Less cortical complexity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex is associated with a greater preference for risky and immediate rewards

In our everyday lives, we are often faced with situations in which we have to make choices that involve risky or delayed rewards. However, the extent to which we are willing to accept larger risky (over smaller certain) or larger delayed (over smaller immediate) rewards vary across individuals. Here we investigated the relationship between cortical surface complexity in medial prefrontal cortex and individual differences in risky and intertemporal preferences. We found that lower cortical complexity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was associated with a greater preference for risky and immediate rewards. In addition to these common structural associations in mPFC, we also found associations between lower cortical complexity and a greater preference for immediate rewards that extended into left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and right vmPFC. Taken together, the shared association suggests that lower cortical complexity in vmPFC may be a structural marker for individual differences in impulsive behavior.

Testing the somatic marker hypothesis in decisions-from-experience with non-stationary outcome probabilities

Introduction

The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) posits that in experience-based choice, people develop physiological reactions that mark options as either positive or negative. These somatic markers aid decision making because they differentiate between "good" and "bad" options during pre-choice deliberation.

Methods

We examined this proposed role for somatic states in two decision-from-experience tasks (each N = 36) in which participants selected repeatedly with full feedback (i.e., for obtained and forgone outcomes) between two unlabeled options that returned wins or losses, with half receiving an additional summary of past outcomes. The probabilities of good and bad outcomes changed at an unannounced point. Participants completed a 100-trial game with a switch in the optimal option after trial 40 (Study 1) or a 200-trial game with switch points after trial 40 and trial 120 (Study 2). Skin conductance (SC) was measured continuously as an index of emotional intensity, from which we extracted measures of anticipatory SC (pre-choice) and outcome SC (post-choice).

Results

Participants reliably selected the optimal option prior to any switches. They also altered their choices appropriately when the payoffs changed, though optimal play following payoff switches was reduced. Losses resulted in a greater outcome SC than wins, but only in Study 1, as did the finding that the outcome SC was greater when the forgone outcome was positive. Anticipatory SC did not reliably predict optimal play in either study.

Discussion

These results provide little support for the SMH. Our studies point to the importance of using diverse tasks and measures and very large sample sizes when testing the role of somatic states in decision making.

Decision making and executive functions in problematic pornography use

Introduction

Previous research on cognitive functions in Compulsive Sexual Behavior Disorder (CSBD) and problematic pornography use (PPU) reported inconsistent findings and mostly included sexual pictures in the used tasks. The role of general executive functions and cognitive competences (without the presence of appetitive stimuli) in the context of PPU is largely unexplored.

Methods

This study investigated differences between individuals with high versus low problem severity of PPU regarding decision making and executive functions. The sample of the laboratory study consisted of N = 102 male adults. Besides measures of trait impulsivity, we used standard neuropsychological tests (Trail Making Test and three-back working memory task) and an intertemporal risky choice paradigm, the Cards & Lottery Task (CLT).

Results

The results show heightened impulsivity (urgency and deficits in perseverance) in individuals with high PPU, but no differences regarding performance in the CLT and executive function tasks.

Discussion

The findings indicate that PPU might be associated with impulsive behavior when experiencing strong emotions (urgency) and deficient cognitive performance especially in the presence of sexual stimuli but not in general.

On the Anatomy of Health-related Actions for Which People Could Reasonably be Held Responsible: A Framework

Should we let personal responsibility for health-related behavior influence the allocation of healthcare resources? In this paper, we clarify what it means to be responsible for an action. We rely on a crucial conceptual distinction between being responsible and holding someone responsible, and show that even though we might be considered responsible and blameworthy for our health-related actions, there could still be well-justified reasons for not considering it reasonable to hold us responsible by giving us lower priority. We transform these philosophical considerations into analytical use first by assessing the general features of health-related actions and the corresponding healthcare needs. Then, we identify clusters of structural features that even adversely affected people cannot reasonably deny constitute actions for which they should be held responsible. We summarize the results in an analytical framework that can be used by decision-makers when considering personal responsibility for health as a criterion for setting priorities.

