Overcoming bias in the comparison of human language and animal communication

Human language is a powerful communicative and cognitive tool. Scholars have long sought to characterize its uniqueness, but each time a property is proposed to set human language apart (e.g., reference, syntax), some (attenuated) version of that property is found in animals. Recently, the uniqueness argument has shifted from linguistic rules to cognitive capacities underlying them. Scholars argue that human language is unique because it relies on ostension and inference, while animal communication depends on simple associations and largely hardwired signals. Such characterizations are often borne out in published data, but these empirical findings are driven by radical differences in the ways animal and human communication are studied. The field of animal communication has been dramatically shaped by the "code model," which imagines communication as involving information packets that are encoded, transmitted, decoded, and interpreted. This framework standardized methods for studying meaning in animal signals, but it does not allow for the nuance, ambiguity, or contextual variation seen in humans. The code model is insidious. It is rarely referenced directly, but it significantly shapes how we study animals. To compare animal communication and human language, we must acknowledge biases resulting from the different theoretical models used. By incorporating new approaches that break away from searching for codes, we may find that animal communication and human language are characterized by differences of degree rather than kind.

Sudden bio-mathematical self-similarity and the uniqueness of human mass societies: from T-patterns and T-strings to T-societies

With the explosive growth of human knowledge especially in the twenteeth century with even greater facilitation of access to knowledge, the world of even relatively recent great thinkers becomes daunting as seen from a modern viewpoint. Recently, humans ignored the existence of the complex intracellular world of cell organs, giant information molecules such as DNA, societies of specialized worker molecules (proteins), and generally the surprising nanoscale world visible to humanity since only a few decades ago. Moreover, computational power and video technology were inaccessible to all scientists from, for example, Aristotle to Freud, so new views and ideas seem to be expected about phenomena at all scales including nano and human. Some have arrived very recently. Thus urgently needed knowledge about the biology of animal and human behavior received the first Nobel Prize as late as 1973, in Physiology and Medicine, shared by Karl von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, and Niko Tinbergen. Lorenz's Nobel lecture was entitled "Analogy as a Source of Knowledge" which did not mention self-analogy (self-similarity) as none of the species studied were part of others and knowledge of the nanoscale phenomena at the heart of this article had barely become available. The views and empirical findings presented in this article depend on such recent intracellular nanoscale insights and the development of a set of mathematical patterns, called T-system, of which only two are considered, the self-similar (i.e., parts having a structure similar to the whole) T-pattern and the derived T-string, a T-patterned material string (here, polymer or text). Specially developed algorithms implemented in the THEME^TM software for T-pattern detection and analysis (TPA) allowed the detection of interaction T-patterns in humans, animals, and brain neuronal networks, showing self-similarity between animal interaction patterns and neuronal interaction patterns in their brains. TPA of DNA and text also showed unique self-similarity between modern human literate mass societies and the protein societies of their body cells, both with Giant Extra-Individual Purely Informational T-strings (GEIPIT; genomes or textomes) defining the behavioral potentials of their specialized citizens. This kind of society is here called T-society and only exists in humans and proteins, while the self-similarity between them only exists in human T-societies.

Apology and Its Acceptance: Perceived Reconciliatory Attitudes Reduce Outgroup Dehumanization

Based on real-life intergroup animosities originating from a historical conflict, the current study examined how the perceived stance of the outgroup about the conflict affects the dehumanization of the outgroup. In Study 1 (N = 120), Korean undergraduates attributed more human nature to the Japanese after reading an article that the Japanese government did (vs. refused to) issue an official apology for a historical wrong. In turn, the more human nature assigned to the Japanese predicted higher expectations about positive mutual relations in the future. Similarly, in Study 2 (N = 209), Japanese undergraduates attributed more human uniqueness to Koreans after reading an article that an official apology for a historical wrong from Japan was accepted (vs. rejected) by Koreans. The higher the perceived human uniqueness of Koreans was, the higher were the willingness to help and the expectations of a positive relationship in the future. The findings demonstrate how mutual dehumanization can be reduced as a result of the other side’s reconciliatory stances and can further contribute to improving intergroup relations.

