Ongoing Cooperative Engagement Facilitates Agile Pandemic and Outbreak Response: Lessons Learned Through Cooperative Engagement Between Uganda and the United States

Pathogens threaten human lives and disrupt economies around the world. This has been clearly illustrated by the current COVID-19 pandemic and outbreaks in livestock and food crops. To manage pathogen emergence and spread, cooperative engagement programs develop and strengthen biosafety, biosecurity, and biosurveillance capabilities among local researchers to detect pathogens. In this case study, we describe the efforts of a collaboration between the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Uganda Virus Research Institute, the primary viral diagnostic laboratory in Uganda, to implement and ensure the sustainability of sequencing for biosurveillance. We describe the process of establishing this capability along with the lessons learned from both sides of the partnership to inform future cooperative engagement efforts in low- and middle-income countries. We found that by strengthening sequencing capabilities at the Uganda Virus Research Institute before the COVID-19 pandemic, the institute was able to successfully sequence SARS-CoV-2 samples and provide data to the scientific community. We highlight the need to strengthen and sustain capabilities through in-country training, collaborative research projects, and trust.

Select Agent Regulatory Challenges in a Patient Care Setting: Review and Recommendations

The Federal Select Agent Program ensures the safe and secure possession, use, and transfer of biological select agents and toxins through the select agent regulations (42 CFR §73, 7 CFR §331, and 9 CFR §121). These regulations are primarily written for interpretation by diagnostic and research laboratories, with limited text pertaining to the care of individuals infected with a select agent. The regulations applicable to patient care settings are ambiguous, resulting in challenges with regulatory compliance. The COVID-19 pandemic called attention to these shortcomings and the need to clarify and modify the select agent regulations. In this article, we discuss 3 select agent regulation phrases regarding patient care that need clarification-specifically, the window of time to transfer, patient care setting, and conclusion of patient care-and provide recommendations for improvement. These recommendations include implementing minimum security standards to safeguard patient specimens against theft, loss, or release prior to the appropriate transfer or destruction of the material and increasing the time allowed for the transfer or destruction of specimens before entities are subject to the select agent regulations. We encourage the Federal Select Agent Program to release a policy statement clarifying the select agent regulations regarding patient care discussed herein and to lengthen the designated time to destroy or transfer agents to a registered entity. Addressing these challenges will aid in compliance with the select agent regulations in patient care settings.

Understanding Biosafety and Biosecurity in Ukraine

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was accompanied by unfounded Russian allegations of bioweapon activities in Ukraine conducted by the United States and its allies. While false, such allegations can cause substantial damage to disarmament efforts and international cooperation for strengthening disease surveillance and global health security. The purpose of this article is to describe Ukraine's biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use policies and to provide important context for understanding the unwarranted Russian allegations. Moreover, the analysis of Ukraine's biorisk management system highlights some of the international efforts underway to ensure that life sciences research across the world is conducted safely, securely, and responsibly. With the help of international partners, Ukraine has strengthened its biorisk management governance, as well as identified areas for improvement that it is working to address.

Design, Implementation, and Evaluation of an N95 Respirator Decontamination and Reuse Program for Healthcare Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, substantial disruptions in personal protective equipment (PPE) supply chains forced healthcare systems to become resourceful to ensure PPE availability for healthcare workers. Most worrisome was the global shortage of N95 respirators. In response, a collaboration between the Department of Infection Control and Healthcare Epidemiology and the Department of Biosafety at the University of Texas Medical Branch developed a PPE recycling program guaranteeing an adequate supply of respirators for frontline staff. The team successfully developed and implemented a novel workflow that included validated decontamination procedures, education, and training programs as well as transportation, labeling, and storage logistics. In total, 15,995 respirators of various types and sizes were received for recycling. Of these, 12,752 (80%) were recycled. Following the program's implementation, we surveyed 134 frontline healthcare workers who overwhelmingly graded our institution's culture of safety positively. Overall impressions of the N95 respirator recycling program were mixed, although interpretation of those results was limited by a lower survey response rate. In an era of increasing health security threats, innovative recycling programs like this one may serve as a model for other health systems to respond to future PPE supply chain disruptions.

A Multilingual Tool for Standardized Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Assessment and Monitoring

Control of infectious diseases requires the handling of infectious materials by both clinical and public health laboratories with exposure risks for laboratory personnel and environment. A comprehensive tool for assessing the capacity to manage these risks could enable the development of action plans for mitigation. Under the framework of the Global Health Security Agenda action package for biosafety and biosecurity, the authors developed a tool dedicated to assessing laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. The Biosafety and Biosecurity Laboratory Assessment Tool (BSS LAT) assesses the status of all laboratory biosafety core requirements across 10 different modules. It consists of a standardized spreadsheet-based tool that provides automatic scoring. It is designed to support national, regional, and global efforts to strengthen biosafety in clinical, public health, and veterinary laboratories. The BSS LAT was first used in Burkina Faso in collaboration with the African Society for Laboratory Medicine and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to support the country in strengthening their biorisk management system. Since then, it has been successfully used in other countries (ie, Armenia, Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Liberia), various settings (medical and veterinary laboratories), and translated into several languages (eg, English, French, Russian). The BSS LAT is a multipurpose tool that assists with standardization of biosafety and biosecurity requirements for all laboratories working with infectious materials, serves as a self-assessment guide for laboratories to develop improvement plans and reinforce capacities, and serves as a training guide for individual laboratories and networks or at the national level. The BSS LAT can also be used as a monitoring tool for the assessment of biosafety and biosecurity across all laboratories working with infectious materials at the national, regional, and global levels.

