Actions are characterized by 'canonical moments' in a sequence of movements

Understanding what others are doing is an essential aspect of social cognition that depends on our ability to quickly recognize and categorize their actions. To effectively study action recognition we need to understand how actions are bounded, where they start and where they end. Here we borrow a conceptual approach - the notion of 'canonicality' - introduced by Palmer and colleagues in their study of object recognition and apply it to the study of action recognition. Using a set of 50 video clips sourced from stock photography sites, we show that many everyday actions - transitive and intransitive, social and non-social, communicative - are characterized by 'canonical moments' in a sequence of movements that are agreed by participants to 'best represent' a named action, as indicated in a forced choice (Exp 1, n = 142) and a free choice (Exp 2, n = 125) paradigm. In Exp 3 (n = 102) we confirm that canonical moments from action sequences are more readily named as depicting specific actions and, mirroring research in object recognition, that such canonical moments are privileged in memory (Exp 4, n = 95). We suggest that 'canonical moments', being those that convey maximal information about human actions, are integral to the representation of human action.1.

The beneficial effect of a speaker's gestures on the listener's memory for action phrases: The pivotal role of the listener's premotor cortex

Memory for action phrases improves in the listeners when the speaker accompanies them with gestures compared to when the speaker stays still. Since behavioral studies revealed a pivotal role of the listeners' motor system, we aimed to disentangle the role of primary motor and premotor cortices. Participants had to recall phrases uttered by a speaker in two conditions: in the gesture condition, the speaker performed gestures congruent with the action; in the no-gesture condition, the speaker stayed still. In Experiment 1, half of the participants underwent inhibitory rTMS over the hand/arm region of the left premotor cortex (PMC) and the other half over the hand/arm region of the left primary motor cortex (M1). The enactment effect disappeared only following rTMS over PMC. In Experiment 2, we detected the usual enactment effect after rTMS over vertex, thereby excluding possible nonspecific rTMS effects. These findings suggest that the information encoded in the premotor cortex is a crucial part of the memory trace.