Measuring feelings about choices and risks: The Berlin Emotional Responses to Risk Instrument (BERRI)

We introduce a brief instrument specifically validated for measuring positive and negative feelings about risks-the Berlin Emotional Responses to Risk Instrument (BERRI). Based on seven studies involving diverse adults from three countries (n = 2120), the BERRI was found to robustly estimate anticipatory affective reactions derived from subjective evaluations of positive (i.e., assured, hopeful, and relieved) and negative emotions (i.e., anxious, afraid, and worried). The brief BERRI outperformed a 14-item assessment, uniquely tracking costs/benefits associated with cancer screening among men and women (Studies 1 and 2). Predictive validity was further documented in paradigmatic risky choice studies wherein options varied over probabilities and severities across six contexts (health, social, financial, technological, ethical, and environmental; Study 3). Studies 4-6, conducted during the Ebola epidemic and COVID-19 pandemic, indicated BERRI responses were sensitive to subtle effects caused by emotion-related framing manipulations presented in different cultures and languages (the United States, Spain, and Poland). Study 7 indicated BERRI responses remained stable for 2 weeks. Although the BERRI can provide an estimate of overall affect, choices were generally better explained by the unique influences of positive and negative affect. Overall, results suggest the novel, brief instrument can be an efficient tool for high-stakes research on decision making and risk communication.

The association between experience-based risky choice and mathematical ability

Mathematical ability has always been considered an important influencing factor in description-based risky choices. Experience-based risky choices, which occur frequently in daily life, are very different from description-based risky choices. The association between experience-based risky choice and mathematical ability remains unknown. This study adopts the feedback paradigm for experience-based risky choice to explore the association between multiple mathematical abilities and experience-based risky choice. The results show that, in experience-based risky choice, mathematical ability did not influence the decision to pursue higher expected value, but it did influence preference for risky. Thus, our study contributes to a more comprehensive view of mathematical ability and risky choice.

Differential transcriptome profile underlying risky choice in a rat gambling task

BACKGROUND AND AIMS

Proper measurement of expected risk is important for making rational decisions, and maladaptive decision making may underlie various psychiatric disorders. However, differentially expressed genetic profiling involved in this process is still largely unknown. A rodent version of the gambling task (rGT) has been developed to measure decision-making by adopting the same principle of Iowa Gambling Task in humans. In the present study, we examined using next-generation sequencing (NGS) technique whether there are differences in gene expression profiles in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the nucleus accumbens (NAc) when rats make different choices toward risk in rGT.

METHODS

Rats were trained in a touch screen chamber to learn the relationships between 4 different light signals on the window of the screen and accompanied reward outcomes or punishments set up with different magnitudes and probabilities. Once they showed a stabilized pattern of preference upon free choice, rats were classified into risk-averse or risk-seeking groups. After performing the rGT, rats were decapitated, the mPFC and the NAc was dissected out, and NGS was performed with the total RNA extracted.

RESULTS

We found that 477 and 36 genes were differentially expressed (approximately 75 and 83% out of them were downregulated) in the mPFC and the NAc, respectively, in risk-seeking compared to risk-averse rats. Among those, we suggested a few top ranked genes that may contribute to promoting risky choices.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Our findings provide insights into transcriptional components underlying risky choices in rats.

The Influence of Trait Emotion and Spatial Distance on Risky Choice Under the Framework of Gain and Loss

In the time of the COVID-19 pandemic, people are often faced with uncertain risky choice. Risky choice will be affected by different descriptions of the event's gain or loss framework, this phenomenon is known as the framing effect. With the continuous expansion and in-depth study of frame effects in the field of risky choice, researchers have found that the are quite different in different situations. People have different interpretations of the same event at different psychological distances, and will also be affected by their own emotions. Therefore, the current study examines the common influence of task frame, spatial distance, and trait emotion on risky choice through two studies. Study 1 used a 2 (framework: gain vs. loss) × 2 (trait sentiment: high vs. low) inter-subject design, and the dependent variable is the choice of the rescue plan for the classic "Asian disease" problem. The results revealed that trait anger did not predict individuals' risky choice preferences, and high trait anxiety led individuals to be more risk-averse. The framing effect exists in risky choice, and individuals prefer risk seeking in the loss frame. Study 2 used a 2 (spatial distance: distant vs. proximal) × 2 (framework: gain vs. loss) × 2 (trait sentiment: high vs. low) three-factor inter-subject design in which the dependent variable is the choice of rescue plan. The results indicate that the framing effect also exists in risky choice, and individuals prefer risk seeking in a loss frame. High trait anxiety lead individuals to be more risk-averse, while trait anger has no significant predictive effect on risk preference. Distant spatial distance lead individuals to increase their preference for risk-seeking under the gain frame, which leads to the disappearance of the framing effect. In conclusion, trait anxiety and spatial distance have a certain degree of influence on risky choice under the framework of gain and loss.

