Using stem cell-derived gametes for same-sex reproduction: an alternative scenario

It has been suggested that future application of stem-cell derived gametes (SCD-gametes) might lead to the possibility for same-sex couples to have genetically related children. Still, for this to become possible, the technique of gamete derivation and techniques of reprogramming somatic cells to a pluripotent state (directly or via somatic cell nuclear transfer) would have to be perfected. Moreover, egg cells would have to be derived from male cells and sperm cells from female cells, which is believed to be particularly difficult, if not impossible. We suggest a more plausible scenario to provide same-sex couples with the possibility to parent a child who is genetically related to both parents. Although technical feasibility is an advantage (also in terms of safety), disadvantages are that cooperation of a donor of the opposite sex is still required and that the partners are genetically linked to the resulting child in a different degree. However, since in our scenario the donor's genetic contribution would not outweigh any of the parents' genetic contribution, this alternative route may ease the fear for a possible parental claim by the donor. Like many other applications in the field of infertility treatment, the goal to create SCD-gametes for reproductive purposes is largely based on the high value attributed to genetic parenthood. Although we believe that genetic relatedness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 'good' parenthood, we do believe that many people may consider our scenario a welcome alternative.

'Social' egg freezing and the UK's statutory storage time limits

This article argues that the statutory time limits upon the storage of gametes have unintended and perhaps even perverse consequences for women freezing their eggs as insurance against age-related fertility decline. They work against good clinical practice and potentially represent an interference with a woman's right to respect for her family life, which is neither necessary nor proportionate. My claim will be that the statutory time limit, and the options for extension, are no longer fit for purpose.

Response to 'A relational approach to Saviour Siblings?' by Selgelid

In his concise argument, 'A relational approach to saviour siblings?', Selgelid reiterates some of the arguments raised in the author meets critics discussion of my book, Saviour Siblings In this response, I highlight an important misunderstanding in one of the arguments put forward by Selgelid, which forms the basis of a large portion of his analysis. Contrary to what Selgelid contends, I do not use the deafness case in my discussion of the non-identity problem to contend that the case of selecting for deafness is ethically different from the case of saviour siblings. As I state in my reply, I use the case of deafness not as a comparator for saviour siblings but rather to illustrate the different categories of risk that apply in selection cases Given this confusion, I restate my objection to relying on the non-identity problem in evaluating risk of harm associated with the embryo biopsy process for preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Finally, I reiterate that the individual interests of saviour siblings remain important in the decision-making matrix and emphasise that Saviour Siblings offers a more contextualised approach to the welfare of the child in selective reproduction, which includes both individual and collective interests.

A case report of embryo donation: ethical and clinical implications for psychologists

Third-party reproduction is a growing field, and an increasing body of literature considers the ethics of embryo donation. Due to the psychosocial complexities that generally accompany the donation and/or use of donor embryos, psychologists can play a pivotal role in these specialised fertility cases. While laws in the USA are in place to regulate the medical procedures involved in embryo donation, only unenforceable guidelines exist for psychologists specialising in fertility cases. The presentation of this case study aims to: (1) clarify the ethical concerns that fertility psychologists should consider in similar situations by assessing whether American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the American Psychological Association (APA) guidelines compete or complement one another within this case of embryo donation and (2) consider the interests, obligations and rights of all parties involved. Several principles, standards and guidelines that must be considered are described. Overall, the APA Ethics Code and the ASRM Guidelines appear to complement one another for most aspects of this case. Fertility psychologists should consider the clinical implications of the interests, rights and duties of all involved parties, including themselves.

Good eggs? Evaluating consent forms for egg donation

Beyond gaps in the provision of information, the informed consent process for egg donation is complicated by conflicts of interest, payment and a lack of longitudinal data about physiological and psychological risks. Recent scholarship has suggested that egg donation programmes could improve the informed consent process by revising consent documents. At a minimum, these documents should include information about eight key criteria: the nature and objectives of treatment; the benefits, risks and inconveniences of egg donation; the privacy of donors and their anonymity (where applicable); disclosure that participation is voluntary (withdrawal); the availability of counselling; financial considerations; the possibility of an unsuccessful cycle and potential uses of the eggs retrieved. This study evaluates the incorporation of these minimum criteria in consent forms for egg donation, obtained through requests to Canadian fertility clinics. Even when clinics were considered to have met criteria simply by mentioning them, among the eight consent forms assessed, none met the minimum standards. Only half of clinics addressed privacy/anonymity concerns, financial issues and the possibility of a future cycle. Improving the quality of consent documentation to meet the minimum standards established by this study may not be an onerous task. For some, this will include re-evaluating how they include one or two elements of disclosure, and for others, this will require a substantial overhaul. Using the criteria provided by this study as the minimum standard for consent could ensure that donors have the basic information they need to make informed decisions.

