Unexpected arousal modulates the influence of sensory noise on confidence

Pupil dilation reflects effortful action invigoration in overcoming aversive Pavlovian biases

"Pavlovian" or "motivational" biases describe the phenomenon that the valence of prospective outcomes modulates action invigoration: Reward prospect invigorates action, whereas punishment prospect suppresses it. The adaptive role of these biases in decision-making is still unclear. One idea is that they constitute a fast-and-frugal decision strategy in situations characterized by high arousal, e.g., in presence of a predator, which demand a quick response. In this pre-registered study (N = 35), we tested whether such a situation-induced via subliminally presented angry versus neutral faces-leads to increased reliance on Pavlovian biases. We measured trial-by-trial arousal by tracking pupil diameter while participants performed an orthogonalized Motivational Go/NoGo Task. Pavlovian biases were present in responses, reaction times, and even gaze, with lower gaze dispersion under aversive cues reflecting "freezing of gaze." The subliminally presented faces did not affect responses, reaction times, or pupil diameter, suggesting that the arousal manipulation was ineffective. However, pupil dilations reflected facets of bias suppression, specifically the physical (but not cognitive) effort needed to overcome aversive inhibition: Particularly strong and sustained dilations occurred when participants managed to perform Go responses to aversive cues. Conversely, no such dilations occurred when they managed to inhibit responses to Win cues. These results suggest that pupil diameter does not reflect response conflict per se nor the inhibition of prepotent responses, but specifically effortful action invigoration as needed to overcome aversive inhibition. We discuss our results in the context of the "value of work" theory of striatal dopamine.

Pharmacological Elevation of Catecholamine Levels Improves Perceptual Decisions, But Not Metacognitive Insight

Perceptual decisions are often accompanied by a feeling of decision confidence. Where the parietal cortex is known for its crucial role in shaping such perceptual decisions, metacognitive evaluations are thought to additionally rely on the (pre)frontal cortex. Because of this supposed neural differentiation between these processes, perceptual and metacognitive decisions may be divergently affected by changes in internal (e.g., attention, arousal) and external (e.g., task and environmental demands) factors. Although intriguing, causal evidence for this hypothesis remains scarce. Here, we investigated the causal effect of two neuromodulatory systems on behavioral and neural measures of perceptual and metacognitive decision-making. Specifically, we pharmacologically elevated levels of catecholamines (with atomoxetine) and acetylcholine (with donepezil) in healthy adult human participants performing a visual discrimination task in which we gauged decision confidence, while electroencephalography was measured. Where cholinergic effects were not robust, catecholaminergic enhancement improved perceptual sensitivity, while at the same time leaving metacognitive sensitivity unaffected. Neurally, catecholaminergic elevation did not affect sensory representations of task-relevant visual stimuli but instead enhanced well-known decision signals measured over the centroparietal cortex, reflecting the accumulation of sensory evidence over time. Crucially, catecholaminergic enhancement concurrently impoverished neural markers measured over the frontal cortex linked to the formation of metacognitive evaluations. Enhanced catecholaminergic neuromodulation thus improves perceptual but not metacognitive decision-making.

A low-dimensional approximation of optimal confidence

Human decision making is accompanied by a sense of confidence. According to Bayesian decision theory, confidence reflects the learned probability of making a correct response, given available data (e.g., accumulated stimulus evidence and response time). Although optimal, independently learning these probabilities for all possible data combinations is computationally intractable. Here, we describe a novel model of confidence implementing a low-dimensional approximation of this optimal yet intractable solution. This model allows efficient estimation of confidence, while at the same time accounting for idiosyncrasies, different kinds of biases and deviation from the optimal probability correct. Our model dissociates confidence biases resulting from the estimate of the reliability of evidence by individuals (captured by parameter α), from confidence biases resulting from general stimulus independent under and overconfidence (captured by parameter β). We provide empirical evidence that this model accurately fits both choice data (accuracy, response time) and trial-by-trial confidence ratings simultaneously. Finally, we test and empirically validate two novel predictions of the model, namely that 1) changes in confidence can be independent of performance and 2) selectively manipulating each parameter of our model leads to distinct patterns of confidence judgments. As a tractable and flexible account of the computation of confidence, our model offers a clear framework to interpret and further resolve different forms of confidence biases.

Double Dissociation of Spontaneous Alpha-Band Activity and Pupil-Linked Arousal on Additive and Multiplicative Perceptual Gain

Perception is a probabilistic process dependent on external stimulus properties and one's internal state. However, which internal states influence perception and via what mechanisms remain debated. We studied how spontaneous alpha-band activity (8-13 Hz) and pupil fluctuations impact visual detection and confidence across stimulus contrast levels (i.e., the contrast response function, CRF). In human subjects of both sexes, we found that low prestimulus alpha power induced an "additive" shift in the CRF, whereby stimuli were reported present more frequently at all contrast levels, including contrast of zero (i.e., false alarms). Conversely, prestimulus pupil size had a "multiplicative" effect on detection such that stimuli occurring during large pupil states (putatively corresponding to higher arousal) were perceived more frequently as contrast increased. Signal detection modeling reveals that alpha power changes detection criteria equally across the CRF but not detection sensitivity (d'), whereas pupil-linked arousal modulated sensitivity, particularly for higher contrasts. Interestingly, pupil size and alpha power were positively correlated, meaning that some of the effect of alpha on detection may be mediated by pupil fluctuations. However, pupil-independent alpha still induced an additive shift in the CRF corresponding to a criterion effect. Our data imply that low alpha boosts detection and confidence by an additive factor, rather than by a multiplicative scaling of contrast responses, a profile which captures the effect of pupil-linked arousal. We suggest that alpha power and arousal fluctuations have dissociable effects on behavior. Alpha reflects the baseline level of visual excitability, which can vary independent of arousal.

Arousal coherence, uncertainty, and well-being: an active inference account

Here we build on recent findings which show that greater alignment between our subjective experiences (how we feel) and physiological states (measurable changes in our body) plays a pivotal role in the overall psychological well-being. Specifically, we propose that the alignment or 'coherence' between affective arousal (e.g. how excited we 'feel') and autonomic arousal (e.g. heart rate or pupil dilation) may be key for maintaining up-to-date uncertainty representations in dynamic environments. Drawing on recent advances in interoceptive and affective inference, we also propose that arousal coherence reflects interoceptive integration, facilitates adaptive belief updating, and impacts our capacity to adapt to changes in uncertainty, with downstream consequences to well-being. We also highlight the role of meta-awareness of arousal, a third level of inference, which may permit conscious awareness, learning about, and intentional regulation of lower-order sources of arousal. Practices emphasizing meta-awareness of arousal (like meditation) may therefore elicit some of their known benefits via improved arousal coherence. We suggest that arousal coherence is also likely to be associated with markers of adaptive functioning (like emotional awareness and self-regulatory capacities) and discuss mind-body practices that may increase coherence.

