Grasping the concept of personal property

You do you: susceptibility of temporal binding to self-relevance

The self-prioritization effect suggests that self-relevant information has a processing advantage over information that is not directly associated with the self. In consequence, reaction times are faster and accuracy rates higher when reacting to self-associated stimuli rather than to other-related stimuli (Sui et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 38:1105-1117, 2012). This spurs the assumption that self-associated action-effects should also be perceived earlier than other-related outcomes. One way to measure this is temporal binding. Previous research indeed showed that the perceived temporal interval between actions and self-associated outcomes was reduced compared to friend- and other-associated outcomes. However, the employed method (interval estimations) and several experimental design choices make it impossible to discern whether the perceived shortening of the interval between a keypress and a self-relevant outcome is due to a perceptual shift of the action or of the action-effect or both. Thus, we conducted four experiments to assess whether temporal binding can indeed be modulated by self-relevance and if so where this perceptual bias is located. The results did not support stronger temporal binding for self- vs other-related action-effects. We discuss these results against the backdrop of the attentional basis of self-prioritization and propose directions for future research.

Predicting others' actions from their social contexts

Contextual cues have been shown to inform our understanding and predictions of others' actions. In this study, we tested whether observers' predictions about unfolding actions depend upon the social context in which they occur. Across five experiments, we showed participants videos of an actor walking toward a piece of furniture either with (joint context) or without (solo context) a partner standing by it. We found greater predictive bias, indicative of stronger action expectations when videos contained a second actor (Experiment 1), even when the solo condition had a perceptually-matched control object in place of the actor (Experiment 2). Critically, belief manipulations about the actions the walking actor would perform suppressed the difference between social context conditions when the manipulation specified an action possible in both contexts (Experiment 5) but not when the action was one that would be difficult without a partner (Experiment 4). Interestingly, the social context effect persisted when the belief manipulation specified an unlikely action given the depicted scene (Experiment 3). These findings provide novel evidence that kinematically-identical actions can elicit different predictions depending on the social context in which they occur.

The curious origins of ownership

What are the origins of ownership as a conceptual domain? By combining experimental evidence from cognitive science, a theoretical proposal from developmental psychology, and the computational framework of reinforcement learning, I argue that ownership concepts can develop as a by-product of our curiosity-based exploration and become grounded via our experience of control in physical and social environments.

Object coding in peripersonal space depends on object ownership

Previous studies have shown that objects located in the peripersonal space (PPS) receive enhanced attention, as compared with extrapersonal space (EPS), However, most objects in the environment belong to someone in particular and how object ownership influences object coding in relation to PPS representation is still unclear. In the present study, after having chosen their own mug, participants performed a reachability judgement task of self-owned and other-owned mugs presented at different distances while facing a virtual character. This task was followed, on each trial, by a localisation task in which participants had to indicate where the mug, removed from view, was previously located. The two tasks were separated by a 900-ms visual mask during which the virtual character was unnoticeably shifted by 3° to evaluate the spatial frame-of-reference used. The results showed that self-owned mugs were processed faster than other-owned mugs, but only when located in the PPS. Furthermore, reachability judgements were biased for self-owned mugs, leading to an extension of the PPS representation, especially for participants with a high score on the fantasy scale of Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). Finally, the virtual character shift altered the localisation performance but only for the distant mugs, suggesting a progressive shift from egocentric to allocentric frame-of-reference when moving from the PPS to EPS, irrespective of object ownership. Overall, our data reveal that the representations of ownership and PPS interact to facilitate the processing of manipulable objects, to an extent that depends on individual sensitivity to the social presence of others.

Electrophysiological correlates of self-prioritization

Personally relevant stimuli exert a powerful influence on social cognition. What is not yet fully understood, however, is how early in the processing stream self-relevance influences decisional operations. Here we used a shape-label matching task in conjunction with electroencephalography and computational modeling to explore this issue. A theoretically important pattern of results was observed. First, a standard self-prioritization effect emerged indicating that responses to self-related items were faster and more accurate than responses to other-related stimuli. Second, a hierarchical drift diffusion model analysis revealed that this effect was underpinned by the enhanced uptake of evidence from self-related stimuli. Third, self-other discrimination during matching trials was observed at both early posterior N1 and late centro-parietal P3 components. Fourth, whereas the N1 was associated with the rate of information accumulation during decisional processing, P3 activity was linked with the evidential requirements of response selection. These findings elucidate the electrophysiological correlates of self-prioritization.