Empirical underidentification in estimating random utility models: The role of choice sets and standardizations

A standard approach to distinguishing people's risk preferences is to estimate a random utility model using a power utility function to characterize the preferences and a logit function to capture choice consistency. We demonstrate that with often-used choice situations, this model suffers from empirical underidentification, meaning that parameters cannot be estimated precisely. With simulations of estimation accuracy and Kullback-Leibler divergence measures we examined factors that potentially mitigate this problem. First, using a choice set that guarantees a switch in the utility order between two risky gambles in the range of plausible values leads to higher estimation accuracy than randomly created choice sets or the purpose-built choice sets common in the literature. Second, parameter estimates are regularly correlated, which contributes to empirical underidentification. Examining standardizations of the utility scale, we show that they mitigate this correlation and additionally improve the estimation accuracy for choice consistency. Yet, they can have detrimental effects on the estimation accuracy of risk preference. Finally, we also show how repeated versus distinct choice sets and an increase in observations affect estimation accuracy. Together, these results should help researchers make informed design choices to estimate parameters in the random utility model more precisely.

Increased Risky Choice and Reduced CHRNB2 Expression in Adult Male Rats Exposed to Nicotine Vapor

While the cognitive enhancing effects of nicotine use have been well documented, it has also been shown to impair decision making. The goal of this study was to determine if exposure to nicotine vapor increases risky decision making. The study also aims to investigate possible long-term effects of nicotine vapor exposure on the expression of genes coding for cholinergic and dopaminergic receptors in brain. Thirty-two adult male Sprague Dawley rats were exposed to 24 mg/mL nicotine vapor or vehicle control, immediately followed by testing in the probability discounting task for 10 consecutive days. Fifty-four days after the 10-day vapor exposure, animals were sacrificed and expression of genes coding for the α4 and β2 cholinergic receptor subunits, and dopamine D1 and D2 receptors, were analyzed using RT-PCR. Exposure to nicotine vapor caused an immediate and transient increase in risky choice. Analyses of gene expression identified significant reductions in CHRNB2 and DRD1 in the nucleus accumbens core and CHRNB2 and DRD2 in the medial prefrontal cortex of rats previously exposed to nicotine vapor, relative to vehicle controls. Results provide data on the negative cognitive effects of nicotine vapor exposure and identify cholinergic and dopaminergic mechanisms that may affected with repeated use.

Reward-Related Decision-Making in Current and Past Disordered Gambling: Implications for Impulsive Choice and Risk Preference in the Maintenance of Gambling Disorder

Impulsive reward-related decision-making (RRDM) is robustly associated with gambling disorder (GD), although its role in the development and perpetuation of GD is still being investigated. This project sought to examine the possible roles of impulsive and risky choice, two aspects of RRDM, in the perpetuation of GD. Additionally, the potential moderating role of comorbid substance misuse was considered. A total of 434 participants with symptoms of current GD and symptoms of concurrent substance use disorder (SUD; n = 105), current GD with past SUD (n = 98), past GD with current SUD (n = 53), or past GD with past substance use disorder (SUD; n = 92), and 96 healthy controls were recruited through MTurk. Participants completed a randomly adjusting delay discounting (a measure of impulsive choice) and probabilistic discounting (a measure of risky choice) task and self-report questionnaires of gambling participation, GD and SUD symptomology, and trait impulsivity. Although control participants showed significantly greater delay discounting compared to individuals with a current or history of GD, no significant group differences emerged between individuals with current GD or a history of GD. Individuals with current GD showed significantly less probabilistic discounting compared to individuals with a history of GD and control participants showed the greatest rates of probabilistic discounting. These effects remained after controlling for lifetime gambling symptom severity and trait impulsivity. Overall, these findings suggest a potential maintaining role of risky choice in gambling disorder, but do not support a maintaining role for impulsive choice.

