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Conspiracy Theory as Individual and Group Behavior: Observations from the Flat Earth International Conference. Top Cogn Sci 2024; 16:187-205. [PMID: 37202921 DOI: 10.1111/tops.12662] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/25/2022] [Revised: 04/20/2023] [Accepted: 04/21/2023] [Indexed: 05/20/2023]
Abstract
Conspiratorial thinking has been with humanity for a long time but has recently grown as a source of societal concern and as a subject of research in the cognitive and social sciences. We propose a three-tiered framework for the study of conspiracy theories: (1) cognitive processes, (2) the individual, and (3) social processes and communities of knowledge. At the level of cognitive processes, we identify explanatory coherence and faulty belief updating as critical ideas. At the level of the community of knowledge, we explore how conspiracy communities facilitate false belief by promoting a contagious sense of understanding, and how community norms catalyze the biased assimilation of evidence. We review recent research on conspiracy theories and explain how conspiratorial thinking emerges from the interaction of individual and group processes. As a case study, we describe observations the first author made while attending the Flat Earth International Conference, a meeting of conspiracy theorists who believe the Earth is flat. Rather than treating conspiracy belief as pathological, we take the perspective that is an extreme outcome of common cognitive processes.
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To tell the truth or not: What effortful control, false belief, and sympathy tell us about preschoolers' instrumental lies. J Exp Child Psychol 2024; 240:105839. [PMID: 38184957 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105839] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2023] [Revised: 09/10/2023] [Accepted: 12/13/2023] [Indexed: 01/09/2024]
Abstract
This study aimed to examine the predictors of instrumental lies in preschool children, specifically focusing on false belief, effortful control, and sympathy. Instrumental lies are intentional falsehoods used to achieve personal goals such as avoiding punishment and obtaining an undeserved reward. A total of 192 preschool children (age range = 32-73 month-olds), along with their mothers and fathers, participated in the study. The Temptation Resistance Paradigm, an experimental task, was employed to elicit instrumental lies from the children. The children also completed first-order false belief measures, and their parents filled out questionnaires assessing their children's effortful control and sympathy skills. Results revealed a positive association between children's effortful control and their decisions to tell instrumental lies. However, no significant relationship was found between false belief and instrumental lying. Age moderated the link between sympathy and the decision to tell instrumental lies, with sympathy being negatively associated with lie-telling behavior among older children but showing no effect among younger children. The study variables did not predict the maintenance of instrumental lies. Overall, this study provides valuable insights into the role of effortful control and sympathy as underlying temperamental and emotional processes influencing children's decisions to engage in instrumental lie-telling.
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Open dataset of theory of mind reasoning in early to middle childhood. Data Brief 2024; 52:109905. [PMID: 38146306 PMCID: PMC10749232 DOI: 10.1016/j.dib.2023.109905] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2023] [Revised: 11/09/2023] [Accepted: 11/28/2023] [Indexed: 12/27/2023] Open
Abstract
Theory of mind (ToM) reasoning refers to the process by which we reason about the mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions) of others. Here, we describe an open dataset of responses from children who completed a story booklet task for assessing ToM reasoning (n = 321 3-12-year-old children, including 64 (neurotypical) children assessed longitudinally and 68 autistic children). Children completed one of two versions of the story booklet task (Booklet 1 or 2). Both versions include two-alternative forced choice and free response questions that tap ToM concepts ranging in difficulty from reasoning about desires and beliefs to reasoning about moral blameworthiness and mistaken referents. Booklet 2 additionally includes items that assess understanding of sarcasm, lies, and second-order belief-desire reasoning. Compared to other ToM tasks, the booklet task provides relatively dense sampling of ToM reasoning within each child (Booklet 1: 41 items; Booklet 2: 65 items). Experimental sessions were video recorded and data were coded offline; the open dataset consists of children's accuracy (binary) on each item and, for many children (n = 171), transcriptions of free responses. The dataset also includes children's scores on standardized tests of receptive language and non-verbal IQ, as well as other demographic information. As such, this dataset is a valuable resource for investigating the development of ToM reasoning in early and middle childhood.
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Unringing the bell: Successful debriefing following a rich false memory study. Mem Cognit 2024:10.3758/s13421-024-01524-9. [PMID: 38286945 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-024-01524-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 01/18/2024] [Indexed: 01/31/2024]
Abstract
In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing - i.e., to what extent can we put participants back the way we found them? We aimed to establish (1) what proportion of participants would retain a false memory or false belief following debriefing, and (2) whether richer, more detailed memories would be more difficult to retract. Participants (N = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the "Lost in the Mall" study (Loftus & Pickrell, Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment 3 days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be nonbelieved memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be "dehoaxed", and even very convincing false memories can be retracted.
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Evidence for a Weak but Reliable Processing Advantage for False Beliefs Over Similar Nonmental States in Adults. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13364. [PMID: 37807678 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13364] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2022] [Revised: 05/27/2023] [Accepted: 09/19/2023] [Indexed: 10/10/2023]
Abstract
The ability to understand the mental states of others has sometimes been attributed to a domain-specific mechanism which privileges the processing of these states over similar but nonmental representations. If correct, then others' beliefs should be processed more efficiently than similar information contained within nonmental states. We tested this by examining whether adults would be faster to process others' false beliefs than equivalent "false" photos. Additionally, we tested whether they would be faster to process others' true beliefs about something than their own (matched) personal knowledge about the same event. Across four experiments, we found a small but reliable effect in favor of the first prediction, but no evidence for the second. Results are consistent with accounts positing specialized processes for (false) mental states. The size of the effect does, however, suggest that alternative explanations such as practice effects cannot be ruled out.
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Putting Complement Clauses into Context: Testing the Effects of Story Context, False-Belief Understanding, and Syntactic form on Children's and Adults' Comprehension and Production of Complement Clauses. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13311. [PMID: 37417456 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13311] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2021] [Revised: 06/08/2023] [Accepted: 06/16/2023] [Indexed: 07/08/2023]
Abstract
A key factor that affects whether and at what age children can demonstrate an understanding of false belief and complement-clause constructions is the type of task used (whether it is implicit/indirect or explicit/direct). In the current study, we investigate, in an implicit/indirect way, whether children understand that a story character's belief can be true or false, and whether this understanding affects children's choice of linguistic structure to describe the character's belief or to explain the character's belief-based action. We also measured children's understanding of false belief in explicit false-belief tasks. English- and German-speaking young 4- and 5-year-olds as well as English- and German-speaking adult controls heard complement-clause constructions in a story context where the belief mentioned in the complement clause (e.g., "He thinks that she's not feeling well") turned out to be false, true, or was left open. After hearing the test question ("Why does he not play with her?"), all age groups were most likely to repeat the whole complement-clause construction when the belief turned out to be false. That is, they tended to explicitly refer to the character's perspective and say "He thinks…" When the belief turned out to be true, participants often reverted to a simple clause ("She's not feeling well"). Furthermore, children with better short-term memory were more likely to repeat the whole complement-clause construction. However, children's performance in explicit false-belief tasks showed no relation to their performance in our novel, more implicit/indirect, task. Whether or not the complement clause was introduced by a that complementizer only had a small effect on the German adults' responses, where leaving out the complementizer also changes the word order of the complement clause. Overall, our results suggest that task characteristics and individual differences in short-term memory affect children's ability to demonstrate false-belief understanding and to express this understanding linguistically.
