Disembodying (tool-use) action understanding

Forward effects from action observation: the role of attentional focus

After viewing an image representing an action on an object, we recognize the forward states of the seen action faster than the backward states. The present study exploits a variant of a new experimental paradigm to investigate cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect. Participants viewed a series of still photos of unfolding actions on objects, each followed by a photo depicting either one of three (instead of two of the original paradigm) different and temporally distant moments after the image or one moment before the image, along with photos of different actions. Experiment 1 revealed the classical forward effects in this new context: when the task was to judge whether the action in the second photo was the same as in the first photo, evaluations were faster for all forward photos than for backward photos. In Experiment 2, we examined the role of participants' attention to the object alongside the role of attention to action kinematics in triggering these "forward effects" by manipulating participants' attentional focus. As the results showed, evaluations were faster for all forward photos when the focus was on the action kinematics, but when the focus was on the object, evaluations were faster only for the last forward photo showing the final action state. These results seem to suggest that focusing on the object triggers a representation of the action goal and thus modulates the mental simulation underlying action anticipation.

The implicit effect of action mental simulation on action evaluation

The main assumption underlying the present investigation is that action observation elicits a mandatory mental simulation representing the action forward in time. In Experiment 1, participants observed pairs of photos portraying the initial and the final still frames of an action video; then they observed a photo depicting the very same action but either forward or backward in time. Their task was to tell whether the action in the photo portrayed something happened before or after the action seen at encoding. In this explicit task, the evaluation was faster for forward photos than for backward photos. Crucially, the effect was replicated when instructions asked only to evaluate at test whether the photo depicted a scene congruent with the action seen at encoding (implicit task from two still frames, Experiment 2), and when at encoding, they were presented a single still frame and evaluated at test whether a photo depicted a scene congruent with the action seen at encoding (implicit task from single still frame; Experiment 3). Overall, the results speak in favour of a mandatory mechanism through which our brain simulates the action also in tasks that do not explicitly require action simulation.

Embodied cognition: So flexible as to be "disembodied"?

This review aims to explore what I call the "Embodiment Cost Hypothesis" (ECH), according to which, when humans "embody" a part of the world other than their bodies, a measurable cost is detectable on their real bodies. The review analyzes experimental evidence in favor of the ECH by examining studies from different research fields, including studies of action observation (2), tool-use (3), rubber hand illusion (4), and full-body illusions (5). In light of this literature, this review argues that embodiment effects can profitably be seen as phenomena associated with both benefits (resulting from the embodiment of external objects/bodies) and costs (resulting from the disembodiment at various levels of the subject's own body). Implications are discussed in relation to the ongoing debate on the embodied cognition (EC) approach.