. Using improvement of consciousness level as favorable outcome criteria, we performed a quantitative meta-analysis, and found that the pooled sensitivity and specificity of the hybrid model that combined more than one technique were both superior to those of any single technique, including EEG and fMRI at the tasks and resting state. These results support the view that any single technique has its own advantages and limitations; and the integrations of multiple techniques, including diverse brain images and different paradigms, have the potential to improve predictive accuracy for DoC. Then, we provide methodological points of view and some prospects about future research. Totally, in comparison to a great many diagnostic methods for the DoC, the research of prognostic models is sparse and preliminary, still largely in its infancy with many challenges and opportunities.

Adverse Vascular Risk Relates to Cerebrospinal Fluid Biomarker Evidence of Axonal Injury in the Presence of Alzheimer's Disease Pathology

BACKGROUND

Vascular risk factors promote cerebral small vessel disease and neuropathological changes, particularly in white matter where large-caliber axons are located. How Alzheimer's disease pathology influences the brain's vulnerability in this regard is not well understood.

OBJECTIVE

Systemic vascular risk was assessed in relation to cerebrospinal fluid concentrations of neurofilament light, a biomarker of large-caliber axonal injury, evaluating for interactions by clinical and protein markers of Alzheimer's disease.

METHODS

Among Alzheimer's Disease Neuroimaging Initiative participants with normal cognition (n = 117), mild cognitive impairment (n = 190), and Alzheimer's disease (n = 95), linear regression related vascular risk (as measured by the modified Framingham Stroke Risk Profile) to neurofilament light, adjusting for age, sex, education, and cognitive diagnosis. Interactions were assessed by cognitive diagnosis, and by cerebrospinal fluid markers of Aβ42, hyperphosphorylated tau, and total tau.

RESULTS

Vascular risk and neurofilament light were not related in the main effect model (p = 0.08). However, interactions emerged for total tau (p = 0.01) and hyperphosphorylated tau (p = 0.002) reflecting vascular risk becoming more associated with cerebrospinal fluid neurofilament light in the context of greater concentrations of tau biomarkers. An interaction also emerged for the Alzheimer's disease biomarker profiles (p = 0.046) where in comparison to the referent 'normal' biomarker group, individuals with abnormal levels of both Aβ42 and total tau showed stronger associations between vascular risk and neurofilament light.

CONCLUSION

Older adults may be more vulnerable to axonal injury in response to higher vascular risk burdens in the context of concomitant Alzheimer's disease pathology.

Prognostication of chronic disorders of consciousness using brain functional networks and clinical characteristics

Disorders of consciousness are a heterogeneous mixture of different diseases or injuries. Although some indicators and models have been proposed for prognostication, any single method when used alone carries a high risk of false prediction. This study aimed to develop a multidomain prognostic model that combines resting state functional MRI with three clinical characteristics to predict one year-outcomes at the single-subject level. The model discriminated between patients who would later recover consciousness and those who would not with an accuracy of around 88% on three datasets from two medical centers. It was also able to identify the prognostic importance of different predictors, including brain functions and clinical characteristics. To our knowledge, this is the first reported implementation of a multidomain prognostic model that is based on resting state functional MRI and clinical characteristics in chronic disorders of consciousness, which we suggest is accurate, robust, and interpretable.

Ten common questions (and their answers) on medical futility

The term medical futility is frequently used when discussing complex clinical scenarios and throughout the medical, legal, and ethics literature. However, we propose that health care professionals and others often use this term inaccurately and imprecisely, without fully appreciating the powerful, often visceral, response that the term can evoke. This article introduces and answers 10 common questions regarding medical futility in an effort to define, clarify, and explore the implications of the term. We discuss multiple domains related to futility, including the biological, ethical, legal, societal, and financial considerations that have a bearing on definitions and actions. Finally, we encourage empathetic communication among clinicians, patients, and families and emphasize how dialogue that seeks an understanding of multiple points of view is critically important in preventing or attenuating conflict among the involved parties.