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Development of representational theory of mind: Concepts of mental states, awareness of thinking, and self-permanence. ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 2023; 65:35-68. [PMID: 37481300 DOI: 10.1016/bs.acdb.2023.05.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/24/2023]
Abstract
In a recent monograph, my students, colleagues, and I reported on a comprehensive set of tests of the theory of Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR), a new theory of the development of representational theory of mind (ToM). The central tenet of the theory is that young children acquire a hitherto undetected non-representational ToM (i.e., PAR), the use of which allows them to pass standard false belief tasks without understanding false beliefs. Thus, PAR theory capitalizes on an unrecognized flaw in all standard false belief tasks. In what follows, I present an overview of PAR theory, the tests that we have conducted of the theory, and logical arguments for how PAR explains the classic findings in the ToM literature. Next, I evaluate two recent alternate accounts that have been offered by critics, and I discuss some of the issues raised by three invited commentaries on the monograph. Finally, I consider the question, "What is the development of representational ToM the development of?" Insights from philosophy of mind point to the primacy of children's understanding of mental states in themselves, leading to a new concept of self-permanence that can provide the basis for a unified theory of the development of children's understanding of the mental and physical worlds. As a final thought, I consider how PAR was able to hide in plain sight for so long.
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Growing out of your own mind: Reexamining the development of the self-other difference in the unexpected contents task. Cognition 2023; 235:105403. [PMID: 36821998 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105403] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2021] [Revised: 02/03/2023] [Accepted: 02/06/2023] [Indexed: 02/25/2023]
Abstract
The unexpected contents task is a well-established measure for studying young children's developing theory of mind. The task measures whether children understand that others have a false belief about a deceptive container and whether children can track the representational change in their own beliefs about the container's contents. Performance on both questions improves between the ages of 3 and 4. A previous meta-analysis (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) found little evidence for a difference in children's responses on these questions, but did not investigate the weak effect size that was reported for the interaction between age and question type. The two meta-analyses reported here update the literature review, and find a more robust interaction between question type and age. Three-year-olds showed better performance on questions about their own representational change than others' false belief, while older children showed the reverse pattern. A mega-analysis of a sample of over 1200 children between the ages of 36-60 months then showed the same result. This response pattern requires novel theoretical interpretations, which include reframing the development of children's understanding of false belief.
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The knowledge ("true belief") error in 4- to 6-year-old children: When are agents aware of what they have in view? Cognition 2023; 230:105255. [PMID: 36088669 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105255] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/13/2021] [Revised: 08/09/2022] [Accepted: 08/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
The standard view on explicit theory of mind development holds that children around the age of 4 years start to ascribe beliefs to themselves and others, typically tested with false belief (FB) tasks. The present study (N = 95, 53 female, 41 male, Austrian, 41 to 80 months) systematically investigated the puzzling phenomenon that FB achievers (FB+) fail knowledge (often subsumed under "true belief") tasks: Despite the story protagonist witnessing the displacement of an object these children predict that the protagonist will look for it in its original location. We replicate this result in Experiment 1. Interestingly, some of our children indicated uncertainty about the protagonist's awareness of the relevant event. Thus, in Experiment 2 a new active watching condition was designed to help children understand that the protagonist attended to the critical event. This practically eradicated the knowledge error. Experiment 3 successfully replicated these results. Implications for existing explanations, perceptual access reasoning (PAR, Fabricius, Boyer, Weimer, & Carroll, 2010) and pragmatic difficulties (Oktay-Gür & Rakoczy, 2017) are discussed.
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Disagreement, justification, and equitable moral judgments: A brief training study. J Exp Child Psychol 2022; 223:105494. [PMID: 35842960 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105494] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2022] [Revised: 06/02/2022] [Accepted: 06/02/2022] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Although theorists agree that social interactions play a major role in moral development, previous research has not experimentally assessed how specific features of social interactions affect children's moral judgments and reasoning. The current study assessed two features: disagreement and justification. In a brief training phase, children aged 4-5.5 years (N = 129) discussed simple moral scenarios about issues of fairness (how to allocate things between individuals) with a puppet who, in a between-participants factorial design, either agreed or disagreed with the children's ideas and either asked or did not ask the children to justify their ideas. Children then responded to another set of moral scenarios in a test phase that was the same for all children. Children in the "agree and do not justify" baseline condition showed an inflexible equality bias (preferring only equal allocations regardless of context), but children who had experiences of disagreement or experiences of being asked to justify themselves shifted toward making equitable decisions based on common ground norms and values. Furthermore, false belief competence was related to children's decisions and justifications. These findings support the classic Piagetian hypothesis that social interactions are a catalyst of cognitive disequilibrium and moral development.
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The influence of group membership on false-belief attribution in preschool children. J Exp Child Psychol 2022; 222:105467. [PMID: 35667302 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105467] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/06/2021] [Revised: 04/08/2022] [Accepted: 05/02/2022] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
The ability to infer beliefs and thoughts in interaction partners is essential in social life. However, reasoning about other people's beliefs might depend on their characteristics or our relationship with them. Recent studies indicated that children's false-belief attribution was influenced by a protagonist's age and competence. In the current experiments, we investigated whether group membership influences the way children reason about another person's beliefs. We hypothesized that 4-year-olds would be less likely to attribute false beliefs to an ingroup member than to an outgroup member. Group membership was manipulated by accent (Experiments 1-3) and gender (Experiment 4). The results indicated that group membership did not consistently influence children's false-belief attribution. Future research should clarify whether the influence of group membership on false-belief attribution either is absent or depends on other cues that we did not systematically manipulate in our study.
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The posterior cerebellum and temporoparietal junction support explicit learning of social belief sequences. COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2022; 22:467-491. [PMID: 34811709 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-021-00966-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/16/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
This study tests the hypothesis that the posterior cerebellum is involved in social cognition by identifying and automatizing sequences of social actions. We applied a belief serial reaction time task (Belief SRT task), which requires mentalizing about two protagonists' beliefs about how many flowers they receive. The protagonists' beliefs could either be true or false depending on their orientation (true belief: oriented towards and directly observing the flowers; or false belief: oriented away and knowing only prior information about flowers). A Control SRT task was created by replacing protagonists and their beliefs with shapes and colors. Participants were explicitly told that there was a standard sequence related to the two protagonists' belief orientations (Belief SRT task) or the shapes' colors (Control SRT task). Both tasks included a Training phase where the standard sequence was repeated and a Test phase where this standard sequence was interrupted by random sequences. As hypothesized, compared with the Control SRT task, the Belief SRT task recruited the posterior cerebellar Crus II and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) more. Faster response times were correlated with less Crus II activation and with more TPJ activation, suggesting that the Crus II supported automatizing the belief sequence while the TPJ supported inferring the protagonists' beliefs. Also as hypothesized, compared with an implicit version of the Belief SRT task (i.e., participants did not know about the existence of sequences; Ma, Pu, et al., 2021b), the cerebellar Crus I &II was engaged less during initial training and automatic application of the sequence, and the cortical TPJ was activated more in processing random sequences.
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Training Syntax to Enhance Theory of Mind in Children with ASD. J Autism Dev Disord 2022; 53:2444-2457. [PMID: 35357603 DOI: 10.1007/s10803-022-05507-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Preschool children with neurotypical development (ND) trained on sentential complements ("X thinks/says that") improve their Theory of Mind (ToM) performance. Can complementation training also enhance ToM in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD)? Thirty-three children with ASD (Mage = 8;11) and 20 younger ND peers (Mage = 4;3) were trained on sentential complements (4-6 weeks, 2-3 times per week, via the DIRE i-Pad App). Pre-training and post-training comparisons show that (1) training boosted both complementation and ToM performance across groups; (2) improvements remained 4-6 weeks after training ended; (3) participants with milder ASD symptoms made most gains. Training on sentential complements thus seems beneficial for addressing ToM difficulties in children with ASD, especially those with milder symptoms.
