Aligning Financial Incentives with Quality of Care in the Hospital Setting

Pay-for-performance and patient safety in acute care: A systematic review

Pay-for-performance (p4p) has been tried in all healthcare settings to address ongoing deficiencies in the quality and outcomes of care. The evidence for the effect of these policies has been inconclusive, especially in acute care. This systematic review focused on patient safety p4p in the hospital setting. Using the PRISMA guidelines, we searched five biomedical databases for quantitative studies using at least one outcome metric from database inception to March 2023, supplemented by reference tracking and internet searches. We identified 6,122 potential titles of which 53 were included: 39 original investigations, eight literature reviews and six grey literature reports. Only five system-wide p4p policies have been implemented, and the quality of evidence was low overall. Just over half of the studies (52 %) included failed to observe improvement in outcomes, with positive findings heavily skewed towards poor quality evaluations. The exception was the Fragility Hip Fracture Best Practice Tariff (BPT) in England, where sustained improvement was observed across various evaluations. All policies had a miniscule impact on total hospital revenue. Our findings underscore the importance of simple and transparent design, involvement of the clinical community, explicit links to other quality improvement initiatives, and gradual implementation of p4p initatives. We also propose a research agenda to lift the quality of evidence in this field.

Do penalty-based pay-for-performance programs improve surgical care more effectively than other payment strategies? A systematic review

Background

The aim of this systematic review is to assess if penalty-based pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are more effective in improving quality and cost outcomes compared to two other payment strategies (i.e., rewards and a combination of rewards and penalties) for surgical care in the United States. Penalty-based programs have gained in popularity because of their potential to motivate behavioral change more effectively than reward-based programs to improve quality of care. However, little is known about whether penalties are more effective than other strategies.

Materials and methods

A systematic literature review was conducted according to the PRISMA guideline to identify studies that evaluated the effects of P4P programs on quality and cost outcomes for surgical care. Five databases were used to search studies published from 2003 to March 1, 2020. Studies were selected based on the PRISMA guidelines. Methodological quality of individual studies was assessed based on ROBINS-I with GRADE approach.

Results

This review included 22 studies. Fifteen cross-sectional, 1 prospective cohort, 4 retrospective cohort, and 2 case-control studies were found. We identified 11 unique P4P programs: 5 used rewards, 3 used penalties, and 3 used a combination of rewards and penalties as a payment strategy. Five out of 10 studies reported positive effects of penalty-based programs, whereas evidence from studies evaluating P4P programs with a reward design or combination of rewards and penalties was little or null.

Conclusions

This review highlights that P4P programs with a penalty design could be more effective than programs using rewards or a combination of rewards and penalties to improve quality of surgical care.

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Evidence on the effectiveness of pay-for-performance programs in quality improvement is mixed.

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Five out of 10 studies reported positive effects of penalty-based programs.

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Evidence from studies evaluating P4P programs with a reward design or combination of rewards and penalties was little or null.

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The increasing use of penalty-based pay-for-performance programs has the potential to improve surgical care quality.

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Penalties may induce stronger provider and hospital behavioral change than other payment strategies.

Pay for performance for hospitals

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-Performance (P4P) is a payment model that rewards health care providers for meeting pre-defined targets for quality indicators or efficacy parameters to increase the quality or efficacy of care.

OBJECTIVES

Our objective was to assess the impact of P4P for in-hospital delivered health care on the quality of care, resource use and equity. Our objective was not only to answer the question whether P4P works in general (simple perspective) but to provide a comprehensive and detailed overview of P4P with a focus on analyzing the intervention components, the context factors and their interrelation (more complex perspective).

