Bias in Self-Reports: An Initial Elevation Phenomenon

Researchers have long worried about a phenomenon where study participants give higher ratings on self-report scales the first time they take a survey compared to subsequent times, particularly for negative subjective experiences. Recent experimental evidence, using samples of U.S. college students, suggests that this initial elevation phenomenon is due to an upward bias in people’s initial responses. Such bias potentially undermines the validity of many research findings. However, more recent studies have found little evidence in support of the phenomenon. To investigate the robustness of the initial elevation phenomenon, we conducted the largest experiments to date in diverse online samples ( N = 5,285 across three studies, from Prolific.co). We observed an initial elevation on self-reports of negative subjective experiences such as mood and mental and physical health symptoms. Our findings show that the threats to validity posed by the phenomenon are real and need to be reckoned with.

Taking a Disagreeing Perspective Improves the Accuracy of People's Quantitative Estimates

Many decisions rest on people's ability to make estimates of unknown quantities. In these judgments, the aggregate estimate of a crowd of individuals is often more accurate than most individual estimates. Remarkably, similar principles apply when multiple estimates from the same person are aggregated, and a key challenge is to identify strategies that improve the accuracy of people's aggregate estimates. Here, we present the following strategy: Combine people's first estimate with their second estimate, made from the perspective of someone they often disagree with. In five preregistered experiments (N = 6,425 adults; N = 53,086 estimates) with populations from the United States and United Kingdom, we found that such a strategy produced accurate estimates (compared with situations in which people made a second guess or when second estimates were made from the perspective of someone they often agree with). These results suggest that disagreement, often highlighted for its negative impact, is a powerful tool in producing accurate judgments.

Risky Therefore Not Beneficial: Replication and Extension of Finucane et al.’s (2000) Affect Heuristic Experiment

Risks and benefits are negatively related in people’s minds. Finucane et al. causally demonstrated that increasing risks of a hazard leads people to judge its benefits as lower. Vice versa, increasing benefits leads people to judge its risks as lower (original: r = −.74 [−0.92, −0.30]). This finding is consistent with an affective explanation, and the negative relationship is often presented as evidence for an affect heuristic. In two well-powered studies, using a more stringent analytic strategy, we replicated the original finding. We observed a strong negative relationship between judgments of risks and benefits across three technologies, although we do find that there was no change in risks when highlighting low benefits. We note that risks seem to be more responsive to manipulation (as opposed to benefits) and find evidence that the negative relationship can depend on incidental mood. We provided materials, data sets, and analyses on https://osf.io/sufjn/?view_only=6f8f5dc6ff524149a4ed5c6de9296ae8 .

How do People Judge Risk? Availability may Upstage Affect in the Construction of Risk Judgments

When making risk judgments, people rely on availability and affect as convenient heuristics. The two heuristics share many similarities and yet there have been no or few attempts to ascertain their causal impact on risk judgments. We present an experiment (N = 143) where we varied availability-by-recall (thinking of less or more occurrences of someone from one's social network dying) and the affective impact of certain risks (using images). We found that availability-by-recall had a stronger impact in constructing risk judgments. Asking people to think of more occurrences led to higher judgments of mortality and higher values placed on a single life, irrespective of changes in affect, risk media coverage, and retrieval time. Affect, however, was not disregarded. Our data suggest a causal mechanism where the retrieval of occurrences leads to changes in affect, which in turn, impact risk judgments. These findings increase understanding of how risk judgments are constructed with the potential to impact risk communication through direct manipulations of availability and affect. We discuss these and other implications of our findings.

The combination of multiple affective experiences and their impact on valuation judgments

People's affective experiences can be influenced by multiple informational inputs. It remains unclear however how this occurs? In this paper, we investigate the construction of affective experiences dependent on the varying number of previously presented, affectively-charged, informational inputs. In addition, because affect is often used as a cue in judgment and decision-making, we probe whether the resulting affective experience is mapped onto people's valuation judgments (how much people are willing-to-pay for target rewards and experiences). In three studies, we show that people's overall affective experience is constructed by averaging the affect of the previously presented, affectively-charged inputs. Subsequently, we find that people rely on the resulting affective experience as a cue for their judgments, as willingness-to-pay valuations were predicted by the combined affective experience. We measured integral, expected, as well as momentary affect - using both self-report and physiological measures. We discuss the potential for studying further how multiple inputs change affect as well as the implications for judgment and decision making.

THE RELATION AMONG INTRINSIC RELIGIOSITY, RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND ATTITUDES TOWARD OUT-GROUPS IN MUSLIMS FROM BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The relation between religion and prejudice has been shown in American Christians and Western Europeans, but it is currently unknown whether this effect can be generalized to other religions and cultures. To address this issue we conducted a study in which we assessed the personal religiosity of Muslim students from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who had to report their attitudes toward their in-group, as well as different out-groups. Consistent with prior findings, participants showed explicit preferences toward their own group relative to other religious and non-religious out-groups. As expected, we also found a relation between religiosity and out-group attitudes. Taken together, our results indicate that religiosity is negatively related to tolerance toward specific value-violating out-groups. Thus, we have extended previous findings in a different cultural and religious context.