Towards the self and away from the others: evidence for self-prioritization observed in an approach avoidance task

Processing advantages arising from self-association have been documented across various stimuli and paradigms. However, the implications of "self-association" for affective and social behavior have been scarcely investigated. The approach-avoidance task (AAT) offers an opportunity to investigate whether the privileged status of the "self" may also translate into differential evaluative attitudes toward the "self" in comparison to "others". In the current work, we first established shape-label associations using the associative-learning paradigm, and then asked the participants to engage in an approach-avoidance task to test whether attitudinal differences induced on the account of self-association lead to participants having different approach-avoidance tendencies toward the "self-related" stimuli relative to the "other-related" stimuli. We found that our participants responded with faster approach and slower avoidance tendencies for shapes associated with the "self" and slower approach and faster avoidance tendencies for the shapes associated with the "stranger." These results imply that "self-association" may lead to positive action tendencies toward "self-associated" stimuli, and at the same time lead to neutral or negative attitudes toward stimuli not related to the "self". Further, as the participants responded to self-associated vs. other-associated stimuli cohorts, these results may also have implications for the modulation of social group-behaviors in favor of those like the self and against those in contrast to the self-group.

Self-prioritization with unisensory and multisensory stimuli in a matching task

A shape-label matching task is commonly used to examine the self-advantage in motor reaction-time responses (the Self-Prioritization Effect; SPE). In the present study, auditory labels were introduced, and, for the first time, responses to unisensory auditory, unisensory visual, and multisensory object-label stimuli were compared across block-type (i.e., trials blocked by sensory modality type, and intermixed trials of unisensory and multisensory stimuli). Auditory stimulus intensity was presented at either 50 dB (Group 1) or 70 dB (Group 2). The participants in Group 2 also completed a multisensory detection task, making simple speeded motor responses to the shape and sound stimuli and their multisensory combinations. In the matching task, the SPE was diminished in intermixed trials, and in responses to the unisensory auditory stimuli as compared with the multisensory (visual shape+auditory label) stimuli. In contrast, the SPE did not differ in responses to the unisensory visual and multisensory (auditory object+visual label) stimuli. The matching task was associated with multisensory ‘costs’ rather than gains, but response times to self- versus stranger-associated stimuli were differentially affected by the type of multisensory stimulus (auditory object+visual label or visual shape+auditory label). The SPE was thus modulated both by block-type and the combination of object and label stimulus modalities. There was no SPE in the detection task. Taken together, these findings suggest that the SPE with unisensory and multisensory stimuli is modulated by both stimulus- and task-related parameters within the matching task. The SPE does not transfer to a significant motor speed gain when the self-associations are not task-relevant.

EXPRESS: Self-Relevance and the Activation of Attentional Networks

Recent theoretical accounts maintain that core components of attentional functioning are preferentially tuned to self-relevant information. Evidence in support of this viewpoint is equivocal, however, with research overly reliant on personally significant (i.e., familiar) stimulus inputs (e.g., faces, forenames) and a diverse range of methodologies. Addressing these limitations, here we utilized arbitrary items (i.e., geometric shapes) and administered the Attention Network Test (ANT) to establish the extent to which self-relevance (vs. friend-relevance) moderates the three subsystems of attentional functioning - alerting, orienting, and executive control. The results revealed that only executive control was sensitive to the meaning of the stimuli, such that conflict resolution was enhanced following the presentation of self-associated compared to friend-associated shapes (i.e., cues). Probing the origin of this effect, a further computational analysis (i.e., Shrinking Spotlight Diffusion Model analysis) indicated that self-relevance facilitated the narrowing of visual attention. These findings highlight when and how the personal significance of otherwise trivial material modulates attentional processing.

Sticky me: Self-relevance slows reinforcement learning

A prominent facet of social-cognitive functioning is that self-relevant information is prioritized in perception, attention, and memory. What is not yet understood, however, is whether similar effects arise during learning. In particular, compared to other people (e.g., best friend) is information about the self acquired more rapidly? To explore this matter, here we used a probabilistic selection task in combination with computational modeling (i.e., Reinforcement Learning Drift Diffusion Model analysis) to establish how self-relevance influences learning under conditions of uncertainty (i.e., choices are based on the perceived likelihood of positive and negative outcomes). Across two experiments, a consistent pattern of effects was observed. First, learning rates for both positive and negative prediction errors were slower for self-relevant compared to friend-relevant associations. Second, self-relevant (vs. friend-relevant) learning was characterized by the exploitation (vs. exploration) of choice selections. That is, in a complex (i.e., probabilistic) decision-making environment, previously rewarded self-related outcomes were selected more often than novel - but potentially riskier - alternatives. The implications of these findings for accounts of self-function are considered.