The content and structure of reputation domains across human societies: a view from the evolutionary social sciences

Reputations are an essential feature of human sociality and the evolution of cooperation and group living. Much scholarship has focused on reputations, yet typically on a narrow range of domains (e.g. prosociality and aggressiveness), usually in isolation. Humans can develop reputations, however, from any collective information. We conducted exploratory analyses on the content, distribution and structure of reputation domain diversity across cultures, using the Human Relations Area Files ethnographic database. After coding ethnographic texts on reputations from 153 cultures, we used hierarchical modelling, cluster analysis and text analysis to provide an empirical view of reputation domains across societies. Findings suggest: (i) reputational domains vary cross-culturally, yet reputations for cultural conformity, prosociality, social status and neural capital are widespread; (ii) reputation domains are more variable for males than females; and (iii) particular reputation domains are interrelated, demonstrating a structure consistent with dimensions of human uniqueness. We label these features: cultural group unity, dominance, neural capital, sexuality, social and material success and supernatural healing. We highlight the need for future research on the evolution of cooperation and human sociality to consider a wider range of reputation domains, as well as their social, ecological and gender-specific variability. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Can Sexual Appeal, Beauty, or Virtue Increase the Opportunity for a Woman to Be Selected as a Spouse? The Mediating Role of Human Uniqueness

High mating value is believed to correspond with high mating opportunities. On that premise, this study explores three cues that are linked to women of high long-term mating value, namely a “beautiful” facial appearance, “sexually attractive” body shape, and “virtuous” behavior. With exclusive attention focused on the above cues, this study examines what kind of human attributes would make a contribution to women’s mating opportunities. The results reveal that both “beautiful” women and “virtuous” women were assessed (in this study) as having greater mating opportunities than “sexually attractive” women. In regard to the human attributes, only the “beautiful” woman was assessed as having high levels of human uniqueness and human nature. Meanwhile, “virtuous” women were assessed as having higher levels of human uniqueness but lower levels of human nature. In contrast, “sexually attractive” women were assessed as having lower levels of human uniqueness but higher levels of human nature. In addition, the results of a mediation analysis show that the trait of human uniqueness, and not human nature, was the mediator between the three types of women and women’s mating opportunities. This finding means that, when women have higher levels of human uniqueness, they can acquire more mating opportunities. These findings contribute an improved understanding to why and how “beauty” or “virtue” increases the opportunity for woman to be selected as a spouse.

Symbols Are Special: An fMRI Adaptation Study of Symbolic, Nonsymbolic, and Non-Numerical Magnitude Processing in the Human Brain

How are different formats of magnitudes represented in the human brain? We used functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation to isolate representations of symbols, quantities, and physical size in 45 adults. Results indicate that the neural correlates supporting the passive processing of number symbols are largely dissociable from those supporting quantities and physical size, anatomically and representationally. Anatomically, passive processing of quantities and size correlate with activation in the right intraparietal sulcus, whereas symbolic number processing, compared with quantity processing, correlates with activation in the left inferior parietal lobule. Representationally, neural patterns of activation supporting symbols are dissimilar from neural activation patterns supporting quantity and size in the bilateral parietal lobes. These findings challenge the longstanding notion that the culturally acquired ability to conceptualize symbolic numbers is represented using entirely the same brain systems that support the evolutionarily ancient system used to process quantities. Moreover, these data reveal that regions that support numerical magnitude processing are also important for the processing of non-numerical magnitudes. This discovery compels future investigations of the neural consequences of acquiring knowledge of symbolic numbers.

Epidemiological transitions in human evolution and the richness of viruses, helminths, and protozoa

Background and objectives

In absolute terms, humans are extremely highly parasitized compared to other primates. This may reflect that humans are outliers in traits correlated with parasite richness: population density, geographic range area, and study effort. The high degree of parasitism could also reflect amplified disease risk associated with agriculture and urbanization. Alternatively, controlling for other variables, cultural and psychological adaptations could have reduced parasitism in humans over evolutionary time.

Methodology

We predicted the number of parasites that would infect a nonhuman primate with human phenotypic characteristics and phylogenetic position, and then compared observed parasitism of humans in eight geopolitical countries to the predicted distributions. The analyses incorporated study effort, phylogeny, and drivers of parasitism in 33 primate species.

Results

Analyses of individual countries were not supportive of either hypothesis. When analyzed collectively, however, human populations showed consistently lower than expected richness of protozoa and helminths, but higher richness of viruses. Thus, human evolutionary innovations and new parasite exposures may have impacted groups of parasites in different ways, with support for both hypotheses in the overall analysis.

Conclusions and implications

The high level of parasitism observed in humans only applies to viruses, and was not extreme in any of our tests of individual countries. In contrast, we find consistent reductions in protozoa and helminths across countries, suggesting reduced parasitism by these groups during human evolution. We propose that hygienic and technological advances might have extinguished fecal-orally or indirectly transmitted parasites like helminths, whereas higher human densities and host-shifting potential of viruses have supported increased virus richness.