Dissociation of vegetative and minimally conscious patients based on brain operational architectonics: factor of etiology

Discrimination between patients in vegetative (VS) and minimally conscious state (MCS) is currently based upon the behavioral gold standard. Behavioral assessment remains equivocal and difficult to interpret as evidence for the presence or absence of consciousness, resulting in possible clinical misdiagnosis in such patients. Application of an operational architectonics (OA) strategy to electroencephalogram (EEG) analysis reveals that absence of consciousness in patients in VS is paralleled by significant impairment in overall EEG operational architecture compared to patients in MCS: neuronal assemblies become smaller, their life span shortened, and they became highly unstable and functionally disconnected (desynchronized). However, in a previous study, patients with different brain damage etiologies were intermixed. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to investigate whether the application of OA methodology to EEG could reliably dissociate patients in VS and MCS independent of brain damage etiology. We conclude that the observed EEG OA structure impairment in patients in VS and partial preservation in patients in MCS is a marker of consciousness/unconsciousness rather than physiological damage. Results of this study may have neuroscientific, clinical, and ethical implications.

Rediscovering catatonia: the biography of a treatable syndrome

OBJECTIVE

Catatonia, a disorder of movement and mood, was described and named in 1874. Other observers quickly made the same recognition. By the turn of the century, however, catatonia was incorporated as a type within a conjured syndrome of schizophrenia. There, catatonia has lain in the psychiatric classification for more than a century.

METHOD

We review the history of catatonia and its present status. In the 1970s, the tie was questioned when catatonia was recognized among those with mood disorders. The recognition of catatonia within the neuroleptic malignant syndrome offered effective treatments of high doses of benzodiazepines and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), again questioning the tie. A verifying test for catatonia (the lorazepam sedation test) was developed. Soon the syndromes of delirious mania, toxic serotonin syndrome, and the repetitive behaviors in adolescents with autism were recognized as treatable variations of catatonia.

RESULTS

Ongoing studies now recognize catatonia among patients labeled as suffering from the Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome, anti-NMDAR encephalitis, obsessive-compulsive disease, and various mutisms.

CONCLUSION

Applying the treatments for catatonia to patients with these syndromes offers opportunities for clinical relief. Catatonia is a recognizable and effectively treatable neuropsychiatric syndrome. It has many faces. It warrants recognition outside schizophrenia in the psychiatric disease classification.

Stroke and disorders of consciousness

Objectives. To determine the severity of stroke and mortality in relation to the type of disturbance of consciousness and outcome of patients with disorders of consciousness. Patients and Methods. We retrospectively analyzed 201 patients. Assessment of disorders of consciousness is performed by Glasgow Coma Scale (Teasdale and Jennet, 1974) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Anonymous, 2000). The severity of stroke was determined by National Institutes of Health Stroke Scale (Lyden et al., 2011). Results. Fifty-four patients had disorders of consciousness (26.9%). Patients with disorders of consciousness on admission (P < 0.001) and discharge (P = 0.003) had a more severe stroke than patients without disturbances of consciousness. Mortality was significantly higher in patients with disorders of consciousness (P = 0.0001), and there was no difference in mortality in relation to the type of disturbance of consciousness. There is no statistically significant effect of specific predictors of survival in patients with disorders of consciousness. Conclusion. Patients with disorders of consciousness have a more severe stroke and higher mortality. There is no difference in mortality and severity of stroke between patients with quantitative and qualitative disorders of consciousness. There is no statistically significant effect of specific predictors of survival in patients with disorders of consciousness.

Diagnosis of brain death

Brain death (BD) should be understood as the ultimate clinical expression of a brain catastrophe characterized by a complete and irreversible neurological stoppage, recognized by irreversible coma, absent brainstem reflexes, and apnea. The most common pattern is manifested by an elevation of intracranial pressure to a point beyond the mean arterial pressure, and hence cerebral perfusion pressure falls and, as a result, no net cerebral blood flow is present, in due course leading to permanent cytotoxic injury of the intracranial neuronal tissue. A second mechanism is an intrinsic injury affecting the nervous tissue at a cellular level which, if extensive and unremitting, can also lead to BD. We review here the methodology of diagnosing death, based on finding any of the signs of death. The irreversible loss of cardio-circulatory and respiratory functions can cause death only when ischemia and anoxia are prolonged enough to produce an irreversible destruction of the brain. The sign of such loss of brain functions, that is to say BD diagnosis, is fully reviewed.