The Promise of Emergent Nanobiotechnologies for In Vivo Applications and Implications for Safety and Security

Nanotechnology, the multidisciplinary field based on the exploitation of the unique physicochemical properties of nanoparticles (NPs) and nanoscale materials, has opened a new realm of possibilities for biological research and biomedical applications. The development and deployment of mRNA-NP vaccines for COVID-19, for example, may revolutionize vaccines and therapeutics. However, regulatory and ethical frameworks that protect the health and safety of the global community and environment are lagging, particularly for nanotechnology geared toward biological applications (ie, bionanotechnology). In this article, while not comprehensive, we attempt to illustrate the breadth and promise of bionanotechnology developments, and how they may present future safety and security challenges. Specifically, we address current advancements to streamline the development of engineered NPs for in vivo applications and provide discussion on nano–bio interactions, NP in vivo delivery, nanoenhancement of human performance, nanomedicine, and the impacts of NPs on human health and the environment.

Concepts to Bolster Biorisk Management

The rapid increase in the power of the life sciences has not been accompanied by a proportionate increase in the sophistication of biorisk management. Through conversations with thought leaders in biosafety and biosecurity, we have identified 19 concepts that are critical for biorisk management to continue to ensure the responsible and safe conduct of the life sciences in the future. Our work is not meant to be a comprehensive list, but rather a collection of topics that we hope will spark dialogue in the policy, research, and biorisk management communities.

COVID-19 Response Among US Hospitals with Emerging Special Pathogen Programs

In February 2015, the US Department of Health and Human Services developed a tiered hospital network to deliver safe and effective care to patients with Ebola virus disease (EVD) and other special pathogens. The tiered network consisted of regional special pathogen treatment centers, state- or jurisdiction-designated treatment centers, assessment hospitals able to safely isolate a patient until a diagnosis of EVD was confirmed and transfer the patient, and frontline healthcare facilities able to identify and isolate patients with EVD and facilitate transport to higher-tier facilities. The National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center (NETEC) was established in tandem to support the development of healthcare facility special pathogen management capabilities. In August 2020, 20 hospitals that previously received an onsite readiness consultation by NETEC were surveyed to assess how special pathogen programs were leveraged for COVID-19 response. All surveyed facilities indicated their programs were leveraged for COVID-19 response in at least 1 of the following ways: NETEC-sponsored resources and training, utilization of patient isolation spaces, specially trained staff, and supplies. Personal protective equipment shortages were experienced by 95% of facilities, with 80% of facilities reporting that special pathogens program personal protective equipment was used to support facility response to COVID-19 admissions. More than half of facilities (63%) reported leveraging biocontainment unit staff to provide training and education to frontline staff during initial response to COVID-19. These findings have implications for planning and investments to avoid the panic-then-forget cycle that hinders sustained preparedness for future special pathogens.

[Work flow of clinical microbiology laboratory in the epidemic of the coronavirus disease 2019]

The burn microbiology laboratory of the author's unit is a level Ⅱ biosafety laboratory, which is mainly responsible for handling clinical microbial samples from our department and other departments in the hospital. Since the outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019, in order to ensure the normal operation of routine work and the safety of medical staff, the microbiology laboratory has actively adjusted the daily work flow. The detailed work flow is summarized as follows to provide references for the safety protection of peer in clinical microbiology laboratory.

Ebola Virus Training: A Needs Assessment and Gap Analysis

In response to the 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak, the Worker Training Program embarked on an assessment of existing training for those at risk for exposure to the virus. Searches of the recent peer-reviewed literature were conducted for descriptions of relevant training. Federal guidance issued during 2015 was also reviewed. Four stakeholder meetings were conducted with representatives from health care, academia, private industry, and public health to discuss issues associated with ongoing training. Our results revealed few articles about training that provided sufficient detail to serve as models. Training programs struggled to adjust to frequently updated federal guidance. Stakeholders commented that most healthcare training focused solely on infection control, and there was an absence of employee health-related training for non-healthcare providers. Challenges to ongoing training included funding and organizational complacency. Best practices were noted where management and employees planned training cooperatively and where infection control, employee health, and hospital emergency managers worked together on the development of protective guidance. We conclude that sustainable training for infectious disease outbreaks requires annual funding, full support from organizational management, input from all stakeholders, and integration of infection control, emergency management, and employee health when implementing guidance and training.