Comedy, consensus, and conflict framework: Comedy as a norm violation can build consensus or escalate conflict in negotiations

In this work, we propose that humor violates norms that can build consensus or escalate conflict in negotiations. Drawing on social identity theory, we propose that humor commits norm violations that are more likely to be perceived as benign among ingroup observers in negotiations, but perceived as offensive to outgroup observers in negotiations. We introduce the Comedy, Consensus, and Conflict Framework to shed light on the interpersonal effect of humor on negotiations. When humor is expressed to an ingroup observer, relative to neutral communication, humor is more likely to violate weak norms that govern social group membership resulting in the violation as being perceived as benign, which promotes cooperative behaviors in negotiations such as concessions and collaborative problem-solving. By contrast, when humor is expressed to an outgroup observer, relative to neutral communication, humor is more likely to violate strong norms that define social group membership resulting in the violation as being interpreted as offensive, which triggers competitive behaviors in negotiations such as aggressive offers and hardened positions. Furthermore, we suggest that humor not only generates appraisals of social identity threats, but also affective responses that influence negotiation behavior. Finally, we expand our theoretical model about humor to consider key relational factors that influence norm strength, which motivates whether negotiators appraise norm violations as offensive or benign.

Emotions and ethics: How emotions sensitize perceptions of the consequences for self and others to motivate unethical behavior

In this work, we suggest that emotions differentiated by cognitive appraisals may promote self-concern or other-concern that alter the utilitarian calculus of weighing the harm and benefits associated with moral decision-making. We introduce the Emotions and Ethics Framework to elucidate the intrapsychic effect of emotion on deception. When emotions promote self-concern, individuals are more likely engage in selfish deception. By contrast, when emotions promote other-concern, individuals are more likely to exhibit honesty. Furthermore, we extrapolate our theoretical model to consider how felt emotions influence different types of deception: selfish lies, prosocial lies, spiteful lies, and pareto lies. Finally, we theorize about the interpersonal effect of emotional expressions on deception, suggesting that the ethical consequences of emotion contagion and reverse-appraisal processes are distinct.

Follow your gut? Emotional intelligence moderates the association between physiologically measured somatic markers and risk-taking

Emotional Intelligence (EI) is a set of adaptive skills that involve emotions and emotional information. Prior research suggests that lower EI individuals behave maladaptively in social situations compared to higher EI individuals. However, there is a paucity of research on whether EI promotes adaptive decision-making. Leveraging the somatic marker hypothesis, we explore whether EI moderates the relationship between skin conductance responses (SCRs) and risky decision-making. In two separate sessions in the behavioral lab, participants (N = 52) completed tests of emotional intelligence and made a total of 5,145 decisions involving risk. At Time 1, participants completed an ability test of EI and cognitive intelligence. At Time 2, participants completed 100 decision trials of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Consistent with prior research using the IGT, participants played a computerized card game with real monetary rewards in which two "safe" decks led to higher average monetary rewards and two "risky" decks led to higher average losses. We found that EI moderates the relationship between physiological arousal, as measured by SCRs, and risk-taking. Specifically, lower EI individuals exhibited a maladaptive, positive association between SCRs and risk-taking, whereas higher EI individuals did not exhibit a relationship between SCRs and risk-taking. Our findings suggest one important way in which low EI may lead to maladaptive decision-making is through appraising physiological arousal incorrectly. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Infuriating Impasses

Prior research has focused on the influence of emotional expressions on the value of negotiated outcomes. Across three studies, we demonstrate that people interacting with angry counterparts become more likely to walk away from a negotiation, resulting in an impasse. In Study 1, participants who encountered counterparts expressing anger were more likely to choose an impasse, relative to those with neutral counterparts. In Study 2, building on the emotion-as-social-information model, we found that inferences of selfishness mediate the effect of angry expressions on impasses. In Study 3, we found that timing moderates the relationship between angry expressions and impasses. Furthermore, we demonstrated that perceptions of inappropriateness mediate the interactive effect of timing and angry expressions on impasses. Taken together, our work reveals that expressing anger is risky in negotiations because people infer that angry counterparts are selfish and become more likely to exit negotiations.

The emotionally intelligent decision maker: emotion-understanding ability reduces the effect of incidental anxiety on risk taking

In two experiments, we examined how a core dimension of emotional intelligence, emotion-understanding ability, facilitates decision making. Individuals with higher levels of emotion-understanding ability can correctly identify which events caused their emotions and, in particular, whether their emotions stem from events that are unrelated to current decisions. We predicted that incidental feelings of anxiety, which are unrelated to current decisions, would reduce risk taking more strongly among individuals with lower rather than higher levels of emotion-understanding ability. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed this prediction. In Experiment 2, the effect of incidental anxiety on risk taking among participants with lower emotion-understanding ability, relative to participants with higher emotion-understanding ability, was eliminated when we informed participants about the source of their anxiety. This finding reveals that emotion-understanding ability guards against the biasing effects of incidental anxiety by helping individuals determine that such anxiety is irrelevant to current decisions.