Human-like dissociations between confidence and accuracy in convolutional neural networks

Prior research has shown that manipulating stimulus energy by changing both stimulus contrast and variability results in confidence-accuracy dissociations in humans. Specifically, even when performance is matched, higher stimulus energy leads to higher confidence. The most common explanation for this effect is the positive evidence heuristic where confidence neglects evidence that disconfirms the choice. However, an alternative explanation is the signal-and-variance-increase hypothesis, according to which these dissociations arise from low-level changes in the separation and variance of perceptual representations. Because artificial neural networks lack built-in confidence heuristics, they can serve as a test for the necessity of confidence heuristics in explaining confidence-accuracy dissociations. Therefore, we tested whether confidence-accuracy dissociations induced by stimulus energy manipulations emerge naturally in convolutional neural networks (CNNs). We found that, across three different energy manipulations, CNNs produced confidence-accuracy dissociations similar to those found in humans. This effect was present for a range of CNN architectures from shallow 4-layer networks to very deep ones, such as VGG-19 and ResNet -50 pretrained on ImageNet. Further, we traced back the reason for the confidence-accuracy dissociations in all CNNs to the same signal-and-variance increase that has been proposed for humans: higher stimulus energy increased the separation and variance of the CNNs' internal representations leading to higher confidence even for matched accuracy. These findings cast doubt on the necessity of the positive evidence heuristic to explain human confidence and establish CNNs as promising models for adjudicating between low-level, stimulus-driven and high-level, cognitive explanations of human behavior.

The future of metacognition research: Balancing construct breadth with measurement rigor

Foundational work in the psychology of metacognition identified a distinction between metacognitive knowledge (stable beliefs about one's capacities) and metacognitive experiences (local evaluations of performance). More recently, the field has focused on developing tasks and metrics that seek to identify metacognitive capacities from momentary estimates of confidence in performance, and providing precise computational accounts of metacognitive failure. However, this notable progress in formalising models of metacognitive judgments may come at a cost of ignoring broader elements of the psychology of metacognition - such as how stable meta-knowledge is formed, how social cognition and metacognition interact, and how we evaluate affective states that do not have an obvious ground truth. We propose that construct breadth in metacognition research can be restored while maintaining rigour in measurement, and highlight promising avenues for expanding the scope of metacognition research. Such a research programme is well placed to recapture qualitative features of metacognitive knowledge and experience while maintaining the psychophysical rigor that characterises modern research on confidence and performance monitoring.

Hands of confidence: When gestures increase confidence in spatial problem-solving

This study examined whether the metacognitive system monitors the potential positive effects of gestures on spatial thinking. Participants (N = 59, 31F, Mage = 21.67) performed a mental rotation task, consisting of 24 problems varying in difficulty, and they evaluated their confidence in their answers to problems in either gesture or control conditions. The results revealed that performance and confidence were higher in the gesture condition, in which the participants were asked to use their gestures during problem-solving, compared with the control condition, extending the literature by evidencing gestures' role in metacognition. Yet, the effect was only evident for females, who already performed worse than males, and when the problems were difficult. Encouraging gestures adversely affected performance and confidence in males. Such results suggest that gestures selectively influence cognition and metacognition and highlight the importance of task-related (i.e., difficulty) and individual-related variables (i.e., sex) in elucidating the links between gestures, confidence, and spatial thinking.

Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective

Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Noninvasive characterization of peripheral sympathetic activation across sensory stimuli using a peripheral arterial stiffness index

Introduction: The peripheral arterial stiffness index has been proposed and validated as a noninvasive measure quantifying stimulus intensity based on amplitude changes induced by sympathetic innervation of vascular tone. However, its temporal response characteristics remain unclear, thus hindering continuous and accurate monitoring of the dynamic process of sympathetic activation. This paper presents a study aimed at modeling the transient response of the index across sensory stimuli to characterize the corresponding peripheral sympathetic activation. Methods: The index was measured using a continuous arterial pressure monitor and a pulse oximeter during experiments with local pain and local cooling stimuli designed to elicit different patterns of sympathetic activation. The corresponding response of the index was modeled to clarify its transient response characteristics across stimuli. Results: The constructed transfer function accurately depicted the transient response of the index to local pain and local cooling stimuli (Fit percentage: 78.4% ± 11.00% and 79.92% ± 8.79%). Differences in dead time (1.17 ± 0.67 and 0.99 ± 0.56 s, p = 0.082), peak time (2.89 ± 0.81 and 2.64 ± 0.68 s, p = 0.006), and rise time (1.81 ± 0.50 and 1.65 ± 0.48 s, p = 0.020) revealed different response patterns of the index across stimuli. The index also accurately characterized similar vasomotor velocities at different normalized peak amplitudes (0.19 ± 0.16 and 0.16 ± 0.19 a.u., p = 0.007). Discussion: Our findings flesh out the characterization of peripheral arterial stiffness index responses to different sensory stimuli and demonstrate its validity in characterizing peripheral sympathetic activation. This study valorizes a noninvasive method to characterize peripheral sympathetic activation, with the potential to use this index to continuously and accurately track sympathetic activators.

Introspective inference counteracts perceptual distortion

Introspective agents can recognize the extent to which their internal perceptual experiences deviate from the actual states of the external world. This ability, also known as insight, is critically required for reality testing and is impaired in psychosis, yet little is known about its cognitive underpinnings. We develop a Bayesian modeling framework and a psychophysics paradigm to quantitatively characterize this type of insight while people experience a motion after-effect illusion. People can incorporate knowledge about the illusion into their decisions when judging the actual direction of a motion stimulus, compensating for the illusion (and often overcompensating). Furthermore, confidence, reaction-time, and pupil-dilation data all show signatures consistent with inferential adjustments in the Bayesian insight model. Our results suggest that people can question the veracity of what they see by making insightful inferences that incorporate introspective knowledge about internal distortions.

Is predictive coding falsifiable?

Predictive-coding has justifiably become a highly influential theory in Neuroscience. However, the possibility of its unfalsifiability has been raised. We argue that if predictive-coding were unfalsifiable, it would be a problem, but there are patterns of behavioural and neuroimaging data that would stand against predictive-coding. Contra (vanilla) predictive patterns are those in which the more expected stimulus generates the largest evoked-response. However, basic formulations of predictive-coding mandate that an expected stimulus should generate little, if any, prediction error and thus little, if any, evoked-response. It has, though, been argued that contra (vanilla) predictive patterns can be obtained if precision is higher for expected stimuli. Certainly, using precision, one can increase the amplitude of an evoked-response, turning a predictive into a contra (vanilla) predictive pattern. We demonstrate that, while this is true, it does not present an absolute barrier to falsification. This is because increasing precision also reduces latency and increases the frequency of the response. These properties can be used to determine whether precision-weighting in predictive-coding justifiably explains a contra (vanilla) predictive pattern, ensuring that predictive-coding is falsifiable.