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The posterior cerebellum supports implicit learning of social belief sequences. COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2021; 21:970-992. [PMID: 34100254 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-021-00910-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/25/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Recent studies have documented the involvement of the posterior cerebellar Crus (I & II) in social mentalizing, when sequences play a critical role. We investigated for the first time implicit learning of belief sequences. We created a novel task in which true and false beliefs of other persons were alternated in an adapted serial reaction time (SRT) paradigm (Belief SRT task). Participants observed two protagonists whose beliefs concerning reality were manipulated, depending on their orientation toward the scene (true belief: directly observing the situation) or away from it (false belief: knowing only the prior situation). Unbeknownst to the participants, a fixed sequence related to the two protagonists' belief orientations was repeated throughout the task (Training phase); and to test the acquisition of this fixed sequence, it was occasionally interrupted by random sequences (Test phase). As a nonsocial control, the two protagonists and their orientations were replaced by two different shapes of different colors respectively (Control SRT task). As predicted, the posterior cerebellar Crus I & II were activated during the Belief SRT task and not in the Control SRT task. The Belief SRT task revealed that Crus I was activated during the initial learning of the fixed sequence (Training phase) and when this learned sequence was interrupted by random sequences (Test phase). Moreover, Crus II was activated during occasional reappearance of the learned sequence in the context of sequence violations (Test phase). Our results demonstrate the contribution of the posterior cerebellar Crus during implicit learning and predicting new belief sequences.
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Theory of Mind in children and adolescents with Down syndrome. RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 2021; 113:103945. [PMID: 33862539 DOI: 10.1016/j.ridd.2021.103945] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/26/2020] [Revised: 03/18/2021] [Accepted: 03/23/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
INTRODUCTION To date, the evidence regarding False Belief (FB) abilities in individuals with Down syndrome (DS) has been both sparse and contradictory. Our study is the first systematic investigation targeting the relation between FB, mental age (MA), syntactic abilities (SA) and verbal short-term memory (VSTM) in individuals with DS so far. METHOD 27 German-speaking children/adolescents with DS (aged 10;0-20;1 years) completed a location-change FB-task and four standardized measures assessing nonverbal intelligence & MA, VSTM, receptive and productive SA. RESULTS 37.5 % (n = 9) of our participants passed the FB-task, whereas 62.5 % (n = 15) did not answer the target question correctly. While no significant differences emerged for MA and language abilities in individuals who passed and those who failed FB-testing, VSTM came out as a significantly associated factor for FB-performance in a median split analysis of raw-scores. DISCUSSION The results suggest that a substantial proportion of individuals with DS is impaired in FB-understanding. In contrast to previous findings on children with developmental disorders such as autism, developmental language deficit or hearing impairment, general and specific SA related to sentence complementation turned out to be of limited relevance for FB-understanding in individuals with DS.
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Reasoning strategies determine the effect of disconfirmation on belief in false claims. Mem Cognit 2021; 49:1528-1536. [PMID: 34050493 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-021-01190-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/12/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
The dual-strategy model of reasoning proposes that people tend to use one of two reasoning strategies: either a statistical or a counterexample strategy, with the latter being more sensitive to potential counterexamples to a given conclusion. Previous studies have examined the effects of reasoning strategy in a variety of contexts. In the present study, we looked at the effects of gist repetition and disconfirmation on belief in an unknown claim. This is particularly interesting since there is no single normative analysis of this situation. We examine the hypotheses that (a) increasing gist repetition will result in higher levels of belief with both counterexample and statistical reasoners, and (b) that counterexample reasoners will have lower belief levels following a single disconfirming instance than will statistical reasoners. In a large-scale online study, over 2,000 adult participants received a False Claim procedure along with a Strategy Diagnostic. Results are consistent with the hypotheses. This provides strong evidence that the dual-strategy model captures a clear difference in information processing that is not captured by any normative/non-normative distinction.
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Extended difficulties with counterfactuals persist in reasoning with false beliefs: Evidence for teleology-in-perspective. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 204:105058. [PMID: 33341018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.105058] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/12/2019] [Revised: 11/06/2020] [Accepted: 11/10/2020] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
Increasing evidence suggests that counterfactual reasoning is involved in false belief reasoning. Because existing work is correlational, we developed a manipulation that revealed a signature of counterfactual reasoning in participants' answers to false belief questions. In two experiments, we tested 3- to 14-year-olds and found high positive correlations (r = .56 and r = .73) between counterfactual and false belief questions. Children were very likely to respond to both questions with the same answer, also committing the same type of error. We discuss different theories and their ability to account for each aspect of our findings and conclude that reasoning about others' beliefs and actions requires similar cognitive processes as using counterfactual suppositions. Our findings question the explanatory power of the traditional frameworks, theory theory and simulation theory, in favor of views that explicitly provide for a relationship between false belief reasoning and counterfactual reasoning.
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Three-year-olds' spontaneous lying in a novel interaction-based paradigm and its relations to explicit skills and motivational factors. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 207:105125. [PMID: 33761406 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105125] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2020] [Revised: 01/29/2021] [Accepted: 02/02/2021] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Previous research has investigated children's lying and its motivational and social-cognitive correlates mostly through explicit tasks. The current study used an anticipatory interaction-based paradigm adopted from research with preverbal infants. We investigated 3-year-olds' spontaneous lying within interaction and its motivational basis and relations to explicit skills of lying, false belief understanding, inhibitory control, and socialization. Children interacted with puppets to secure stickers that were hidden in one of two boxes. Either a friend or a competitor puppet tried to obtain the stickers. Nearly all children helpfully provided information about the sticker's location to the friend, and about half of the sample anticipatorily provided false information to the competitor. Children misinformed the competitor significantly more often than the friend, both when the reward was for themselves and when it was for someone else. Explicitly planning to lie in response to a question occurred significantly less often but predicted spontaneous lying, as did passing the explicit standard false belief task. Thus, by 3 years of age, children spontaneously invoke false beliefs in others. This communicative skill reveals an interactional use of false belief understanding in that it requires holding one's perspective to pursue one's goal while providing a different perspective to distract a competitor. Findings support the view that practical theory of mind skills emerge for social coordination and serve as a basis for developing explicit false belief reasoning.
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A Systematic Replication of Teaching Children With Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities Correct Responding to False-Belief Tasks. Behav Anal Pract 2021; 14:378-386. [PMID: 34150454 DOI: 10.1007/s40617-020-00531-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/13/2020] [Indexed: 10/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Behavioral research has demonstrated that children with autism spectrum disorder can be taught to recognize the false beliefs of others using video modeling (e.g., Charlop-Christy & Daneshvar Journal of Positive Behavior Interventions, 5(1), 12-21, 2003; LeBlanc et al. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 36(2), 253-257, 2003). The current study extended such research by teaching three children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and other developmental disabilities to respond appropriately to false-belief tasks using behavioral intervention strategies conducted in the natural environment with people in their enviornment. We used a nonconcurrent multiple-baseline across-participants design to evaluate the use of multiple-exemplar training, prompting, and reinforcement for training correct responses with two false-belief tasks: the hide-and-seek task and the M&Ms task. We also conducted a pre/posttest of an untrained false-belief task, the Sally-Anne task. All participants learned to pass the hide-and-seek task and the M&Ms task and improved on their performance on the Sally-Anne task during the posttest.