Phenomenological Origins of Psychological Ownership

Motivated by a set of converging empirical findings and theoretical suggestions pertaining to the construct of ownership, we survey literature from multiple disciplines and present an extensive theoretical account linking the inception of a foundational naïve theory of ownership to principles governing the sense of (body) ownership. The first part of the account examines the emergence of the non-conceptual sense of ownership in terms of the minimal self and the body schema—a dynamic mental model of the body that functions as an instrument of directed action. A remarkable feature of the body schema is that it expands to incorporate objects that are objectively controlled by the person. Moreover, this embodiment of extracorporeal objects is accompanied by the phenomenological feeling of ownership towards the embodied objects. In fact, we argue that the sense of agency and ownership are inextricably linked, and that predictable control over an object can engender the sense of ownership. This relation between objective agency and the sense of ownership is moderated by gestalt-like principles. In the second part, we posit that these early emerging principles and experiences lead to the formation of a naïve theory of ownership rooted in notions of agential involvement.

From Affordances to Abstract Words: The Flexibility of Sensorimotor Grounding

The sensorimotor system plays a critical role in several cognitive processes. Here, we review recent studies documenting this interplay at different levels. First, we concentrate on studies that have shown how the sensorimotor system is flexibly involved in interactions with objects. We report evidence demonstrating how social context and situations influence affordance activation, and then focus on tactile and kinesthetic components in body-object interactions. Then, we turn to word use, and review studies that have shown that not only concrete words, but also abstract words are grounded in the sensorimotor system. We report evidence that abstract concepts activate the mouth effector more than concrete concepts, and discuss this effect in light of studies on adults, children, and infants. Finally, we pinpoint possible sensorimotor mechanisms at play in the acquisition and use of abstract concepts. Overall, we show that the involvement of the sensorimotor system is flexibly modulated by context, and that its role can be integrated and flanked by that of other systems such as the linguistic system. We suggest that to unravel the role of the sensorimotor system in cognition, future research should fully explore the complexity of this intricate, and sometimes slippery, relation.

Self-prioritization depends on assumed task-relevance of self-association

We conducted three experiments to test the effect of assumed task-relevance of self-association on the self-prioritization effect (SPE). Participants were first performing the standard matching task, and then a pseudo-word matching task, in which familiar labels from the standard task were replaced with pseudo-words. In the pseudo-words task, the association between stimuli and the self was, in fact, task-irrelevant. Learning instructions were varied to make participants believe that the self-association was task-relevant (Experiments 1 and 3) or task-irrelevant (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we told participants that geometrical shapes represent specific identities (self, friend, none) and pseudo-words' meanings reflect each of these identities to make participants believe that semantic associations of pseudo-words were task-relevant. In this experiment, a SPE was present in the pseudo-words task. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, but participants were told to form association pairs between pseudo-words and shapes, and not pseudo-words and identities. Thus, because the matching task presented only shapes and pseudo-words, participants were led to correctly believe that associations were task-irrelevant. Under these conditions, we did not observe a SPE in the pseudo-words task. Finally, in Experiment 3, participants were told that pseudo-words are "paired with" identities, making their relations with identities weaker than in Experiment 1, but still task-relevant. The SPE in the pseudo-word task reappeared. Together, the results suggest that a SPE can be observed in the absence of any stimuli with established self-associations, but only if self-associations are represented as task-relevant.

More or less of me and you: self-relevance augments the effects of item probability on stimulus prioritization

Self-relevance exerts a powerful influence on information processing. Compared to material associated with other people, personally meaningful stimuli are prioritized during decision-making. Further exploring the character of this effect, here we considered the extent to which stimulus enhancement is impacted by the frequency of self-relevant versus friend-relevant material. In a matching task, participants reported whether shape-label stimulus pairs corresponded to previously learned associations (e.g., triangle = self, square = friend). Crucially however, before the task commenced, stimulus-based expectancies were provided indicating the probability with which both self- and friend-related shapes would be encountered. The results revealed that task performance was impacted by the frequency of stimulus presentation in combination with the personal relevance of the items. When self- and friend-related shapes appeared with equal frequencies, a self-prioritization effect emerged (Expt. 1). Additionally, in both confirmatory (Expt. 2) and dis-confirmatory (Expt. 3) task contexts, stimuli that were encountered frequently (vs. infrequently) were prioritized, an effect that was most pronounced for self-relevant (vs. friend-relevant) items. Further computational analyses indicated that, in each of the reported experiments, differences in performance were underpinned by variation in the rate of information uptake, with evidence extracted more rapidly from self-relevant compared to friend-relevant stimuli. These findings advance our understanding of the emergence and origin of stimulus-prioritization effects during decisional processing.

