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Wagner-Altendorf TA, Heldmann M, Münte TF. Limited Impact of Object Attributes on Event-related Potentials During an Implicit Word Reading Task. Cogn Behav Neurol 2025:00146965-990000000-00089. [PMID: 40329891 DOI: 10.1097/wnn.0000000000000393] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/24/2024] [Accepted: 02/24/2025] [Indexed: 05/08/2025]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Previous research in cognitive science has focused on the encoding and activation of sensory-based object knowledge in the brain during language comprehension, including aspects such as appearance, movement, and taste. OBJECTIVE To investigate how different object-related attributes affect event-related potentials (ERPs), specifically the N400 component, during word processing in an implicit task setting. METHOD We embedded a set of 420 critical nouns within a list of 2,745 total words and asked 240 participants to read each one, but to respond only to words denoting colors. We categorized each noun by attributes such as familiarity, smell, pain, taste, sound, graspability, and motion. We focused primarily on changes in the N400 component, indicative of semantic processing, across nouns with different attributes. RESULTS The least familiar stimuli elicited the strongest N400 response, indicating significant ERP variability across familiarity levels with more positive amplitudes for highly familiar stimuli. Among the attributes examined, only the attribute of smell demonstrated a notable, though isolated, increase in N400 amplitude. Other attributes, including pain, taste, sound, graspability, and visual motion showed no significant differences in N400 responses, suggesting a minimal influence on semantic processing in this context. CONCLUSION These results suggest that the specific sensory attributes of objects have limited influence on the N400 component of ERPs in implicit reading tasks, highlighting the complexity of semantic networks in cognitive processing. The subtlety of ERP modulations driven by object-related attributes points to the need for further exploration into how these attributes interact within semantic networks during cognitive tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tobias A Wagner-Altendorf
- Department of Neurology, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
- The Center for Brain Behavior and Metabolism, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
| | - Marcus Heldmann
- Department of Neurology, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
- The Center for Brain Behavior and Metabolism, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
| | - Thomas F Münte
- The Center for Brain Behavior and Metabolism, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
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2
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Dehn KI, Maiello G, Hartmann FT, Morgenstern Y, Hawkins SJ, Offner T, Walter J, Hassenklöver T, Manzini I, Fleming RW. Human shape perception spontaneously discovers the biological origin of novel, but natural, stimuli. J R Soc Interface 2025; 22:20240931. [PMID: 40393522 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2024.0931] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/28/2024] [Revised: 03/17/2025] [Accepted: 04/24/2025] [Indexed: 05/22/2025] Open
Abstract
Humans excel at categorizing objects by shape. This facility involves identifying shape features that objects have in common with other members of their class and relies-at least in part-on semantic/cognitive constructs. For example, plants sprout branches, fish grow fins, shoes are moulded to our feet. Can humans parse shapes according to the processes that give shapes their key characteristics, even when such processes are hidden? To answer this, we investigated how humans perceive the shape of cells from the olfactory system of Xenopus laevis tadpoles. These objects are novel to most humans yet occur in nature and cluster into classes following their underlying biological function. We reconstructed three-dimensional (3D) cell models through 3D microscopy and photogrammetry, then conducted psychophysical experiments. Human participants performed two tasks: they arranged 3D-printed cell models by similarity and rated them along eight visual dimensions. Participants were highly consistent in their arrangements and ratings and spontaneously grouped stimuli to reflect the cell classes, unwittingly revealing the underlying processes shaping these forms. Our findings thus demonstrate that human perceptual organization mechanisms spontaneously parse the biological systematicities of never-before-seen, natural shapes. Integrating such human perceptual strategies into automated systems may enhance morphology-based analysis in biology and medicine.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kira Isabel Dehn
- Department of Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Hessen, Germany
| | - Guido Maiello
- School of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, England, UK
| | - Frieder Tom Hartmann
- Department of Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Hessen, Germany
| | - Yaniv Morgenstern
- Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland, The Netherlands
| | - Sara Joy Hawkins
- School of Biological Sciences, University of Southampton, Southampton, England, UK
| | - Thomas Offner
- Georg August University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Lower Saxony, Germany
| | - Joshua Walter
- Department of Animal Physiology and Molecular Biomedicine, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Hessen, Germany
| | - Thomas Hassenklöver
- Department of Animal Physiology and Molecular Biomedicine, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Hessen, Germany
| | - Ivan Manzini
- Department of Animal Physiology and Molecular Biomedicine, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Hessen, Germany
- Center for Mind, Brain and Behavior (CMBB), Marburg, Hessen, Germany
| | - Roland W Fleming
- Department of Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Hessen, Germany
- Center for Mind, Brain and Behavior (CMBB), Marburg, Hessen, Germany
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3
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Schmidt F, Hebart MN, Schmid AC, Fleming RW. Core dimensions of human material perception. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2025; 122:e2417202122. [PMID: 40042912 PMCID: PMC11912425 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2417202122] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/23/2024] [Accepted: 01/24/2025] [Indexed: 03/19/2025] Open
Abstract
Visually categorizing and comparing materials is crucial for everyday behavior, but what organizational principles underlie our mental representation of materials? Here, we used a large-scale data-driven approach to uncover core latent dimensions of material representations from behavior. First, we created an image dataset of 200 systematically sampled materials and 600 photographs (STUFF dataset, https://osf.io/myutc/). Using these images, we next collected 1.87 million triplet similarity judgments and used a computational model to derive a set of sparse, positive dimensions underlying these judgments. The resulting multidimensional embedding space predicted independent material similarity judgments and the similarity matrix of all images close to the human intersubject consistency. We found that representations of individual images were captured by a combination of 36 material dimensions that were highly reproducible and interpretable, comprising perceptual (e.g., grainy, blue) as well as conceptual (e.g., mineral, viscous) dimensions. These results provide the foundation for a comprehensive understanding of how humans make sense of materials.