Influence of the Manner of Information Presentation on Risky Choice

We are constantly faced with decisive situations in which the options are not presented simultaneously. How the information of options is presented might influence the subsequent decision-making. For instance, presenting the information of options in an alternative- or dimension-wise manner may affect searching patterns and thus lead to different choices. In this study, the effects of this manner of information presentation on risky choice according to two experiments (Experiment 1, N = 45; Experiment 2, N = 50) are systematically examined. Specifically, two tasks with different presentation are conducted. Participants could search the information of one option (alternative-wise task) or dimension (dimension-wise task) for each time. Results revealed that the participants assigned in the alternative-wise task exhibited more choices consistent with expected value theory and took a longer decision time than those in the dimension-wise task. Moreover, the effect of task on choice was mediated by the direction of information search. These findings suggest a relationship between information search pattern and risky choice and allow for a better understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved in risky choice.

"I Feel Therefore I Decide": Effect of Negative Emotions on Temporal Discounting and Probability Discounting

Temporal and probability discounting are considered two fundamental constructs in economic science, as they are associated with phenomena with major societal impact and a variety of sub-optimal behaviors and clinical conditions. Although it is well known that positive and negative affective states bear important cognitive/behavioral consequences, the effect of emotional experiences on decision-making remains unclear due to the existence of many conflicting results. Inspired by the need to understand if and to what extent the current COVID-19 pandemic has determined changes in our decision-making processes by means of the unusual, prolonged experience of negative feelings, in this study we investigate the effect of anger, fear, sadness, physical and moral disgust on intertemporal and risky choices. Results show that all emotions significantly increase subjects' preferences for immediate rewards over delayed ones, and for risky rewards over certain ones, in comparison to a "neutral emotion" condition, although the magnitude of the effect differs across emotions. In particular, we observed a more pronounced effect in the case of sadness and moral disgust. These findings contribute to the literature on emotions and decision-making by offering an alternative explanation to the traditional motivational appraisal theories. Specifically, we propose that the increased preference for immediate gratification and risky outcomes serves as a mechanism of self-reward aimed at down-regulating negative feelings and restore the individual's "emotional balance".

How top-down and bottom-up attention modulate risky choice

We examine how bottom-up (or stimulus-driven) and top-down (or goal-driven) processes govern the distribution of attention in risky choice. In three experiments, participants chose between a certain payoff and the chance of receiving a payoff drawn randomly from an array of eight numbers. We tested the hypothesis that initial attention is driven by perceptual properties of the stimulus (e.g., font size of the numbers), but subsequent choice is goal-driven (e.g., win the best outcome). Two experiments in which task framing (goal driven) and font size (stimulus driven) were manipulated demonstrated that payoffs with the highest values and the largest font sizes had the greatest impact on choice. The third experiment added a number in large font to the array, which could not be an outcome of the gamble (i.e., a distractor). Eye movement and choice data indicated that although the distractor attracted attention, it had no influence on option selection. Together with computational modeling analyses, the results suggest that perceptual salience can induce bottom-up effects of overt selection but that the perceived value of information is the crucial arbiter of intentional control over risky choice.

Three Theories of Choice and Their Psychology of Losses

Loss aversion has long been regarded as a fundamental psychological regularity, yet evidence has accumulated to challenge this conclusion. We review three theories of how people make decisions under risk and, as a consequence, value potential losses: expected-utility theory, prospect theory, and risk-sensitivity theory. These theories, which stem from different behavioral disciplines, differ in how they conceptualize value and thus differ in their assumptions about the degree to which value is dependent on state and context; ultimately, they differ in the extent to which they see loss aversion as a stable individual trait or as a response to particular circumstances. We highlight points of confusion that have at least partly fueled the debate on the reality of loss aversion and discuss four sources of conflicting views: confusion of loss aversion with risk aversion, conceptualization of loss aversion as a trait or as state dependent, conceptualization of loss aversion as context dependent or independent, and the attention-aversion gap-the observation that people invest more attentional resources when evaluating losses than when evaluating gains, even when their choices do not reveal loss aversion.