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, three other databases and two trial registers on 27 June 2018. In addition, we searched conference proceedings, gray literature and web pages of relevant health care institutions, contacted experts in the field, conducted cited reference searches and performed cross-checks of included references and systematic reviews on the same topic.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized trials, cluster randomized trials, non-randomized clustered trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series and repeated measures studies that analyzed hospitals, hospital units or groups of hospitals and that compared any kind of P4P to a basic payment scheme (e.g. capitation) without P4P. Studies had to analyze at least one of the following outcomes to be eligible: patient outcomes; quality of care; utilization, coverage or access; resource use, costs and cost shifting; healthcare provider outcomes; equity; adverse effects or harms.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two review authors independently screened all citations for inclusion, extracted study data and assessed risk of bias for each included study. Study characteristics were extracted by one reviewer and verified by a second.We did not perform meta-analysis because the included studies were too heterogenous regarding hospital characteristics, the design of the P4P programs and study design. Instead we present a structured narrative synthesis considering the complexity as well as the context/setting of the intervention. We assessed the certainty of evidence using the GRADE approach and present the results narratively in 'Summary of findings' tables.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 27 studies (20 CBA, 7 ITS) on six different P4P programs. Studies analyzed between 10 and 4267 centers. All P4P programs targeted acute or emergency physical conditions and compared a capitation-based payment scheme without P4P to the same capitation-based payment scheme combined with a P4P add-on. Two P4P program used rewards or penalties; one used first rewards and than penalties; two used penalties only and one used rewards only. Four P4P programs were established and evaluated in the USA, one in England and one in France.Most studies showed no difference or a very small effect in favor of the P4P program. The impact of each P4P program was as follows.Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration Program: It is uncertain whether this program, which used rewards for some hospitals and penalties for others, has an impact on mortality, adverse clinical events, quality of care, equity or resource use as the certainty of the evidence was very low.Value-Based Purchasing Program: It is uncertain whether this program, which used rewards for some hospitals and penalties for others, has an impact on mortality, adverse clinical events or quality of care as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in the studies, which evaluated this program.Non-payment for Hospital-Acquired Conditions Program: It is uncertain whether this penalty-based program has an impact on adverse clinical events as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Mortality, quality of care, equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in the studies, which evaluated this program.Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: None of the studies that examined this penalty-based program reported mortality, adverse clinical events, quality of care (process quality score), equity or resource use outcomes.Advancing Quality Program: It is uncertain whether this reward-/penalty-based program has an impact on mortality as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Adverse clinical events, quality of care, equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in any study.Financial Incentive to Quality Improvement Program: It is uncertain whether this reward-based program has an impact on quality of care, as the certainty of the evidence was very low. Mortality, adverse clinical events, equity and resource use outcomes were not reported in any study.Subgroup analysis (analysis of modifying design and context factors)Analysis of P4P design factors provides some hints that non-payments compared to additional payments and payments for quality attainment (e.g. falling below specified mortality threshold) compared to quality improvement (e.g. reduction of mortality by specified percent points within one year) may have a stronger impact on performance.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

It is uncertain whether P4P, compared to capitation-based payments without P4P for hospitals, has an impact on patient outcomes, quality of care, equity or resource use as the certainty of the evidence was very low (or we found no studies on the outcome) for all P4P programs. The effects on patient outcomes of P4P in hospitals were at most small, regardless of design factors and context/setting. It seems that with additional payments only small short-term but non-sustainable effects can be achieved. Non-payments seem to be slightly more effective than bonuses and payments for quality attainment seem to be slightly more effective than payments for quality improvement.

Impact of the Iranian hospital grading system on hospitals' adherence to audited standards: an examination of possible mechanisms

INTRODUCTION

All Iranian hospitals have been subject to a grading system which determines the payments they can charge. We examined all possible pathways through which the grading system could influence hospitals' adherence to audited standards.

METHODS

Using a mixed methods study we examined five stakeholder groups: hospital staff, patients, general practitioners, health insurance organisations and surveyor organisations. Data were collected via semi-structured interviews, a questionnaire survey, observation and documentary analysis.

