How Elicitation Procedure Shapes Beliefs About Others' Affective Responses to Action and Inaction

Humans have long pondered the distinction between action and inaction. Classic work in social sciences provides evidence that most people believe that others experience higher levels of affect when they obtain the same outcome through action as opposed to inaction. In this paper, we theorize that people's attributions of affect to identical outcomes resulting from action versus inaction are largely constructive in nature, such that they heavily depend on the elicitation procedure. Seven preregistered studies demonstrate that most individuals cease to attribute greater affect to identical outcomes resulting from action as opposed to inaction when it is made possible-or salient-that they can state that action and inaction are associated with equal levels of affect. Consequently, the present studies suggest that researchers can reach different conclusions about participants' general proclivity to attribute greater affect to identical outcomes resulting from action (vs. inaction) depending on how participants' beliefs are measured.

[Problems of causality in forensic medical examinations on «medical cases»]

The purpose of the study is to investigate the results of the forensic medical examinations on «medical cases» in terms of establishing cause-and-effect relationships. The main groups of problems of establishing cause-and-effect relationships are highlighted, namely: who should establish it; whether it is worth establishing the presence or absence of a direct connection or it is possible to judge about indirect and other causal relationships, whether it is possible to establish a direct causal relationship of inaction with the outcome. Possible ways of solving the indicated problems are shown.

Neuromuscular electrical stimulation and protein during bed rest increases CD11b+ skeletal muscle macrophages but does not correspond to muscle size or insulin sensitivity

With this cohort, we previously demonstrated preservation of thigh lean tissue with neuromuscular electrical stimulation combined with protein supplementation (NMES+PRO) treatment during bed rest in healthy older adults. Because macrophage polarization plays a significant role in the repair and maintenance of muscle size and insulin sensitivity, we hypothesized that muscle macrophages would be induced by NMES+PRO and would correspond to an increase in lean mass and an attenuated insulin resistance response altered by bed rest. Older adults (60-80 years old; body mass index < 30 kg/m2) underwent 5 days of bed rest and were randomized to either thrice daily treatment of NMES+PRO (n = 8) or CON (n = 8). Lean mass, insulin sensitivity, and markers of muscle macrophages, inflammation, and connective tissue were determined before and after bed rest. Glucose intolerance and insulin resistance occurred after bed rest but there was not a treatment effect (p > 0.10). Proinflammatory-like macrophages (CD11b+, CD206-) increased (p < 0.05) with NMES+PRO treatment and was different than CON. Minor changes in noncontractile tissue were observed. However, changes in muscle macrophages or extracellular matrix were not related to the preservation of thigh lean mass or insulin resistance. Daily NMES+PRO treatment during bed rest induced a muscle proinflammatory-like macrophage response and was unrelated to muscle size or metabolic function. This study is listed as clinical trial NCT02566590. Novelty Neuromuscular electrical stimulation combined with protein supplementation (NMES+PRO) increased proinflammatory-like macrophages and extracellular matrix content in older adults after bed rest. NMES+PRO changes in macrophages and noncontractile tissue macrophages were not related to muscle size preservation or insulin sensitivity.

Where did inaction go? Towards a broader and more refined perspective on collective actions

While injustice is widespread, collective action against it appears to be rare. This paper argues that this may be because research often focuses on a narrow range of outgroup‐oriented actions, such as demonstrating, signing petitions, that are symbolic of a collective response to injustice. The present work takes a bottom‐up approach to study a broad range of collective and individual actions that people undertake in response to collective injustice. Participants indicated actions they felt they could take (Study 1) and, via interviews, actually had taken (Study 2) in response to human‐induced earthquakes. These studies revealed a broad range of actions, many of which are collective but ingroup‐ (e.g., helping ingroup members) rather than outgroup‐oriented. Study 3 further conceptualized these collective and individual actions by including quantitative measures thereof in an assessment of responses to stressful life events that were collective or individual. Results revealed that, while traditional forms of collective action are rare, ingroup‐oriented and individual level (e.g., social support) responses form distinct dimensions in response to both individual and collective events. This work extends our understanding of responses to collective injustice and suggests the need to broaden the scope of collective action research.

Action Dominance: The Performance Effects of Multiple Action Demands and the Benefits of an Inaction Focus

Four experiments uncovered an action dominance error by which people's natural focus on actions hinders appropriate responses to social and nonsocial stimuli. This surprising error comprises higher rates of both omission (misses) and commission (false alarms) when, in responding to action and inaction demands, people have higher numbers of action targets. The action dominance error was verified over four experiments using an analog that required responses to words and to target individuals. Experiments 1 and 2 tested our hypotheses and distinguished the action error effect from the effects of practicing action or inaction responses. Experiment 3 linked the error to the greater cognitive load imposed by the higher proportion of action over inaction targets. Furthermore, Experiment 4 demonstrated that (a) there is a default tendency to pay more attention to action (vs. inaction) targets and (b) shifting focus to inaction targets reduces the action dominance error.

