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Fleck LM. Public Reason, Bioethics, and Public Policy: A Seductive Delusion or Ambitious Aspiration? Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2024:1-15. [PMID: 38465673 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180124000124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/12/2024]
Abstract
Can Rawlsian public reason sufficiently justify public policies that regulate or restrain controversial medical and technological interventions in bioethics (and the broader social world), such as abortion, physician aid-in-dying, CRISPER-cas9 gene editing of embryos, surrogate mothers, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of eight-cell embryos, and so on? The first part of this essay briefly explicates the central concepts that define Rawlsian political liberalism. The latter half of this essay then demonstrates how a commitment to Rawlsian public reason can ameliorate (not completely resolve) many of the policy disagreements related to bioethically controversial medical interventions today. The goal of public reason is to reduce the size of the disagreement by eliminating features of the disagreement that violate the norms of public reason. The norms of public reason are those norms that are politically necessary to preserve the liberal, pluralistic, democratic character of this society. What remains is reasonable disagreement to be addressed through normal democratic deliberative processes. Specific issues addressed from a public reason perspective include personal responsibility for excessive health costs, the utility of a metaphysical definition of death for organ transplantation, and the moral status of excess embryos generated through IVF and/or their use in medical research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leonard M Fleck
- Center for Bioethics and Social Justice, College of Human Medicine, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA
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Slater J. The SIA Can't Just Go with the FLO. HEC Forum 2023:10.1007/s10730-023-09510-5. [PMID: 37440146 DOI: 10.1007/s10730-023-09510-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 06/30/2023] [Indexed: 07/14/2023]
Abstract
Hendricks (2018) has defended an argument that abortion is (usually) immoral, which he calls the impairment argument. This argument purports to apply regardless of the moral status of the fetus. It has recently been bolstered by several amendments from Blackshaw and Hendricks (2021a; 2021b). In this paper, three problems are presented for their Strengthened Impairment Argument (SIA). In the first, it is observed that even with the new modifications the argument, contrary to their insistence, does seem to depend on Marquis' argument. In order for it not to do so, they would need to provide some other plausible reason why impairing a fetus is wrong that persists in cases of abortion. Because of the restrictions regarding what reasons can be used, they are not entitled to stipulate that some plausible reason can be found. In the second section, the use of an over-ridingness caveat - the most recent modification - is scrutinised. This is shown to either beg the question about the permissibility of abortion by assuming that opposing reasons are insufficient in most cases, or require an entirely separate argument to establish that such reasons are insufficient. Thirdly, I observe that the principle utilised in the latest version of the argument fails to account for undercutting reason, which suggest that the principle, in its current form, is false.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joe Slater
- Philosophy Department, 67-69 Oakfield Avenue, G12 8LP, Glasgow, UK.
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Abstract
William Simkulet has recently criticised Colgrove et al's defence against what they have called inconsistency arguments-arguments that claim opponents of abortion (OAs) act in ways inconsistent with their underlying beliefs about human fetuses (eg, that human fetuses are persons at conception). Colgrove et al presented three objections to inconsistency arguments, which Simkulet argues are unconvincing. Further, he maintains that OAs who hold that the fetus is a person at conception fail to act on important issues such as the plight of frozen embryos, poverty and spontaneous abortion. Thus, they are morally negligent. In response, we argue that Simkulet has targeted a very narrow group of OAs, and so his criticisms are inapplicable to most OAs. We then explain why his responses to each of Colgrove et al's objections do not succeed, even for this restricted group. Finally, we note that Simkulet fails to provide evidence for his claims regarding OAs' supposed failures to act, and we show that OAs veritably do invest resources into these important issues. We conclude that Colgrove et al's reasons for rejecting inconsistency arguments (en masse) remain intact.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Nicholas Colgrove
- Philosophy Department and Center for Bioethics, Health and Society, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA
| | - Daniel Rodger
- Allied Health Sciences, London South Bank University School of Health and Social Care, London, UK
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Blackshaw BP, Colgrove N, Rodger D. Why inconsistency arguments fail: a response to Shaw. New Bioeth 2022; 28:139-151. [PMID: 35531764 DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2070960] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