On stopping yourself: Self-relevance facilitates response inhibition

It is well documented that stimuli associated with the self are easier to process than identical material paired with other people (i.e., self-prioritization effect). Surprisingly, however, relatively little is known about how self-relevance impacts core aspects of executive functioning, notably response inhibition. Accordingly, here we used a stop-signal task to establish how effectively responses toward self-relevant (vs. other-relevant) stimuli can intentionally be inhibited. In the context of personal possession, participants were required to classify stimuli (i.e., pens and pencils) based on ownership (i.e., owned-by-self vs. owned-by-friend/stranger), unless an occasional auditory tone indicated that the response should be withheld. The results revealed the benefits of self-relevance on response inhibition. Compared with items owned by a friend or stranger, responses to self-owned objects were inhibited more efficiently. These findings confirm that self-relevance facilitates executive control.

Sticking together? Re-binding previous other-associated stimuli interferes with self-verification but not partner-verification

The self-prioritisation and we-prioritisation effects can be observed through faster responses to self-stimuli (self and group) than non-self-stimuli. It remains uncertain if we-prioritisation extends to individual members of one's own group. In light of recent work that implicates memory-based processes in identity-prioritisation effects, the present experiment was developed to determine whether a task-partner's identity relevant information also benefits from an enhanced representation, despite conflicting evidence of partner-prioritisation. To this end, pairs of participants were recruited to perform a joint task. Each partner was assigned a shape and a stranger was also assigned a shape. Participants then completed a shape-to-label matching task where one participant responded if a shape and a label pair matched and the other responded if the shape and a label pair did not match. Halfway through the task the associated identities were switched such that the same shapes and labels were reassigned. Overall, a standard self-prioritisation effect was observed with match-responders making faster responses to self- over partner- and stranger-stimuli. After identities were remapped a decrement in performance was observed for self-trials relative to baseline self-responses. Conversely, responses were faster to partner- and stranger-stimuli relative to baseline performance for each stimulus type. Thus, no evidence was observed for an enhanced representation for task-partner-associated identities. However, an interaction between old and new memory traces for self- and other-associated identities does seem to interfere with self-retrieval and self-verification processes.

It's not always about me: The effects of prior beliefs and stimulus prevalence on self-other prioritisation

Although self-relevance is widely acknowledged to enhance stimulus processing, the exclusivity of this effect remains open to question. In particular, in commonly adopted experimental paradigms, the prioritisation of self-relevant (vs. other-relevant) material may reflect the operation of a task-specific strategy rather than an obligatory facet of social-cognitive functioning. By changing basic aspects of the decisional context, it may therefore be possible to generate stimulus-prioritisation effects for targets other than the self. Based on the demonstration that ownership facilitates object categorisation (i.e., self-ownership effect), here we showed that stimulus prioritisation is sensitive to prior expectations about the prevalence of forthcoming objects (owned-by-self vs. owned-by-friend) and whether these beliefs are supported during the task. Under conditions of stimulus uncertainty (i.e., no prior beliefs), replicating previous research, objects were classified more rapidly when owned-by-self compared with owned-by-friend (Experiment 1). When, however, the frequency of stimulus presentation either confirmed (Experiment 2) or disconfirmed (Experiment 3) prior expectations, stimulus prioritisation was observed for the most prevalent objects regardless of their owner. A hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) analysis further revealed that decisional bias was underpinned by differences in the evidential requirements of response generation. These findings underscore the flexibility of ownership effects (i.e., stimulus prioritisation) during object processing.

Self-relevance enhances evidence gathering during decision-making

Despite repeated demonstrations that self-relevant material is prioritized during stimulus appraisal, a number of unresolved issues remain. In particular, it is unclear if self-relevance facilitates task performance when stimuli are encountered under challenging processing conditions. To explore this issue, using a backward masking procedure, here participants were required to report if briefly presented objects (pencils and pens) had previously been assigned to the self or a best friend (i.e., object-ownership task). The results yielded a standard self-ownership effect, such that responses were faster and more accurate to self-owned (vs. friend-owned) objects. In addition, a drift diffusion model analysis indicated that this effect was underpinned by a stimulus bias. Specifically, evidence was accumulated more rapidly from self-owned compared to friend-owned stimuli. These findings further elucidate the extent and origin of self-prioritization during decisional processing.