Cardiac activity impacts cortical motor excitability

Human cognition and action can be influenced by internal bodily processes such as heartbeats. For instance, somatosensory perception is impaired both during the systolic phase of the cardiac cycle and when heartbeats evoke stronger cortical responses. Here, we test whether these cardiac effects originate from overall changes in cortical excitability. Cortical and corticospinal excitability were assessed using electroencephalographic and electromyographic responses to transcranial magnetic stimulation while concurrently monitoring cardiac activity with electrocardiography. Cortical and corticospinal excitability were found to be highest during systole and following stronger neural responses to heartbeats. Furthermore, in a motor task, hand-muscle activity and the associated desynchronization of sensorimotor oscillations were stronger during systole. These results suggest that systolic cardiac signals have a facilitatory effect on motor excitability-in contrast to sensory attenuation that was previously reported for somatosensory perception. Thus, it is possible that distinct time windows exist across the cardiac cycle, optimizing either perception or action.

Body as First Teacher: The Role of Rhythmic Visceral Dynamics in Early Cognitive Development

Embodied cognition-the idea that mental states and processes should be understood in relation to one's bodily constitution and interactions with the world-remains a controversial topic within cognitive science. Recently, however, increasing interest in predictive processing theories among proponents and critics of embodiment alike has raised hopes of a reconciliation. This article sets out to appraise the unificatory potential of predictive processing, focusing in particular on embodied formulations of active inference. Our analysis suggests that most active-inference accounts invoke weak, potentially trivial conceptions of embodiment; those making stronger claims do so independently of the theoretical commitments of the active-inference framework. We argue that a more compelling version of embodied active inference can be motivated by adopting a diachronic perspective on the way rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development in utero. According to this visceral afferent training hypothesis, early-emerging physiological processes are essential not only for supporting the biophysical development of neural structures but also for configuring the cognitive architecture those structures entail. Focusing in particular on the cardiovascular system, we propose three candidate mechanisms through which visceral afferent training might operate: (a) activity-dependent neuronal development, (b) periodic signal modeling, and (c) oscillatory network coordination.

Perceived time expands and contracts within each heartbeat

Perception of passing time can be distorted.¹ Emotional experiences, particularly arousal, can contract or expand experienced duration via their interactions with attentional and sensory processing mechanisms.^2,3 Current models suggest that perceived duration can be encoded from accumulation processes^4,5 and from temporally evolving neural dynamics.^6,7 Yet all neural dynamics and information processing ensue at the backdrop of continuous interoceptive signals originating from within the body. Indeed, phasic fluctuations within the cardiac cycle impact neural and information processing.^{8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15} Here, we show that these momentary cardiac fluctuations distort experienced time and that their effect interacts with subjectively experienced arousal. In a temporal bisection task, durations (200-400 ms) of an emotionally neutral visual shape or auditory tone (experiment 1) or of an image displaying happy or fearful facial expressions (experiment 2) were categorized as short or long.¹⁶ Across both experiments, stimulus presentation was time-locked to systole, when the heart contracts and baroreceptors fire signals to the brain, and to diastole, when the heart relaxes, and baroreceptors are quiescent. When participants judged the duration of emotionally neural stimuli (experiment 1), systole led to temporal contraction, whereas diastole led to temporal expansion. Such cardiac-led distortions were further modulated by the arousal ratings of the perceived facial expressions (experiment 2). At low arousal, systole contracted while diastole expanded time, but as arousal increased, this cardiac-led time distortion disappeared, shifting duration perception toward contraction. Thus, experienced time contracts and expands within each heartbeat-a balance that is disrupted under heightened arousal.

Confidence of probabilistic predictions modulates the cortical response to pain

Pain typically evolves over time, and the brain needs to learn this temporal evolution to predict how pain is likely to change in the future and orient behavior. This process is termed temporal statistical learning (TSL). Recently, it has been shown that TSL for pain sequences can be achieved using optimal Bayesian inference, which is encoded in somatosensory processing regions. Here, we investigate whether the confidence of these probabilistic predictions modulates the EEG response to noxious stimuli, using a TSL task. Confidence measures the uncertainty about the probabilistic prediction, irrespective of its actual outcome. Bayesian models dictate that the confidence about probabilistic predictions should be integrated with incoming inputs and weight learning, such that it modulates the early components of the EEG responses to noxious stimuli, and this should be captured by a negative correlation: when confidence is higher, the early neural responses are smaller as the brain relies more on expectations/predictions and less on sensory inputs (and vice versa). We show that participants were able to predict the sequence transition probabilities using Bayesian inference, with some forgetting. Then, we find that the confidence of these probabilistic predictions was negatively associated with the amplitude of the N2 and P2 components of the vertex potential: the more confident were participants about their predictions, the smaller the vertex potential. These results confirm key predictions of a Bayesian learning model and clarify the functional significance of the early EEG responses to nociceptive stimuli, as being implicated in confidence-weighted statistical learning.

Trait Anxiety Influences Negative Affect-modulated Distribution of Visuospatial Attention

Visuospatial attention allows humans to selectively gate and prioritize visual (including salient, emotional) information for efficiently navigating natural visual environments. As emotions have been known to influence attentional performance, we asked if emotions also modulate the spatial distribution of visual attention and whether any such effect was further associated with individual differences in anxiety. Participants (n = 28) discriminated the orientation of target Gabor patches co-presented with distractors, speedily and accurately. The key manipulation was randomly presenting a task-irrelevant face emotion prime briefly (50 ms), conveying Neutral/Disgust/Scrambled (Null) emotion signal 150 ms preceding the target patches. We calculated attention gradient (change in negative inverse attentional efficiency with unit change in distance from the source of emotion signal) as a metric to answer our questions. Specifically, the Disgust signal modulated the direction of attention gradients differentially in individuals with varying degrees of trait - anxiety, such that the gradients correlated negatively with individual trait-anxiety scores. This implies spatial shifts in Disgust-signalled visual attention with varying trait - anxiety levels. Neutral yielded attention gradients comparable to Scrambled, implying no specific effect of this signal and there was no association with anxiety levels in both. No correlation was observed between state - anxiety and the emotion-cued attention gradients. In sum, the results suggest that individual trait - anxiety levels influence the effect of negative and physiologically arousing emotion signals (e.g., Disgust) on the spatial distribution of visual attention. The findings could be of relevance for understanding biases in visual behaviour underlying affective states and disorders.