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Designer receptor inhibition suggests mechanism for monkey Theory of Mind. Learn Behav 2020; 49:171-172. [PMID: 33236319 DOI: 10.3758/s13420-020-00451-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/13/2020] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of human social cognition that has not been found reliably in other primates, especially monkeys. Hayashi et al. (Cell Reports, 30, 4433-4444, 2020) used newly developed behavioral techniques to detect evidence for ToM in Japanese macaque monkeys and employed sophisticated neurobiological manipulations to implicate the medial prefrontal cortex is this capacity.
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Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural study. Conscious Cogn 2020; 85:103017. [PMID: 32932099 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.103017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/10/2020] [Revised: 08/27/2020] [Accepted: 08/31/2020] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Prior studies document cross cultural variation in the developmental onset of mindreading. In particular, Japanese children are reported to pass a standard false belief task later than children from Western countries. By contrast, we know little about cross-cultural variation in young children's metacognitive abilities. Moreover, one prominent theoretical discussion in developmental psychology focuses on the relation between metacognition and mindreading. Here we investigated the relation between mindreading and metacognition (both implicit and explicit) by testing 4-year-old Japanese and German children. We found no difference in metacognition between the two cultural groups. By contrast, Japanese children showed lower performance than German children replicating cultural differences in mindreading. Finally, metacognition and mindreading were not related in either group. We discuss the findings in light of the existing theoretical accounts of the relation between metacognition and mindreading.
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Theory of mind development: State of the science and future directions. PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 2020; 254:141-166. [PMID: 32859285 DOI: 10.1016/bs.pbr.2020.05.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/07/2023]
Abstract
This chapter offers a brief overview of how research on theory of mind development has developed over the recent years, with a focus on current research and theoretical accounts of theory of mind during the infancy period. The topics covered include the factors contributing to individual differences in theory of mind skills in preschoolers, the current replication crisis in theory of mind in infancy, the stability of theory of mind from infancy to childhood, and recent research suggesting that infants' concept of false belief is, at best, immature (e.g., overattribution to inanimate agents). Future directions in theory of mind research are suggested.
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Altered Connectivity During a False-Belief Task in Adults With Autism Spectrum Disorder. BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY: COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROIMAGING 2020; 5:901-912. [PMID: 32600899 DOI: 10.1016/j.bpsc.2020.04.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2019] [Revised: 04/15/2020] [Accepted: 04/15/2020] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Deficits in social communication are one of the main features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Adults with ASD show atypical brain activity during false-belief understanding, an aspect of social communication involving the ability to infer that an individual can have an incorrect belief about a situation. Our study is the first to investigate whether adults with ASD exhibit differences in frequency-specific functional connectivity patterns during false-belief reasoning. METHODS We used magnetoencephalography to contrast functional connectivity underlying false-belief understanding between 40 adults with ASD and 39 control adults. We examined whole-brain phase synchrony measures during a false-belief task in 3 frequency bands: theta (4-7 Hz), alpha (8-14 Hz), and beta (15-30 Hz). RESULTS Adults with ASD demonstrated reduced theta-band connectivity compared with control adults between several right-lateralized and midline regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex, right temporoparietal junction, right inferior frontal gyrus, and right superior temporal gyrus. During false-belief trials, they also recruited a network in the beta band that included primary visual regions such as the bilateral inferior occipital gyri and the left anterior temporoparietal junction. CONCLUSIONS Reduced theta-band synchrony between areas associated with mentalizing, inhibition, and visual processing implies some difficulty in communication among these functions in ASD. This impairment in top-down control in the theta band may be counterbalanced by their engagement of a beta-band network because both the left anterior temporoparietal junction and beta-band oscillations are associated with attentional processes. Thus, adults with ASD demonstrate alternative neural mechanisms for successful false-belief reasoning.
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Electrophysiological investigation of infants' understanding of understanding. Dev Cogn Neurosci 2020; 43:100783. [PMID: 32510346 PMCID: PMC7218257 DOI: 10.1016/j.dcn.2020.100783] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/08/2019] [Revised: 04/01/2020] [Accepted: 04/09/2020] [Indexed: 11/28/2022] Open
Abstract
Social cognition might play a critical role in language acquisition and comprehension, as mindreading may be necessary to infer the intended meaning of linguistic expressions uttered by communicative partners. In three electrophysiological experiments, we explored the interplay between belief attribution and language comprehension of 14-month-old infants. First, we replicated our earlier finding: infants produced an N400 effect to correctly labelled objects when the labels did not match a communicative partner's beliefs about the referents. Second, we observed no N400 when we replaced the object with another category member. Third, when we named the objects incorrectly for infants, but congruently with the partner's false belief, we observed large N400 responses, suggesting that infants retained their own perspective in addition to that of the partner. We thus interpret the observed social N400 effect as a communicational expectancy indicator because it was contingent not on the attribution of false beliefs but on semantic expectations by both the self and the communicative partner. Additional exploratory analyses revealed an early, frontal, positive-going electrophysiological response in all three experiments, which was contingent on infants' computing the comprehension of the social partner based on attributed beliefs.
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Competitive children, cooperative mothers? Effect of various social factors on the retrospective and prospective use of theory of mind. J Exp Child Psychol 2019; 190:104715. [PMID: 31726243 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2019.104715] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/04/2019] [Revised: 09/04/2019] [Accepted: 09/11/2019] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Our capacity to attribute mental states to others, or theory of mind (ToM), affects the way in which we manage social interactions. Likewise, the social scenario in which we find ourselves probably influences our use of ToM. In this study, 6-year-old children and adult women participated in pairs in a task where participants needed to infer their partner's behavior considering the partner's visual perception (Experiment 1), knowledge (Experiment 2), and false belief (Experiment 3) regarding the placement of rewards under cups. The results were analyzed according to the temporal direction of the inference (past or future behavior of the partner), the social context (competition or cooperation), and-in the case of women-the type of social relationship with their partner (another adult or their own child). Children solved only the visual perception task, and adults solved the three tasks but performed better in the visual perception task than in the false belief task, suggesting that not only developmental issues but also differences in the intrinsic difficulty of the tasks underlie children's results. The temporal direction of the inference, in contrast, did not influence their results. Whereas children performed better in the competition context, adults performed better in the cooperation context in one experiment. Moreover, women avoided competing against their own child, and even cooperated with her or him when this was against their own interest, suggesting that cooperation between mothers and children might have been a key driving force in the evolution of ToM in our species.
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Is Language Required to Represent Others' Mental States? Evidence From Beliefs and Other Representations. Cogn Sci 2019; 43. [PMID: 30648802 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12710] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2018] [Revised: 11/28/2018] [Accepted: 12/10/2018] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
An important part of our Theory of Mind-the ability to reason about other people's unobservable mental states-is the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. We investigated whether processing these false beliefs, as well as similar but nonmental representations, is reliant on language. Participants watched videos in which a protagonist hides a gift and either takes a photo of it or writes a text about its location before a second person inadvertently moves the present to a different location, thereby rendering the belief and either the photo or text false. At the same time, participants performed either a concurrent verbal interference task (rehearsing strings of digits) or a visual interference task (remembering a visual pattern). Results showed that performance on false belief trials did not decline under verbal interference relative to visual interference. We interpret these findings as further support for the view that language does not form an essential part of the process of reasoning online ("in the moment") about false beliefs.