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Affiliation(s)
- Filipp Schmidt
- Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University, Giessen35394, Germany
- Center for Mind, Brain and Behavior, Universities of Marburg, Giessen, and Darmstadt, Marburg35032, Germany
| | - Martin N. Hebart
- Center for Mind, Brain and Behavior, Universities of Marburg, Giessen, and Darmstadt, Marburg35032, Germany
- Department of Medicine, Justus Liebig University, Giessen35390, Germany
- Vision and Computational Cognition Group, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig04103, Germany
| | - Alexandra C. Schmid
- Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University, Giessen35394, Germany
- Laboratory of Brain and Cognition, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, MD20814
| | - Roland W. Fleming
- Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University, Giessen35394, Germany
- Center for Mind, Brain and Behavior, Universities of Marburg, Giessen, and Darmstadt, Marburg35032, Germany
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4
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Tian LY, Garzón KU, Rouse AG, Eldridge MAG, Schieber MH, Wang XJ, Tenenbaum JB, Freiwald WA. Neural representation of action symbols in primate frontal cortex. BIORXIV : THE PREPRINT SERVER FOR BIOLOGY 2025:2025.03.03.641276. [PMID: 40093053 PMCID: PMC11908170 DOI: 10.1101/2025.03.03.641276] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/19/2025]
Abstract
At the core of intelligence is proficiency in solving new problems, including those that differ dramatically from problems seen before. Problem-solving, in turn, depends on goal-directed generation of novel thoughts and behaviors1, which has been proposed to rely on internal representations of discrete units, or symbols, and processes that can recombine them into a large set of possible composite representations1-11. Although this view has been influential in formulating cognitive-level explanations of behavior, definitive evidence for a neuronal substrate of symbols has remained elusive. Here, we identify a neural population encoding action symbols-internal, recombinable representations of discrete units of motor behavior-localized to a specific area of frontal cortex. In macaque monkeys performing a drawing-like task designed to assess recombination of learned action symbols into novel sequences, we found behavioral evidence for three critical features that indicate actions have an underlying symbolic representation: (i) invariance over low-level motor parameters; (ii) categorical structure, reflecting discrete classes of action; and (iii) recombination into novel sequences. In simultaneous neural recordings across motor, premotor, and prefrontal cortex, we found that planning-related population activity in ventral premotor cortex encodes actions in a manner that, like behavior, reflects motor invariance, categorical structure, and recombination, three properties indicating a symbolic representation. Activity in no other recorded area exhibited this combination of properties. These findings reveal a neural representation of action symbols localized to PMv, and therefore identify a putative neural substrate for symbolic cognitive operations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lucas Y Tian
- Laboratory of Neural Systems, The Rockefeller University, New York, NY, USA
- Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, MIT & Rockefeller University
| | - Kedar U Garzón
- Laboratory of Neural Systems, The Rockefeller University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Adam G Rouse
- Department of Neurosurgery, Department of Cell Biology & Physiology, University of Kansas Medical Center, Kansas City, KS, USA
| | - Mark A G Eldridge
- Biosciences Institute, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
| | - Marc H Schieber
- Department of Neurology, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA
| | - Xiao-Jing Wang
- Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Joshua B Tenenbaum
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
- Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, MIT & Rockefeller University
| | - Winrich A Freiwald
- Laboratory of Neural Systems, The Rockefeller University, New York, NY, USA
- Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, MIT & Rockefeller University
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Limbacher T, Ozdenizci O, Legenstein R. Memory-Dependent Computation and Learning in Spiking Neural Networks Through Hebbian Plasticity. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL NETWORKS AND LEARNING SYSTEMS 2025; 36:2551-2562. [PMID: 38113154 DOI: 10.1109/tnnls.2023.3341446] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/21/2023]
Abstract
Spiking neural networks (SNNs) are the basis for many energy-efficient neuromorphic hardware systems. While there has been substantial progress in SNN research, artificial SNNs still lack many capabilities of their biological counterparts. In biological neural systems, memory is a key component that enables the retention of information over a huge range of temporal scales, ranging from hundreds of milliseconds up to years. While Hebbian plasticity is believed to play a pivotal role in biological memory, it has so far been analyzed mostly in the context of pattern completion and unsupervised learning in artificial and SNNs. Here, we propose that Hebbian plasticity is fundamental for computations in biological and artificial spiking neural systems. We introduce a novel memory-augmented SNN architecture that is enriched by Hebbian synaptic plasticity. We show that Hebbian enrichment renders SNNs surprisingly versatile in terms of their computational as well as learning capabilities. It improves their abilities for out-of-distribution generalization, one-shot learning, cross-modal generative association, language processing, and reward-based learning. This suggests that powerful cognitive neuromorphic systems can be built based on this principle.