Brain death, states of impaired consciousness, and physician-assisted death for end-of-life organ donation and transplantation

In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea (i.e., brain death) with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism (locked-in syndrome), minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human death. (1) Brain death does not disrupt somatic integrative unity and coordinated biological functioning of a living organism. (2) Neurological criteria of human death fail to determine the precise moment of an organism's death when death is established by circulatory criterion in other states of impaired consciousness for organ procurement with non-heart-beating donation protocols. The criterion of circulatory arrest 75 s to 5 min is too short for irreversible cessation of whole brain functions and respiration controlled by the brain stem. (3) Brain-based criteria for determining death with a beating heart exclude relevant anthropologic, psychosocial, cultural, and religious aspects of death and dying in society. (4) Clinical guidelines for determining brain death are not consistently validated by the presence of irreversible brain stem ischemic injury or necrosis on autopsy; therefore, they do not completely exclude reversible loss of integrated neurological functions in donors. The questionable reliability and varying compliance with these guidelines among institutions amplify the risk of determining reversible states of impaired consciousness as irreversible brain death. (5) The scientific uncertainty of defining and determining states of impaired consciousness including brain death have been neither disclosed to the general public nor broadly debated by the medical community or by legal and religious scholars. Heart-beating or non-heart-beating organ procurement from patients with impaired consciousness is de facto a concealed practice of physician-assisted death, and therefore, violates both criminal law and the central tenet of medicine not to do harm to patients. Society must decide if physician-assisted death is permissible and desirable to resolve the conflict about procuring organs from patients with impaired consciousness within the context of the perceived need to enhance the supply of transplantable organs.

Lactic dehydrogenase in cerebrospinal fluid may differentiate between structural and non-structural central nervous system lesions in patients with diminished levels of consciousness

BACKGROUND

Impaired consciousness without a history of trauma is a common reason for emergency department (ED) visits. Among critically ill patients with a history and physical findings suggestive of a cerebrovascular accident (CVA), it may be difficult to differentiate between a structural and a non-structural cause for their condition.

OBJECTIVES

This study was conducted to determine if lactic dehydrogenase (LDH) levels in the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) of patients with acute non-traumatic neurological disorders could distinguish between structural and non-structural etiologies.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

Over a 6-month period, CSF specimens were collected from 54 critically ill patients admitted to the ED with impaired consciousness and findings consistent with a CVA. The patients had moderate to severe impairment of consciousness, had a new motor or sensory deficit, or had meningeal signs of recent onset. CSF-LDH levels were analyzed because CSF levels of the enzyme are typically elevated in meningitis, metastatic cancer, and disorders resulting in ischemic necroses. Patients were excluded if a computed tomography scan showed contraindications to performing a lumbar puncture, if they had a coagulopathy, or if the CSF was xanthochromic or produced visible blood sediment after centrifuging. The data were analyzed according to the patients' admission diagnoses-structural vs. non-structural lesion.

RESULTS

Of the samples collected from 54 patients, eight were excluded. Among the 46 patients included in the study, the mean age was 56.1 +/- 2.75 years, mean APACHE II score was 20.93 +/- 0.98, Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) score was 7.15 +/- 0.49, and mortality was 55% (22 patients). The 30 patients with a structural abnormality had a mean age of 56.7 +/- 3.55 years, GCS score of 7.3 +/- 0.61, APACHE II score of 20.2 +/- 1.1, mortality of 43% (13 patients), and CSF-LDH level of 128.8 +/- 24.8 IU/L (95% confidence interval [CI] 78.1-179.6). The 16 patients with a non-structural (metabolic) disturbance had: a mean age of 55.0 +/- 4.42 years, GCS score of 6.87 +/- 0.86, APACHE II score of 22.2 +/- 1.94, mortality of 56% (9 patients), and CSF-LDH level of 29.8 +/- 2.9 IU/L (95% CI 23.6-36.1). Analysis by Student's t-test was p < 0.05. When the diagnostic value of CSF-LDH level was evaluated using a cutoff point of 40 IU/L, the following results were obtained: sensitivity: 86.7%, specificity: 81.3%, pretest likelihood: 65%, positive predictive value: 90%, negative predictive value: 76%, Likelihood Ratio (LR)+: 4.62, LR-: 0.16 (6.25-fold increase).

