Serial or parallel proactive control of components of task-set? A task-switching investigation with concurrent EEG and eye-tracking

Among the issues examined by studies of cognitive control in multitasking is whether processes underlying performance in the different tasks occur serially or in parallel. Here we ask a similar question about processes that pro-actively control task-set. In task-switching experiments, several indices of task-set preparation have been extensively documented, including anticipatory orientation of gaze to the task-relevant location (an unambiguous marker of reorientation of attention), and a positive polarity brain potential over the posterior cortex (whose functional significance is less well understood). We examine whether these markers of preparation occur in parallel or serially, and in what order. On each trial a cue required participants to make a semantic classification of one of three digits presented simultaneously, with the location of each digit consistently associated with one of three classification tasks (e.g., if the task was odd/even, the digit at the top of the display was relevant). The EEG positivity emerged following, and appeared time-locked to, the anticipatory fixation on the task-relevant location, which might suggest serial organisation. However, the fixation-locked positivity was not better defined than the cue-locked positivity; in fact, for the trials with the earliest fixations the positivity was better time-locked to the cue onset. This is more consistent with (re)orientation of spatial attention occurring in parallel with, but slightly before, the reconfiguration of other task-set components indexed by the EEG positivity.

Role of verbal working memory in rapid procedural acquisition of a choice response task

How quickly are instructions for a task translated into an effective task-set? If declarative working memory (dWM) is used to maintain a task's S-R rules until practice compiles them adequately into procedural memory, variables that affect retrieval from dWM should influence task performance while it is still dependent on dWM. Participants were trained on a series of 6-choice RT tasks, with a 1:1 mapping from object pictures to keys. In Experiments 1 and 2, an instruction phase - presentation of the S-R rules one by one -was followed by test trials. The phonological similarity of the objects' names significantly affected performance only during the first few encounters with the stimuli. Serial position effects were also consistent with retrieval from verbal dWM during those early trials. In Experiment 3, instruction onon the S-R rules was omitted, so participants had to learn the S-R mappings by trial and error alone; the effect of phonological similarity lasted longer, but still disappeared after a dozen encounters with each stimulus. Experiment 4 showed that instructions and just four trials of practice per S-R rule were sufficient to form a persisting representation of the S-R rules robust enough to interfere with later acquisition of a competing S-R rule after several minutes spent acquiring other task-sets. An effective and lasting task-set is rapidly compiled into procedural memory through instruction and early feedback; verbal dWM plays little role thereafter.

Can we prepare to attend to one of two simultaneous voices?

We can selectively attend to one of two simultaneous voices sharing a source location. Can we endogenously select the voice before speech is heard? Participants heard two digit names, spoken simultaneously by a male voice and a female voice, following a visual cue indicating which voice's digit to classify as odd or even. There was a substantial cost in reaction time and errors when the target voice switched from one trial to the next. In Experiment 1, with a highly familiar pair of voices, the switch cost reduced by nearly half as the cue-stimulus interval increased from 50 to 800 ms, indicating (contrary to previous reports) effective endogenous preparation for a change of voice. No further reduction in switch cost occurred with a longer preparation interval-this "residual" switch cost may be attributable to attentional "inertia." In Experiment 2, with previously unfamiliar voices, the pattern of switch costs was very similar, though repeated attention to the same target voice over a run of trials improved performance more. Delaying the onset of one voice by 366 ms improved performance, but the pattern of preparatory tuning effects was similar. Thus, endogenous preparation for a voice is possible, but it is limited in efficacy, as for some other attentional domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Mackintosh lecture—: Association and cognition: Two processes, one system

This article argues that the dual-process position can be a useful first approximation when studying human mental life, but it cannot be the whole truth. Instead, we argue that cognition is built on association, in that associative processes provide the fundamental building blocks that enable propositional thought. One consequence of this position is to suggest that humans are able to learn associatively in a similar fashion to a rat or a pigeon, but another is that we must typically suppress the expression of basic associative learning in favour of rule-based computation. This stance conceptualises us as capable of symbolic computation but acknowledges that, given certain circumstances, we will learn associatively and, more importantly, be seen to do so. We present three types of evidence that support this position: The first is data on human Pavlovian conditioning that directly support this view. The second is data taken from task-switching experiments that provide convergent evidence for at least two modes of processing, one of which is automatic and carried out “in the background.” And the last suggests that when the output of propositional processes is uncertain, the influence of associative processes on behaviour can manifest.

