Social demonstration of colour preference improves the learning of associated demonstrated actions

We studied how different types of social demonstration improve house sparrows' (Passer domesticus) success in solving a foraging task that requires both operant learning (opening covers) and discrimination learning (preferring covers of the rewarding colour). We provided learners with either paired demonstration (of both cover opening and colour preference), action-only demonstration (of opening white covers only), or no demonstration (a companion bird eating without covers). We found that sparrows failed to learn the two tasks with no demonstration, and learned them best with a paired demonstration. Interestingly, the action of cover opening was learned faster with paired rather than action-only demonstration despite being equally demonstrated in both. We also found that only with paired demonstration, the speed of operant (action) learning was related to the demonstrator's level of activity. Colour preference (i.e. discrimination learning) was eventually acquired by all sparrows that learned to open covers, even without social demonstration of colour preference. Thus, adding a demonstration of colour preference was actually more important for operant learning, possibly as a result of increasing the similarity between the demonstrated and the learned tasks, thereby increasing the learner's attention to the actions of the demonstrator. Giving more attention to individuals in similar settings may be an adaptive strategy directing social learners to focus on ecologically relevant behaviours and on tasks that are likely to be learned successfully.

Mechanisms of impulsive choice: Experiments to explore and models to map the empirical terrain

Impulsive choice is preference for a smaller-sooner (SS) outcome over a larger-later (LL) outcome when LL choices result in greater reinforcement maximization. Delay discounting is a model of impulsive choice that describes the decaying value of a reinforcer over time, with impulsive choice evident when the empirical choice-delay function is steep. Steep discounting is correlated with multiple diseases and disorders. Thus, understanding the processes underlying impulsive choice is a popular topic for investigation. Experimental research has explored the conditions that moderate impulsive choice, and quantitative models of impulsive choice have been developed that elegantly represent the underlying processes. This review spotlights experimental research in impulsive choice covering human and nonhuman animals across the domains of learning, motivation, and cognition. Contemporary models of delay discounting designed to explain the underlying mechanisms of impulsive choice are discussed. These models focus on potential candidate mechanisms, which include perception, delay and/or reinforcer sensitivity, reinforcement maximization, motivation, and cognitive systems. Although the models collectively explain multiple mechanistic phenomena, there are several cognitive processes, such as attention and working memory, that are overlooked. Future research and model development should focus on bridging the gap between quantitative models and empirical phenomena.

Does ASMR propensity reflect a mentally flexible mindset? Exploring the relationship between ASMR propensity, transliminality, emotional contagion, schizotypal traits, roleplaying ability, and creativity

Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response (ASMR) is an alternative state of consciousness characterised by changes in affect, feelings of relaxation, and tingling sensations on the body. Online videos designed to stimulate ASMR in viewers have become increasingly popular. Although there is evidence that ASMR may improve sleep, emotion regulation, and relaxation, the current understanding of ASMR propensity remains limited. This study examined whether a mentally flexible cognitive style may underlie the ability to experience ASMR. Undergraduate students (N = 376) completed an online survey involving a series of self-report questionnaires and two performance-based creative ability tasks. Findings did not provide support for an overall mentally flexible mindset, however, transliminality, emotional contagion susceptibility, positive schizotypal traits, and roleplaying ability all significantly positively predicted ASMR propensity. These findings suggest that ASMR propensity represents several possible underlying cognitive styles relating to enhanced imagination and perceptual ability, and cannot be simply characterised by mental flexibility.

MEM-EX: An exemplar memory model of decisions from experience

Many real-world decisions must be made on basis of experienced outcomes. However, there is little consensus about the mechanisms by which people make these decisions from experience (DfE). Across five experiments, we identified several factors influencing DfE. We also introduce a novel computational modeling framework, the memory for exemplars model (MEM-EX), which posits that decision makers rely on memory for previously experienced outcomes to make choices. Using MEM-EX, we demonstrate how cognitive mechanisms provide intuitive and parsimonious explanations for the effects of value-ignorance, salience, outcome order, and sample size. We also conduct a cross-validation analysis of several models within the MEM-EX framework. We compare these to three alternative models; two baseline models built on the principle of expected value maximization, and another employing a suite of choice methods previously shown to perform well in prediction tournaments. We find that MEM-EX consistently outperforms these competitors, demonstrating its value as a tool for making quantitative predictions without overfitting. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of the interplay between attention, memory, and experience-based choice.

The cognitive profiles for different samples of mathematical learning difficulties and their similarity to typical development: Evidence from a longitudinal study

Several cognitive deficits have been suggested to induce mathematical learning difficulties (MLD), but it is unclear whether the cognitive profile for all children with MLD is the same and to what extent it differs from typically developing (TD) children. This study investigated whether such a profile could be distinguished when cognitive skills and math performance are compared between TD children and children with MLD. This was accomplished by employing two-way repeated-measures analyses of covariance in 276 10-year-old participants (60 with MLD) from fourth and fifth grades. In addition, we investigated whether more restrictive selection criteria for MLD result in different mathematical and cognitive profiles by means of independent-samples t tests. Results revealed that cognitive mechanisms for math development are mostly similar for children with MLD and TD children and that variability in sample selection criteria did not produce different mathematical or cognitive profiles. To conclude, the cognitive mechanisms for math development are broadly similar for children with MLD and their TD counterparts even when different MLD samples were selected. This strengthens our idea that MLD can be defined as the worst performance on a continuous scale rather than as a discrete disorder.

Pseudo-mechanistic Explanations in Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience

Few articles in psychology and cognitive neuroscience do without the promise to get into the “mechanisms underlying” particular psychological phenomena. And yet the progress in our mechanistic understanding of human cognition and behavior must be considered disappointing: Most “explanations” merely classify the phenomenon under investigation as falling into a broader category of (not any better understood) phenomena, specify the context conditions under which the phenomenon is likely to occur, or specify a particular kind of neural activity (such as the activation of a particular brain area) that is correlated with the phenomenon. None of these meets the criteria of a truly mechanistic explanation, which needs to account for phenomena in terms of “a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization” (Bechtel, 2006). This contribution characterizes the problem and some of its implications and discusses possible solutions.

Pseudo‐mechanistic explanations in psychology and cognitive neuroscience

This paper focuses on the level of systems/cognitive neuroscience. It argues that the great majority of explanations in psychology and cognitive neuroscience is “pseudo‐mechanistic.” On the basis of various case studies, Hommel argues that cognitive neuroscience should move beyond what he calls an “Aristotelian phase” to become a mature “Galilean” science seeking to discover actual mechanisms of cognitive phenomena.