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Schmidt F, Tiedemann H, Fleming RW, Morgenstern Y. Inferring shape transformations in a drawing task. Mem Cognit 2025; 53:189-199. [PMID: 37668880 PMCID: PMC11779755 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-023-01452-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/09/2023] [Indexed: 09/06/2023]
Abstract
Many objects and materials in our environment are subject to transformations that alter their shape. For example, branches bend in the wind, ice melts, and paper crumples. Still, we recognize objects and materials across these changes, suggesting we can distinguish an object's original features from those caused by the transformations ("shape scission"). Yet, if we truly understand transformations, we should not only be able to identify their signatures but also actively apply the transformations to new objects (i.e., through imagination or mental simulation). Here, we investigated this ability using a drawing task. On a tablet computer, participants viewed a sample contour and its transformed version, and were asked to apply the same transformation to a test contour by drawing what the transformed test shape should look like. Thus, they had to (i) infer the transformation from the shape differences, (ii) envisage its application to the test shape, and (iii) draw the result. Our findings show that drawings were more similar to the ground truth transformed test shape than to the original test shape-demonstrating the inference and reproduction of transformations from observation. However, this was only observed for relatively simple shapes. The ability was also modulated by transformation type and magnitude but not by the similarity between sample and test shapes. Together, our findings suggest that we can distinguish between representations of original object shapes and their transformations, and can use visual imagery to mentally apply nonrigid transformations to observed objects, showing how we not only perceive but also 'understand' shape.
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Affiliation(s)
- Filipp Schmidt
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10F, 35394, Giessen, Germany.
- Center for Mind, Brain and Behavior (CMBB), University of Marburg and Justus Liebig University, Giessen, Germany.
| | - Henning Tiedemann
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10F, 35394, Giessen, Germany
| | - Roland W Fleming
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10F, 35394, Giessen, Germany
- Center for Mind, Brain and Behavior (CMBB), University of Marburg and Justus Liebig University, Giessen, Germany
| | - Yaniv Morgenstern
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10F, 35394, Giessen, Germany
- University of Leuven (KU Leuven), Leuven, Belgium
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7
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Apostel A, Hahn LA, Rose J. Jackdaws form categorical prototypes based on experience with category exemplars. Brain Struct Funct 2024; 229:593-608. [PMID: 37261488 PMCID: PMC10978630 DOI: 10.1007/s00429-023-02651-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2022] [Accepted: 05/06/2023] [Indexed: 06/02/2023]
Abstract
Categorization represents one cognitive ability fundamental to animal behavior. Grouping of elements based on perceptual or semantic features helps to reduce processing resources and facilitates appropriate behavior. Corvids master complex categorization, yet the detailed categorization learning strategies are less well understood. We trained two jackdaws on a delayed match to category paradigm using a novel, artificial stimulus type, RUBubbles. Both birds learned to differentiate between two session-unique categories following two distinct learning protocols. Categories were either introduced via central category prototypes (low variability approach) or using a subset of diverse category exemplars from which diagnostic features had to be identified (high variability approach). In both versions, the stimulus similarity relative to a central category prototype explained categorization performance best. Jackdaws consistently used a central prototype to judge category membership, regardless of whether this prototype was used to introduce distinct categories or had to be inferred from multiple exemplars. Reliance on a category prototype occurred already after experiencing only a few trials with different category exemplars. High stimulus set variability prolonged initial learning but showed no consistent beneficial effect on later generalization performance. High numbers of stimuli, their perceptual similarity, and coherent category structure resulted in a prototype-based strategy, reflecting the most adaptive, efficient, and parsimonious way to represent RUBubble categories. Thus, our birds represent a valuable comparative animal model that permits further study of category representations throughout learning in different regions of a brain producing highly cognitive behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aylin Apostel
- Neural Basis of Learning, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology, Ruhr University Bochum, 44801, Bochum, Germany
| | - Lukas Alexander Hahn
- Neural Basis of Learning, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology, Ruhr University Bochum, 44801, Bochum, Germany
| | - Jonas Rose
- Neural Basis of Learning, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology, Ruhr University Bochum, 44801, Bochum, Germany.