Confidence reflects a noisy decision reliability estimate

Decisions vary in difficulty. Humans know this and typically report more confidence in easy than in difficult decisions. However, confidence reports do not perfectly track decision accuracy, but also reflect response biases and difficulty misjudgements. To isolate the quality of confidence reports, we developed a model of the decision-making process underlying choice-confidence data. In this model, confidence reflects a subject's estimate of the reliability of their decision. The quality of this estimate is limited by the subject's uncertainty about the uncertainty of the variable that informs their decision ('meta-uncertainty'). This model provides an accurate account of choice-confidence data across a broad range of perceptual and cognitive tasks, investigated in six previous studies. We find meta-uncertainty varies across subjects, is stable over time, generalizes across some domains and can be manipulated experimentally. The model offers a parsimonious explanation for the computational processes that underlie and constrain the sense of confidence.

Why and When Beliefs Change

Why people do or do not change their beliefs has been a long-standing puzzle. Sometimes people hold onto false beliefs despite ample contradictory evidence; sometimes they change their beliefs without sufficient reason. Here, we propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. Belief change can then be understood as an economic transaction in which the multidimensional utility of the old belief is compared against that of the new belief. Change will occur when potential outcomes alter across attributes, for example because of changing environments or when certain outcomes are made more or less salient.

Pupil diameter tracked during motor adaptation in humans

Pupil diameter, under constant illumination, is known to reflect individuals' internal states, such as surprise about observation and environmental uncertainty. Despite the growing use of pupillometry in cognitive learning studies as an additional measure for examining internal states, few studies have used pupillometry in human motor learning studies. Here, we provide the first detailed characterization of pupil diameter changes in a short-term reach adaptation paradigm. We measured pupil changes in 121 human participants while they adapted to abrupt, gradual, or switching force field conditions. Sudden increases in movement error caused by the introduction/reversal of the force field resulted in strong phasic pupil dilation during movement accompanied by a transient increase in tonic premovement baseline pupil diameter in subsequent trials. In contrast, pupil responses were reduced when the force field was gradually introduced, indicating that large, unexpected errors drove the changes in pupil responses. Interestingly, however, error-induced pupil responses gradually became insensitive after experiencing multiple force field reversals. We also found an association between baseline pupil diameter and incidental knowledge of the gradually introduced perturbation. Finally, in all experiments, we found a strong co-occurrence of larger baseline pupil diameter with slower reaction and movement times after each rest break. Collectively, these results suggest that tonic baseline pupil diameter reflects one's belief about environmental uncertainty, whereas phasic pupil dilation during movement reflects surprise about a sensory outcome (i.e., movement error), and both effects are modulated by novelty. Our results provide a new approach for nonverbally assessing participants' internal states during motor learning.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Pupil diameter is known as a noninvasive window into individuals' internal states. Despite the growing use of pupillometry in cognitive learning studies, it receives little attention in motor learning studies. Here, we characterized the pupil responses in a short-term reach adaptation paradigm by measuring pupil diameter of human participants while they adapted to abrupt, gradual, or switching force field conditions. Our results demonstrate how surprise and uncertainty reflected in pupil diameter develop during motor adaptation.

Influence of emotional stimuli on metacognition: A study in arithmetic

We investigate the role of negative emotional stimuli on direct and indirect metacognition, and document age-related differences in this role during adulthood. Participants were presented with negative or neutral pictures while asked to select which of two available strategies was the better strategy to find approximate estimates of two-digit multiplication problems. Following each strategy selection, participants provided either a direct (confidence judgment; Expt. 1) or an indirect (opt-out judgment; Expt. 2) evaluation of their strategy choice. Negative emotional stimuli decreased metacognitive accuracy for arithmetic strategy selection, but only when indirect metacognitive measures were collected. No differences were found when direct metacognitive judgments were requested. The effects of emotional stimuli on indirect metacognition and lack of effects on direct metacognition were found in both young and older adults. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the mechanisms underlying the effects of emotion on metacognition in young and older adults.

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

In the Body’s Eye: The computational anatomy of interoceptive inference

A growing body of evidence highlights the intricate linkage of exteroceptive perception to the rhythmic activity of the visceral body. In parallel, interoceptive inference theories of affective perception and self-consciousness are on the rise in cognitive science. However, thus far no formal theory has emerged to integrate these twin domains; instead, most extant work is conceptual in nature. Here, we introduce a formal model of cardiac active inference, which explains how ascending cardiac signals entrain exteroceptive sensory perception and uncertainty. Through simulated psychophysics, we reproduce the defensive startle reflex and commonly reported effects linking the cardiac cycle to affective behaviour. We further show that simulated ‘interoceptive lesions’ blunt affective expectations, induce psychosomatic hallucinations, and exacerbate biases in perceptual uncertainty. Through synthetic heart-rate variability analyses, we illustrate how the balance of arousal-priors and visceral prediction errors produces idiosyncratic patterns of physiological reactivity. Our model thus offers a roadmap for computationally phenotyping disordered brain-body interaction.

Understanding interactions between the brain and the body has become a topic of increased interest in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. A particular question here concerns how visceral, homeostatic rhythms such as the heart beat influence sensory, affective, and cognitive processing. To better understand these and other oscillatory brain-body interactions, we here introduce a novel computational model of interoceptive inference in which a synthetic agent’s perceptual beliefs are coupled to the rhythm of the heart. Our model both helps to explain emerging empirical data indicating that perceptual inference depends upon beat-to-beat heart rhythms, and can be used to better quantify intra- and inter-individual differences in heart-brain coupling. Using proof-of-principle simulations, we demonstrate how future empirical works could utilize our model to better understand and stratify disorders of interoception and brain-body interaction.

Metacognition and the effect of incentive motivation in two compulsive disorders: Gambling disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder

AIMS

Compulsivity is a common phenotype among psychiatric disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and gambling disorder (GD). Deficiencies in metacognition, such as the inability to estimate one's performance via confidence judgments could contribute to pathological decision-making. Earlier research has shown that patients with OCD exhibit underconfidence, while patients with GD exhibit overconfidence. Moreover, it is known that motivational states (e.g. monetary incentives) influence metacognition, with gain (respectively loss) prospects increasing (respectively decreasing) confidence. Here, we reasoned that OCD and GD symptoms might correspond to an exacerbation of this interaction between metacognition and motivation.

METHODS

We hypothesized GD's overconfidence to be exaggerated during gain prospects, while OCD's underconfidence to be worsened in loss context, which we expected to see represented in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) blood-oxygen-level-dependent activity. We tested those hypotheses in a task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) design (27 patients with GD, 28 patients with OCD, 55 controls). The trial is registered in the Dutch Trial Register (NL6171).

