Searching for momentum in NBA triplets of free throws

The literature on momentum is still undecided, with mixed results whether momentum exists or is only perceived to exist ("hot hand fallacy"). We explore whether momentum exists by looking at cases in which a basketball player has three consecutive free throws. A free throw is a well-defined task executed in a stable environment, allegedly giving momentum optimal chances to occur. Taking 14 NBA seasons we collected over 4500 three-free-throw sets (triplets). We obtained the outcomes of the shots as well as some additional variables about the player and the game: the player's average free-throw percentage, home or away, and the game score and the quarter when the free throws were attempted. We first analyse the hit rates in the three shots and then proceed to regression analysis that also controls for the abovementioned variables. We address several concerns raised in the literature. All comparisons and analyses yield the same conclusion that there is no evidence for momentum in the data.

Gender differences in the effect of employee-manager friendships on salary dynamics in CPA firms

We study the effect of employee-manager relations on salary increases. We use data obtained from a longitudinal survey, carried out among auditing team members in leading Israeli CPA firms (which are subsidiaries of American firms). Our main findings suggest that the degree of friendship with the team manager is positively correlated with the rate of the salary increase, particularly among female workers whose team manager is also a female. We also find that upon being hired to the job, male workers gain a higher return to experience compared with female workers.

Searching for Judgment Biases Among Elite Basketball Referees

An attacking basketball player initiating significant physical contact with a defender who has already established a legal and stationary position, should be called with an offensive foul. Offensive foul situations are particularly ambiguous and complex, making the referee’s task a difficult one. In such conditions of complexity and constraints of time, the referee is likely to be prone to systematic biases, as has been documented by previous research in other sport settings. We analyzed the referees’ decisions in 250 instances of collisions between an attacking player and a defender. In these collisions the defender fell, and potentially an offensive foul could be called. We found no evidence of favoritism granted to the home team, to star players, or to high-reputation teams, or of small players being tackled by significantly larger opponents. The findings suggest that these biases are not very robust, and are sensitive to the context, and that proper training of referees and enhanced awareness can help to alleviate referees’ biases.

At Least I Tried: The Relationship between Regulatory Focus and Regret Following Action vs. Inaction

Regret is an unpleasant feeling that may arise following decisions that ended poorly, and may affect the decision-maker's well-being and future decision making. Some studies show that a decision to act leads to greater regret than a decision not to act when both resulted in failure, because the latter is usually the norm. In some cases, when the norm is to act, this pattern is reversed. We suggest that the decision maker's regulatory focus, affects regret after action or inaction. Specifically, promotion-focused individuals, who tend to be more proactive, view action as more normal than prevention-focused individuals, and therefore experience regulatory fit when an action decision is made. Hence, we hypothesized that promotion-focused individuals will feel less regret than prevention-focused individuals when a decision to act ended poorly. In addition, we hypothesized that a trigger for change implied in the situation, decreases the level of regret following action. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 330 participants enrolled in an online survey. The participants received six decision scenarios, in which they were asked to evaluate the level of regret following action and inaction. Individual regulatory focus was measured by two different scales. Promotion-focused individuals attributed less regret than prevention-focused individuals to action decisions. Regret following inaction was not affected by regulatory focus. In addition, a trigger for change decreases regret following action. Orthodox people tend to attribute more regret than non-orthodox to a person who made an action decision. The results contribute to the literature by showing that not only the situation but also the decision maker's orientation affects the regret after action vs. inaction.

The Academic Review Process: How Can We Make it More Efficient?

Recently many editors try to reduce the turnaround times of academic journals. Shorter turnaround times, however, will induce many additional submissions of low-quality papers, increasing significantly the workload of editors and referees, and the number of rejections prior to publication. I suggest several ideas how editors can shorten turnaround times and four ideas how they can still avoid frivolous submissions, thus improving the review process efficiency: higher submission fees; requiring authors to review papers in proportion to their submissions; using differential editorial delay—letting low-quality papers wait more; and banning papers from being submitted after a certain number of rejections.

Beliefs and social behavior in a multi-period ultimatum game

We conduct a multi-period ultimatum game in which we elicit players' beliefs. Responders do not predict accurately the amount that will be offered to them, and do not get better in their predictions over time. At the individual level we see some effect of the mistake in expectations in the previous period on the responder's expectation about the offer in the current period, but this effect is relatively small. The proposers' beliefs about the minimum amount that responders will accept is significantly higher than the minimum amount responders believe will be accepted by other responders. The proposer's belief about the minimal acceptable offer does not change following a rejection. Nevertheless, the proposer's offer in the next period does increase following a rejection. The probability of rejection increases when the responder has higher expectations about the amount that will be offered to him or higher beliefs about the minimal amount that other responders will accept.