Interpersonal influences on decision-making capacity: a content analysis of court judgments

For many purposes in England and Wales, the Court of Protection determines whether a person has or lacks capacity to make a decision, by applying the test within the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This test is regularly described as a cognitive test with cognitive processes discussed as internal characteristics. However, it is unclear how the courts have framed interpersonal influence as negatively impacting upon a person's decision-making processes in a capacity assessment context. We reviewed published court judgments in England and Wales in which interpersonal problems were discussed as relevant to capacity. Through content analysis, we developed a typology that highlights five ways the courts considered influence to be problematic to capacity across these cases. Interpersonal influence problems were constructed as (i) P's inability to preserve their free will or independence, (ii) restricting P's perspective, (iii) valuing or dependence on a relationship, (iv) acting on a general suggestibility to influence, or (v) P denying facts about the relationship. These supposed mechanisms of interpersonal influence problems are poorly understood and clearly merit further consideration. Our typology and case discussion are a start towards more detailed practice guidelines, and raise questions as to whether mental capacity and influence should remain legally distinct.

Mental capacity-why look for a paradigm shift?

Challenges to the legitimacy of mental capacity over the past 10 years have been spearheaded by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the treaty body for the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). This challenge has been asserted to have produced a 'paradigm shift'. In this article, we examine why that interpretation has had such limited traction in the legal policy arena, and whether it should have traction. We also analyse whether the Committee has subtly but importantly shifted its position. We then develop an argument that the true goal, compatible with the CRPD, is the satisfactory determination of whether a person has or lacks mental capacity to make or take a relevant decision. Our article contextualises multi-disciplinary, research-informed guidelines designed as a contribution to satisfactory determination. While our article is based upon the position in England and Wales, we suggest that our conclusions are of wider application.

Applying decision-making capacity criteria in practice: A content analysis of court judgments

BACKGROUND/OBJECTIVES

Many jurisdictions use a functional model of capacity with similar legal criteria, but there is a lack of agreed understanding as to how to apply these criteria in practice. We aimed to develop a typology of capacity rationales to describe court practice in making capacity determinations and to guide professionals approaching capacity assessments.

METHODS

We analysed all published cases from courts in England and Wales [Court of Protection (CoP) judgments, or Court of Appeal cases from the CoP] containing rationales for incapacity or intact capacity(n = 131). Qualitative content analysis was used to develop a typology of capacity rationales or abilities. Relationships between the typology and legal criteria for capacity [Mental Capacity Act (MCA)] and diagnoses were analysed.

RESULTS

The typology had nine categories (reliability: kappa = 0.63): 1) to grasp information or concepts, 2) to imagine/ abstract, 3) to remember, 4) to appreciate, 5) to value/ care, 6) to think through the decision non-impulsively, 7) to reason, 8) to give coherent reasons, and 9) to express a stable preference. Rationales most frequently linked to MCA criterion 'understand' were ability to grasp information or concepts (43%) or to appreciate (42%), and to MCA criterion 'use or weigh' were abilities to appreciate (45%) or to reason (32%). Appreciation was the most frequently cited rationale across all diagnoses. Judges often used rationales without linking them specifically to any MCA criteria (42%).

CONCLUSIONS

A new typology of rationales could bridge the gap between legal criteria for decision-making capacity and phenomena encountered in practice, increase reliability and transparency of assessments, and provide targets for decision-making support.