It is not in the details: Self-related shapes are rapidly classified but their features are not better remembered

Self-prioritization is a robust phenomenon whereby judgments concerning self-representational stimuli are faster than judgments toward other stimuli. The present paper examines if and how self-prioritization causes more vivid short-term memories for self-related objects by giving geometric shapes arbitrary identities (self, mother, stranger). In Experiment 1 participants were presented with an array of the three shapes and required to retain the location and color of each in memory. Participants were then probed regarding the identity of one of the shapes and subsequently asked to indicate the color of the probed shape or an unprobed shape on a color wheel. Results indicated no benefit for self-stimuli in either response time for the identification probe or for color fidelity in memory. Yet, a cuing benefit was observed such that the cued stimulus in the identity probe did have higher fidelity within memory. Experiments 2 and 3 reduced the cognitive load by only requiring that participants process the identity and color of one shape at a time. For Experiment 2, the identity probe was memory-based, whereas the stimulus was presented alongside the identity probe for Experiment 3. Results demonstrated a robust self-prioritization effect: self-related shapes were classified faster than non-self-shapes, but this self-advantage did not lead to an increase in the fidelity of memory for self-related shapes’ colors. Overall, these results suggest that self-prioritization effects may be restricted to an improvement in the ability to recognize that the self-representational stimulus is present without devoting more perceptual and short-term memory resources to such stimuli.

Self-bias effect: movement initiation to self-owned property is speeded for both approach and avoidance actions

Recall of, and physical interaction with, self-owned items is privileged over items owned by other people (Constable et al. in Cognition 119(3):430-437, 2011; Cunningham et al. in Conscious Cognit 17(1):312-318, 2008). Here, we investigate approach (towards the item), compared with avoidance (away from the item) movements to images of self- and experimenter-owned items. We asked if initiation time and movement duration of button-press approach responses to self-owned items are associated with a systematic self-bias (overall faster responses), compared with avoidance movements, similar to findings of paradigms investigating affective evaluation of (unowned) items. Participants were gifted mugs to use, and after a few days they completed an approach-avoidance task (Chen and Bargh in Pers Soc Psychol Bull 25(2):215-224, 1999; Seibt et al. in J Exp Soc Psychol 44:713-720, 2008; Truong et al. in J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 42(3), 375-385, 2016) to images of their own or the experimenter's mug, using either congruent or incongruent movement direction mappings. There was a self-bias effect for initiation time to the self-owned mug, for both congruent and incongruent mappings, and for movement duration in the congruent mapping. The effect was abolished in Experiment 2 when participants responded based on a shape on the handle rather than mug ownership. We speculate that ownership status requires conscious processing to modulate responses. Moreover, ownership status judgements and affective evaluation may employ different mechanisms.

To have and to hold: embodied ownership is established in early childhood

We investigated whether embodied ownership is evident in early childhood. To do so, we gifted a drinking bottle to children (aged 24-48 months) to use for 2 weeks. They returned to perform reach-grasp-lift-replace actions with their own or the experimenter's bottle while we recorded their movements using motion capture. There were differences in motor interactions with self- vs experimenter-owned bottles, such that children positioned self-owned bottles significantly closer to themselves compared with the experimenter's bottle. Age did not modulate the positioning of the self-owned bottle relative to the experimenter-owned bottle. In contrast, the pattern was not evident in children who selected one of the two bottles to keep only after the task was completed, and thus did not 'own' it during the task (Experiment 2). These results extend similar findings in adults, confirming the importance of ownership in determining self-other differences and provide novel evidence that object ownership influences sensorimotor processes from as early as 2 years of age.

Exploring the first possessor bias in children

Even very young children are adept at linking property to owners (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012). However, some studies report that children systematically conserve property with the first possessors (Blake & Harris, 2009; Friedman & Neary, 2008). The present study seeks to integrate these two findings by testing for the presence of a first possessor bias in older children (ages 7-10) using a broader array of property transfers, and by investigating how manipulations of context-from third-person to first-person-yield ownership attributions that are more or less biased. Seven- and 8-year-olds, but not older children, exhibited a first possessor bias when property transfers were presented in a third-person context. This finding suggests that the first possessor bias persists longer in childhood than previously suspected. However, the bias was greatly attenuated or absent when property transfers were presented in a first-person context, rather than a third-person context.