Having a child together in lesbian families: combining gestation and genetics

The increasing acceptance of lesbian couples in medically assisted reproduction has led to new, unusual requests. This paper discusses the request for egg transfer from one partner to the other. In the first part, different analogies (egg donation, embryo donation, surrogacy and mitochondrial replacement) are made in order to find out whether one of these can help us determine whether this procedure is acceptable. It is shown that there are major difficulties with all analogies. In the second part, two balances are developed between the medical risks and costs of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and intrauterine insemination on the one hand and the medical risks of IVF and the psychosocial benefits on the other hand. The final conclusion is that the disadvantages of the procedure can be compensated by the psychosocial advantages and thus can be accepted.

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and rational choice under risk or uncertainty

In this paper I present an argument in favour of a parental duty to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). I argue that if embryos created in vitro were able to decide for themselves in a rational manner, they would sometimes choose PGD as a method of selection. Couples, therefore, should respect their hypothetical choices on a principle similar to that of patient autonomy. My thesis shows that no matter which moral doctrine couples subscribe to, they ought to conduct the PGD procedure in the situations when it is impossible to implant all of the created embryos and if there is a significant risk for giving birth to a child with a serious condition.

Ancestor embryos: embryonic gametes and genetic parenthood

The proposal for reproducing human generations in vitro raises the question to what extent parenthood is possible in embryos and to what extent human rights and interests are dependent on conscious awareness. This paper argues that the interest in not being made a parent non-consensually for the benefit of others persists throughout the lifespan of the individual human organism. We do not become genetic parents by learning that we are parents; rather, we discover (or fail to discover) an existing genetic relationship between our offspring and ourselves. The claim to genetic parenthood of an embryo used for reproduction in vitro is, if anything, clearer than the claim of the adult for whom gametes are derived via ips cells, in that an embryo's cells, unlike an adult's somatic cells, are already functionally geared to producing gametes (among other types of cell). An embryo used to make gametes that are used in reproduction is immediately and non-consensually made a genetic parent and to that extent is wronged whether or not the parent embryo survives-as some could survive-the harvesting of cells. All human individuals carry objective interests in benefits appropriate to the kind of being they are; these include the stake in not being made a parent without one's consent, whether posthumously or otherwise.

Genetic generations: artificial gametes and the embryos produced with them

Certain interventions now permit the derivation of mammalian gametes from stem cells cultivated from either somatic cells or embryos. These gametes can be used in an indefinite cycle of conception in vitro, gamete derivation, conception in vitro, and so on, producing genetic generations that live only in vitro. One commentator has described this prospect for human beings as eugenics, insofar as it would allow for the selection and development of certain traits in human beings. This commentary not only offers this topic for discussion, it also wades into the ethical fray over the practice. Several possible lines of objection can be raised against this practice, but these accounts are by and large insufficient as an ethical analysis of this possible, future way of conceiving human children.

The trespasses of property law

The purpose of this article is to identify a limit to the appropriate application of property law to the use and storage of bodily material. I argue here that property law ought to be limited to protecting 'contingent rights' and that recent cases where property rights have been recognised in semen represent the application of property law beyond this limit. I also suggest how the law ought to develop in order to avoid the overextensive use of property law.

Embryo deaths in reproduction and embryo research: a reply to Murphy's double effect argument

The majority of embryos created in natural reproduction die spontaneously within a few weeks of conception. Some have argued that, therefore, if one believes the embryo is a person (in the normative sense) one should find 'natural' reproduction morally problematic. An extension of this argument holds that, if one accepts embryo deaths in natural reproduction, consistency requires that one also accepts embryo deaths that occur in (i) assisted reproduction via in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and (ii) embryo research. In a recent paper in this journal, Timothy Murphy criticises both the initial argument and its extension. Murphy argues that double-effect reasoning can justify embryo deaths both in natural reproduction and IVF, but not in embryo research. Thus, according to Murphy, one can, without being inconsistent, (1) believe the embryo is a person and accept natural reproduction and IVF, and (2) accept natural reproduction and IVF, while rejecting embryo research on the ground that it involves embryo deaths. I show that Murphy's argument is problematic because double effect cannot justify embryo deaths in standard IVF practices. The problem is that the proportionality criterion of double effect is not met by such practices. Thus, Murphy's argument fails to support (1) and (2). An implication of his argument failing to support (2) is that it does not defeat the position I have defended in the past-that if one accepts standard IVF practices one should also accept embryo research, including research with embryos created solely for that purpose.