Beliefs as Self-Sustaining Networks: Drawing Parallels Between Networks of Ecosystems and Adults' Predictions

The nonlinearity of pupil diameter fluctuations in an insight task as criteria for detecting children who solve the problem from those who do not

Insights, characterized by sudden discoveries following unsuccessful problem-solving attempts, are fascinating phenomena. Dynamic systems perspectives argue that insight arises from self-organizing perceptual and motor processes. Entropy and fractal scaling are potential markers for emerging new and effective solutions. This study investigated whether specific features associated with self-organization in dynamical systems can distinguish between individuals who succeed and those who fail in solving insight tasks. To achieve this, we analyzed pupillary diameter fluctuations of children aged 6 to 12 during the 8-coin task, a well-established insight task. The participants were divided into two groups: successful (n = 24) and unsuccessful (n = 43) task completion. Entropy, determinism, recurrence ratio, and the β scaling exponent were estimated using Recurrence Quantification and Power Spectrum Density analyses. The results indicated that the solver group exhibited more significant uncertainty and lower predictability in pupillary diameter fluctuations before finding the solution. Recurrence Quantification Analysis revealed changes that went unnoticed by mean and standard deviation measures. However, the β scaling exponent did not differentiate between the two groups. These findings suggest that entropy and determinism in pupillary diameter fluctuations can identify early differences in problem-solving success. Further research is needed to determine the exclusive role of perceptual and motor activity in generating insights and investigate these results' generalizability to other tasks and populations.

From Believing to Belief: A General Theoretical Model

Cognitive neuroscience research has begun to explore the mental processes underlying what a belief and what believing are. Recent evidence suggests that believing involves fundamental brain functions that result in meaningful probabilistic representations, called beliefs. When relatively stable, these beliefs allow for guidance of behavior in individuals and social groups. However, they are also fluid and can be modified by new relevant information, interpersonal contact, social pressure, and situational demands. We present a theoretical model of believing that can account for the formation of both empirically grounded and metaphysical beliefs.

Hands-on experience can lead to systematic mistakes: A study on adults' understanding of sinking objects

In line with theories of embodied cognition, hands-on experience is typically assumed to support learning. In the current paper, we explored this issue within the science domain of sinking objects. Adults had to make a guess about which of two objects in a pair would sink faster. The crucial manipulation was whether participants were handed real-life objects (real-objects condition) or were shown static images of objects (static-images condition). Results of Experiment 1 revealed more systematic mistakes in the real-objects than the static-images condition. Experiment 2 investigated this result further, namely by having adults make predictions about sinking objects after an initial training. Again, we found that adults made more mistakes in the real-objects than the static-images condition. Experiment 3 showed that the negative effect of hands-on experiences did not influence later performance. Thus, the negative effects of hands-on experiences were short-lived. Even so, our results call into question an undifferentiated use of manipulatives to convey science concepts. Based on our findings, we suggest that a nuanced theory of embodied cognition is needed, especially as it applies to science learning.

Embodied cognition and circular causality: on the role of constitutive autonomy in the reciprocal coupling of perception and action

The reciprocal coupling of perception and action in cognitive agents has been firmly established: perceptions guide action but so too do actions influence what is perceived. While much has been said on the implications of this for the agent's external behavior, less attention has been paid to what it means for the internal bodily mechanisms which underpin cognitive behavior. In this article, we wish to redress this by reasserting that the relationship between cognition, perception, and action involves a constitutive element as well as a behavioral element, emphasizing that the reciprocal link between perception and action in cognition merits a renewed focus on the system dynamics inherent in constitutive biological autonomy. Our argument centers on the idea that cognition, perception, and action are all dependent on processes focussed primarily on the maintenance of the agent's autonomy. These processes have an inherently circular nature-self-organizing, self-producing, and self-maintaining-and our goal is to explore these processes and suggest how they can explain the reciprocity of perception and action. Specifically, we argue that the reciprocal coupling is founded primarily on their endogenous roles in the constitutive autonomy of the agent and an associated circular causality of global and local processes of self-regulation, rather than being a mutual sensory-motor contingency that derives from exogenous behavior. Furthermore, the coupling occurs first and foremost via the internal milieu realized by the agent's organismic embodiment. Finally, we consider how homeostasis and the related concept of allostasis contribute to this circular self-regulation.