I before U: Temporal order judgements reveal bias for self-owned objects

A multitude of studies demonstrate that self-relevant stimuli influence attention. Self-owned objects are a special class of self-relevant stimuli. If a self-owned object can indeed be characterised as a self-relevant stimulus then, consistent with theoretical predictions, a behavioural effect of ownership on attention should be present. To test this prediction, a task was selected that is known to be particularly sensitive measure of the prioritisation of visual information: the temporal order judgement. Participants completed temporal order judgements with pictures of "own" and "experimenter" owned objects (mugs) presented on either side of a central fixation cross. There was a variable onset delay between each picture, ranging between 0 ms and 105 ms, and participants were asked to indicate which mug appeared first. The results indicated a reliable change in the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) in favour of their own mug. Such a change in the PSS was not observed for two groups of participants who were exposed to a mug but did not keep the mug. A further experiment indicated that the source of the bias in PSS was more consistent with a criterion shift or top-down attentional prioritisation rather than a perceptual bias. These findings suggest that ownership, beyond mere-touch, mere-choice, or familiarity, leads to prioritised processing and responses, but the mechanism underlying the effect is not likely to be perceptual in nature.

Avoidance of Novelty Contributes to the Uncanny Valley

A hypothesis suggests that objects with a high degree of visual similarity to real humans trigger negative impressions (i.e., the uncanny valley). Previous studies have suggested that difficulty in object categorization elicits negative emotional reactions to enable the avoidance of potential threats. The present study further investigated this categorization-difficulty hypothesis. In an experiment, observers categorized morphed images of photographs and human doll faces as "photograph" or "doll" and evaluated the perceived eeriness of the images. Additionally, we asked the observers to answer questionnaires on behavioral inhibition systems (BIS). The results indicated that individual differences in the BIS score were associated with enhanced eeriness in the objects with a specific human likeness. These findings suggest that the tendency to avoid a potentially threatening novel experience contributes to promoting the perceived eeriness of objects with some degree of visual similarity to real humans.

Self-prioritization and perceptual matching: The effects of temporal construal

Recent research has revealed that self-referential processing enhances perceptual judgments - the so-called self-prioritization effect. The extent and origin of this effect remains unknown, however. Noting the multifaceted nature of the self, here we hypothesized that temporal influences on self-construal (i.e., past/future-self continuity) may serve as an important determinant of stimulus prioritization. Specifically, as representations of the self increase in abstraction as a function of temporal distance (i.e., distance from now), self-prioritization may only emerge when stimuli are associated with the current self. The results of three experiments supported this prediction. Self-relevance only enhanced performance in a standard perceptual-matching task when stimuli (i.e., geometric shapes) were connected with the current self; representations of the self in the future (Expts. 1 & 2) and past (Expt. 3) failed to facilitate decision making. To identify the processes underlying task performance, data were interrogated using a hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) approach. Results of these analyses revealed that self-prioritization was underpinned by a stimulus bias (i.e., rate of information uptake). Collectively, these findings elucidate when and how self-relevance influences decisional processing.

Cues of control modulate the ascription of object ownership

Knowing whether an object is owned and by whom is essential to avoid costly conflicts. We hypothesize that everyday interactions around objects are influenced by a minimal sense of object ownership grounded on respect of possession. In particular, we hypothesize that tracking object ownership can be influenced by any cue that predicts the establishment of individual physical control over objects. To test this hypothesis we used an indirect method to determine whether visual cues of physical control like spatial proximity to an object, temporal priority in seeing it, and touching it influence this minimal sense of object ownership. In Experiment 1 participants were shown a neutral object located on a table, in the reaching space of one of two characters. In Experiment 2 one character was the first to find the object then another character appeared and saw the object. In Experiments 3 and 4, spatial proximity, temporal priority, and touch are pitted against each other to assess their relative weight. After having seen the scenes, participants were required to judge the sensibility of sentences in which ownership of the object was ascribed to one of the two characters. Responses were faster when the objects were located in the reaching space of the character to whom ownership was ascribed in the sentence and when ownership was ascribed to the character who was the first to find the object. When contrasting the relevant cues, results indicate that touch is stronger than temporal priority in modulating the ascription of object ownership. However, all these effects were also influenced by contextual social cues like the gender of both characters and participants, the presence of a third-party observer, and the co-presence of characters. Consistently with our hypothesis, results indicate that many different cues of physical control influence the ascription of ownership in daily social contexts.