Shifting Attention Between Visual Dimensions as a Source of Switch Costs

Task-switching experiments have documented a puzzling phenomenon: Advance warning of the switch reduces but does not eliminate the switch cost. Theoretical accounts have posited that the residual switch cost arises when one selects the relevant stimulus–response mapping, leaving earlier perceptual processes unaffected. We put this assumption to the test by seeking electrophysiological markers of encoding a perceptual dimension. Participants categorized a colored letter as a vowel or consonant or its color as “warm” or “cold.” Orthogonally to the color manipulation, some colors were eight times more frequent than others, and the letters were in upper- or lowercase. Color frequency modulated the electroencephalogram amplitude at around 150 ms when participants repeated the color-classification task. When participants switched from the letter task to the color task, this effect was significantly delayed. Thus, even when prepared for, a task switch delays or prolongs encoding of the relevant perceptual dimension.

The coupling between spatial attention and other components of task-set: A task-switching investigation

Is spatial attention reconfigured independently of, or in tandem with, other task-set components when the task changes? We tracked the eyes of participants cued to perform one of three digit-classification tasks, each consistently associated with a distinct location. Previously we observed, on task switch trials, a substantial delay in orientation to the task-relevant location and tendency to fixate the location of the previously relevant task—“attentional inertia”. In the present experiments the cues specified (and instructions emphasized) the relevant location rather than the current task. In Experiment 1, with explicit spatial cues (arrows or spatial adverbs), the previously documented attentional handicaps all but disappeared, whilst the performance “switch cost” increased. Hence, attention can become decoupled from other aspects of task-set, but at a cost to the efficacy of task-set preparation. Experiment 2 used arbitrary single-letter cues with instructions and a training regime that encouraged participants to interpret the cue as indicating the relevant location rather than task. As in our previous experiments, and unlike in Experiment 1, we now observed clear switch-induced attentional delay and inertia, suggesting that the natural tendency is for spatial attention and task-set to be coupled and that only quasi-exogenous location cues decouple their reconfiguration.

Is it harder to switch among a larger set of tasks?

When stimuli afford multiple tasks, switching among them involves promoting one of several task-sets in play into a most-active state. This process, often conceptualized as retrieving task parameters and stimulus-response (S-R) rules into procedural working memory, is a likely source of the reaction time (RT) cost of a task-switch, especially when no time is available for task preparation before the stimulus. We report 2 task-cuing experiments that asked whether the time consumed by task-set retrieval increases with the number of task-sets in play, while unconfounding the number of tasks with their frequency and recency of use. Participants were required to switch among 3 or 5 orthogonal classifications of perceptual attributes of an object (Experiment 1) or of phonological/semantic attributes of a word (Experiment 2), with a 100 or 1,300 ms cue-stimulus interval. For 2 tasks for which recency and frequency were matched in the 3- and 5-task conditions, there was no effect of number of tasks on the switch cost. For the other tasks, there was a greater switch cost in the 5-task condition with little time for preparation, attributable to effects of frequency/recency. Thus, retrieval time for active task-sets is not influenced by the number of alternatives per se (unlike several other kinds of memory retrieval) but is influenced by recency or frequency of use.

A brain-potential study of preparation for and execution of a task-switch with stimuli that afford only the relevant task

Behavioural and neurophysiological studies of task-switching have tended to employ 'bivalent' stimuli (which afford responses in two tasks). Using brain potential recordings, we investigated task-switching with 'univalent' stimuli affording responses in only one of the tasks, and compared the outcomes to those recently obtained with bivalent stimuli (Lavric et al. [2008]: Eur J Neurosci 1-14), in order to examine two phenomena. First, when only univalent stimuli are presented, the processing of task cues becomes optional. Our results showed that in these circumstances linguistic (but not pictorial) cues were still effective in eliciting at least some degree of preparation for a task-switch, as evidenced by the reduction in the error cost of switching at the longer preparation interval and by a posterior switch-induced ERP positivity at about 450-800 ms in the cue-stimulus interval. Second, single affordance stimuli not only reduced behavioural switch costs relative to bivalent stimuli; they also produced a smaller post-stimulus switch-induced negativity, consistent with the latter being a marker of conflict between task-sets. However, using stimuli not associated with responses in the alternative task did not completely eliminate the negativity. We speculate that the residue reflects other sources of conflict: attention to the irrelevant perceptual dimension and/or persistence of task goals.