Lay Summary

Vastly more parasite species infect humans than any other primate host. Controlling for factors that influence parasite richness, such as the intensity of study effort and body mass, we find that humans may have more viruses, but fewer helminths and protozoa, than expected based on evolutionary analyses of parasitism in other primates.

Understanding Human Cognitive Uniqueness

Humanity has regarded itself as intellectually superior to other species for millennia, yet human cognitive uniqueness remains poorly understood. Here, we evaluate candidate traits plausibly underlying our distinctive cognition (including mental time travel, tool use, problem solving, social cognition, and communication) as well as domain generality, and we consider how human cognitive uniqueness may have evolved. We conclude that there are no traits present in humans and absent in other animals that in isolation explain our species' superior cognitive performance; rather, there are many cognitive domains in which humans possess unusually potent capabilities compared to those found in other species. Humans are flexible cognitive all-rounders, whose proficiency arises through interactions and reinforcement between cognitive domains at multiple scales.

Humanity and the left hemisphere: The story of half a brain

Until fairly late in the nineteenth century, it was held that the brain was bilaterally symmetrical. With the discovery of left-brain dominance for language, the so-called "laws of symmetry" were revoked, and asymmetry was then seen as critical to the human condition, with the left hemisphere, in particular, assuming superordinate properties. I trace this idea from the early discoveries of the late nineteenth century through the split-brain studies of the 1960s, and beyond. Although the idea has persisted, the evidence has revealed widespread cerebral asymmetries in nonhuman animals, and even language and its asymmetries are increasingly understood to have evolved gradually, rather than in a single speciation event. The left hemisphere nevertheless seemed to take over a role previously taken by other structures, such as the pineal gland and the hippocampus minor, in a determined effort to place humans on a pedestal above all other species.

Production of Supra-regular Spatial Sequences by Macaque Monkeys

Understanding and producing embedded sequences in language, music, or mathematics, is a central characteristic of our species. These domains are hypothesized to involve a human-specific competence for supra-regular grammars, which can generate embedded sequences that go beyond the regular sequences engendered by finite-state automata. However, is this capacity truly unique to humans? Using a production task, we show that macaque monkeys can be trained to produce time-symmetrical embedded spatial sequences whose formal description requires supra-regular grammars or, equivalently, a push-down stack automaton. Monkeys spontaneously generalized the learned grammar to novel sequences, including longer ones, and could generate hierarchical sequences formed by an embedding of two levels of abstract rules. Compared to monkeys, however, preschool children learned the grammars much faster using a chunking strategy. While supra-regular grammars are accessible to nonhuman primates through extensive training, human uniqueness may lie in the speed and learning strategy with which they are acquired.

Memory for stimulus sequences: a divide between humans and other animals?

Humans stand out among animals for their unique capacities in domains such as language, culture and imitation, yet it has been difficult to identify cognitive elements that are specifically human. Most research has focused on how information is processed after it is acquired, e.g. in problem solving or 'insight' tasks, but we may also look for species differences in the initial acquisition and coding of information. Here, we show that non-human species have only a limited capacity to discriminate ordered sequences of stimuli. Collating data from 108 experiments on stimulus sequence discrimination (1540 data points from 14 bird and mammal species), we demonstrate pervasive and systematic errors, such as confusing a red-green sequence of lights with green-red and green-green sequences. These errors can persist after thousands of learning trials in tasks that humans learn to near perfection within tens of trials. To elucidate the causes of such poor performance, we formulate and test a mathematical model of non-human sequence discrimination, assuming that animals represent sequences as unstructured collections of memory traces. This representation carries only approximate information about stimulus duration, recency, order and frequency, yet our model predicts non-human performance with a 5.9% mean absolute error across 68 datasets. Because human-level cognition requires more accurate encoding of sequential information than afforded by memory traces, we conclude that improved coding of sequential information is a key cognitive element that may set humans apart from other animals.

Unraveling the evolution of uniquely human cognition

A satisfactory account of human cognitive evolution will explain not only the psychological mechanisms that make our species unique, but also how, when, and why these traits evolved. To date, researchers have made substantial progress toward defining uniquely human aspects of cognition, but considerably less effort has been devoted to questions about the evolutionary processes through which these traits have arisen. In this article, I aim to link these complementary aims by synthesizing recent advances in our understanding of what makes human cognition unique, with theory and data regarding the processes of cognitive evolution. I review evidence that uniquely human cognition depends on synergism between both representational and motivational factors and is unlikely to be accounted for by changes to any singular cognitive system. I argue that, whereas no nonhuman animal possesses the full constellation of traits that define the human mind, homologies and analogies of critical aspects of human psychology can be found in diverse nonhuman taxa. I suggest that phylogenetic approaches to the study of animal cognition-which can address questions about the selective pressures and proximate mechanisms driving cognitive change-have the potential to yield important insights regarding the processes through which the human cognitive phenotype evolved.