CONCLUSIONS

In critically ill patients with acutely altered levels of consciousness but without a history of trauma, a CSF-LDH value < or = 40 IU/L is associated with non-structural pathology.

Mismatch of neurophysiological findings in partial recovery of consciousness: a case report

AIM

Electroencephalography (EEG) and somatosensory potentials (SEP) are regarded as useful tools for exploring residual brain activity and providing information for recovery in patients with anoxic encephalopaty. However, the diagnoses of vegetative and minimally conscious states can only be made by means of repeated specific neurological examinations. In this respect, this study describes the case of a patient with mismatch of neurophysiological findings despite partial recovery to a minimally conscious state.

CASE REPORT

A 52-year-old man was admitted to the Post-Coma Intensive and Rehabilitation Care Unit with a diagnosis of anoxic encephalopathy. EEG, according to Hockaday, was severely abnormal (Grade IVa). SEP showed bilateral loss of all cortical components. Four weeks after admission the Coma Recovery Scale Revised (CRS-R) score moved from 7/23 to 13/23.

CONCLUSIONS

This patient persistently showed a mismatch of neurophysiological findings which did not anticipate the slight but discriminating improvement ascertained through the neurological examination. This observation confirms that electrophysiological evaluations can only be regarded as ancillary tools since level of consciousness may be reliably evaluated only by means of repeated specific neurological assessments. As this case-report suggests, neurophysiological findings may turn out to be inconclusive and misleading in relation to the assessment of consciousness and may lead to an underestimate of minimal signs of recovery across the grey-zone from the vegetative to the minimally conscious state.

Coma, delirium, and cognitive dysfunction in critical illness

Syndromes of global cerebral dysfunction that are associated with critical illness include acute disorders (eg, coma, delirium) and chronic processes (ie, cognitive impairment). These syndromes can result from direct cerebral injury; however, many cases develop as a complication of a systemic insult. Coma frequently evolves into phenomenologically distinct disorders of consciousness; it must be differentiated from conditions in which consciousness is preserved, as in the locked-in state. Advances have been made in defining, scoring, and delineating the epidemiology of cerebral dysfunction in the ICU, but research is needed to elucidate underlying mechanisms, with the goal of identifying targets for prevention and therapy.

Chronic disorders of consciousness

The vegetative state and the minimally conscious state are disorders of consciousness that can be acute and reversible or chronic and irreversible. Diffuse lesions of the thalami, cortical neurons, or the white-matter tracts that connect them cause the vegetative state, which is wakefulness without awareness. Functional imaging with PET and functional MRI shows activation of primary cortical areas with stimulation, but not of secondary areas or distributed neural networks that would indicate awareness. Vegetative state has a poor prognosis for recovery of awareness when present for more than a year in traumatic cases and for 3 months in non-traumatic cases. Patients in minimally conscious state are poorly responsive to stimuli, but show intermittent awareness behaviours. Indeed, findings of preliminary functional imaging studies suggest that some patients could have substantially intact awareness. The outcomes of minimally conscious state are variable. Stimulation treatments have been disappointing in vegetative state but occasionally improve minimally conscious state. Treatment decisions for patients in vegetative state or minimally conscious state should follow established ethical and legal principles and accepted practice guidelines of professional medical specialty societies.

The Terri Schiavo saga: the making of a tragedy and lessons learned

The recent case of Terri Schiavo has been an important medical, legal, and ethical controversy. However, much of the public discussion of the tragedy has been based on inaccurate information regarding the facts of the case and the actual legal and ethical issues involved. This article reviews the pertinent aspects of the case and the ethical and legal questions raised and highlights the lessons we should learn from this unique story.