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Peters B, DiCarlo JJ, Gureckis T, Haefner R, Isik L, Tenenbaum J, Konkle T, Naselaris T, Stachenfeld K, Tavares Z, Tsao D, Yildirim I, Kriegeskorte N. How does the primate brain combine generative and discriminative computations in vision? ARXIV 2024:arXiv:2401.06005v1. [PMID: 38259351 PMCID: PMC10802669] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/24/2024]
Abstract
Vision is widely understood as an inference problem. However, two contrasting conceptions of the inference process have each been influential in research on biological vision as well as the engineering of machine vision. The first emphasizes bottom-up signal flow, describing vision as a largely feedforward, discriminative inference process that filters and transforms the visual information to remove irrelevant variation and represent behaviorally relevant information in a format suitable for downstream functions of cognition and behavioral control. In this conception, vision is driven by the sensory data, and perception is direct because the processing proceeds from the data to the latent variables of interest. The notion of "inference" in this conception is that of the engineering literature on neural networks, where feedforward convolutional neural networks processing images are said to perform inference. The alternative conception is that of vision as an inference process in Helmholtz's sense, where the sensory evidence is evaluated in the context of a generative model of the causal processes that give rise to it. In this conception, vision inverts a generative model through an interrogation of the sensory evidence in a process often thought to involve top-down predictions of sensory data to evaluate the likelihood of alternative hypotheses. The authors include scientists rooted in roughly equal numbers in each of the conceptions and motivated to overcome what might be a false dichotomy between them and engage the other perspective in the realm of theory and experiment. The primate brain employs an unknown algorithm that may combine the advantages of both conceptions. We explain and clarify the terminology, review the key empirical evidence, and propose an empirical research program that transcends the dichotomy and sets the stage for revealing the mysterious hybrid algorithm of primate vision.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Peters
- Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University
- School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of Glasgow
| | - James J DiCarlo
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT
- McGovern Institute for Brain Research, MIT
- NSF Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, MIT
- Quest for Intelligence, Schwarzman College of Computing, MIT
| | | | - Ralf Haefner
- Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester
- Center for Visual Science, University of Rochester
| | - Leyla Isik
- Department of Cognitive Science, Johns Hopkins University
| | - Joshua Tenenbaum
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT
- NSF Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, MIT
- Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, MIT
| | - Talia Konkle
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University
- Center for Brain Science, Harvard University
- Kempner Institute for Natural and Artificial Intelligence, Harvard University
| | | | | | - Zenna Tavares
- Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University
- Data Science Institute, Columbia University
| | - Doris Tsao
- Dept of Molecular & Cell Biology, University of California Berkeley
- Howard Hughes Medical Institute
| | - Ilker Yildirim
- Department of Psychology, Yale University
- Department of Statistics and Data Science, Yale University
| | - Nikolaus Kriegeskorte
- Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University
- Department of Psychology, Columbia University
- Department of Neuroscience, Columbia University
- Department of Electrical Engineering, Columbia University
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Fan JE, Bainbridge WA, Chamberlain R, Wammes JD. Drawing as a versatile cognitive tool. NATURE REVIEWS PSYCHOLOGY 2023; 2:556-568. [PMID: 39239312 PMCID: PMC11377027 DOI: 10.1038/s44159-023-00212-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 06/21/2023] [Indexed: 09/07/2024]
Abstract
Drawing is a cognitive tool that makes the invisible contents of mental life visible. Humans use this tool to produce a remarkable variety of pictures, from realistic portraits to schematic diagrams. Despite this variety and the prevalence of drawn images, the psychological mechanisms that enable drawings to be so versatile have yet to be fully explored. In this Review, we synthesize contemporary work in multiple areas of psychology, computer science and neuroscience that examines the cognitive processes involved in drawing production and comprehension. This body of findings suggests that the balance of contributions from perception, memory and social inference during drawing production varies depending on the situation, resulting in some drawings that are more realistic and other drawings that are more abstract. We also consider the use of drawings as a research tool for investigating various aspects of cognition, as well as the role that drawing has in facilitating learning and communication. Taken together, information about how drawings are used in different contexts illuminates the central role of visually grounded abstractions in human thought and behaviour.
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Affiliation(s)
- Judith E Fan
- Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
| | | | | | - Jeffrey D Wammes
- Department of Psychology, Centre for Neuroscience Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada
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