Predictive eye movements are adjusted in a Bayes-optimal fashion in response to unexpectedly changing environmental probabilities

The empirical status of predictive coding and active inference

Research on predictive processing models has focused largely on two specific algorithmic theories: Predictive Coding for perception and Active Inference for decision-making. While these interconnected theories possess broad explanatory potential, they have only recently begun to receive direct empirical evaluation. Here, we review recent studies of Predictive Coding and Active Inference with a focus on evaluating the degree to which they are empirically supported. For Predictive Coding, we find that existing empirical evidence offers modest support. However, some positive results can also be explained by alternative feedforward (e.g., feature detection-based) models. For Active Inference, most empirical studies have focused on fitting these models to behavior as a means of identifying and explaining individual or group differences. While Active Inference models tend to explain behavioral data reasonably well, there has not been a focus on testing empirical validity of active inference theory per se, which would require formal comparison to other models (e.g., non-Bayesian or model-free reinforcement learning models). This review suggests that, while promising, a number of specific research directions are still necessary to evaluate the empirical adequacy and explanatory power of these algorithms.

Investigating how Explicit Contextual Cues Affect Predictive Sensorimotor Control in Autistic Adults

Research suggests that sensorimotor difficulties in autism could be reduced by providing individuals with explicit contextual information. To test this, we examined autistic visuomotor control during a virtual racquetball task, in which participants hit normal and unexpectedly-bouncy balls using a handheld controller. The probability of facing each type of ball was varied unpredictably over time. However, during cued trials, participants received explicit information about the likelihood of facing each uncertain outcome. When compared to neurotypical controls, autistic individuals displayed poorer task performance, atypical gaze profiles, and more restricted swing kinematics. These visuomotor patterns were not significantly affected by contextual cues, indicating that autistic people exhibit underlying differences in how prior information and environmental uncertainty are dynamically modulated during movement tasks.

Testing predictive coding theories of autism spectrum disorder using models of active inference

Several competing neuro-computational theories of autism have emerged from predictive coding models of the brain. To disentangle their subtly different predictions about the nature of atypicalities in autistic perception, we performed computational modelling of two sensorimotor tasks: the predictive use of manual gripping forces during object lifting and anticipatory eye movements during a naturalistic interception task. In contrast to some accounts, we found no evidence of chronic atypicalities in the use of priors or weighting of sensory information during object lifting. Differences in prior beliefs, rates of belief updating, and the precision weighting of prediction errors were, however, observed for anticipatory eye movements. Most notably, we observed autism-related difficulties in flexibly adapting learning rates in response to environmental change (i.e., volatility). These findings suggest that atypical encoding of precision and context-sensitive adjustments provide a better explanation of autistic perception than generic attenuation of priors or persistently high precision prediction errors. Our results did not, however, support previous suggestions that autistic people perceive their environment to be persistently volatile.

The effect of performance pressure and error-feedback on anxiety and performance in an interceptive task

Introduction

Whilst the disruptive effects of anxiety on attention and performance have been well documented, the antecedents to anxiety in motivated performance scenarios are less well understood. We therefore sought to understand the cognitive appraisals that mediate the relationship between pressurised performance situations and the onset of anxiety.

Methods

We tested the effects of performance pressure and error feedback on appraisals of the probability and cost of failure, the experience of anxiety, and subsequent impacts on visual attention, movement kinematics, and task performance during a virtual reality interception task.

Results

A series of linear mixed effects models indicated that failure feedback and situational pressure influenced appraisals of the probability and cost of failure, which subsequently predicted the onset of anxious states. We did not, however, observe downstream effects on performance and attention.

Discussion

The findings support the predictions of Attentional Control Theory Sport, that (i) momentary errors lead to negative appraisals of the probability of future failure; and (ii) that appraisals of both the cost and probability of future failure are important predictors of anxiety. The results contribute to a better understanding of the precursors to anxiety and the feedback loops that may maintain anxious states.