RESULTS

We showed increased confidence for patients with GD versus patients with OCD, which could partly be explained by sex and IQ. Although our primary analyses did not support the hypothesized interaction between incentives and groups, exploratory analyses did show increased confidence in patients with GD specifically in gain context. fMRI analyses confirmed a central role for VMPFC in the processing of confidence and incentives, but no differences between the groups.

CONCLUSION

Patients with OCD and those with GD reside at opposite ends of the confidence spectrum, while no interaction with incentives was found, nor group differences in neuronal processing of confidence.

Human perceptual and metacognitive decision-making rely on distinct brain networks

Perceptual decisions depend on the ability to exploit available sensory information in order to select the most adaptive option from a set of alternatives. Such decisions depend on the perceptual sensitivity of the organism, which is generally accompanied by a corresponding level of certainty about the choice made. Here, by use of corticocortical paired associative transcranial magnetic stimulation protocol (ccPAS) aimed at inducing plastic changes, we shaped perceptual sensitivity and metacognitive ability in a motion discrimination task depending on the targeted network, demonstrating their functional dissociation. Neurostimulation aimed at boosting V5/MT+-to-V1/V2 back-projections enhanced motion sensitivity without impacting metacognition, whereas boosting IPS/LIP-to-V1/V2 back-projections increased metacognitive efficiency without impacting motion sensitivity. This double-dissociation provides causal evidence of distinct networks for perceptual sensitivity and metacognitive ability in humans.

Partially Overlapping Neural Correlates of Metacognitive Monitoring and Metacognitive Control

Metacognition describes the process of monitoring one's own mental states, often for the purpose of cognitive control. Previous research has investigated how metacognitive signals are generated (metacognitive monitoring), for example, when people (both female/male) judge their confidence in their decisions and memories. Research has also investigated how metacognitive signals are used to influence behavior (metacognitive control), for example, setting a reminder (i.e., cognitive offloading) for something you are not confident you will remember. However, the mapping between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control needs further study on a neural level. We used fMRI to investigate a delayed-intentions task with a reminder element, allowing human participants to use their metacognitive insight to engage metacognitive control. Using multivariate pattern analysis, we found that we could separately decode both monitoring and control, and, to a lesser extent, cross-classify between them. Therefore, brain patterns associated with monitoring and control are partially, but not fully, overlapping.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Models of metacognition commonly distinguish between monitoring (how metacognition is formed) and control (how metacognition is used for behavioral regulation). Research into these facets of metacognition has often happened in isolation. Here, we provide a study which directly investigates the mapping between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control at a neural level. We applied multivariate pattern analysis to fMRI data from a novel task in which participants separately rated their confidence (metacognitive monitoring) and how much they would like to use a reminder (metacognitive control). We find support for the notion that the two aspects of metacognition overlap partially but not fully. We argue that future research should focus on how different metacognitive signals are selected for control.

Respiration, Heartbeat, and Conscious Tactile Perception

Previous studies have shown that timing of sensory stimulation during the cardiac cycle interacts with perception. Given the natural coupling of respiration and cardiac activity, we investigated here their joint effects on tactile perception. Forty-one healthy female and male human participants reported conscious perception of finger near-threshold electrical pulses (33% null trials) and decision confidence while electrocardiography, respiratory activity, and finger photoplethysmography were recorded. Participants adapted their respiratory cycle to expected stimulus onsets to preferentially occur during late inspiration/early expiration. This closely matched heart rate variation (sinus arrhythmia) across the respiratory cycle such that most frequent stimulation onsets occurred during the period of highest heart rate probably indicating highest alertness and cortical excitability. Tactile detection rate was highest during the first quadrant after expiration onset. Interindividually, stronger respiratory phase-locking to the task was associated with higher detection rates. Regarding the cardiac cycle, we confirmed previous findings that tactile detection rate was higher during diastole than systole and newly specified its minimum at 250-300 ms after the R-peak corresponding to the pulse wave arrival in the finger. Expectation of stimulation induced a transient heart deceleration which was more pronounced for unconfident decision ratings. Interindividually, stronger poststimulus modulations of heart rate were linked to higher detection rates. In summary, we demonstrate how tuning to the respiratory cycle and integration of respiratory-cardiac signals are used to optimize performance of a tactile detection task.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Mechanistic studies on perception and cognition tend to focus on the brain neglecting contributions of the body. Here, we investigated how respiration and heartbeat influence tactile perception: respiration phase-locking to expected stimulus onsets corresponds to highest heart rate (and presumably alertness/cortical excitability) and correlates with detection performance. Tactile detection varies across the heart cycle with a minimum when the pulse reaches the finger and a maximum in diastole. Taken together with our previous finding of unchanged early event-related potentials across the cardiac cycle, we conclude that these effects are not a peripheral physiological artifact but a result of cognitive processes that model our body's internal state, make predictions to guide behavior, and might also tune respiration to serve the task.

Interoception of breathing and its relationship with anxiety

Interoception, the perception of internal bodily states, is thought to be inextricably linked to affective qualities such as anxiety. Although interoception spans sensory to metacognitive processing, it is not clear whether anxiety is differentially related to these processing levels. Here we investigated this question in the domain of breathing, using computational modeling and high-field (7 T) fMRI to assess brain activity relating to dynamic changes in inspiratory resistance of varying predictability. Notably, the anterior insula was associated with both breathing-related prediction certainty and prediction errors, suggesting an important role in representing and updating models of the body. Individuals with low versus moderate anxiety traits showed differential anterior insula activity for prediction certainty. Multi-modal analyses of data from fMRI, computational assessments of breathing-related metacognition, and questionnaires demonstrated that anxiety-interoception links span all levels from perceptual sensitivity to metacognition, with strong effects seen at higher levels of interoceptive processes.

Affective regulation through touch: homeostatic and allostatic mechanisms

We focus on social touch as a paradigmatic case of the embodied, cognitive, and metacognitive processes involved in social, affective regulation. Social touch appears to contribute three interrelated but distinct functions to affective regulation. First, it regulates affects by fulfilling embodied predictions about social proximity and attachment. Second, caregiving touch, such as warming an infant, regulates affect by socially enacting homeostatic control and co-regulation of physiological states. Third, affective touch such as gentle stroking or tickling regulates affect by allostatic regulation of the salience and epistemic gain of particular experiences in given contexts and timescales. These three functions of affective touch are most likely mediated, at least partly, by different neurobiological processes, including convergent hedonic, dopaminergic and analgesic, opioidergic pathways for the attachment function, 'calming' autonomic and endocrine pathways for the homeostatic function, while the allostatic function may be mediated by oxytocin release and related 'salience' neuromodulators and circuits.