Opponents of abortion are commonly said to be inconsistent in their beliefs or actions, and to fail in their obligations to prevent the deaths of embryos and fetuses from causes other than induced abortion. We have argued that these 'inconsistency arguments' conform to a pattern which is susceptible to a number of objections, and that consequently they fail en masse. In response, Joshua Shaw argues that we misrepresent inconsistency arguments, and that we underestimate the extent to which our opponents have anticipated and addressed counterarguments. In this essay we draw on aspects of Shaw's alternative formulation of inconsistency arguments to present an improved inconsistency argument structure. While we agree with Shaw that inconsistency arguments must each be examined on their merits, we reject Shaw's assertion that our objections are dependent on misrepresentations. Our initial objections remain largely successful, therefore, in dealing with the inconsistency arguments of which we are aware.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Daniel Rodger
- Allied Health Sciences, London South Bank University, London, UK
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Simkulet W. The Moral Significance of Abortion Inconsistency Arguments. Asian Bioeth Rev 2022; 14:41-56. [PMID: 34729080 PMCID: PMC8554498 DOI: 10.1007/s41649-021-00189-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/13/2021] [Revised: 09/02/2021] [Accepted: 09/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Most opponents of abortion (OA) believe fetuses matter. Critics argue that OA act inconsistently with regards to fetal life, seeking to restrict access to induced abortion, but largely ignoring spontaneous abortion and the creation of surplus embryos by IVF. Nicholas Colgrove, Bruce Blackshaw, and Daniel Rodger call such arguments inconsistency arguments and contend they do not matter. They present three objections to these arguments - the other beliefs, other actions, and hypocrisy objection. Previously, I argued these objections fail and threaten to undermine ethical inquiry. Colgrove et al. have recently replied, but here, I argue their reply fails as well and raises a new criticism of the other actions' objection. This essay sets out to show, as well as any philosophical argument can, that inconsistency arguments are morally significant.
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Affiliation(s)
- William Simkulet
- Park University, Parkville, MO USA
- Dodge City Community College, Dodge City, KS USA
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Blackshaw BP. Defending the substance view against its critics. New Bioeth 2021; 28:54-67. [PMID: 34806554 DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2021.1996953] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
Recently, the substance view of persons has been heavily criticized for the counterintuitive conclusions it seems to imply in scenarios such as embryo rescue cases and embryo loss. These criticisms have obscured the considerable success of the substance view in supporting other intuitions that are widely shared, and that competing accounts such as the psychological view have difficulties accounting for. Here, I examine common intuitions regarding identity, human exceptionalism, the moral equality of children and adults, infanticide, and prenatal injury. I conclude that when we broaden the range of intuitions examined, the substance view emerges as just as plausible an account of our nature as the more widely accepted psychological view.
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Bohn JA. Miscarriage Can Kill … But it Usually Does Not: Evaluating Inconsistency Arguments. New Bioeth 2021; 27:245-265. [PMID: 34455942 DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2021.1970374] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
Recent publications debate the value of inconsistency arguments. Here, I argue that 'Cause of Death Arguments' - inconsistency arguments that claim miscarriage causes death far more often than induced abortion - are unsound or invalid. 'Miscarriage' ambiguously refers both to intrauterine death, an outcome that does not itself cause death, and preterm delivery, which only sometimes causes death. The referential ambiguity also obscures actions people do take to prevent 'miscarriage.' When using the most plausible versions of each premise, these arguments equivocate. Thus, they cannot prove anything. However, missing the equivocation also causes those responding to Cause of Death Arguments to make unconvincing arguments; they inadvertently make or grant false claims themselves. To avoid such mistakes and expose the merely rhetorical power of Cause of Death Arguments, philosophers should replace 'miscarriage' with disambiguated terms. Doing so should lead people across the abortion debate to finally abandon the Cause of Death Argument.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jessalyn A Bohn
- Department of Philosophy, St. Edward's University, Austin, TX, USA
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Abstract
Some opponents of abortion claim fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. Call these "Personhood-At-Conception" (or PAC), opponents of abortion. Amy Berg (2017, Philosophical Studies 174:1217-26) argues that if fetuses are persons from the moment of conception, then miscarriage kills far more people than abortion. Thus, PAC opponents of abortion must "immediately" and "substantially" shift their attention, resources, etc., toward preventing miscarriage or admit they do not believe that personhood begins at conception (or, at least, they should recognize they are not acting in ways consistent with this belief). Unfortunately, Berg's argument fails at every step. After outlining her argument, I show that her claim-that "miscarriage . . . is much deadlier than abortion"-is false (when taken literally) and misleading otherwise. Further, Berg's argument is identical in structure to a criticism sometimes levied against the "Black Lives Matter" movement. In the latter context, the argument has been vehemently rejected. Berg's argument should be rejected for the same reasons. Finally, Berg cites no evidence when claiming that PAC opponents of abortion are "not doing enough" to prevent miscarriage. And, even if PAC opponents of abortion are not diverting substantial funds toward miscarriage prevention, Berg fails to notice that this may be for good reason.