From fear of falling to choking under pressure: A predictive processing perspective of disrupted motor control under anxiety

Under the Predictive Processing Framework, perception is guided by internal models that map the probabilistic relationship between sensory states and their causes. Predictive processing has contributed to a new understanding of both emotional states and motor control but is yet to be fully applied to their interaction during the breakdown of motor movements under heightened anxiety or threat. We bring together literature on anxiety and motor control to propose that predictive processing provides a unifying principle for understanding motor breakdowns as a disruption to the neuromodulatory control mechanisms that regulate the interactions of top-down predictions and bottom-up sensory signals. We illustrate this account using examples from disrupted balance and gait in populations who are anxious/fearful of falling, as well as 'choking' in elite sport. This approach can explain both rigid and inflexible movement strategies, as well as highly variable and imprecise action and conscious movement processing, and may also unite the apparently opposing self-focus and distraction approaches to choking. We generate predictions to guide future work and propose practical recommendations.

A Bayesian computational model to investigate expert anticipation of a seemingly unpredictable ball bounce

During dynamic and time-constrained sporting tasks performers rely on both online perceptual information and prior contextual knowledge to make effective anticipatory judgments. It has been suggested that performers may integrate these sources of information in an approximately Bayesian fashion, by weighting available information sources according to their expected precision. In the present work, we extended Bayesian brain approaches to anticipation by using formal computational models to estimate how performers weighted different information sources when anticipating the bounce direction of a rugby ball. Both recreational (novice) and professional (expert) rugby players (n = 58) were asked to predict the bounce height of an oncoming rugby ball in a temporal occlusion paradigm. A computational model, based on a partially observable Markov decision process, was fitted to observed responses to estimate participants' weighting of online sensory cues and prior beliefs about ball bounce height. The results showed that experts were more sensitive to online sensory information, but that neither experts nor novices relied heavily on prior beliefs about ball trajectories in this task. Experts, but not novices, were observed to down-weight priors in their anticipatory decisions as later and more precise visual cues emerged, as predicted by Bayesian and active inference accounts of perception.

Task-evoked pupillary responses track precision-weighted prediction errors and learning rate during interceptive visuomotor actions

In this study, we examined the relationship between physiological encoding of surprise and the learning of anticipatory eye movements. Active inference portrays perception and action as interconnected inference processes, driven by the imperative to minimise the surprise of sensory observations. To examine this characterisation of oculomotor learning during a hand-eye coordination task, we tested whether anticipatory eye movements were updated in accordance with Bayesian principles and whether trial-by-trial learning rates tracked pupil dilation as a marker of 'surprise'. Forty-four participants completed an interception task in immersive virtual reality that required them to hit bouncing balls that had either expected or unexpected bounce profiles. We recorded anticipatory eye movements known to index participants' beliefs about likely ball bounce trajectories. By fitting a hierarchical Bayesian inference model to the trial-wise trajectories of these predictive eye movements, we were able to estimate each individual's expectations about bounce trajectories, rates of belief updating, and precision-weighted prediction errors. We found that the task-evoked pupil response tracked prediction errors and learning rates but not beliefs about ball bounciness or environmental volatility. These findings are partially consistent with active inference accounts and shed light on how encoding of surprise may shape the control of action.

An Active Inference Account of Skilled Anticipation in Sport: Using Computational Models to Formalise Theory and Generate New Hypotheses

Optimal performance in time-constrained and dynamically changing environments depends on making reliable predictions about future outcomes. In sporting tasks, performers have been found to employ multiple information sources to maximise the accuracy of their predictions, but questions remain about how different information sources are weighted and integrated to guide anticipation. In this paper, we outline how predictive processing approaches, and active inference in particular, provide a unifying account of perception and action that explains many of the prominent findings in the sports anticipation literature. Active inference proposes that perception and action are underpinned by the organism’s need to remain within certain stable states. To this end, decision making approximates Bayesian inference and actions are used to minimise future prediction errors during brain–body–environment interactions. Using a series of Bayesian neurocomputational models based on a partially observable Markov process, we demonstrate that key findings from the literature can be recreated from the first principles of active inference. In doing so, we formulate a number of novel and empirically falsifiable hypotheses about human anticipation capabilities that could guide future investigations in the field.