FINDINGS

Patients and general practitioners were generally unaware of the hospital grading. Hospital staff and insurance organisations were informed, but this was not found to influence the hospital staff's choice of where to work nor the insurance organisations contracting behaviour. The grading system was criticised for the performance standards' validity and the validity of hospitals' awarded results. Hospitals responded to financial and reputational incentives for achieving better grades, although gaming and misrepresentation was also reported.

CONCLUSION

Pay-for-performance was the main influential factor in shaping hospitals' adherence to audit standards. Other potential mechanisms for influencing hospital behaviour, the selection mechanism and intrinsic motives, were not found to be sufficient to affect hospital behaviour.

Performance contracting and quality improvement in outpatient treatment: effects on waiting time and length of stay

We evaluate the effects of a performance contract (PC) implemented in Delaware in 2001 and participation in quality improvement (QI) programs on waiting time for treatment and length of stay (LOS) using client treatment episode level data from Delaware (n = 12,368) and Maryland (n = 147,151) for 1998-2006. Results of difference-in-difference analyses indicate that waiting time declined 13 days following the PC, after controlling for client characteristics and historical trends. Participation in the PC and a formal QI program was associated with a decrease of 20 days. LOS increased 22 days under the PC and 24 days under the PC and QI programs, after controlling for client characteristics. The PC and QI programs were associated with improvements in LOS and waiting time, although we cannot determine which aspects of the programs (incentives, training, and monitoring) resulted in these changes.

Role of pay-for-performance in a hospital performance measurement system: a multiple case study in Iran

Pay for performance (P4P) is becoming increasingly popular in the health care sector as a tool for encouraging performance (especially quality) improvement. Evidence about the effect of policies in hospitals is rare and generally confined to developed countries. The Iranian hospital grading system, which links the charges hospitals can make for patient stay to the results of their annual performance grading, is one of the earliest examples of P4P in the world. We report here the first evaluation of the impact of the Iranian P4P system. We conducted a multiple case study using semi-structured interviews and observation in four hospitals with different ownership and grading results, to explore responses to the grading system and the P4P policy. The data were analysed using framework analysis assisted by Atlas-ti software. The findings showed hospital behaviour was influenced by and changed in response to P4P policy, despite serious concerns about the validity of the grading standards. The main driver for such changes was hospital revenue, which acted as a direct financial incentive for private hospital managers and as a factor for public hospital managers' sense of success and reputation. Frontline staff were motivated indirectly by higher revenue flowing into investment in better facilities and working environment. Other potential mechanisms by which the grading system could have influenced behaviour [such as patient and General Practitioner (GP) referral choice] did not appear to influence hospital behaviour.

Improving the management of non-ST elevation acute coronary syndromes: systematic evaluation of a quality improvement programme European QUality Improvement Programme for Acute Coronary Syndrome: the EQUIP-ACS project protocol and design

BACKGROUND

Acute coronary syndromes, including myocardial infarction and unstable angina, are important causes of premature mortality, morbidity and hospital admissions. Acute coronary syndromes consume large amounts of health care resources, and have a major negative economic and social impact through days lost at work, support for disability, and coping with the psychological consequences of illness. Several registries have shown that evidence based treatments are under-utilised in this patient population, particularly in high-risk patients. There is evidence that systematic educational programmes can lead to improvement in the management of these patients. Since application of the results of important clinical trials and expert clinical guidelines into clinical practice leads to improved patient care and outcomes, we propose to test a quality improvement programme in a general group of hospitals in Europe.

METHODS/DESIGN

This will be a multi-centre cluster-randomised study in 5 European countries: France, Spain, Poland, Italy and the UK. Thirty eight hospitals will be randomised to receive a quality improvement programme or no quality improvement programme. Centres will enter data for all eligible non-ST segment elevation acute coronary syndrome patients admitted to their hospital for a period of approximately 10 months onto the study database and the sample size is estimated at 2,000-4,000 patients. The primary outcome is a composite of eight measures to assess aggregate potential for improvement in the management and treatment of this patient population (risk stratification, early coronary angiography, anticoagulation, beta-blockers, statins, ACE-inhibitors, clopidogrel as a loading dose and at discharge). After the quality improvement programme, each of the eight measures will be compared between the two groups, correcting for cluster effect.