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Colgrove N, Blackshaw BP, Rodger D. Prolife hypocrisy: why inconsistency arguments do not matter. J Med Ethics 2020; 47:medethics-2020-106633. [PMID: 33303649 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2020-106633] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2020] [Revised: 10/28/2020] [Accepted: 11/01/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Opponents of abortion are often described as 'inconsistent' (hypocrites) in terms of their beliefs, actions and/or priorities. They are alleged to do too little to combat spontaneous abortion, they should be adopting cryopreserved embryos with greater frequency and so on. These types of arguments-which we call 'inconsistency arguments'-conform to a common pattern. Each specifies what consistent opponents of abortion would do (or believe), asserts that they fail to act (or believe) accordingly and concludes that they are inconsistent. Here, we show that inconsistency arguments fail en masse. In short, inconsistency arguments typically face four problems. First, they usually fail to account for diversity among opponents of abortion. Second, they rely on inferences about consistency based on isolated beliefs shared by some opponents of abortion (and these inferences often do not survive once we consider other beliefs opponents of abortion tend to hold). Third, inconsistency arguments usually ignore the diverse ways in which opponents of abortion might act on their beliefs. Fourth, inconsistency arguments criticise groups of people without threatening their beliefs (eg, that abortion is immoral). Setting these problems aside, even supposing inconsistency arguments are successful, they hardly matter. In fact, in the two best-case scenarios-where inconsistency arguments succeed-they either encourage millions of people to make the world a (much) worse place (from the critic's perspective) or promote epistemically and morally irresponsible practices. We conclude that a more valuable discussion would be had by focusing on the arguments made by opponents of abortion rather than opponents themselves.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nicholas Colgrove
- Philosophy Department and the Center for Bioethics, Health & Society, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA
| | | | - Daniel Rodger
- Allied Health Sciences, London South Bank University, School of Health and Social Care, London, UK
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Räsänen J. Schrödinger's Fetus. Med Health Care Philos 2020; 23:125-130. [PMID: 31325076 DOI: 10.1007/s11019-019-09916-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
This paper defends and develops Elizabeth Harman's Actual Future Principle with a concept called Schrödinger's Fetus. I argue that all early fetuses are Schrödinger's Fetuses: those early fetuses that survive and become conscious beings have full moral status already as early fetuses, but those fetuses that die as early fetuses lack moral status. With Schrödinger's Fetus, it becomes possible to accept two widely held but contradictory intuitions to be true, and to avoid certain reductiones ad absurdum that pro-life and pro-choice positions face. It also gives a simple solution to the problem of prenatal harm.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joona Räsänen
- Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Arts and Ideas, Faculty of Humanities, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1020, Blindern, 0315, Oslo, Norway.
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Abstract
The substance view is an account of personhood that regards all human beings as possessing instrinsic value and moral status equivalent to that of an adult human being. Consequently, substance view proponents typically regard abortion as impermissible in most circumstances. The substance view, however, has difficulty accounting for certain intuitions regarding the badness of death for embryos and fetuses, and the wrongness of killing them. Jeff McMahan's time-relative interest account is designed to cater for such intuitions, and so I present a proposal for strengthening the substance view by incorporating McMahan's account - the Dual-Aspect Account of the morality of killing. I show that it resolves some important issues for the substance view while preserving its central premise of moral equality for all human beings. I then compare the Dual-Aspect Account with McMahan's Two-Tiered Account of the morality of killing, which he derives from his time-relative interest account.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bruce P Blackshaw
- Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
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