Neurophysiological signature of effective anticipatory task-set control: a task-switching investigation

Changing between cognitive tasks requires a reorganization of cognitive processes. Behavioural evidence suggests this can occur in advance of the stimulus. However, the existence or detectability of an anticipatory task-set reconfiguration process remains controversial, in part because several neuroimaging studies have not detected extra brain activity during preparation for a task switch relative to a task repeat. In contrast, electrophysiological studies have identified potential correlates of preparation for a task switch, but their interpretation is hindered by the scarcity of evidence on their relationship to performance. We aimed to: (i) identify the brain potential(s) reflecting effective preparation for a task-switch in a task-cuing paradigm that shows clear behavioural evidence for advance preparation, and (ii) characterize this activity by means of temporal segmentation and source analysis. Our results show that when advance preparation was effective (as indicated by fast responses), a protracted switch-related component, manifesting itself as widespread posterior positivity and concurrent right anterior negativity, preceded stimulus onset for approximately 300 ms, with sources primarily in the left lateral frontal, right inferior frontal and temporal cortices. When advance preparation was ineffective (as implied by slow responses), or made impossible by a short cue-stimulus interval (CSI), a similar component, with lateral prefrontal generators, peaked approximately 300 ms poststimulus. The protracted prestimulus component (which we show to be distinct from P3 or contingent negative variation, CNV) also correlated over subjects with a behavioural measure of preparation. Furthermore, its differential lateralization for word and picture cues was consistent with a role for verbal self-instruction in preparatory task-set reconfiguration.

Can the task-cuing paradigm measure an endogenous task-set reconfiguration process?

In 6 task-cuing experiments, with 2 cues per task, the authors varied cue-stimulus interval to investigate G. D. Logan and C. Bundesen's (2003) claim that when cue repetition is controlled for, task-switch cost and its reduction with preparation are largely eliminated and hence cannot index an endogenous control process. Experiment 1 replicates their result, but Experiments 2 and 3, with similar designs, demonstrate a substantial task-switch cost, reducing with increasing cue-stimulus interval. Experiments 4 to 6 show that the critical difference is the probability of a task change: If it is kept low enough to discourage reconfiguration of task set unless and until the cue signals a task change, robust evidence for anticipatory task-set reconfiguration is obtained, even in Experiment 6, modeled closely on Logan and Bundesen's.

A componential analysis of task‐switching deficits associated with lesions of left and right frontal cortex

Executive functions such as task-set switching are thought to depend on the frontal cortex. However, more precision is required in identifying which components of such high-level processes relate to which, if any, subregions of the brain. In a recent study of 19 patients with focal right frontal (RF) lesions and 17 with left frontal (LF) lesions, we found that response inhibition, as measured by the stop-signal task, was specifically disrupted by damage to the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). The present study examined task-switching performance in this same group of patients and in matched controls on the grounds that inhibitory mechanisms may also be required to switch task-set. Both RF and LF patients showed significantly larger switch costs (the difference, in reaction time and errors, between changing tasks and repeating the same task) than controls, but apparently for different reasons. For RF patients, a part of the switch deficit could be accounted for by impaired inhibition of inappropriate responses or task-sets triggered by stimuli, and one measure of the switch cost correlated reliably with damage to the IFG, specifically the pars opercularis (POp). For LF patients, a part of the switch deficit may have arisen from weak top-down control of task-set. The degree of top-down control correlated reliably with the extent of damage to the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG). This study localizes two components of the complex task-switching process (inhibition of task-sets and/or responses and top-down control of task-set) to the right IFG/POp and the left MFG respectively.

The effects of recent practice on task switching

Four experiments investigated the effect of recent selective practice on the cost of switching between 2 tasks afforded by letter-digit pairs: alphabet arithmetic and shape comparison. Experiments 1 and 2 found a greater cost associated with switching to the more recently practiced task: evidence that task-set inertia contributes to switching costs. Experiment 3 found this effect to be limited to trials on which a recently trained stimulus followed another such stimulus: a result problematic for all current theories of task-set priming. Experiment 4 showed that the effect of recent practice was eliminated by active preparation for a task switch: It appears that endogenous task-set preparation reduces the effects of task-set inertia. ((c) 2003 APA, all rights reserved)