Sleep intensity and the evolution of human cognition

Over the past four decades, scientists have made substantial progress in understanding the evolution of sleep patterns across the Tree of Life. Remarkably, the specifics of sleep along the human lineage have been slow to emerge. This is surprising, given our unique mental and behavioral capacity and the importance of sleep for individual cognitive performance. One view is that our species' sleep architecture is in accord with patterns documented in other mammals. We promote an alternative view, that human sleep is highly derived relative to that of other primates. Based on new and existing evidence, we specifically propose that humans are more efficient in their sleep patterns than are other primates, and that human sleep is shorter, deeper, and exhibits a higher proportion of REM than expected. Thus, we propose the sleep intensity hypothesis: Early humans experienced selective pressure to fulfill sleep needs in the shortest time possible. Several factors likely served as selective pressures for more efficient sleep, including increased predation risk in terrestrial environments, threats from intergroup conflict, and benefits arising from increased social interaction. Less sleep would enable longer active periods in which to acquire and transmit new skills and knowledge, while deeper sleep may be critical for the consolidation of those skills, leading to enhanced cognitive abilities in early humans.

What's Special about Human Imitation? A Comparison with Enculturated Apes

What, if anything, is special about human imitation? An evaluation of enculturated apes’ imitation skills, a “best case scenario” of non-human apes’ imitation performance, reveals important similarities and differences between this special population of apes and human children. Candidates for shared imitation mechanisms include the ability to imitate various familiar transitive responses and object–object actions that involve familiar tools. Candidates for uniquely derived imitation mechanisms include: imitating novel transitive actions and novel tool-using responses as well as imitating opaque or intransitive gestures, regardless of familiarity. While the evidence demonstrates that enculturated apes outperform non-enculturated apes and perform more like human children, all apes, regardless of rearing history, generally excel at imitating familiar, over-rehearsed responses and are poor, relative to human children, at imitating novel, opaque or intransitive responses. Given the similarities between the sensory and motor systems of preschool age human children and non-human apes, it is unlikely that differences in sensory input and/or motor-output alone explain the observed discontinuities in imitation performance. The special rearing history of enculturated apes—including imitation-specific training—further diminishes arguments suggesting that differences are experience-dependent. Here, it is argued that such differences are best explained by distinct, specialized mechanisms that have evolved for copying rules and responses in particular content domains. Uniquely derived social and imitation learning mechanisms may represent adaptations for learning novel communicative gestures and complex tool-use. Given our species’ dependence on both language and tools, mechanisms that accelerated learning in these domains are likely to have faced intense selective pressures, starting with the earliest of human ancestors.

How do different humanness measures relate? Confronting the attribution of secondary emotions, human uniqueness, and human nature traits

The present research examines the relationship between the infrahumanization approach and the two-dimensional model of humanness: an issue that has received very little empirical attention. In Study 1, we created three unknown groups (Humanized, Animalized, and Mechanized) granting/denying them Human Nature (HN) and Human Uniqueness (HU) traits. The attribution of primary/secondary emotions was measured. As expected, participants attributed more secondary emotions to the humanized compared to dehumanized groups. Importantly, both animalized and mechanized groups were attributed similar amounts of secondary emotions. In Study 2, the groups were described in terms of their capacity to express secondary emotions. We measured the attribution of HN/HU traits. Results showed that the infrahumanized group was denied both HU/HN traits. The results highlight the importance of considering the common aspects of both approaches in understanding processes of dehumanization.

Embracing humanity in the face of death: why do existential concerns moderate ingroup humanization?

People humanize their ingroup to address existential concerns about their mortality, but the reasons why they do so remain ambiguous. One explanation is that people humanize their ingroup to bolster their social identity in the face of their mortality. Alternatively, people might be motivated to see their ingroup as more uniquely human (UH) to distance themselves from their corporeal "animal" nature. These explanations were tested in Australia, where social identity is tied less to UH and more to human nature (HN) which does not distinguish humans from animals. Australians attributed more HN traits to the ingroup when mortality was salient, while the attribution of UH traits remained unchanged. This indicates that the mortality-buffering function of ingroup humanization lies in reinforcing the humanness of our social identity, rather than just distancing ourselves from our animal nature. Implications for (de)humanization in intergroup relations are discussed.