A robust confidence-accuracy dissociation via criterion attraction

Many studies have shown that confidence and accuracy can be dissociated in a variety of tasks. However, most of these dissociations involve small effect sizes, occur only in a subset of participants, and include a reaction time (RT) confound. Here, I develop a new method for inducing confidence-accuracy dissociations that overcomes these limitations. The method uses an external noise manipulation and relies on the phenomenon of criterion attraction where criteria for different tasks become attracted to each other. Subjects judged the identity of stimuli generated with either low or high external noise. The results showed that the two conditions were matched on accuracy and RT but produced a large difference in confidence (effect appeared for 25 of 26 participants, effect size: Cohen's d = 1.9). Computational modeling confirmed that these results are consistent with a mechanism of criterion attraction. These findings establish a new method for creating conditions with large differences in confidence without differences in accuracy or RT. Unlike many previous studies, however, the current method does not lead to differences in subjective experience and instead produces robust confidence-accuracy dissociations by exploiting limitations in post-perceptual, cognitive processes.

Metacognitive Awareness of Difficulty in Action Selection: The Role of the Cingulo-opercular Network

The question whether and how we are able to monitor our own cognitive states (metacognition) has been a matter of debate for decades. Do we have direct access to our cognitive processes, or can we only infer them indirectly based on their consequences? In the current study, we wanted to investigate the brain circuits that underlie the metacognitive experience of fluency in action selection. To manipulate action-selection fluency, we used a subliminal response priming paradigm. On each trial, both male and female human participants additionally engaged in the metacognitive process of rating how hard they felt it was to respond to the target stimulus. Despite having no conscious awareness of the prime, results showed that participants rated incompatible trials (during which subliminal primes interfered with the required response) to be more difficult than compatible trials (where primes facilitated the required response), reflecting metacognitive awareness of difficulty. This increased sense of subjective difficulty was mirrored by increased activity in the rostral cingulate zone and the anterior insula, two regions that are functionally closely connected. Importantly, this reflected activations that were unique to subjective difficulty ratings and were not explained by RTs or prime-response compatibility. We interpret these findings in light of a possible grounding of the metacognitive judgment of fluency in action selection in interoceptive signals resulting from increased effort.

Affective Saturation Index: A Lexical Measure of Affect

Affect plays a major role in the individual's daily life, driving the sensemaking of experience, psychopathological conditions, social representations of phenomena, and ways of coping with others. The characteristics of affect have been traditionally investigated through physiological, self-report, and behavioral measures. The present article proposes a text-based measure to detect affect intensity: the Affective Saturation Index (ASI). The ASI rationale and the conceptualization of affect are overviewed, and an initial validation study on the ASI's convergent and concurrent validity is presented. Forty individuals completed a non-clinical semi-structured interview. For each interview transcript, the ASI was esteemed and compared to the individual's physiological index of propensity to affective arousal (measured by heart rate variability (HRV)); transcript semantic complexity (measured through the Semantic Entropy Index (SEI)); and lexical syntactic complexity (measured through the Flesch-Vacca Index (FVI)). ANOVAs and bi-variate correlations estimated the size of the relationships between indexes and sample characteristics (age, gender), then a set of multiple linear regressions tested the ASI's association with HRV, the SEI, and the FVI. Results support the ASI construct and criteria validity. The ASI proved able to detect affective saturation in interview transcripts (SEI and FVI, adjusted R2 = 0.428 and adjusted R2 = 0.241, respectively) and the way the text's affective saturation reflected the intensity of the individual's affective state (HRV, adjusted R2 = 0.428). In conclusion, although the specificity of the sample (psychology students) limits the findings' generalizability, the ASI provides the chance to use written texts to measure affect in accordance with a dynamic approach, independent of the spatio-temporal setting in which they were produced. In doing so, the ASI provides a way to empower the empirical analysis of fields such as psychotherapy and social group dynamics.

Towards new concepts for a biological neuroscience of consciousness

In the search for a sound model of consciousness, we aim at introducing new concepts: closure, compositionality, biobranes and autobranes. This is important to overcome reductionism and to bring life back into the neuroscience of consciousness. Using these definitions, we conjecture that consciousness co-arises with the non-trivial composition of biological closure in the form of biobranes and autobranes: conscious processes generate closed activity at various levels and are, in turn, themselves, supported by biobranes and autobranes. This approach leads to a non-reductionist biological and simultaneously phenomenological theory of conscious experience, giving new perspectives for a science of consciousness. Future works will implement experimental definitions and computational simulations to characterize these dynamical biobranes interacting.

Unification by Fiat: Arrested Development of Predictive Processing

Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of principles, we observe systematic equivocations in PP‐based models, or outright contradictions with its avowed principles. To make matters worse, PP‐based models are seldom empirically validated, and they are frequently offered as mere just‐so stories. The large number of PP‐based models is thus not evidence of theoretical progress in unifying perception, action, and cognition. On the contrary, we maintain that the gap between theory and its biological and computational bases contributes to the arrested development of PP as a unificatory theory. Thus, we urge the defenders of PP to focus on its critical problems instead of offering mere re‐descriptions of known phenomena, and to validate their models against possible alternative explanations that stem from different theoretical assumptions. Otherwise, PP will ultimately fail as a unified theory of cognition.

State anxiety modulates the effect of emotion cues on visual temporal sensitivity in autism spectrum disorder

Atypical processing of stimulus inputs across a range of sensory modalities in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is widely reported. Sensory processing is known to be influenced by bodily internal states such as physiological arousal and anxiety. As a sizeable proportion of ASD reportedly have co-morbid anxiety disorders that are linked with dysregulated arousal, we investigated if face emotion arousal cues influenced visual sensory sensitivity (indexed by temporal resolution) in ASD (n = 20) compared to a matched group of typically developed individuals (TD, n = 21). We asked further if emotion-cued changes in visual sensitivity were associated with individual differences in state and trait anxiety. Participants reported the laterality of the second of two consecutive Gaussian-blob flashes in a visual temporal order judgment task (v-TOJ), demanding higher-level visual processing. The key manipulation was presenting a task-irrelevant face emotion cue briefly at unexpected time points preceding the task-relevant flashes. Disgust vs. Neutral emotion signals significantly enhanced the visual temporal resolution in ASD. Individual state-anxiety scores showed a fair correlative trend with the emotion-cued changes in temporal resolution (Disgust versus Neutral) in ASD but missed statistical significance. Both these effects were absent in TD. The results show that individual state-anxiety levels likely modulate the effect of emotions on visual temporal sensitivity in ASD. The findings support a nuanced approach to understand the disparate sensory features in ASD, by factoring in the interplay of the individual reactivity to environmental affective information and the severity of anxiety.