Task-set switching deficits in early-stage Huntington's disease: implications for basal ganglia function

Executive functions are likely mediated by interconnected circuits including frontal lobe and basal ganglia structures. We assessed the executive function of task switching in patients with early-stage Huntington's disease (HD), a neurodegenerative disease affecting the basal ganglia. In two experiments, the HD patients had greater difficulty when switching than when repeating a task than matched controls, and this was true even when scaling for the overall slowing of the patients. In the first experiment, HD patients had a switching deficit even in a "pure" condition where they had to switch, predictably, and with substantial preparation time, between stimuli having only one possible response, indicating a switching deficit different from that for patients with Parkinson's disease or frontal lobe trauma, and possibly relating to inadequate activation of stimulus-response links or "response set." In the more elaborate second experiment, we could not account for the switching deficit of the patients in terms of inadequate preparation in advance of a switch, deficient suppression of task-set processing from the preswitch trial, or impaired suppression of interference due to the presence of a competing task set. Instead, we found that part of the switching deficit was due to elevated reaction time and errors on switch trials for a repeated response (same button press as on preswitch trial) relative to an alternated response (different button press from preswitch trial). We argue that this elevated "repetition effect" for the HD patients is due to excessive inhibition of the just-performed response in advance of a switch. Alterations in the "response-setting" process alone (Experiment 1) and both the response-setting and "response inhibition" process (Experiment 2) probably arise from striatal pathology in HD, thus accounting for the task-switching deficits and showing how basal ganglia implemented response processes may underpin executive function.

Task-Set Switching Deficits in Early-Stage Huntington's Disease: Implications for Basal Ganglia Function

Executive functions are likely mediated by interconnected circuits including frontal lobe and basal ganglia structures. We assessed the executive function of task switching in patients with early-stage Huntington's disease (HD), a neurodegenerative disease affecting the basal ganglia. In two experiments, the HD patients had greater difficulty when switching than when repeating a task than matched controls, and this was true even when scaling for the overall slowing of the patients. In the first experiment, HD patients had a switching deficit even in a “pure” condition where they had to switch, predictably, and with substantial preparation time, between stimuli having only one possible response, indicating a switching deficit different from that for patients with Parkinson's disease or frontal lobe trauma, and possibly relating to inadequate activation of stimulus-response links or “response set.” In the more elaborate second experiment, we could not account for the switching deficit of the patients in terms of inadequate preparation in advance of a switch, deficient suppression of taskset processing from the preswitch trial, or impaired suppression of interference due to the presence of a competing task set. Instead, we found that part of the switching deficit was due to elevated reaction time and errors on switch trials for a repeated response (same button press as on preswitch trial) relative to an alternated response (different button press from preswitch trial). We argue that this elevated “repetition effect” for the HD patients is due to excessive inhibition of the justperformed response in advance of a switch. Alterations in the “response-setting” process alone (Experiment 1) and both the response-setting and “response inhibition” process (Experiment 2) probably arise from striatal pathology in HD, thus accounting for the task-switching deficits and showing how basal ganglia implemented response processes may underpin executive function.

Switching between tasks of unequal familiarity: the role of stimulus-attribute and response-set selection

It has been reported that it is harder to switch to a strong, well-practiced task from a weaker, less-practiced task than vice versa. Three experiments replicated this surprising asymmetry and investigated how it is affected by a reduction in interference between tasks. Experiment 1 progressively delayed the onset of the stimulus attribute associated with the stronger task. Experiments 2 and 3 separated the response sets of the tasks. Both manipulations reduced, without eliminating, interference of the stronger with the weaker task but reversed the asymmetry of switch costs, resulting in a larger cost of switching to the weaker task. The results are interpreted in terms of a model of the interactions between control input, task strength, and task priming.

Task-set reconfiguration with predictable and unpredictable task switches

Participants switched frequently between high/low and odd/even classification of a digit. The interval between a task cue and the next digit varied between blocks. In Experiment 1, the task switched predictably every two, four, or eight trials. In Experiment 2, switching predictably every four trials was compared with random switching. With predictable switching, the cost was limited to the first trial of a run. Random switching produced a more gradual approach to asymptotic performance. After one performance, control processes attenuate the resulting change in task-set bias if a further switch is likely, but this strategic modulation is soon overwhelmed by task-set priming through further performances. Preparation reduced switch costs but not interference from the irrelevant attribute: Control of interference appears to be reactive, not proactive. Switch costs did not increase with run length, suggesting that retrieval of the task set last associated with the stimulus did not contribute to switch costs.