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Do you know what I'm thinking? Temporal and spatial brain activity during a theory-of-mind task in children with autism. Dev Cogn Neurosci 2018; 34:139-147. [PMID: 30415185 PMCID: PMC6969351 DOI: 10.1016/j.dcn.2018.08.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2017] [Revised: 08/15/2018] [Accepted: 08/30/2018] [Indexed: 01/31/2023] Open
Abstract
First MEG study of neural underpinnings of theory of mind differences in autism. Children with autism show decreased LTPJ activity from 300 to 375 and 425 to 500 ms. Children with autism also show increased RIFG activity from 325 to 375 ms. Co-incident lower LTPJ and higher RIFG activity implies compensatory use of RIFG. Executive functions may augment impaired theory of mind in autism.
The social impairments observed in children with autism spectrum disorder are thought to arise in part from deficits in theory of mind, the ability to understand other people’s thoughts and feelings. To determine the temporal-spatial dynamics of brain activity underlying these atypical theory-of-mind processes, we used magnetoencephalography to characterize the sequence of functional brain patterns (i.e. when and where) related to theory-of-mind reasoning in 19 high-functioning children with autism compared to 22 age- and sex-matched typically-developing children aged 8–12 during a false-belief (theory-of-mind) task. While task performance did not differ between the two groups, children with autism showed reduced activation in the left temporoparietal junction between 300–375 and 425–500 ms, as well as increased activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus from 325 to 375 ms compared to controls. The overlap in decreased temporoparietal junction activity and increased right inferior frontal gyrus activation from 325 to 375 ms suggests that in children with autism, the right inferior frontal gyrus may compensate for deficits in the temporoparietal junction, a neural theory-of-mind network hub. As the right inferior frontal gyrus is involved in inhibitory control, this finding suggests that children with autism rely on executive functions to bolster their false-belief understanding.
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False belief and relative clauses in Autism Spectrum Disorders. JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION DISORDERS 2018; 74:35-44. [PMID: 29753216 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcomdis.2018.04.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/17/2016] [Revised: 04/05/2018] [Accepted: 04/09/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
Previous studies have suggested sentential complementation is the crucial ingredient of language that relates to false-belief (FB) reasoning, while the role of relative clauses (RCs) is less clear. Nevertheless, under the hypothesis that clausal embedding has a meta-representational effect, arguably implied in FB, one expects a link between FB and not only complementation but also relativization. Seventeen children with ASD (6 to 16 years, mean age 9;2) were assessed for RCs and FB. Comprehension of RCs significantly predicted FB performance, while none of the controlled factors played a predictive role (comprehension of simple sentences, vocabulary, morpho-syntax and working memory). Findings suggest that clausal embedding, common to both sentential complements and RCs, serves as a bootstrap for FB reasoning.
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Longitudinal evidence for 4-year-olds' but not 2- and 3-year-olds' false belief-related action anticipation. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2018; 46:58-68. [PMID: 30147231 PMCID: PMC6103291 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.08.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/15/2017] [Revised: 07/29/2017] [Accepted: 08/20/2017] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Recently, infants younger than 2 years have been shown to display correct expectations of the actions of an agent with a false belief. The developmental trajectory of these early-developing abilities and their robustness, however, remain a matter of debate. Here, we tested children longitudinally from 2 to 4 years of age with an established anticipatory looking false belief task, and found a significant developmental change between the ages of 3 and 4 years. Children anticipated correctly only by the age of 4 years, and performed at chance at the ages of 2 and 3 years. Moreover, we found correct anticipation only when the agent falsely believed an object to be in its last rather than a previous location. These findings point towards the fragility of early belief-related action anticipation before the age of 4 years, when children start passing traditional false belief tasks.
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Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding. Cogn Sci 2018; 42:1179-1206. [PMID: 29453768 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12594] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2016] [Revised: 01/08/2018] [Accepted: 01/16/2018] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation (EET) in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective taking such as false belief reasoning may also involve EET because of what has been widely reported in the embodied cognition literature, showing that our processing of abstract, propositional information is often grounded in concrete bodily sensations which are not apparently linked to higher cognition. In Experiment 1, an agent placed a ball into one of two boxes and left. The ball then rolled out and moved either into the other box (new box) or back into the original one (old box). The participants were to decide from which box they themselves or the agent would try to recover the ball. Results showed that false belief performance was affected by increased orientation disparity between the participants and the agent, suggesting involvement of embodied transformation. In Experiment 2, false belief was similarly induced and the participants were to decide if the agent would try to recover the ball in one specific box. Orientation disparity was again found to affect false belief performance. The present results extend previous findings on EET in visuospatial perspective taking and suggest that false belief reasoning, which is a kind of psychological perspective taking, can also involve embodied rotation, consistent with the embodied cognition view.
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Mental files theory of mind: When do children consider agents acquainted with different object identities? Cognition 2017; 171:122-129. [PMID: 29156240 PMCID: PMC7100039 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.10.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/14/2016] [Revised: 10/10/2017] [Accepted: 10/17/2017] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Mental files theory explains why children pass many perspective taking tasks like the false belief test around age 4 (Perner & Leahy, 2016). It also explains why older children struggle to understand that beliefs about an object depend on how one is acquainted with it (intensionality or aspectuality). If Heinz looks at an object that is both a die and an eraser, but cannot tell by looking that it is an eraser, he will not reach for it if he needs an eraser. Four- to 6-year olds find this difficult (Apperly & Robinson, 1998). We tested 129 35- to 86-month olds with a modified version of Apperly and Robinson’s task. Each child faced four tasks resulting from two experimental factors, timing and mode of information. Timing: Children saw Heinz learn the die’s location either before or after they learn that the die is an eraser. Mode of information: Heinz learns where the die is either perceptually or verbally. When Heinz’ learning is verbal, he never perceives the die at all. We found that Apperly and Robinson’s problem occurs only in the seen-after condition, where Heinz sees the die after children had learnt that it was also an eraser. It vanishes when Heinz learns where the die is before children learn that it is also an eraser. The problem also vanishes when Heinz learns where the die is purely verbally (e.g., “The die is in the red box”) and never sees it. This evidence lets us refine existing mental files theory, and eliminate several alternatives from the literature.
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Thinking about others and the future: Neural correlates of perspective taking relate to preferences for delayed rewards. COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2017; 18:35-42. [PMID: 29134457 PMCID: PMC5823963 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-017-0550-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
Abstract
We infer the thoughts and feelings of others by taking their perspectives. Similar processes could be used to understand how we will be affected by future events, by allowing us to take the perspective of our future self. In this paper, we test this idea using a previously presented framework for guiding predictions. The framework proposes that a shared neural mechanism is involved in controlling egocentric bias, both while shifting our perspective away from self and towards others, and while shifting our perspective from immediate to future perspectives. To test this framework, 36 adults performed an intertemporal choice task. They were then scanned using 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging while completing a false-belief “localizer” task, which requires egocentric bias control. A positive correlation was observed between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response during the false-belief task, and preferences for delayed rewards in intertemporal choices. A subset of participants performed the intertemporal choice task again in the scanner, which revealed that the response of the same rTPJ cluster, individually localized during the false-belief task, was higher during delayed over immediate reward choices. In addition, functional connectivity between the rTPJ and ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to differ between immediate and delayed choices. The current results indicate an overlap in processes of egocentric bias control and those that determine preferences in intertemporal choices, offering a social cognitive explanation for why rewards are devalued with delay in temporal discounting.
