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Gwyther MPD, Lenggenhager B, Windt JM, Aspell JE, Ciaunica A. Examining the association between depersonalisation traits and the bodily self in waking and dreaming. Sci Rep 2024; 14:6107. [PMID: 38480797 PMCID: PMC10937666 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-56119-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/19/2023] [Accepted: 02/29/2024] [Indexed: 03/17/2024] Open
Abstract
Depersonalisation (DP) is characterized by fundamental alterations to the sense of self that include feelings of detachment and estrangement from one's body. We conducted an online study in healthy participants (n = 514) with DP traits to investigate and quantify the subjective experience of body and self during waking and dreaming, as the vast majority of previous studies focussed on waking experience only. Investigating dreams in people experiencing DP symptoms may help us understand whether the dream state is a 'spared space' where people can temporarily 'retrieve' their sense of self and sense of bodily presence. We found that higher DP traits-i.e. higher scores on the Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (CDS)-were associated with more frequent dream experiences from an outside observer perspective (r = 0.28) and more frequent dream experiences of distinct bodily sensations (r = 0.23). We also found that people with higher CDS scores had more frequent dream experiences of altered bodily perception (r = 0.24), more frequent nightmares (r = 0.33) and higher dream recall (r = 0.17). CDS scores were negatively correlated with body boundary scores (r = - 0.31) in waking states and there was a negative association between CDS scores and the degree of trust in interoceptive signals (r = - 0.52). Our study elucidates the complex phenomenology of DP in relation to bodily selfhood during waking and dreaming and suggests avenues for potential therapeutic interventions in people with chronic depersonalisation (depersonalisation -derealisation disorder).
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Affiliation(s)
- Matt P D Gwyther
- School of Psychology and Sport Science, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK.
| | - Bigna Lenggenhager
- Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
- Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
| | - Jennifer M Windt
- Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Melbourne, Australia
| | - Jane E Aspell
- School of Psychology and Sport Science, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK
| | - Anna Ciaunica
- Centre for Philosophy of Science, University of Lisbon, Campo Grande, 1749-016, Lisbon, Portugal
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, WC1N 3AR, UK
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2
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Gerrans P. Pain suffering and the self. An active allostatic inference explanation. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae002. [PMID: 38348334 PMCID: PMC10860504 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2023] [Revised: 01/06/2024] [Accepted: 01/16/2024] [Indexed: 02/15/2024] Open
Abstract
Distributed processing that gives rise to pain experience is anchored by a multidimensional self-model. I show how the phenomenon of pain asymbolia and other atypical pain-related conditions (Insensitivity to Pain, Chronic Pain, 'Social' Pain, Insensitivity to Pain, Chronic Pain, 'Social' Pain, empathy for pain and suffering) can be explained by this idea. It also explains the patterns of association and dissociation among neural correlates without importing strong modular assumptions. It treats pain processing as a species of allostatic active inference in which the mind co-ordinates its processing resources to optimize basic bodily functioning at different time scales. The self is inferred to be source and target of regulation in this process. The self-modelling account reconciles conflicting deaffectualization and depersonalization accounts of pain asymbolia by showing how depersonalization and pain asymbolia arise at different levels of hierarchical self modelling.
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Affiliation(s)
- Philip Gerrans
- Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia
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Párraga JP, Castellanos A. A Manifesto in Defense of Pain Complexity: A Critical Review of Essential Insights in Pain Neuroscience. J Clin Med 2023; 12:7080. [PMID: 38002692 PMCID: PMC10672144 DOI: 10.3390/jcm12227080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2023] [Revised: 11/10/2023] [Accepted: 11/10/2023] [Indexed: 11/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Chronic pain has increasingly become a significant health challenge, not just as a symptomatic manifestation but also as a pathological condition with profound socioeconomic implications. Despite the expansion of medical interventions, the prevalence of chronic pain remains remarkably persistent, prompting a turn towards non-pharmacological treatments, such as therapeutic education, exercise, and cognitive-behavioral therapy. With the advent of cognitive neuroscience, pain is often presented as a primary output derived from the brain, aligning with Engel's Biopsychosocial Model that views disease not solely from a biological perspective but also considering psychological and social factors. This paradigm shift brings forward potential misconceptions and over-simplifications. The current review delves into the intricacies of nociception and pain perception. It questions long-standing beliefs like the cerebral-centric view of pain, the forgotten role of the peripheral nervous system in pain chronification, misconceptions around central sensitization syndromes, the controversy about the existence of a dedicated pain neuromatrix, the consciousness of the pain experience, and the possible oversight of factors beyond the nervous system. In re-evaluating these aspects, the review emphasizes the critical need for understanding the complexity of pain, urging the scientific and clinical community to move beyond reductionist perspectives and consider the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon.
