Speak Up! Mistaken Beliefs About How Much to Talk in Conversations

We hypothesized that people would exhibit a reticence bias, the incorrect belief that they will be more likable if they speak less than half the time in a conversation with a stranger, as well as halo ignorance, the belief that their speaking time should depend on their goal (e.g., to be liked vs. to be found interesting), when in fact, perceivers form global impressions of each other. In Studies 1 and 2, participants forecasted they should speak less than half the time when trying to be liked, but significantly more when trying to be interesting. In Study 3, we tested the accuracy of these forecasts by randomly assigning participants to speak for 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, or 70% of the time in a dyadic conversation. Contrary to people's forecasts, they were more likable the more they spoke, and their partners formed global rather than differentiated impressions.

Is Personality Pathology Ego-Syntonic? Self- and Meta-Perception of Maladaptive Personality Traits

Research has challenged the assumption that personality pathology is "ego-syntonic" or perceived favorably and consistent with one's self-image. The present study employed a community sample (n = 401) to examine relations between self-rated maladaptive personality and liking of maladaptive traits in self and others as well as meta-perception of personality pathology (i.e., how likable participants believe others find maladaptive traits). In general, individuals with higher self-rated maladaptive traits provided higher ratings of the likability of these traits in themselves and others. However, as hypothesized, comparison of liking ratings for high scorers and the rest of the sample revealed that individuals who score high on most pathological personality traits do not "like" these traits (or rate others as "liking" them) but simply dislike them less. Results support a dimensional view of ego-syntonicity.

Political (Meta-)Dehumanization in Mental Representations: Divergent Emphases in the Minds of Liberals Versus Conservatives

We conducted two reverse-correlation studies, as well as two pilot studies reported in the online supplement (total N = 1,411), on the topics of (a) whether liberals and conservatives differ in the types of dehumanization that they cognitively emphasize when mentally representing one another, and if so, (b) whether liberals and conservatives are sensitive to how they are represented in the minds of political outgroup members. Results suggest that partisans indeed differ in the types of dehumanization that they cognitively emphasize when mentally representing one another: whereas conservatives' dehumanization of liberals emphasizes immaturity (vs. savagery), liberals' dehumanization of conservatives more strongly emphasizes savagery (vs. immaturity). In addition, results suggest that partisans may be sensitive to how they are represented. That is, partisans' meta-representations-their representations of how the outgroup represents the ingroup-appear to accurately index the relative emphases of these two dimensions in the minds of political outgroup members.

Understanding and combating misperceived polarization

By many accounts politics is becoming more polarized, yielding dire consequences for democracy and trust in government. Yet a growing body of research on so-called false polarization finds that perceptions of 'what the other side believes' are inaccurate-specifically, overly pessimistic-and that these inaccuracies exacerbate intergroup conflict. Through a review of existing work and a reanalysis of published data, we (i) develop a typology of the disparate phenomena that are labelled 'polarization', (ii) use that typology to distinguish actual from (mis)perceived polarization, and (iii) identify when misperceived polarization gives rise to actual polarization (e.g. extreme issue attitudes and prejudice). We further suggest that a specific psychological domain is ideal for developing corrective interventions: meta-perception, one's judgement of how they are perceived by others. We review evidence indicating that correcting meta-perception inaccuracies is effective at reducing intergroup conflict and discuss methods for precisely measuring meta-perception accuracy. We argue that the reputational nature of meta-perception provides a motivational mechanism by which individuals are sensitive to the truth, even when those truths pertain to the 'other side'. We conclude by discussing how these insights can be integrated into existing research seeking to understand polarization and its negative consequences. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'.

Self-Other Agreement and Metaperception Accuracy Across the Big Five: Examining the Roles of Depression and Self-Esteem

OBJECTIVE

The ability to judge other people's personality characteristics and to know how we are viewed by others are important aspects of social cognition. The present study tested the impact of depressive symptoms and low self-esteem on self-other agreement and the accuracy of metaperception (i.e., how we believe others view us) across the Big Five dimensions of personality.

METHOD

Participants who varied in depressive symptoms engaged in a 10-minute "getting to know you" interaction in dyads. Ratings on the Big Five personality dimensions, depression, and self-esteem were completed prior to the interaction. After the interaction, participants rated the personality of their partner and rated how they believed their partner would rate them (metaperception).

RESULTS

Self-other agreement was only found on Extraversion, whereas there was significant meta-accuracy on Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion. Depressive symptoms and low self-esteem negatively biased metaperceptions of Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism.

CONCLUSIONS

Depression and low self-esteem function to negatively bias how we believe we are seen by others in new acquaintanceships and therefore may play an important role in the development of interpersonal relationships.

You probably think this paper's about you: narcissists' perceptions of their personality and reputation

Do narcissists have insight into the negative aspects of their personality and reputation? Using both clinical and subclinical measures of narcissism, the authors examined others' perceptions, self-perceptions, and meta-perceptions of narcissists across a wide range of traits for a new acquaintance and close other (Study 1), longitudinally with a group of new acquaintances (Study 2), and among coworkers (Study 3). Results bring 3 surprising conclusions about narcissists: (a) they understand that others see them less positively than they see themselves (i.e., their meta-perceptions are less biased than are their self-perceptions), (b) they have some insight into the fact that they make positive first impressions that deteriorate over time, and (c) they have insight into their narcissistic personality (e.g., they describe themselves as arrogant). These findings shed light on some of the psychological mechanisms underlying narcissism.