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Adding sound to theory of mind: Comparing children's development of mental-state understanding in the auditory and visual realms. J Exp Child Psychol 2017; 164:239-249. [PMID: 28818286 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2017] [Revised: 07/10/2017] [Accepted: 07/19/2017] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Theory of mind (ToM) gradually develops during the preschool years. Measures of ToM usually target visual experience, but auditory experiences also provide valuable social information. Given differences between the visual and auditory modalities (e.g., sights persist, sounds fade) and the important role environmental input plays in social-cognitive development, we asked whether modality might influence the progression of ToM development. The current study expands Wellman and Liu's ToM scale (2004) by testing 66 preschoolers using five standard visual ToM tasks and five newly crafted auditory ToM tasks. Age and gender effects were found, with 4- and 5-year-olds demonstrating greater ToM abilities than 3-year-olds and girls passing more tasks than boys; there was no significant effect of modality. Both visual and auditory tasks formed a scalable set. These results indicate that there is considerable consistency in when children are able to use visual and auditory inputs to reason about various aspects of others' mental states.
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Testing the validity of a continuous false belief task in 3- to 7-year-old children. J Exp Child Psychol 2017; 160:50-66. [PMID: 28426950 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2017.03.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/01/2016] [Revised: 03/13/2017] [Accepted: 03/15/2017] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
In two studies, we examined young children's performance on the paper-and-pencil version of the Sandbox task, a continuous measure of false belief, and its relations with other false belief and inhibition tasks. In Study 1, 96 children aged 3 to 7years completed three false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, and Appearance/Reality) and two inhibition tasks (Head-Shoulders-Knees-Toes and Grass/Snow). Results revealed that false belief bias-a measure of egocentrism-on the Sandbox task correlated with age but not with the Unexpected Contents or Appearance/Reality task or with measures of inhibition after controlling for age. In Study 2, 90 3- to 7-year-olds completed five false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, Appearance/Reality, Change of Location, and a second-order false belief task), two inhibition tasks (Simon Says and Grass/Snow), and a receptive vocabulary task (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test). Results showed that false belief bias on the Sandbox task correlated negatively with age and with the Change of Location task but not with the other false belief or inhibition tasks after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. The Sandbox task shows promise as an age-sensitive measure of false belief performance during early childhood and shows convergent and discriminant validity.
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Perspectives on Perspective Taking: How Children Think About the Minds of Others. ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 2017; 52:185-226. [PMID: 28215285 DOI: 10.1016/bs.acdb.2016.10.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Perspective taking, or "theory of mind," involves reasoning about the mental states of others (e.g., their intentions, desires, knowledge, beliefs) and is called upon in virtually every aspect of human interaction. Our goals in writing this chapter were to provide an overview of (a) the research questions developmental psychologists ask to shed light on how children think about the inner workings of the mind, and (b) why such research is invaluable in understanding human nature and our ability to interact with, and learn from, one another. We begin with a brief review of early research in this field that culminated in the so-called litmus test for a theory of mind (i.e., false-belief tasks). Next, we describe research with infants and young children that created a puzzle for many researchers, and briefly mention an intriguing approach researchers have used to attempt to "solve" this puzzle. We then turn to research examining children's understanding of a much broader range of mental states (beyond false beliefs). We briefly discuss the value of studying individual differences by highlighting their important implications for social well-being and ways to improve perspective taking. Next, we review work illustrating the value of capitalizing on children's proclivity for selective social learning to reveal their understanding of others' mental states. We close by highlighting one line of research that we believe will be an especially fruitful avenue for future research and serves to emphasize the complex interplay between our perspective-taking abilities and other cognitive processes.
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Reprint of: Equal egocentric bias in school-aged children with and without autism spectrum disorders. J Exp Child Psychol 2016; 149:134-45. [PMID: 27262614 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.05.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
Egocentric bias is a core feature of autism. This phenomenon has been studied using the false belief task. However, typically developing children who pass categorical (pass or fail) false belief tasks may still show subtle egocentric bias. We examined 7- to 13-year-old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; n=76) or typical development (n=113) using tasks with a continuous response scale: a modified false belief task and a visual hindsight bias task. All children showed robust egocentric bias on both tasks, but no group effects were found. Our large sample size, coupled with our sensitive tasks and resoundingly null group effects, indicate that children with and without ASD possess more similar egocentric tendencies than previously reported.
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Children's understanding of first- and third-person perspectives in complement clauses and false-belief tasks. J Exp Child Psychol 2016; 151:131-43. [PMID: 27067632 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/29/2015] [Revised: 02/26/2016] [Accepted: 03/01/2016] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
De Villiers (Lingua, 2007, Vol. 117, pp. 1858-1878) and others have claimed that children come to understand false belief as they acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition and the speaker's epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In the current study, English-speaking children of 3 and 4years of age (N=64) were asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with a first- or third-person subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., "I think the sticker is in the red box" or "The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box", respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding of their own and others' false beliefs. We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions. The older children also showed a better understanding of their own false beliefs than of others' false beliefs. In addition, regression analyses suggest that the older children's comprehension of their own false beliefs was mainly related to their understanding of third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional attitude constructions that are supposed to support children's false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their own and others' beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks.
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Thinking about the thoughts of others; temporal and spatial neural activation during false belief reasoning. Neuroimage 2016; 134:320-327. [PMID: 27039146 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.03.053] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2015] [Revised: 02/25/2016] [Accepted: 03/21/2016] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand the perspectives, mental states and beliefs of others in order to anticipate their behaviour and is therefore crucial to social interactions. Although fMRI has been widely used to establish the neural networks implicated in ToM, little is known about the timing of ToM-related brain activity. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure the neural processes underlying ToM, as MEG provides very accurate timing and excellent spatial localization of brain processes. We recorded MEG activity during a false belief task, a reliable measure of ToM, in twenty young adults (10 females). MEG data were recorded in a 151 sensor CTF system (MISL, Coquitlam, BC) and data were co-registered to each participant's MRI (Siemens 3T) for source reconstruction. We found stronger right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) activations in the false belief condition from 150ms to 225ms, in the right precuneus from 275ms to 375ms, in the right inferior frontal gyrus from 200ms to 300ms and the superior frontal gyrus from 300ms to 400ms. Our findings extend the literature by demonstrating the timing and duration of neural activity in the main regions involved in the "mentalizing" network, showing that activations related to false belief in adults are predominantly right lateralized and onset around 100ms. The sensitivity of MEG will allow us to determine spatial and temporal differences in the brain processes in ToM in younger populations or those who demonstrate deficits in this ability.
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Differing views: Can chimpanzees do Level 2 perspective-taking? Anim Cogn 2016; 19:555-64. [PMID: 26852383 PMCID: PMC4824821 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-016-0956-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/21/2015] [Revised: 12/25/2015] [Accepted: 01/14/2016] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Although chimpanzees understand what others may see, it is unclear whether they understand how others see things (Level 2 perspective-taking).
We investigated whether chimpanzees can predict the behavior of a conspecific which is holding a mistaken perspective that differs from their own. The subject competed with a conspecific over two food sticks. While the subject could see that both were the same size, to the competitor one appeared bigger than the other. In a previously established game, the competitor chose one stick in private first and the subject chose thereafter, without knowing which of the sticks was gone. Chimpanzees and 6-year-old children chose the ‘riskier’ stick (that looked bigger to the competitor) significantly less in the game than in a nonsocial control. Children chose randomly in the control, thus showing Level 2 perspective-taking skills; in contrast, chimpanzees had a preference for the ‘riskier’ stick here, rendering it possible that they attributed their own preference to the competitor to predict her choice. We thus run a follow-up in which chimpanzees did not have a preference in the control. Now, they also chose randomly in the game. We conclude that chimpanzees solved the task by attributing their own preference to the other, while children truly understood the other’s mistaken perspective.
