Spanish version of Multidimensional Mentalizing Questionnaire (MMQ): Translation, adaptation and psychometric properties in a Chilean population

This paper presents the first translation and adaptation of the Multidimensional Mentalizing Questionnaire (MMQ) into Spanish for a native Spanish-speaking sample in Chile. The study examines the psychometric properties and internal consistency of the translated MMQ. The instrument undergoes modifications based on a confirmatory factor analysis of the original structure, resulting in the elimination of items with cross-loadings and improvement in model fit. The modified scale is then analyzed, demonstrating strong psychometric properties. Convergent evidence is assessed by correlating MMQ subscales with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and Empathy Quotient (EQ), while divergent evidence is assessed by correlating aggressive traits using the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ). The study also explores gender differences and age. Results reveal positive correlations between good mentalizing and empathy, particularly cognitive empathy, supporting the significance of positive mentalization in empathy. Negative mentalization is associated with difficulties in perspective-taking and social skills, as well as aggressive traits. Gender differences in mentalizing capacities are observed, and negative aspects of mentalization decrease with age. The availability of the Spanish translation of the MMQ, the first self-reporting scale measuring mentalization adapted to Chilean population, contributes to research aiming to understand its relationship with other psychological phenomena in different cultural context and facilitating clinical interventions with different population groups. We therefore encourage further investigation into cultural, gender and age differences in mentalization.

Processing Speaker-Specific Information in Two Stages During the Interpretation of Referential Precedents

To reduce ambiguity across a conversation, interlocutors reach temporary conventions or referential precedents on how to refer to an entity. Despite their central role in communication, the cognitive underpinnings of the interpretation of precedents remain unclear, specifically the role and mechanisms by which information related to the speaker is integrated. We contrast predictions of one-stage, original two-stage, and extended two-stage models for the processing of speaker information and provide evidence favoring the latter: we show that both stages are sensitive to speaker-specific information. Using an experimental paradigm based on visual-world eye tracking in the context of a referential communication task, we look at the moment-by-moment interpretation of precedents and focus on the temporal profile of the influence of the speaker and linguistic information when facing ambiguity. We find two clearly identifiable moments where speaker-specific information has its effects on reference resolution. We conclude that these two stages reflect two distinct cognitive mechanisms, with different timings, and rely on different representational formats for encoding and accessing information about the speaker: a cue-driven memory retrieval process that mediates language processing and an inferential mechanism based on perspective-taking abilities.

How Do Addressees Exploit Conventionalizations? From a Negative Reference to an ad hoc Implicature

A negative reference, such as “not the sculpture” (where the sculpture is a name the speaker had only just invented to describe an unconventional-looking object and where the negation is saying that she does not currently desire that object), seems like a perilous and linguistically underdetermined way to point to another object, especially when there are three objects to choose from. To succeed, it obliges listeners to rely on contextual elements to determine which object the speaker has in mind. Prior work has shown that pragmatic inference-making plays a crucial role in such an interpretation process. When a negative reference leaves two candidate objects to choose from, listeners avoid an object that had been previously named, preferring instead an unconventional-looking object that had remained unnamed (Kronmüller et al., 2017). In the present study, we build over these findings by maintaining our focus on the two remaining objects (what we call the second and third objects) as we systematically vary two features. With respect to the second object – which is always unconventional looking – we vary whether or not it has been given a name. With respect to the third object – which is never named – we vary whether it is unconventional or conventional looking (for the latter, imagine an object that clearly resembles a bicycle). As revealed by selection patterns and eye-movements in a visual-world eye-tracking paradigm, we replicate our previous findings that show that participants choose randomly when both of the remaining objects are unconventional looking and unnamed and that they opt reliably in favor of the most nondescript (the unnamed unconventional looking) object when the second object is named. We show further that (unnamed) conventional-looking objects provide similar outcomes when juxtaposed with an unnamed unconventional object (participants prefer the most non-descript as opposed to the conventional-looking object). Nevertheless, effects emerging from the conventional (unnamed) case are not as strong as those found with respect to those reported when an unconventional object is named. In describing participants’ choices in the non-random cases, we propose that addressees rely on the construction of an ad hoc implicature that takes into account which object can be eliminated from consideration, given that the speaker did not explicitly name it.

The positive side of a negative reference: the delay between linguistic processing and common ground

Interlocutors converge on names to refer to entities. For example, a speaker might refer to a novel looking object as the jellyfish and, once identified, the listener will too. The hypothesized mechanism behind such referential precedents is a subject of debate. The common ground view claims that listeners register the object as well as the identity of the speaker who coined the label. The linguistic view claims that, once established, precedents are treated by listeners like any other linguistic unit, i.e. without needing to keep track of the speaker. To test predictions from each account, we used visual-world eyetracking, which allows observations in real time, during a standard referential communication task. Participants had to select objects based on instructions from two speakers. In the critical condition, listeners sought an object with a negative reference such as not the jellyfish. We aimed to determine the extent to which listeners rely on the linguistic input, common ground or both. We found that initial interpretations were based on linguistic processing only and that common ground considerations do emerge but only after 1000 ms. Our findings support the idea that-at least temporally-linguistic processing can be isolated from common ground.

Show me the pragmatic contribution: a developmental investigation of contrastive inference

An utterance such as 'Show me the large rabbit' potentially generates a contrastive inference, i.e., the article the and the adjective large allow listeners to pragmatically infer the existence of other entities having the same noun (e.g. a small rabbit). The primary way to measure children's ability to carry out this pragmatic inference has been through tasks that measure infelicity detection. We argue that such studies are not as revealing as one might assume because they force children to adopt a metalinguistic stance and they consider infelicity detection as tantamount to contrastive inference-making. To address these concerns, we develop a game-like situation in which all utterances remain felicitous. Moreover, we make a distinction between responses that are revealing of a pragmatic interpretation and responses that are revealing of a reliance on the utterance's linguistically encoded meaning (i.e., a lack of contrastive inference). Three experiments with seven-year-olds, ten-year-olds, and adults show that pragmatic interpretations do not emerge among seven-year-olds, that ten-year-olds do not show adult-like performance, and that adults are not at ceiling. We conclude that contrastive inference-making is an effortful process and that the ability to detect such gains-in-information through language increases with age.