Reconciling competing mechanisms posited to underlie auditory verbal hallucinations

Perception is not the passive registration of incoming sensory data. Rather, it involves some analysis by synthesis, based on past experiences and context. One adaptive consequence of this arrangement is imagination-the ability to richly simulate sensory experiences, interrogate and manipulate those simulations, in service of action and decision making. In this paper, we will discuss one possible cost of this adaptation, namely hallucinations-perceptions without sensory stimulation, which characterize serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia, but which also occur in neurological illnesses, and-crucially for the present piece-are common also in the non-treatment-seeking population. We will draw upon a framework for imagination that distinguishes voluntary from non-voluntary experiences and explore the extent to which the varieties and features of hallucinations map onto this distinction, with a focus on auditory-verbal hallucinations (AVHs)-colloquially, hearing voices. We will propose that sense of agency for the act of imagining is key to meaningfully dissecting different forms and features of AVHs, and we will outline the neural, cognitive and phenomenological sequelae of this sense. We will conclude that a compelling unifying framework for action, perception and belief-predictive processing-can incorporate observations regarding sense of agency, imagination and hallucination. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

The Computational, Pharmacological, and Physiological Determinants of Sensory Learning under Uncertainty

The ability to represent and respond to uncertainty is fundamental to human cognition and decision-making. Noradrenaline (NA) is hypothesized to play a key role in coordinating the sensory, learning, and physiological states necessary to adapt to a changing world, but direct evidence for this is lacking in humans. Here, we tested the effects of attenuating noradrenergic neurotransmission on learning under uncertainty. We probed the effects of the β-adrenergic receptor antagonist propranolol (40 mg) using a between-subjects, double-blind, placebo-controlled design. Participants performed a probabilistic associative learning task, and we employed a hierarchical learning model to formally quantify prediction errors about cue-outcome contingencies and changes in these associations over time (volatility). Both unexpectedness and noise slowed down reaction times, but propranolol augmented the interaction between these main effects such that behavior was influenced more by prior expectations when uncertainty was high. Computationally, this was driven by a reduction in learning rates, with people slower to update their beliefs in the face of new information. Attenuating the global effects of NA also eliminated the phasic effects of prediction error and volatility on pupil size, consistent with slower belief updating. Finally, estimates of environmental volatility were predicted by baseline cardiac measures in all participants. Our results demonstrate that NA underpins behavioral and computational responses to uncertainty. These findings have important implications for understanding the impact of uncertainty on human biology and cognition.

Modeling pupil responses to rapid sequential events

Pupil size is an easily accessible, noninvasive online indicator of various perceptual and cognitive processes. Pupil measurements have the potential to reveal continuous processing dynamics throughout an experimental trial, including anticipatory responses. However, the relatively sluggish (~2 s) response dynamics of pupil dilation make it challenging to connect changes in pupil size to events occurring close together in time. Researchers have used models to link changes in pupil size to specific trial events, but such methods have not been systematically evaluated. Here we developed and evaluated a general linear model (GLM) pipeline that estimates pupillary responses to multiple rapid events within an experimental trial. We evaluated the modeling approach using a sample dataset in which multiple sequential stimuli were presented within 2-s trials. We found: (1) Model fits improved when the pupil impulse response function (PuRF) was fit for each observer. PuRFs varied substantially across individuals but were consistent for each individual. (2) Model fits also improved when pupil responses were not assumed to occur simultaneously with their associated trial events, but could have non-zero latencies. For example, pupil responses could anticipate predictable trial events. (3) Parameter recovery confirmed the validity of the fitting procedures, and we quantified the reliability of the parameter estimates for our sample dataset. (4) A cognitive task manipulation modulated pupil response amplitude. We provide our pupil analysis pipeline as open-source software (Pupil Response Estimation Toolbox: PRET) to facilitate the estimation of pupil responses and the evaluation of the estimates in other datasets.

Vocal signals only impact speakers' own emotions when they are self-attributed

Emotions are often accompanied by vocalizations whose acoustic features provide information about the physiological state of the speaker. Here, we ask if perceiving these affective signals in one's own voice has an impact on one's own emotional state, and if it is necessary to identify these signals as self-originated for the emotional effect to occur. Participants had to deliberate out loud about how they would feel in various familiar emotional scenarios, while we covertly manipulated their voices in order to make them sound happy or sad. Perceiving the artificial affective signals in their own voice altered participants' judgements about how they would feel in these situations. Crucially, this effect disappeared when participants detected the vocal manipulation, either explicitly or implicitly. The original valence of the scenarios also modulated the vocal feedback effect. These results highlight the role of the exteroception of self-attributed affective signals in the emergence of emotional feelings.

Emotional metacognition: stimulus valence modulates cardiac arousal and metamemory

Emotion alters how we feel, see, and experience the world. In the domain of memory, the emotional valence and arousal of memorised stimuli can modulate both the acuity and content of episodic recall. However, no experiment has investigated whether arousal and valence also influence metacognition for memory (i.e. the process of self-monitoring memories). In a pre-registered study, we applied a novel psychophysiological design together with computational models of metacognition to assess the influence of stimulus valence and arousal on the sensitivity, bias, and efficiency of metamemory. To estimate the role of physiological arousal in mediating these effects, we recorded cardiac measures through pulse oximetry. We found that negative valence substantially decreased both memory performance and subjective confidence, in particular for low arousal words. Simultaneously, we found that emotional valence modulated both heart rate and heart-rate variability (HRV) during recognition memory. Exploratory trial-level analyses further revealed that subjective confidence was encoded in instantaneous heart-rate fluctuations and that this relationship was also modulated by emotional valence. Our results demonstrate that recognition memory and metacognition are influenced by the emotional valence of encoded items and that this correlation is in part related to cardiac activity.

Enhanced bodily states of fear facilitates bias perception of fearful faces

We investigated whether enhanced interoceptive bodily states of fear would facilitate recognition of the fearful faces. Participants performed an emotional judgment task after a bodily imagery task inside a functional magnetic resonance imaging scanner. In the bodily imagery task, participants were instructed to imagine feeling the bodily sensations of two specific somatotopic patterns: a fear-associated bodily sensation (FBS) or a disgust-associated bodily sensation (DBS). They were shown faces expressing various levels of fearfulness and disgust and instructed to classify the facial expression as fear or disgust. We found a stronger bias favoring the “fearful face” under the congruent FBS condition than under the incongruent DBS condition. The brain response to fearful versus intermediate faces increased in the fronto-insular-temporal network under the FBS condition, but not the DBS condition. The fearful face elicited activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and extrastriate body area under the FBS condition relative to the DBS condition. Furthermore, functional connectivity between the anterior cingulate cortex/extrastriate body area and the fronto-insular-temporal network was modulated according to the specific bodily sensation. Our findings suggest that somatotopic patterns of bodily sensation provide informative access to the collective visceral state in the fear processing via the fronto-insular-temporal network.

