What can history do for bioethics?

Forgetting how we ate: personalised nutrition and the strategic uses of history

Personalised nutrition (PN) has emerged over the past twenty years as a promising area of research in the postgenomic era and has been popularized as the new big thing out of molecular biology. Advocates of PN claim that previous approaches to nutrition sought general and universal guidance that applied to all people. In contrast, they contend that PN operates with the principle that "one size does not fit all" when it comes to dietary guidance. While the molecular mechanisms studied within PN are new, the notion of a personal dietary regime guided by medical advice has a much longer history that can be traced back to Galen's "On Food and Diet" or Ibn Sina's (westernized as Avicenna) "Canon of Medicine". Yet this history is either wholly ignored or misleadingly appropriated by PN proponents. This (mis)use of history, we argue helps to sustain the hype of the novelty of the proposed field and potential commodification of molecular advice that undermines longer histories of food management in premodern and non-Western cultures. Moreover, it elides how the longer history of nutritional advice always happened in a heavily moralized, gendered, and racialized context deeply entwined with collective technologies of power, not just individual advice. This article aims at offering a wider appreciation of this longer history to nuance the hype and exceptionalism surrounding contemporary claims.

The place of ethics in practice of anatomical sciences: have we left our dark past behind and looking towards a bright future?

INTRODUCTION

Anatomical sciences involve handling of human tissues and, therefore, application of principles of bioethics is central to anatomical practice. For a considerable period of time, anatomy was practiced without ethical norms as concept of ethics developed during second half of twentieth century. Hence, possible glimpse into contrast in ethical standards between anatomy in the past and present was deemed as an intriguing research theme.

METHODS

A literature search was undertaken from indexed databases (Medline and Pubmed, Scopus, Embase, CINAHL Plus, Web of Science and Google Scholar). Relevant data were extracted from 37 articles that were selected from an initial pool of 752 articles based on search criteria set for the study.

RESULTS

Prevalent anatomical practices in the past such as dissection of executed criminals, acts of vivisection, illegal procurement of human remains, use of human tissues obtained as part of war crimes and dissection of human fetuses as well as their archival were analyzed through prism of established ethical norms in present day. The observations from past were presented vis-à-vis ethical practices undertaken in present times such as use of donated bodies and/or body parts procured through legal means for dissection, adherence to ethical norms during dissection, archival of human tissues mandating stringent regulation and dignified disposal of human remains. Existing loop holes were identified and future prospects regarding ethical standards in anatomy were highlighted based on rational judgment of existing trends.

CONCLUSION

The article concludes with defense on future prospects of ethics in anatomy based on documented arguments.

Looking into the shadow: the eugenics argument in debates on reproductive technologies and practices

Eugenics is often referred to in debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies and practices, in relation to the creation of moral boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable technologies, and acceptable and unacceptable uses of these technologies. Historians have argued that twentieth century eugenics cannot be reduced to a uniform set of practices, and that no simple lessons can be drawn from this complex history. Some authors stress the similarities between past eugenics and present reproductive technologies and practices (what I define throughout the paper as 'the continuity view') in order to condemn the latter. Others focus on the differences between past and present practices (what I define throughout the paper as 'the discontinuity view') in order to defend contemporary reproductive technologies. In this paper, I explore the meanings of the word 'eugenics' and the relationship between its past and present uses in terms of contemporary debates on reproductive technologies and practices. I argue that moral disagreement about present technologies originate in divergent views of condemnable and justifiable features of the past.

A hidden history: A survey of the teaching of eugenics in health, social care and pedagogical education and training courses in Europe

Knowledge and understanding of how eugenics has historically affected the lives of people with intellectual disabilities is vital if professionals are to mount an effective defence against its contemporary influences. An online survey of European providers of health, social care and pedagogical education and training courses was undertaken to find out how the history of eugenics is taught to those wishing to work in services for people with intellectual disabilities. Two hundred and six educational providers were contacted with a response rate of 35.9% (n = 74). Findings showed that the majority of educational providers recognize the importance of including the history of eugenics in their courses, although fewer feel confident that it is sufficiently well covered to prepare future professionals for their role as protector. Course content differs on both the emphasis given to the different components of this history, time dedicated to its delivery and the extent to which it is used to inform legal and ethical debate. Specific recommendations for developing the way in which this subject area is taught are outlined.

Bioethics as a Governance Practice

Bioethics can be considered as a topic, an academic discipline (or combination of disciplines), a field of study, an enterprise in persuasion. The historical specificity of the forms bioethics takes is significant, and raises questions about some of these approaches. Bioethics can also be considered as a governance practice, with distinctive institutions and structures. The forms this practice takes are also to a degree country specific, as the paper illustrates by drawing on the author's UK experience. However, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics can provide a starting point for comparisons provided that this does not exclude sensitivity to the socio-political context. Bioethics governance practices are explained by various legitimating narratives. These include response to scandal, the need to restrain irresponsible science, the accommodation of pluralist views, and the resistance to the relativist idea that all opinions count equally in bioethics. Each approach raises interesting questions and shows that bioethics should be studied as a governance practice as a complement to other approaches.

On the nature and sociology of bioethics

Much has been written in the last decade about how we should understand the value of the sociology of bioethics. Increasingly the value of the sociology of bioethics is interpreted by its advocates directly in terms of its relationship to bioethics. It is claimed that the sociology of bioethics (and related disciplinary approaches) should be seen as an important component of work in bioethics. In this paper we wish to examine whether, and how, the sociology of bioethics can be defended as a valid and justified research activity, in the context of debates about the nature of bioethics. We begin by presenting and arguing for an account of bioethics that does justice to the content of the field, the range of questions that belong within this field, and the justificatory standards (and methodological orientations) that can provide convincing answers to these questions. We then consider the role of sociology in bioethics and show how and under what conditions it can contribute to answering questions within bioethics. In the final section, we return to the sociology of bioethics to show that it can make only a limited contribution to the field.