Task switching

Everyday life requires frequent shifts between cognitive tasks. Research reviewed in this article probes the control processes that reconfigure mental resources for a change of task by requiring subjects to switch frequently among a small set of simple tasks. Subjects' responses are substantially slower and, usually, more error-prone immediately after a task switch. This 'switch cost' is reduced, but not eliminated, by an opportunity for preparation. It seems to result from both transient and long-term carry-over of 'task-set' activation and inhibition as well as time consumed by task-set reconfiguration processes. Neuroimaging studies of task switching have revealed extra activation in numerous brain regions when subjects prepare to change tasks and when they perform a changed task, but we cannot yet separate 'controlling' from 'controlled' regions.

Residual costs in task switching: testing the failure-to-engage hypothesis

Reaction time is typically longer on trials on which the task changes. This switch cost is reduced by the opportunity to prepare for the change before the stimulus onset, but there remains a residual cost that resists reduction by further opportunity for preparation. De Jong (2000) proposed a model for evaluating the contribution to the residual cost of (1) failure to achieve endogenous task-set reconfiguration on a proportion of trials, and (2) limitations to the completeness of reconfiguration attainable by endogenous means. We report good fits of the model to the data from one previous and one new task-switching experiment, suggesting that the residual switch cost may indeed be attributable to a probabilistic failure to complete advance preparation. But strong incentives for preparation only marginally increased the estimated preparation probability, suggesting some intrinsic limitation to the ability to achieve endogenous preparation for a task switch on every trial.

Naming the color of a word: is it responses or task sets that compete?

Subjects named the colors in which high- and low-frequency words and pronounceable nonwords, otherwise matched, were displayed. Color naming was slower for all three item types than for visually equivalent strings of nonalphanumeric symbols but was no slower for words than for nonwords, nor for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words. Unpronounceable letter strings had intermediate color-naming latencies. However, frequency and lexical status had large effects on latency for reading the same words and pseudowords aloud. Interference is thus predicted not by the strength of association between a letter string and its pronunciation but by the presence of word-like constituents. We argue that the interference from an unprimed noncolor word is due to, and isolates, one of two components of the classic Stroop effect: competition from the whole task set of reading. The other component, response competition, occurs only when lexical access is sufficiently primed.

Reconfiguration of task-set: is it easier to switch to the weaker task?

Switching between two tasks afforded by the same stimuli results in slower reactions and more errors on the first stimulus after the task changes. This "switch cost" is reduced, but not usually eliminated, by the opportunity to prepare for a task switch. While there is agreement that this preparation effect indexes a control process performed before the stimulus, the "residual" cost has been attributed to several sources: to a control process essential for task-set reconfiguration that can be carried out only after the stimulus onset, to probabilistic failure to engage in preparation prior to the stimulus, and to two kinds of priming from previous trials: positive priming of the now-irrelevant task set and inhibition of the now-relevant task-set. The main evidence for the carry-over of inhibition is the observation that it is easier to switch from the stronger to the weaker of a pair of tasks afforded by the stimulus than vice versa. We survey available data on interactions between task switching and three manipulations of relative task strength: pre-experimental experience, stimulus-response compatibility, and intra-experimental practice. We conclude that it is far from universally true that it is easier to switch to the weaker task. Either inhibition of the stronger task-set is a strategy used only in the special case of extreme inequality in strength, or its consequences for later performance may be masked by slower post-stimulus control operations for more complex tasks. Inhibitory priming may also be stimulus specific.

Competitor priming in spoken word recognition

Most models predict that priming a word should retard recognition of another sharing its initial sounds. Available short lag priming data do not clearly support the prediction. The authors report 7 continuous lexical-decision experiments with 288 participants. With lags of 1-5 min between prime and probe, response time increased for a monosyllabic word preceded by a word sharing its onset and vowel (but not one sharing its rime) and for a polysyllabic word preceded by another sharing its first syllable. The effect was limited to words primed by words, suggesting that identifying the prime strengthens its lexical attractor, making identification of a lexical neighbor more difficult. With lags of only a few trials, facilitatory effects of phonological similarity or familiarity bias effects were also seen; this may explain why clear evidence for inhibitory priming has been lacking hitherto.