SOAP Opera: Self as Object and Agent in Prioritizing Attention

A growing body of evidence has demonstrated that multiple sources of salience tune attentional sets toward aspects of the environment, including affectively and motivationally significant categories of stimuli such as angry faces and reward-associated target locations. Recent evidence further indicates that objects that have gained personal significance through ownership can elicit similar attentional prioritization. Here we discuss current research on sources of attentional prioritization that shape our awareness of the visual world from moment to moment and the underlying neural systems and contextualize what is known about attentional prioritization of our possessions within that research. We review behavioral and neuroimaging research on the influence of self-relevance and ownership on cognition and discuss challenges to this literature stemming from different modes of conceptualizing and operationalizing the self. We argue that ownership taps into both “self-as-object,” which characterizes the self as an object with a constellation of traits and attributes, and “self-as-subject,” which characterizes the self as an agentic perceiver and knower. Despite an abundance of research probing neural and behavioral indices of self-as-object and its effects on attention, there exists a paucity of research on the influence of self-relevance of attention when self is operationalized from the perspective of a first-person subject. To begin to address this gap, we propose the Self as Ownership in Attentional Prioritization (SOAP) framework to explain how ownership increases salience through attention to external representations of self-identity (i.e., self as object) and attention to contextually mediated permission to act (i.e., self as subject).

Is there any Influence of Variations in Context on Object-Affordance Effects in Schizophrenia? Perception of Property and Goals of Action

The simple perception of an object can potentiate an associated action. This affordance effect depends heavily on the action context in which the object is presented. In recent years, psychologists, psychiatrists, and phenomenologists have agreed that subjects with schizophrenia may not perceive the affordances of people or objects that could lead to a loss of ease in their actions. We examined whether the addition of contextually congruent elements, during the perception of everyday objects, could promote the emergence of object-affordance effects in subjects with schizophrenia and controls. Participants performed two Stimulus–Response-Compatibility tasks in which they were presented with semantic primes related to sense of property (Experiment 1) or goal of action (Experiment 2) prior to viewing each graspable object. Controls responded faster when their response hand and the graspable part of the object were compatibly oriented, but only when the context was congruent with the individual’s needs and goals. When the context operated as a constraint, the affordance-effect was disrupted. These results support the understanding that object-affordance is flexible and not just intrinsic to an object. However, the absence of this object-affordance effect in subjects with schizophrenia suggests the possible impairment of their ability to experience the internal simulation of motor action potentialities. In such case, all activities of daily life would require the involvement of higher cognitive processes rather than lower level sensorimotor processes. The study of schizophrenia requires the consideration of concepts and methods that arise from the theories of embodied and situated cognition.

Ownership Status Influences the Degree of Joint Facilitatory Behavior

When engaging in joint activities, humans tend to sacrifice some of their own sensorimotor comfort and efficiency to facilitate a partner’s performance. In the two experiments reported here, we investigated whether ownership—a socioculturally based nonphysical feature ascribed to objects—influenced facilitatory motor behavior in joint action. Participants passed mugs that differed in ownership status across a table to a partner. We found that participants oriented handles less toward their partners when passing their own mugs than when passing mugs owned by their partners (Experiment 1) and mugs owned by the experimenter (Experiment 2). These findings indicate that individuals plan and execute actions that assist their partners but do so to a smaller degree if it is the individuals’ own property that the partners intend to manipulate. We discuss these findings in terms of underlying variables associated with ownership and conclude that a self-other distinction can be found in the human sensorimotor system.

Language and memory for object location

In three experiments, we investigated the influence of two types of language on memory for object location: demonstratives (this, that) and possessives (my, your). Participants first read instructions containing demonstratives/possessives to place objects at different locations, and then had to recall those object locations (following object removal). Experiments 1 and 2 tested contrasting predictions of two possible accounts of language on object location memory: the Expectation Model (Coventry, Griffiths, & Hamilton, 2014) and the congruence account (Bonfiglioli, Finocchiaro, Gesierich, Rositani, & Vescovi, 2009). In Experiment 3, the role of attention allocation as a possible mechanism was investigated. Results across all three experiments show striking effects of language on object location memory, with the pattern of data supporting the Expectation Model. In this model, the expected location cued by language and the actual location are concatenated leading to (mis)memory for object location, consistent with models of predictive coding (Bar, 2009; Friston, 2003).