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Affiliation(s)
- Javier Picañol Párraga
- Laboratory of Neurophysiology, Biomedicine Department, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Institute of Neurosciences, University of Barcelona, 08036 Barcelona, Spain
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Abstract
This review considers computational psychiatry from a particular viewpoint: namely, a commitment to explaining psychopathology in terms of pathophysiology. It rests on the notion of a generative model as underwriting (i) sentient processing in the brain, and (ii) the scientific process in psychiatry. The story starts with a view of the brain-from cognitive and computational neuroscience-as an organ of inference and prediction. This offers a formal description of neuronal message passing, distributed processing and belief propagation in neuronal networks; and how certain kinds of dysconnection lead to aberrant belief updating and false inference. The dysconnections in question can be read as a pernicious synaptopathy that fits comfortably with formal notions of how we-or our brains-encode uncertainty or its complement, precision. It then considers how the ensuing process theories are tested empirically, with an emphasis on the computational modelling of neuronal circuits and synaptic gain control that mediates attentional set, active inference, learning and planning. The opportunities afforded by this sort of modelling are considered in light of in silico experiments; namely, computational neuropsychology, computational phenotyping and the promises of a computational nosology for psychiatry. The resulting survey of computational approaches is not scholarly or exhaustive. Rather, its aim is to review a theoretical narrative that is emerging across subdisciplines within psychiatry and empirical scales of investigation. These range from epilepsy research to neurodegenerative disorders; from post-traumatic stress disorder to the management of chronic pain, from schizophrenia to functional medical symptoms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, WC1N 3AR, UK.
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Herzog P, Kube T, Fassbinder E. How childhood maltreatment alters perception and cognition - the predictive processing account of borderline personality disorder. Psychol Med 2022; 52:2899-2916. [PMID: 35979924 PMCID: PMC9693729 DOI: 10.1017/s0033291722002458] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/16/2022] [Revised: 06/24/2022] [Accepted: 07/18/2022] [Indexed: 01/05/2023]
Abstract
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental disorder, comprised of heterogeneous psychological and neurobiological pathologies. Here, we propose a predictive processing (PP) account of BPD to integrate these seemingly unrelated pathologies. In particular, we argue that the experience of childhood maltreatment, which is highly prevalent in BPD, leaves a developmental legacy with two facets: first, a coarse-grained, alexithymic model of self and others - leading to a rigidity and inflexibility concerning beliefs about self and others. Second, this developmental legacy leads to a loss of confidence or precision afforded beliefs about the consequences of social behavior. This results in an over reliance on sensory evidence and social feedback, with concomitant lability, impulsivity and hypersensitivity. In terms of PP, people with BPD show a distorted belief updating in response to new information with two opposing manifestations: rapid changes in beliefs and a lack of belief updating despite disconfirmatory evidence. This account of distorted information processing has the potential to explain both the instability (of affect, self-image, and interpersonal relationships) and the rigidity (of beliefs about self and others) which is typical of BPD. At the neurobiological level, we propose that enhanced levels of dopamine are associated with the increased integration of negative social feedback, and we also discuss the hypothesis of an impaired inhibitory control of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of negative social information. Our account may provide a new understanding not only of the clinical aspects of BPD, but also a unifying theory of the corresponding neurobiological pathologies. We conclude by outlining some directions for future research on the behavioral, neurobiological, and computational underpinnings of this model, and point to some clinical implications of it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Philipp Herzog
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University of Lübeck, Ratzeburger Allee 160, D-23562 Lübeck, Germany
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Niemannsweg 147, D-24105 Kiel, Germany
- Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Ostbahnstr. 10, 76829 Landau, Germany
| | - Tobias Kube
- Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Ostbahnstr. 10, 76829 Landau, Germany
| | - Eva Fassbinder
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Niemannsweg 147, D-24105 Kiel, Germany
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McParlin Z, Cerritelli F, Rossettini G, Friston KJ, Esteves JE. Therapeutic Alliance as Active Inference: The Role of Therapeutic Touch and Biobehavioural Synchrony in Musculoskeletal Care. Front Behav Neurosci 2022; 16:897247. [PMID: 35846789 PMCID: PMC9280207 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2022.897247] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2022] [Accepted: 05/24/2022] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
Touch is recognised as crucial for survival, fostering cooperative communication, accelerating recovery, reducing hospital stays, and promoting overall wellness and the therapeutic alliance. In this hypothesis and theory paper, we present an entwined model that combines touch for alignment and active inference to explain how the brain develops "priors" necessary for the health care provider to engage with the patient effectively. We appeal to active inference to explain the empirically integrative neurophysiological and behavioural mechanisms that underwrite synchronous relationships through touch. Specifically, we offer a formal framework for understanding - and explaining - the role of therapeutic touch and hands-on care in developing a therapeutic alliance and synchrony between health care providers and their patients in musculoskeletal care. We first review the crucial importance of therapeutic touch and its clinical role in facilitating the formation of a solid therapeutic alliance and in regulating allostasis. We then consider how touch is used clinically - to promote cooperative communication, demonstrate empathy, overcome uncertainty, and infer the mental states of others - through the lens of active inference. We conclude that touch plays a crucial role in achieving successful clinical outcomes and adapting previous priors to create intertwined beliefs. The ensuing framework may help healthcare providers in the field of musculoskeletal care to use hands-on care to strengthen the therapeutic alliance, minimise prediction errors (a.k.a., free energy), and thereby promote recovery from physical and psychological impairments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zoe McParlin
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
| | - Francesco Cerritelli
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
| | | | - Karl J. Friston
- Institute of Neurology, Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, London, United Kingdom
| | - Jorge E. Esteves
- Clinical-Based Human Research Department, Foundation COME Collaboration, Pescara, Italy
- Malta ICOM Educational, Gzira, Malta
- University College of Osteopathy, London, United Kingdom
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Gerrans P. Alienation and identification in addiction. Philosophical Psychology 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2067034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Philip Gerrans
- Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia
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Ciaunica A, Seth A, Limanowski J, Hesp C, Friston KJ. I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder. Conscious Cogn 2022; 101:103320. [PMID: 35490544 PMCID: PMC9130736 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103320] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2021] [Revised: 03/27/2022] [Accepted: 03/29/2022] [Indexed: 12/17/2022]
Abstract
This paper examines potential mechanisms behind atypical sense of self and agency in Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD). Using Active Inference, we argue that aberrant somatosensory attenuation and precision weighting underlies DPD. Failures of somatosensory attenuation may disrupt the sense of agency and control over one’s perceptions and actions. In DPD, individuals may believe ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions. Unlike psychosis however, in DPD the individual maintains the full insight that the ‘other agent’ is ‘me’ (the self).