Sources of Metacognitive Inefficiency

Confidence judgments are typically less informative about one's accuracy than they could be; a phenomenon we call metacognitive inefficiency. We review the existence of different sources of metacognitive inefficiency and classify them into four categories based on whether the corruption is due to: (i) systematic or nonsystematic influences, and (ii) the input to or the computation of the metacognitive system. Critically, the existence of different sources of metacognitive inefficiency provides an alternative explanation for behavioral findings typically interpreted as evidence for domain-specific (and against domain-general) metacognitive systems. We argue that, contrary to the dominant assumption in the field, metacognitive failures are not monolithic and suggest that understanding the sources of metacognitive inefficiency should be a primary goal of the science of metacognition.

Segregated Co-activation Patterns in the Emergence of Decision Confidence During Visual Perception

Visual metacognition-the introspection and evaluation of one's own visual perceptual processes-is measured through both decision confidence and "metacognitive efficiency." Metacognitive efficiency refers to an individual's ability to accurately judge incorrect and correct decisions through confidence ratings given their task performance. Previous imaging studies in humans and nonhuman primates reported widely distributed brain regions being involved in decision confidence and metacognition. However, the neural correlates of metacognition are remarkably inconsistent across studies concerning spatial outline. Therefore, this study investigates the neural correlates of visual metacognition by examining co-activation across regions that scale with visual decision confidence. We hypothesized that interacting processes of perceptual and metacognitive performance contribute to the arising decision confidence in distributed, but segregable co-activating brain regions. To test this hypothesis, we performed task-fMRI in healthy humans during a visual backward masking task with four-scale, post-decision confidence ratings. We measured blood oxygenation covariation patterns, which served as a physiological proxy for co-activation across brain regions. Decision confidence ratings and an individual's metacognitive efficiency served as behavioral measures for metacognition. We found three distinct co-activation clusters involved in decision confidence: the first included right-centered fronto-temporal-parietal regions, the second included left temporal and parietal regions, and the left basal forebrain (BF), and the third included cerebellar regions. The right fronto-temporal-parietal cluster including the supplementary eye field and the right basal forebrain showed stronger co-activation in subjects with higher metacognitive efficiency. Our results provide novel evidence for co-activation of widely distributed fronto-parieto-temporal regions involved in visual confidence. The supplementary eye field was the only region that activated for both decision confidence and metacognitive efficiency, suggesting the supplementary eye field plays a key role in visual metacognition. Our results link findings in electrophysiology studies and human fMRI studies and provide evidence that confidence estimates arise from the integration of multiple information processing pathways.

Pupillometry as an Objective Measure of Sustained Attention in Young and Older Listeners

The ability to sustain attention on a task-relevant sound source while avoiding distraction from concurrent sounds is fundamental to listening in crowded environments. We aimed to (a) devise an experimental paradigm with which this aspect of listening can be isolated and (b) evaluate the applicability of pupillometry as an objective measure of sustained attention in young and older populations. We designed a paradigm that continuously measured behavioral responses and pupillometry during 25-s trials. Stimuli contained a number of concurrent, spectrally distinct tone streams. On each trial, participants detected gaps in one of the streams while resisting distraction from the others. Behavior demonstrated increasing difficulty with time-on-task and with number/proximity of distractor streams. In young listeners (N = 20; aged 18 to 35 years), pupil diameter (on the group and individual level) was dynamically modulated by instantaneous task difficulty: Periods where behavioral performance revealed a strain on sustained attention were accompanied by increased pupil diameter. Only trials on which participants performed successfully were included in the pupillometry analysis so that the observed effects reflect task demands as opposed to failure to attend. In line with existing reports, we observed global changes to pupil dynamics in the older group (N = 19; aged 63 to 79 years) including decreased pupil diameter, limited dilation range, and reduced temporal variability. However, despite these changes, older listeners showed similar effects of attentive tracking to those observed in the young listeners. Overall, our results demonstrate that pupillometry can be a reliable and time-sensitive measure of attentive tracking over long durations in both young and (with caveats) older listeners.

Long-term modulation of cardiac activity induced by inhibitory control over emotional memories

Efforts to exclude past experiences from conscious awareness can lead to forgetting. Memory suppression is central to affective disorders, but we still do not really know whether emotions, including their physiological causes, are also impacted by this process in normal functioning individuals. In two studies, we measured the after-effects of suppressing negative memories on cardiac response in healthy participants. Results of Study 1 revealed that efficient control of memories was associated with long-term inhibition of the cardiac deceleration that is normally induced by disgusting stimuli. Attempts to suppress sad memories, by contrast, aggravated the cardiac response, an effect that was closely related to the inability to forget this specific material. In Study 2, electroencephalography revealed a reduction in power in the theta (3-8 Hz), alpha (8-12 Hz) and low-beta (13-20 Hz) bands during the suppression of unwanted memories, compared with their voluntary recall. Interestingly, however, the reduction of power in the theta frequency band during memory control was related to a subsequent inhibition of the cardiac response. These results provide a neurophysiological basis for the influence of memory control mechanisms on the cardiac system, opening up new avenues and questions for treating intrusive memories using motivated forgetting.

The nature of metacognitive inefficiency in perceptual decision making

Humans have the metacognitive ability to judge the accuracy of their own decisions via confidence ratings. A substantial body of research has demonstrated that human metacognition is fallible but it remains unclear how metacognitive inefficiency should be incorporated into a mechanistic model of confidence generation. Here we show that, contrary to what is typically assumed, metacognitive inefficiency depends on the level of confidence. We found that, across 5 different data sets and 4 different measures of metacognition, metacognitive ability decreased with higher confidence ratings. To understand the nature of this effect, we collected a large dataset of 20 subjects completing 2,800 trials each and providing confidence ratings on a continuous scale. The results demonstrated a robustly nonlinear zROC curve with downward curvature, despite a decades-old assumption of linearity. This pattern of results was reproduced by a new mechanistic model of confidence generation, which assumes the existence of lognormally distributed metacognitive noise. The model outperformed competing models either lacking metacognitive noise altogether or featuring Gaussian metacognitive noise. Further, the model could generate a measure of metacognitive ability which was independent of confidence levels. These findings establish an empirically validated model of confidence generation, have significant implications about measures of metacognitive ability, and begin to reveal the underlying nature of metacognitive inefficiency. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).