Female vervet monkeys fine-tune decisions on tolerance versus conflict in a communication network

Group living promotes opportunities for both cooperation and competition. Selection on the ability to cope with such opposing social opportunities has been proposed as a driving force in the evolution of large brains in primates and other social species. However, we still know little about the degree of complexity involved in such social strategies. Here, we report advanced social strategies in wild vervet monkeys. Building on recent experimental evidence that subordinate females trade grooming for tolerance from higher-ranking individuals during foraging activities, we show that the audience composition strongly affects this trade. First, tolerance was lower if the audience contained individuals that outranked the subordinate partner, independently of audience size and kinship relationships. Second, we found a significant interaction between previous grooming and relative rank of bystanders: dominant subjects valued recent grooming by subordinates while intermediate ranked subjects valued the option to aggress subordinate partners in the presence of a dominant audience. Aggressors were also more likely to emit coalition recruitment calls if the audience contained individuals that outranked the subordinate partner. In conclusion, vervet monkeys include both recent grooming and knowledge about third-party relationships to make complex decisions when trading grooming for tolerance, leading to a finely balanced trade-off between reciprocation and opportunities to reinforce rank relationships.

Chimpanzee uses manipulative gaze cues to conceal and reveal information to foraging competitor

Tactical deception has been widely reported in primates on a functional basis, but details of behavioral mechanisms are usually unspecified. We tested a pair of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in the informed forager paradigm, in which the subordinate saw the location of hidden food and the dominant did not. We employed cross-correlations to examine temporal contingencies between chimpanzees' behavior: specifically how the direction of the subordinate's gaze and movement functioned to manipulate the dominant's searching behavior through two tactics, withholding, and misleading information. In Experiment 1, not only did the informed subordinate tend to stop walking toward a single high value food, but she also refrained from gazing toward it, thus, withholding potentially revealing cues from her searching competitor. In a second experiment, in which a moderate value food was hidden in addition to the high value food, whenever the subordinate alternated her gaze between the dominant and the moderate value food, she often paused walking for 5 s; this frequently recruited the dominant to the inferior food, functioning as a "decoy." The subordinate flexibly concealed and revealed gaze toward a goal, which suggests that not only can chimpanzees use visual cues to make predictions about behavior, but also that chimpanzees may understand that other individuals can exploit their gaze direction. These results substantiate descriptive reports of how chimpanzees use gaze to manipulate others, and to our knowledge are the first quantitative data to identify behavioral mechanisms of tactical deception.

RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS

Cross correlations show a subordinate chimpanzee tactically deceived a dominant by not gazing toward a valuable food (withholding), and recruiting to a "decoy" food (misleading). Chimpanzees understand that others can exploit their gaze direction.

Cooperation creates selection for tactical deception

Conditional social behaviours such as partner choice and reciprocity are held to be key mechanisms facilitating the evolution of cooperation, particularly in humans. Although how these mechanisms select for cooperation has been explored extensively, their potential to select simultaneously for complex cheating strategies has been largely overlooked. Tactical deception, the misrepresentation of the state of the world to another individual, may allow cheaters to exploit conditional cooperation by tactically misrepresenting their past actions and/or current intentions. Here we first use a simple game-theoretic model to show that the evolution of cooperation can create selection pressures favouring the evolution of tactical deception. This effect is driven by deception weakening cheater detection in conditional cooperators, allowing tactical deceivers to elicit cooperation at lower costs, while simple cheats are recognized and discriminated against. We then provide support for our theoretical predictions using a comparative analysis of deception across primate species. Our results suggest that the evolution of conditional strategies may, in addition to promoting cooperation, select for astute cheating and associated psychological abilities. Ultimately, our ability to convincingly lie to each other may have evolved as a direct result of our cooperative nature.