Semantic Bimodal Presentation Differentially Slows Working Memory Retrieval

Although evidence has shown that working memory (WM) can be differentially affected by the multisensory congruency of different visual and auditory stimuli, it remains unclear whether different multisensory congruency about concrete and abstract words could impact further WM retrieval. By manipulating the attention focus toward different matching conditions of visual and auditory word characteristics in a 2-back paradigm, the present study revealed that for the characteristically incongruent condition under the auditory retrieval condition, the response to abstract words was faster than that to concrete words, indicating that auditory abstract words are not affected by visual representation, while auditory concrete words are. Alternatively, for concrete words under the visual retrieval condition, WM retrieval was faster in the characteristically incongruent condition than in the characteristically congruent condition, indicating that visual representation formed by auditory concrete words may interfere with WM retrieval of visual concrete words. The present findings demonstrated that concrete words in multisensory conditions may be too aggressively encoded with other visual representations, which would inadvertently slow WM retrieval. However, abstract words seem to suppress interference better, showing better WM performance than concrete words in the multisensory condition.

The Acquisition of Modal Concepts

Sometimes we accept propositions, sometimes we reject them, and sometimes we take propositions to be worth considering but not yet established, as merely possible. The result is a complex representation with logical structure. Is the ability to mark propositions as merely possible part of our innate representational toolbox or does it await development, perhaps relying on language acquisition? Several lines of inquiry show that preverbal infants manage possibilities in complex ways, while others find that preschoolers manage possibilities poorly. Here, we discuss how this apparent conflict can be resolved by distinguishing modal representations of possibility, which mark possibility symbolically, from minimal representations of possibility, which do not encode any modal status and need not have a logical structure.