Role of gamma-band synchronization in priming of form discrimination for multiobject displays

Human visual perceptual organization beats thinking on speed

What is the degree to which knowledge influences visual perceptual processes? This question, which is central to the seeing-versus-thinking debate in cognitive science, is often discussed using examples claimed to be proof of one stance or another. It has, however, also been muddled by the usage of different and unclear definitions of perception. Here, for the well-defined process of perceptual organization, I argue that including speed (or efficiency) into the equation opens a new perspective on the limits of top-down influences of thinking on seeing. While the input of the perceptual organization process may be modifiable and its output enrichable, the process itself seems so fast (or efficient) that thinking hardly has time to intrude and is effective mostly after the fact.

A neurocomputational system for relational reasoning

The representation and manipulation of structured relations is central to human reasoning. Recent work in computational modeling and neuroscience has set the stage for developing more detailed neurocomputational models of these abilities. Several key neural findings appear to dovetail with computational constraints derived from a model of analogical processing, 'Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies' (LISA). These include evidence that (i) coherent oscillatory activity in the gamma and theta bands enables long-distance communication between the prefrontal cortex and posterior brain regions where information is stored; (ii) neurons in prefrontal cortex can rapidly learn to represent abstract concepts; (iii) a rostral-caudal abstraction gradient exists in the PFC; and (iv) the inferior frontal gyrus exerts inhibitory control over task-irrelevant information.

Cognitive architecture of perceptual organization: from neurons to gnosons

What, if anything, is cognitive architecture and how is it implemented in neural architecture? Focusing on perceptual organization, this question is addressed by way of a pluralist approach which, supported by metatheoretical considerations, combines complementary insights from representational, connectionist, and dynamic systems approaches to cognition. This pluralist approach starts from a representationally inspired model which implements the intertwined but functionally distinguishable subprocesses of feedforward feature encoding, horizontal feature binding, and recurrent feature selection. As sustained by a review of neuroscientific evidence, these are the subprocesses that are believed to take place in the visual hierarchy in the brain. Furthermore, the model employs a special form of processing, called transparallel processing, whose neural signature is proposed to be gamma-band synchronization in transient horizontal neural assemblies. In neuroscience, such assemblies are believed to mediate binding of similar features. Their formal counterparts in the model are special input-dependent distributed representations, called hyperstrings, which allow many similar features to be processed in a transparallel fashion, that is, simultaneously as if only one feature were concerned. This form of processing does justice to both the high combinatorial capacity and the high speed of the perceptual organization process. A naturally following proposal is that those temporarily synchronized neural assemblies are "gnosons", that is, constituents of flexible self-organizing cognitive architecture in between the relatively rigid level of neurons and the still elusive level of consciousness.

RTbox: a device for highly accurate response time measurements

Although computer keyboards and mice are frequently used in measuring response times (RTs), the accuracy of these measurements is quite low. Specialized RT collection devices must be used to obtain more accurate measurements. However, all the existing devices have some shortcomings. We have developed and implemented a new, commercially available device, the RTbox, for highly accurate RT measurements. The RTbox has its own microprocessor and high-resolution clock. It can record the identities and timing of button events with high accuracy, unaffected by potential timing uncertainty or biases during data transmission and processing in the host computer. It stores button events until the host computer chooses to retrieve them. The asynchronous storage greatly simplifies the design of user programs. The RTbox can also receive and record external signals as triggers and can measure RTs with respect to external events. The internal clock of the RTbox can be synchronized with the computer clock, so the device can be used without external triggers. A simple USB connection is sufficient to integrate the RTbox with any standard computer and operating system.

Interaction of attention and temporal object priming

Within a 3 x 3 matrix of 90 degrees corner junctions, detection of a Kanizsa-type square is facilitated when the target display is preceded by a 40-Hz flickering premask of 3 x 3 crosses, with four crosses synchronously oscillating at the subsequent target location. To examine whether this 'synchrony-priming' effect is influenced by, or dependent on, visuo-spatial attention, a spatial-cueing manipulation was introduced. Observers were presented with a visual or acoustic cue which indicated the likely target quadrant. The main finding was that synchrony priming was larger for invalidly, compared with validly, cued locations, and that the priming effect was figural, rather than spatial, in nature (i.e., confined to points associated with the completed boundary, rather than extending to the inner region, defined by the synchronous premask elements). This pattern of effects argues that target processing is expedited not by attracting spatial attention to the primed location, but by the prime expediting (figure-specific) target encoding, as a result of which the target position gains a processing and selection advantage relative to non-primed locations.

Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds

Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as “one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system (PSS) (Newell 1980). We show that this symbolic-relational discontinuity pervades nearly every domain of cognition and runs much deeper than even the spectacular scaffolding provided by language or culture alone can explain. We propose a representational-level specification as to where human and nonhuman animals' abilities to approximate a PSS are similar and where they differ. We conclude by suggesting that recent symbolic-connectionist models of cognition shed new light on the mechanisms that underlie the gap between human and nonhuman minds.