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Equal egocentric bias in school-aged children with and without autism spectrum disorders. J Exp Child Psychol 2015; 144:15-26. [PMID: 26687336 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2015.10.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/12/2015] [Revised: 09/10/2015] [Accepted: 10/15/2015] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
Egocentric bias is a core feature of autism. This phenomenon has been studied using the false belief task. However, typically developing children who pass categorical (pass or fail) false belief tasks may still show subtle egocentric bias. We examined 7- to 13-year-old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; n=76) or typical development (n=113) using tasks with a continuous response scale: a modified false belief task and a visual hindsight bias task. All children showed robust egocentric bias on both tasks, but no group effects were found. Our large sample size, coupled with our sensitive tasks and resoundingly null group effects, indicate that children with and without ASD possess more similar egocentric tendencies than previously reported.
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The contribution of theory of mind, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function to pre-readers' language comprehension and later reading awareness and comprehension in elementary school. J Exp Child Psychol 2015; 144:27-45. [PMID: 26689129 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2015.11.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 63] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/30/2015] [Revised: 11/14/2015] [Accepted: 11/16/2015] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
The current longitudinal study examined the roles of theory of mind, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function in children's pre-reading skills, reading awareness, and reading comprehension. It is the first to examine this set of variables with preschool and school-aged children. A sample of 31 children completed language comprehension, working memory, cognitive flexibility, first-order false belief, and counterfactual reasoning measures when they were 3 to 5 years of age and completed second-order false belief, cognitive flexibility, reading comprehension, and reading awareness measures at 6 to 9 years of age. Results indicated that false belief understanding contributed to phrase and sentence comprehension and reading awareness, whereas cognitive flexibility and counterfactual reasoning accounted for unique variance in reading comprehension. Implications of the results for the development of reading skill are discussed.
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Abstract
In social interaction, Theory of Mind (ToM) enables us to construct representations of others' mental states, and to use those representations flexibly to explain or predict others' behavior. Although previous literature has documented that schizophrenia is associated with poor ToM ability, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms underlying their difficulty in ToM use. This study developed a new methodology to test whether the difficulty in false-belief-use might be related to deficits in perspective-switching or impaired inhibitory control among 23 remitted schizophrenia patients and 18 normal controls. Patients showed a significantly greater error rate in a perspective-switching condition than a perspective-repeating position in a false-belief-use task, whereas normal controls did not show a difference between the two conditions. In addition, a larger main effect of inhibition was found in remitted schizophrenia patients than normal controls in both a false-belief-use task and control task. Thus, remitted schizophrenia patients' impairment in ToM use might be accounted for, at least partially, by deficits in perspective-switching and impaired inhibitory control.
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Mental files and belief: A cognitive theory of how children represent belief and its intensionality. Cognition 2015; 145:77-88. [PMID: 26319972 PMCID: PMC7108955 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/29/2015] [Revised: 08/04/2015] [Accepted: 08/11/2015] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
There is converging evidence that over the course of the second year children become good at various fairly sophisticated forms of pro-social activities, such as helping, informing and comforting. Not only are toddlers able to do these things, they appear to do them routinely and almost reliably. A striking feature of these interventions, emphasized in the recent literature, is that they show precocious abilities in two different domains: they reflect complex ‘theory of mind’ abilities as well as ‘altruistic motivation’. Our aim in this paper is to present a theoretical hypothesis that bears on both kinds of developments. The suggestion is that children’s ‘instrumental helping’ reflects their budding understanding of practical reasons (in the standard sense of ‘considerations that count in favour of’ someone’s acting in a certain way). We can put the basic idea in the familiar terminology of common coding: toddlers conceive of the goals of others’ actions in the same format as the goals of their own actions: in terms of features of their situation that provide us with reasons to act.
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Confronting the language barrier: Theory of mind in deaf children. JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION DISORDERS 2015; 56:47-58. [PMID: 26176712 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcomdis.2015.06.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/12/2014] [Revised: 05/22/2015] [Accepted: 06/29/2015] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
UNLABELLED The current study addressed deaf children's Theory of Mind (ToM) development as measured by a battery of first- and second-order belief tasks. Both a chronological age-matched control group and a younger group of pre-school aged hearing children were compared to a group of deaf children born to hearing parents. A hearing native signer enacted each of the tasks, which were pre-recorded in video clips in English (SSE), British Sign Language (BSL) and spoken English, in order to consider all communication preferences of the deaf children. Results revealed no differences in performance between the deaf and the young hearing children. However, despite the inclusion of ToM tasks based on their preferred mode of communication, the deaf children performed significantly worse at the unexpected-content and second-order belief task compared with their age-matched controls. These findings imply a delay rather than a deficit in ToM in deaf children that could be attributed to limited opportunities to converse and overhear conversations about mental states. LEARNING OUTCOMES None.
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Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task. Cognition 2015; 139:50-70. [PMID: 25800351 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.02.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2012] [Revised: 02/14/2015] [Accepted: 02/28/2015] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Interpreting other peoples' actions relies on an understanding of their current mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires and intentions). In this paper, we distinguish between listeners' ability to infer others' perspectives and their explicit use of this knowledge to predict subsequent actions. In a visual-world study, two groups of participants (passive observers vs. active participants) watched short videos, depicting transfer events, where one character ('Jane') either held a true or false belief about an object's location. We tracked participants' eye-movements around the final visual scene, time-locked to related auditory descriptions (e.g. "Jane will look for the chocolates in the container on the left".). Results showed that active participants had already inferred the character's belief in the 1s preview period prior to auditory onset, before it was possible to use this information to predict an outcome. Moreover, they used this inference to correctly anticipate reference to the object's initial location on false belief trials at the earliest possible point (i.e. from "Jane" onwards). In contrast, passive observers only showed evidence of a belief inference from the onset of "Jane", and did not show reliable use of this inference to predict Jane's behaviour on false belief trials until much later, when the location ("left/right") was auditorily available. These results show that active engagement in a task activates earlier inferences about others' perspectives, and drives immediate use of this information to anticipate others' actions, compared to passive observers, who are susceptible to influences from egocentric or reality biases. Finally, we review evidence that using other peoples' perspectives to predict their behaviour is more cognitively effortful than simply using one's own.