This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of ‘predicting precision’ and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that “I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception”. We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the ‘other agent’ is ‘me’ (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anna Ciaunica
- Institute of Philosophy, University of Porto, via Panoramica s/n 4150-564 Porto, Portugal
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, WC1N 3AR London, UK
- Centre for Philosophy of Science, University of Lisbon, Campo Gra, 1749-016 Lisbon, Portugal
| | | | - Estelle Nakul
- Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, LNC, FR3C, Marseille, France
| | - Luis Madeira
- Faculdade de Medicina, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal
| | - Harry Farmer
- School of Human Sciences, University of Greenwich, UK
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Tran The J, Magistretti PJ, Ansermet F. Interoception Disorder and Insular Cortex Abnormalities in Schizophrenia: A New Perspective Between Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience. Front Psychol 2021; 12:628355. [PMID: 34276464 PMCID: PMC8281924 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.628355] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/11/2020] [Accepted: 05/31/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The existence of disturbances in the perception of somatic states and in the representation of the body with the presence of cœnesthetic hallucinations, of delusional hypochondriac ideas or of dysmorphophobias is a recognized fact in the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Freudian psychoanalytic theory had accorded a privileged place to the alteration of the perception of the body in schizophrenia. Freud had attributed to these phenomena a primary and prodromal role in the psychopathology of psychosis. We propose to look at this theory in a new way, starting from the perspective of recent studies about the role of the insula in the perception and representation of somatic states, since this structure has been identified as underpinning the sense of interoception. The data in the neurobiological literature about abnormalities in the insular cortex in schizophrenia has shown that insula dysfunction could constitute one of the biological substrates of disorders of body perception in schizophrenia, and could be a source of the alteration of the sense of self that is characteristic of this psychiatric pathology. Moreover, this alteration could thus be involved in the positive symptomatology of schizophrenia.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jessica Tran The
- Département d'études Psychanalytiques, Université de Paris, Paris, France.,Agalma Foundation, Geneva, Switzerland.,Faculté de Biologie et de Médecine, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Pierre J Magistretti
- Agalma Foundation, Geneva, Switzerland.,Brain Mind Institute, Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne, Sion, Switzerland.,Division of Biological and Environmental Sciences and Engineering, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, Thuwal, Saudi Arabia
| | - Francois Ansermet
- Agalma Foundation, Geneva, Switzerland.,Department of Psychiatry, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
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Kolodny O, Moyal R, Edelman S. A possible evolutionary function of phenomenal conscious experience of pain. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab012. [PMID: 34141452 PMCID: PMC8206511 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/02/2021] [Revised: 04/01/2021] [Accepted: 04/05/2021] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Evolutionary accounts of feelings, and in particular of negative affect and of pain, assume that creatures that feel and care about the outcomes of their behavior outperform those that do not in terms of their evolutionary fitness. Such accounts, however, can only work if feelings can be shown to contribute to fitness-influencing outcomes. Simply assuming that a learner that feels and cares about outcomes is more strongly motivated than one that does is not enough, if only because motivation can be tied directly to outcomes by incorporating an appropriate reward function, without leaving any apparent role to feelings (as it is done in state-of-the-art engineered systems based on reinforcement learning). Here, we propose a possible mechanism whereby pain contributes to fitness: an actor-critic functional architecture for reinforcement learning, in which pain reflects the costs imposed on actors in their bidding for control, so as to promote honest signaling and ultimately help the system optimize learning and future behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Oren Kolodny
- Department of Ecology, Evolution, and Behavior, The Alexander Silberman Institute of Life Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Edmond J. Safra Campus - Givat Ram, Jerusalem 9190401, Israel
| | - Roy Moyal
- Department of Psychology, Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
| | - Shimon Edelman
- Department of Psychology, Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
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