Expensive seems better: The price of a non-effective drug modulates its perceived efficacy

Previous studies have shown that the price of a given product impacts the perceived quality of such product. This finding was also observed in medical contexts, showing that expensive drugs increase the placebo effect compared to inexpensive ones. However, addressing a drug's efficacy requires making causal inferences between the drug and the healing. These inferences rely on the contingency between these two events, a factor that is difficult to control in the placebo research. The present study aimed to test whether the price of a given drug modulates its perceived efficacy using a proper (though fictitious) non-effective drug, so that not only the objective contingency, but also the probability of the cause and the probability of the effect could be adequately controlled for. We expected higher efficacy judgements for the expensive non-effective drug than for the inexpensive one. To test this hypothesis, 60 volunteers participated in a contingency learning task that was programmed so that 72% of the patients healed regardless of whether they took the drug. Approximately one-half of the participants were told that the drug was expensive, whereas the other half were told that it was inexpensive. As expected, the efficacy judgements of participants who saw the expensive drug were significantly higher than those who saw the inexpensive one. Overall, our results showed that the price of a non-effective drug modulates its perceived efficacy, an effect that seems to be mediated by the estimated number of doses administered. This result parallels findings in the placebo literature but using a laboratory methodology that allows stronger control of the variables, suggesting that the illusory overestimation produced by the more expensive treatments might be on the basis of the greater efficacy of the more expensive placebos.

Registered Replication Report: Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998)

Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) reported that participants primed with a category associated with intelligence ("professor") subsequently performed 13% better on a trivia test than participants primed with a category associated with a lack of intelligence ("soccer hooligans"). In two unpublished replications of this study designed to verify the appropriate testing procedures, Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, and Holland observed a smaller difference between conditions (2%-3%) as well as a gender difference: Men showed the effect (9.3% and 7.6%), but women did not (0.3% and -0.3%). The procedure used in those replications served as the basis for this multilab Registered Replication Report. A total of 40 laboratories collected data for this project, and 23 of these laboratories met all inclusion criteria. Here we report the meta-analytic results for those 23 direct replications (total N = 4,493), which tested whether performance on a 30-item general-knowledge trivia task differed between these two priming conditions (results of supplementary analyses of the data from all 40 labs, N = 6,454, are also reported). We observed no overall difference in trivia performance between participants primed with the "professor" category and those primed with the "hooligan" category (0.14%) and no moderation by gender.

Thinking in a Foreign language reduces the causality bias

The purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of a foreign language on the causality bias (i.e., the illusion that two events are causally related when they are not). We predict that using a foreign language could reduce the illusions of causality. A total of 36 native English speakers participated in Experiment 1, 80 native Spanish speakers in Experiment 2. They performed a standard contingency learning task, which can be used to detect causal illusions. Participants who performed the task in their native tongue replicated the illusion of causality effect, whereas those performing the task in their foreign language were more accurate in detecting that the two events were causally unrelated. Our results suggest that presenting the information in a foreign language could be used as a strategy to debias individuals against causal illusions, thereby facilitating more accurate judgements and decisions in non-contingent situations. They also contribute to the debate on the nature and underlying mechanisms of the foreign language effect, given that the illusion of causality is rooted in basic associative processes.

Illusions of causality: how they bias our everyday thinking and how they could be reduced

Illusions of causality occur when people develop the belief that there is a causal connection between two events that are actually unrelated. Such illusions have been proposed to underlie pseudoscience and superstitious thinking, sometimes leading to disastrous consequences in relation to critical life areas, such as health, finances, and wellbeing. Like optical illusions, they can occur for anyone under well-known conditions. Scientific thinking is the best possible safeguard against them, but it does not come intuitively and needs to be taught. Teaching how to think scientifically should benefit from better understanding of the illusion of causality. In this article, we review experiments that our group has conducted on the illusion of causality during the last 20 years. We discuss how research on the illusion of causality can contribute to the teaching of scientific thinking and how scientific thinking can reduce illusion.