Competitor priming in spoken word recognition

Most models predict that priming a word should retard recognition of another sharing its initial sounds. Available short lag priming data do not clearly support the prediction. The authors report 7 continuous lexical-decision experiments with 288 participants. With lags of 1-5 min between prime and probe, response time increased for a monosyllabic word preceded by a word sharing its onset and vowel (but not one sharing its rime) and for a polysyllabic word preceded by another sharing its first syllable. The effect was limited to words primed by words, suggesting that identifying the prime strengthens its lexical attractor, making identification of a lexical neighbor more difficult. With lags of only a few trials, facilitatory effects of phonological similarity or familiarity bias effects were also seen; this may explain why clear evidence for inhibitory priming has been lacking hitherto.

The disorder-salient stroop effect as a measure of psychopathology in eating disorders

OBJECTIVES

The aim was to assess, using sophisticated experimental methods, the amount of interference on a Stroop task in patients with eating disorders, under conditions of blocked and mixed stimulus presentation.

METHODS

Patients with eating disorders and non-patients named the color in which a word was displayed. Words came from an experimental category (food/eating, weight/shape, "emotion," or affectively neutral word) or from a matched set of unrelated control words. Color-naming latencies were compared in a blocked condition, with words from just one set in each block, and in a mixed condition, with a mixture of word types in each block.

RESULTS

In the mixed condition, patients took longer to color-name food/eating and weight/shape words than control words. With blocked presentation this effect was magnified; and patients with bulimia nervosa also showed increased naming-latency for "emotion" words. Non-patients showed neither effect and no group showed interference for the affectively neutral category. Patients' interference effects correlated reliably with self-reported depression and anxiety.

DISCUSSION

Sources of interference and methodological and diagnostic implications are discussed.

The locus of repetition priming of spoken word production

Naming of a pictured object is substantially facilitated when the name has recently been produced in response to a definition or read aloud. The first experiment shows this to be so when over one hundred trials have intervened, and when the subjects can name the pictures quickly and accurately in the absence of priming. The locus of the effect must be in lexicalization processes subsequent to picture identification and is unlikely to be mediated by recovery of an episodic trace. Two further experiments show that prior production of a homophone of the object's name is not an effective prime, (although slower responses are somewhat facilitated when the homophones are spelled the same). Hence the facilitation observed for repeated production of the same word cannot be associated with the repetition of the phonological form per se. We conclude that the facilitation must be associated with retrieval of the semantic specification or the process of mapping of that specification to its associated phonological representation.

Repetition of lexicalization across languages: a further test of the locus of priming

Wheeldon and Monsell (this issue) found that production of a word in response to a definition had a large and long-lasting facilitatory effect on latency for later production of the same word to name a pictured object, and that this priming effect was not due to repeated production of the phonological word-form per se. This paper reports a further test of the locus of the effect. Welsh-English bilinguals named pictured objects in Welsh. Half the words were primed either by their earlier production in Welsh in response to Welsh definitions or by production of their equivalents in English in response to English definitions. Substantial facilitation resulted from prior production in the same language, none from prior production in the other language--provided that the equivalents differed in phonological form. Given that priming results neither from repeated activation of a meaning when different phonological forms are produced, nor from repetition of the same phonological form in response to different meanings, the priming effect must be localized in the connection between a word's meaning and its phonological form. We also put forward an account of bilingual lexicalization that accommodates this result together with some evidence indicating that production of words in one language is not wholly insulated from the "availability" of words in the other.

Effects of frequency on visual word recognition tasks: Where are they?

Compared the effect of frequency on lexical decision time (LDT) with that on reaction time (RT) in four other tasks, for the same words and subjects. Exp. 1 yielded an effect on semantic categorization RT (person vs. thing) similar in size and form to the effect on LDT. Exp. 2 yielded a substantial effect for syntactic categorization (noun vs. adjective), although weaker than the effect on LDT. In Exp. 3, the effect on naming RT for stress-final disyllabic words was identical to that on LDT, whereas the effect for stress-initial words was weaker. Exp. 4 showed no effect of frequency on delayed naming RT. The data undermine recent arguments for a (mainly) postidentification task-specific locus of frequency effects but are compatible with the older assumption (also characteristic of new PDP learning models) that lexical identification is a major locus of frequency effects (perhaps together with retrieval of meaning or phonology). But effects at that locus may be masked or diluted by other processes.