Flexible Utility Function Approximation via Cubic Bezier Splines

In intertemporal and risky choice decisions, parametric utility models are widely used for predicting choice and measuring individuals' impulsivity and risk aversion. However, parametric utility models cannot describe data deviating from their assumed functional form. We propose a novel method using cubic Bezier splines (CBS) to flexibly model smooth and monotonic utility functions that can be fit to any dataset. CBS shows higher descriptive and predictive accuracy over extant parametric models and can identify common yet novel patterns of behavior that are inconsistent with extant parametric models. Furthermore, CBS provides measures of impulsivity and risk aversion that do not depend on parametric model assumptions.

Effects of winning cues and relative payout on choice between simulated slot machines

BACKGROUND AND AIMS

Cues associated with winning may encourage gambling. We assessed the effects on risky choice of slot machine of: (1) neutral sounds paired with winning, (2) casino-related cues (such as the sound of coins dropping and pictures of dollar signs) and (3) relative payouts.

DESIGN

Experimental studies in which participants repeatedly chose between safer and riskier simulated slot machines. Safer slot machines paid the same amount regardless of which symbols lined up. Risky machines paid different amounts depending on which symbols lined up. Effects of initially neutral sounds paired with the best payout were assessed between-groups (experiment 1a) and within-participants (experiment 1b). In experiment 2, pairing of casino-related audiovisual cues with payout was assessed within participants, and cue timing was assessed between groups.

SETTING

A university research laboratory in Edmonton, Canada.

PARTICIPANTS

Undergraduate students (n = 630 across three experiments).

MEASUREMENTS

Preference for riskier over safer machines, preference between machines that differed in cues, payout recall and frequency estimates for payouts. Risky choice was calculated as the proportion of choices of the risky machine when presented with a fixed machine of the same expected value.

FINDINGS

In experiment 1a, risky choice was slightly increased by pairing a sound with the best payout compared with pairing the sound with a lower payout (P = 0.04, d = 0.28) but not compared with no sound [P = 0.36, d = 0.13, Bayes factors (BF)₁₀  = 0.22]. In experiment 1b, people did not prefer a machine with a best-payout sound over one with a lower-payout sound (P = 0.67, d = 0.03, BF₁₀  = 0.11). Relative payout affected choice: risky choices were higher for high- than low-payout decisions (P < 0.001, d = 0.53). In experiment 2, people preferred machines with casino-related cues paired with winning (P < 0.001, r²  = 0.11) and cue timing (at choice or concurrently with the win) had no effect (P = 0.95, r²  = 0.0, BF₁₀  = 0.05). Casino-related cues also enhanced payout memory (P = 0.013 and 0.006). Cue effects were not specific to risk: people also preferred fixed-payout machines with casino-related cues (P < 0.001, r²  = 0.16).

CONCLUSIONS

In a gambling simulation, student participants chose more risky slot machines when payouts were relatively higher and when casino-related cues were associated with payouts. Pairing a neutral sound with the best payout did not consistently affect slot machine choice, and the effect of casino cues did not depend on their timing. Casino-related cues enhanced payout memory.

Entrepreneurship: Tenacity, Future Self-Continuity, and Inter-Temporal Risky Choice

This study examines entrepreneurship. It focuses on the effect of tenacity and future self-continuity (FSC) on inter-temporal risky choice in the entrepreneurial context. A total of 129 Chinese undergraduates participated in this survey. The results formulate that tenacity positively correlates with the risky choices and inter-temporal risky choices, in which commitment, endurance, and challenge play a major role. Meanwhile, FSC predicts the risk-return of the subjects. Higher FSC corresponds to higher expected inter-temporal risk-return. Furthermore, the multivariable regression analysis shows that there is a reciprocal effect when tenacity and FSC work together on subjects’ inter-temporal risky decision-making. FSC slightly mitigates both the pursuit of risky-return and the tolerance of time delay for the subjects with high tenacity. This implies that their worthwhile goal is to seek smooth income rather than to pursue an extreme high risk-return. These findings extend the research on personality, choice, and entrepreneurship and provide a guiding significance to the start-up.