A Memory Advantage for Property

People's access to resources depends on their status as the owner of particular items. To respect property, people need to remember who owns which objects. We test the hypothesis that people possess enhanced memory for ownership relations compared to unrelated objects. Participants viewed a sequence of 10 person-object pairs before completing a surprise associative memory test in which they matched each person with the previously paired object. We varied the description of the person-object pairs in the instructions. Across three experiments, participants showed better recall when the person was described as the owner of the object compared to being unrelated. Furthermore, memory for property was better than a physical relation (bumping), whereas it did not differ from mental relations (wanting and thinking). These patterns were observed both for memory of items (Experiments 1 and 2) and perceptual details (Experiment 3). We discuss implications for how people remember other people's property.

Value Learning Modulates goal-Directed Actions

With experience, particular objects can predict good or bad outcomes. This alters our perceptual response to them: Reliable predictors of salient outcomes are recognized faster and better than unreliable predictors, regardless of the value (gain, loss) of the outcome they predict. When attentional resources are constrained, learned value associations matter, causing recognition of gain-associated objects to be spared. Here, we ask how learned predictiveness and value change the way we interact with potentially rewarding objects. After associating virtual objects (drinking flutes) with monetary gains or losses, reaching for and grasping corresponding real objects depended on the object's learned value. Action was faster when directed at objects that previously predicted outcomes more rather than less consistently, regardless of value. Conversely, reaches were more direct for gain- than for loss-associated objects, regardless of their predictiveness. Action monitoring thus reveals how value learning components become accessible during action.

Body ownership and beyond: connections between cognitive neuroscience and linguistic typology

During the past few decades, two disciplines that rarely come together-namely, cognitive neuroscience and linguistic typology-have been generating remarkably similar results regarding the representational domain of personal possessions. Research in cognitive neuroscience indicates that although the core self is grounded in body ownership, the extended self encompasses a variety of noncorporeal possessions, especially those that play a key role in defining one's identity. And research in linguistic typology indicates that many languages around the world contain a distinct grammatical construction for encoding what is commonly called "inalienable" possession-a category of owned objects that almost always includes body parts, but that also tends to include several other kinds of personally relevant entities. Both of these independent lines of investigation are summarized, and a number of interdisciplinary connections between them are discussed.

Spatial demonstratives and perceptual space: describing and remembering object location

Spatial demonstratives - terms including this and that - are among the most common words across all languages. Yet, there are considerable differences between languages in how demonstratives carve up space and the object characteristics they can refer to, challenging the idea that the mapping between spatial demonstratives and the vision and action systems is universal. In seven experiments we show direct parallels between spatial demonstrative usage in English and (non-linguistic) memory for object location, indicating close connections between the language of space and non-linguistic spatial representation. Spatial demonstrative choice in English and immediate memory for object location are affected by a range of parameters - distance, ownership, visibility and familiarity - that are lexicalized in the demonstrative systems of some other languages. The results support a common set of constraints on language used to talk about space and on (non-linguistic) spatial representation itself. Differences in demonstrative systems across languages may emerge from basic distinctions in the representation and memory for object location. In turn, these distinctions offer a building block from which non-spatial uses of demonstratives can develop.

Disentangling the sense of ownership from the sense of fairness

Both evolutionary and developmental research indicate that humans are adapted to respecting property rights, independently (and possibly orthogonally) of considerations of fairness. We offer evidence from psychological experiments suggesting that enforcing one’s rights and respecting others’ possessions are basic cognitive mechanisms automatically activated and grounded in humans’ sensory-motor system. This may entail an independent motivation that is more profound than considerations of fairness and impartiality.

So far so good: emotion in the peripersonal/extrapersonal space

Current accounts of spatial cognition and human-object interaction suggest that the representation of peripersonal space depends on an action-specific system that remaps its representation according to action requirements. Here we demonstrate that this mechanism is sensitive to knowledge about properties of objects. In two experiments we explored the interaction between physical distance and object attributes (functionality, desirability, graspability, etc.) through a reaching estimation task in which participants indicated if objects were near enough to be reached. Using both a real and a cutting-edge digital scenario, we demonstrate that perceived reaching distance is influenced by ease of grasp and the affective valence of an object. Objects with a positive affective valence tend to be perceived reachable at locations at which neutral or negative objects are perceived as non-reachable. In addition to this, reaction time to distant (non-reachable) positive objects suggests a bias to perceive positive objects as closer than negative and neutral objects (exp. 2). These results highlight the importance of the affective valence of objects in the action-specific mapping of the peripersonal/extrapersonal space system.