DISCUSSION

If we can demonstrate important improvements in the quality of patient care as a result of a quality improvement programme, this could lead to a greater acceptance that such programmes should be incorporated into routine health training for health professionals and hospital managers.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

Clinicaltrials.gov NCT00716430.

Antibiotic prescriptions are associated with increased patient satisfaction with emergency department visits for acute respiratory tract infections

OBJECTIVES

Health care providers cite patient satisfaction as a common reason for prescribing antibiotics for viral acute upper respiratory infections (URIs), even though quality performance measures emphasize nonantibiotic treatment for these conditions. In a secondary analysis of a cluster-randomized trial to test a combined patient and physician educational intervention to reduce antibiotic prescribing for URIs, the authors examined whether satisfaction is greater among patients diagnosed with URIs who are prescribed antibiotics in emergency department (ED) settings.

METHODS

This was a follow-up telephone survey of 959 patients who received care for acute respiratory infections at any of eight Veterans Administration (VA) hospital EDs or eight location-matched non-VA hospital EDs around the United States. Patients reported their satisfaction with the amount of time spent in the ED, the explanation of treatment, the provider treatment, and overall satisfaction on a five-point Likert scale. The primary measure of effect was the association between antibiotic prescription and visit satisfaction, adjusted for patient and visit characteristics.

RESULTS

Antibiotic treatment was significantly associated with increased overall visit satisfaction in non-VA EDs (adjusted odds ratio [OR] = 1.97, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.23 to 3.17), but not VA EDs (adjusted OR = 1.13, 95% CI = 0.81 to 1.58). Patients managed in non-VA EDs who received antibiotics were also significantly more likely to be satisfied with the explanation of treatment and the manner in which they were treated by the provider.

CONCLUSIONS

Antibiotic prescriptions are associated with increased overall patient satisfaction in non-VA, but not VA, ED visits for URIs. Continued efforts to reduce unnecessary prescriptions in these settings must address ways to maintain patient satisfaction and still reduce antibiotic prescriptions.

Pay for performance in the hospital setting: what is the state of the evidence?

More than 40 private sector hospital pay-for-performance (P4P) programs now exist, and Congress is considering initiating a Medicare hospital P4P program. Given the growing interest in hospital P4P, this systematic review of the literature examines the current state of knowledge about the effect of P4P on clinical process measures, patient outcomes and experience, safety, and resource utilization. Little formal evaluation of hospital P4P has occurred, and most of the 8 published studies have methodological flaws. The most rigorous studies focus on clinical process measures and demonstrate that hospitals participating in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services-Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, a P4P program, had a 2- to 4-percentage point greater improvement than the improvement observed in control hospitals. There is a need for more systematic evaluation of hospital P4P to understand its effect and whether the benefits of investing in P4P outweigh the associated costs.

Lessons From Evaluations of Purchaser Pay-for-Performance Programs

There has been a growing interest in the use of financial incentives to encourage improvements in the quality of health care. Several articles have reviewed past studies of the impact of specific incentive arrangements, but these studies addressed small-scale experiments, making their findings arguably of limited relevance to current improvement efforts. In this article, the authors review evaluations of more recent pay-for-performance initiatives instituted by health plans or by provider organizations in cooperation with health plans. Findings show improvement in selected quality measures in most of these initiatives, but the contribution of financial incentives to that improvement is not clear; the incentives typically were implemented in conjunction with other quality improvement efforts, or there was not a convincing comparison group. However, the literature relating to purchaser pay-for-performance initiatives does underscore several important issues that deserve attention going forward that relate to the design and implementation of pay-for-performance initiatives.