Action and inaction in multi-behaviour recommendations: a meta-analysis of lifestyle interventions

This meta-analysis examined theoretical predictions about the effects of different combinations of action (e.g., start an exercise regime) and of inaction (e.g., reduce screen time, rest in between weight lifting series) recommendations in smoking, diet, and physical activity multiple-domain interventions. The synthesis included 150 research reports of interventions promoting multiple behaviour domain change and measuring change at the most immediate follow-up. The main outcome measure was an indicator of overall change that combined behavioural and clinical effects. There were two main findings. First, as predicted, interventions produced the highest level of change when they included a predominance of recommendations along one behavioural dimension (i.e., predominantly inaction or predominantly action). Unexpectedly, within interventions with predominant action or inaction recommendations, those including predominantly inaction recommendations had greater efficacy than those including predominantly action recommendations. This effect, however, was limited to interventions in the diet and exercise domains, but reversed (greater efficacy for interventions with predominant action vs. inaction recommendations) in the smoking domain. These findings provide important insights on how to best combine recommendations when interventions target clusters of health behaviours.

What Makes for the Most Intense Regrets? Comparing the Effects of Several Theoretical Predictors of Regret Intensity

Several theories have been proposed to account for variation in the intensity of life regrets. Variables hypothesized to affect the intensity of regret include: whether the regretted decision was an action or an inaction, the degree to which the decision was justified, and the life domain of the regret. No previous study has compared the effects of these key predictors in a single model in order to identify which are most strongly associated with the intensity of life regret. In this study, respondents (N = 500) to a postal survey answered questions concerning the nature of their greatest life regret. A Bayesian regression analysis suggested that regret intensity was greater for—in order of importance—decisions that breached participants’ personal life rules, decisions in social life domains than non-social domains, and decisions that lacked an explicit justification. Although regrets of inaction were more frequent than regrets of action, regrets relating to actions were slightly more intense.

At Least I Tried: The Relationship between Regulatory Focus and Regret Following Action vs. Inaction

Regret is an unpleasant feeling that may arise following decisions that ended poorly, and may affect the decision-maker's well-being and future decision making. Some studies show that a decision to act leads to greater regret than a decision not to act when both resulted in failure, because the latter is usually the norm. In some cases, when the norm is to act, this pattern is reversed. We suggest that the decision maker's regulatory focus, affects regret after action or inaction. Specifically, promotion-focused individuals, who tend to be more proactive, view action as more normal than prevention-focused individuals, and therefore experience regulatory fit when an action decision is made. Hence, we hypothesized that promotion-focused individuals will feel less regret than prevention-focused individuals when a decision to act ended poorly. In addition, we hypothesized that a trigger for change implied in the situation, decreases the level of regret following action. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 330 participants enrolled in an online survey. The participants received six decision scenarios, in which they were asked to evaluate the level of regret following action and inaction. Individual regulatory focus was measured by two different scales. Promotion-focused individuals attributed less regret than prevention-focused individuals to action decisions. Regret following inaction was not affected by regulatory focus. In addition, a trigger for change decreases regret following action. Orthodox people tend to attribute more regret than non-orthodox to a person who made an action decision. The results contribute to the literature by showing that not only the situation but also the decision maker's orientation affects the regret after action vs. inaction.

Naïve Definitions of Action and Inaction: The Continuum, Spread, and Valence of Behaviors

The cohesiveness of a society depends, in part, on how its individual members manage their daily activities with respect to the goals of that society. Hence, there should be a degree of social agreement on what constitutes action and what constitutes inaction. The present research investigated the structure of action and inaction definitions, the evaluation of action versus inaction, and individual differences in these evaluations. Action-inaction ratings of behaviors and states showed more social agreement at the ends of the inaction-action continuum than at the middle, suggesting a socially shared construal of this definition. Action-inaction ratings were also shown to correlate with the valence of the rated behaviors, such that the more active the behavior the more positive its valence. Lastly, individual differences in locomotion, need for closure, and Christian religious beliefs correlated positively with a preference for action.

General Action and Inaction Goals: Their Behavioral, Cognitive, and Affective Origins and Influences

Since the 1970s, researchers on motivation and behavior have taken the stance that important human behaviors are determined by specific attitudes, intentions, and goals. In the present article, we review evidence suggesting that, in addition to specific motivational constructs, general goals of action and inaction are also vital determinants of many important human behaviors. This research examines the effects of these goals on motor behavior, cognitive performance, and political participation. Furthermore, we connect these general action and inaction goals with other important areas in psychology, including affect, approach/avoidance, energization, material resources, mindsets, and power. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of individual and regional/cultural differences in action and inaction. Overall, general goals for action and inaction are shown to influence a vast array of important behaviors, suggesting that in addition to considering specific attitudes, intentions, and goals, researchers may gain important insight into human behavior by considering general motivations.