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Exploring links between language and cognition in autism spectrum disorders: Complement sentences, false belief, and executive functioning. JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION DISORDERS 2015; 54:15-31. [PMID: 25637130 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcomdis.2014.12.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2014] [Revised: 10/20/2014] [Accepted: 12/07/2014] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
UNLABELLED A growing body of work indicates a close relation between complement clause sentences and Theory of Mind (ToM) in children with autism (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, & Joseph (2005). In Astington, & Baird (Eds.), Why language matters for theory of mind (pp. 298-318). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press, Lind, & Bowler (2009). Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39(6), 929). However, this link is based primarily on success at a specific complement clause task and a verbal false-belief (FB) task. One cannot exclude that the link found between these tasks may be a by-product of their both presupposing similar levels of language skills. It is also an open question if the role of complementation in ToM success is a privileged one as compared to that of other abilities which have been claimed to be an important factor for ToM understanding in autism, namely executive functioning (EF) (Pellicano (2007). Developmental Psychology 43, 974). Indeed the role played by complementation may be conceived of as an indirect one, mediated by some more general cognitive function related to EF. This study is the first to examine the relation between theory of mind assessed both verbally and non-verbally and various types of complement clause sentences as well as executive functions in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Our participants included 17 children and adolescents with ASD (aged 6 to 16) and a younger TD control group matched on non-verbal IQ (aged 4 to 9 years). Three tasks assessing complements of verbs of cognition, verbs of communication and verbs of perception were conducted. ToM tasks involved a verbal ToM task (Sally-Anne, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985). Cognition, 21(1), 37) as well as a non-verbal one (Colle et al. (2007). Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37(4), 716). Indexes of executive functions were collected via a computerized version of the Dimensional Change Card-Sorting task (Frye et al., 1995). Standardized measures of vocabulary, morphosyntax and non-verbal IQ were also administered. Results show similar performance by children with ASD and TD controls for the understanding of complement sentences, for non-verbal ToM and for executive functions. However, children with ASD were significantly impaired for false belief when this was measured verbally. For both ASD and TD, correlations controlling for IQ were found between the verbal FB task and complement sentences of verbs of communication and cognition, but not with verbs of perception. EF indexes did not significantly correlate with either of the ToM tasks, nor did any of the general language scores. These findings provide support for the view that knowledge of certain specific types of complement clause may serve as a privileged means of 'hacking out' solutions to verbal false belief tasks for individuals on the autistic spectrum. More specifically, complements with a truth-value that is independent of that of the matrix clause (i.e. those occurring with verbs of cognition and of communication, but not of perception) may describe a false event while the whole sentence remains true, making these linguistic structures particularly well suited for representing the minds of others (de Villiers, 2007). LEARNING OUTCOMES Readers will be able to (1) describe and evaluate the hypothesis that complement sentences play a privileged role in false belief task success in autism; (2) describe performance on complement sentences, executive functioning and false belief tasks by children with autism as compared to IQ-matched peers; (3) explain which types of complements specifically relate to false belief task performance and why; and (4) understand that differences in performance by children with autism at different types of false-belief tasks may be related to the nature of the task conducted and the underlying mechanisms involved.
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The roles of liar intention, lie content, and theory of mind in children's evaluation of lies. J Exp Child Psychol 2015; 132:1-13. [PMID: 25576966 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2014.12.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/14/2014] [Revised: 12/08/2014] [Accepted: 12/09/2014] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
This study found that 7-, 9-, and 11-year-old children and young adults identified prosocial lies as lies less frequently and evaluated them less negatively than selfish lies (liar intention effect); lies about opinions were identified as lies less frequently and evaluated less negatively than those about reality (lie content effect). The lie content effect was more pronounced in the prosocial lies than in the selfish lies for both identification and evaluation. Overall, the older participants considered liar intention more than the younger participants in lie evaluation. For the child participants, second-order belief understanding correlated marginally with sensitivity to liar intention in the opinion lies, but not with content sensitivity. Finally, lie identification correlated with evaluation in the prosocial-opinion lies for all of the children. The independent effects of intention and content could potentially explain children's development in "white lie" understanding demonstrated in the literature. Although the content effect appears to stem from a more general concern for whether communication is about objective reality, the intention effect may involve theory of mind.
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The special case of self-perspective inhibition in mental, but not non-mental, representation. Neuropsychologia 2014; 67:183-92. [PMID: 25527113 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.12.015] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2014] [Revised: 11/10/2014] [Accepted: 12/12/2014] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) has been implicated in studies of both executive and social functions. Recent meta-analyses suggest that vlPFC plays an important but little understood role in Theory of Mind (ToM). Converging neuropsychological and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) evidence suggests that this may reflect inhibition of self-perspective. The present study adapted an extensively published ToM localizer to evaluate the role of vlPFC in inhibition of self-perspective. The classic false belief, false photograph vignettes that comprise the localizer were modified to generate high and low salience of self-perspective. Using a factorial design, the present study identified a behavioural and neural cost associated with having a highly salient self-perspective that was incongruent with the representational content. Importantly, vlPFC only differentiated between high versus low salience of self-perspective when representing mental state content. No difference was identified for non-mental representation. This result suggests that different control processes are required to represent competing mental and non-mental content.
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Deaf children's use of clear visual cues in mindreading. RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 2014; 35:2849-2857. [PMID: 25104224 DOI: 10.1016/j.ridd.2014.07.034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2014] [Revised: 07/15/2014] [Accepted: 07/15/2014] [Indexed: 06/03/2023]
Abstract
Previous studies show that typically developing 4-year old children can understand other people's false beliefs but that deaf children of hearing families have difficulty in understanding false beliefs until the age of approximately 13. Because false beliefs are implicit mental states that are not expressed through clear visual cues in standard false belief tasks, the present study examines the hypothesis that the deaf children's developmental delay in understanding false beliefs may reflect their difficulty in understanding a spectrum of mental states that are not expressed through clear visual cues. Nine- to 13-year-old deaf children of hearing families and 4-6-year-old typically developing children completed false belief tasks and emotion recognition tasks under different cue conditions. The results indicated that after controlling for the effect of the children's language abilities, the deaf children inferred other people's false beliefs as accurately as the typically developing children when other people's false beliefs were clearly expressed through their eye-gaze direction. However, the deaf children performed worse than the typically developing children when asked to infer false beliefs with ambiguous or no eye-gaze cues. Moreover, the deaf children were capable of recognizing other people's emotions that were clearly conveyed by their facial or body expressions. The results suggest that although theory-based or simulation-based mental state understanding is typical of hearing children's theory of mind mechanism, for deaf children of hearing families, clear cue-based mental state understanding may be their specific theory of mind mechanism.
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Validating the Why/How contrast for functional MRI studies of Theory of Mind. Neuroimage 2014; 99:301-11. [PMID: 24844746 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.05.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 67] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/05/2014] [Revised: 05/03/2014] [Accepted: 05/11/2014] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
The ability to impute mental states to others, or Theory of Mind (ToM), has been the subject of hundreds of neuroimaging studies. Although reviews and meta-analyses of these studies have concluded that ToM recruits a coherent brain network, mounting evidence suggests that this network is an abstraction based on pooling data from numerous studies, most of which use different behavioral tasks to investigate ToM. Problematically, this means that no single behavioral task can be used to reliably measure ToM Network function as currently conceived. To make ToM Network function scientifically tractable, we need standardized tasks capable of reliably measuring specific aspects of its functioning. Here, our goal is to validate the Why/How Task for this purpose. Several prior studies have found that when compared to answering how-questions about another person's behavior, answering why-questions about that same behavior activates a network that is anatomically consistent with meta-analytic definitions of the ToM Network. In the version of the Why/How Task presented here, participants answer yes/no Why (e.g., Is the person helping someone?) and How (e.g., Is the person lifting something?) questions about pretested photographs of naturalistic human behaviors. Across three fMRI studies, we show that the task elicits reliable performance measurements and modulates a left-lateralized network that is consistently localized across studies. While this network is convergent with meta-analyses of ToM studies, it is largely distinct from the network identified by the widely used False-Belief Localizer, the most common ToM task. Our new task is publicly available, and can be used as an efficient functional localizer to provide reliable identification of single-subject responses in most regions of the network. Our results validate the Why/How Task, both as a standardized protocol capable of producing maximally comparable data across studies, and as a flexible foundation for programmatic research on the neurobiological foundations of a basic manifestation of human ToM.
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