Heuristics and optimal solutions to the breadth-depth dilemma

In multialternative risky choice, we are often faced with the opportunity to allocate our limited information-gathering capacity between several options before receiving feedback. In such cases, we face a natural trade-off between breadth-spreading our capacity across many options-and depth-gaining more information about a smaller number of options. Despite its broad relevance to daily life, including in many naturalistic foraging situations, the optimal strategy in the breadth-depth trade-off has not been delineated. Here, we formalize the breadth-depth dilemma through a finite-sample capacity model. We find that, if capacity is small (∼10 samples), it is optimal to draw one sample per alternative, favoring breadth. However, for larger capacities, a sharp transition is observed, and it becomes best to deeply sample a very small fraction of alternatives, which roughly decreases with the square root of capacity. Thus, ignoring most options, even when capacity is large enough to shallowly sample all of them, is a signature of optimal behavior. Our results also provide a rich casuistic for metareasoning in multialternative decisions with bounded capacity using close-to-optimal heuristics.

Dopamine and Risky Decision-Making in Gambling Disorder

Gambling disorder is a behavioral addiction associated with impairments in value-based decision-making and cognitive control. These functions are thought to be regulated by dopamine within fronto-striatal circuits, but the role of altered dopamine neurotransmission in the etiology of gambling disorder remains controversial. Preliminary evidence suggests that increasing frontal dopamine tone might improve cognitive functioning in gambling disorder. We therefore examined whether increasing frontal dopamine tone via a single dose of the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) inhibitor tolcapone would reduce risky choice in human gamblers (n = 14) in a randomized double-blind placebo-controlled crossover study. Data were analyzed using hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation and a combined risky choice drift diffusion model (DDM). Model comparison revealed a nonlinear mapping from value differences to trial-wise drift rates, confirming recent findings. An increase in risk-taking under tolcapone versus placebo was about five times more likely, given the data, than a decrease [Bayes factor (BF) = 0.2]. Examination of drug effects on diffusion model parameters revealed that an increase in the value dependency of the drift rate under tolcapone was about thirteen times more likely than a decrease (BF = 0.073). In contrast, a reduction in the maximum drift rate under tolcapone was about seven times more likely than an increase (BF = 7.51). Results add to previous work on COMT inhibitors in behavioral addictions and to mounting evidence for the applicability of diffusion models in value-based decision-making. Future work should focus on individual genetic, clinical and cognitive factors that might account for heterogeneity in the effects of COMT inhibition.

Using a dependent schedule to measure risky choice in male rats: Effects of d-amphetamine, methylphenidate, and methamphetamine

Risky choice is the tendency to choose a large, uncertain reward over a small, certain reward, and is typically measured with probability discounting, in which the probability of obtaining the large reinforcer decreases across blocks of trials. One caveat to traditional procedures is that independent schedules are used, in which subjects can show exclusive preference for one alternative relative to the other. For example, some rats show exclusive preference for the small, certain reinforcer as soon as delivery of the large reinforcer becomes probabilistic. Therefore, determining if a drug increases risk aversion (i.e., decreases responding for the probabilistic alternative) is difficult (due to floor effects). The overall goal of this experiment was to use a concurrent-chains procedure that incorporated a dependent schedule during the initial link, thus preventing animals from showing exclusive preference for one alternative relative to the other. To determine how pharmacological manipulations alter performance in this task, male Sprague-Dawley rats (n = 8) received injections of amphetamine (0, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0 mg/kg), methylphenidate (0, 0.3, 1.0, 3.0 mg/kg), and methamphetamine (0, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0 mg/kg). Amphetamine (0.25 mg/kg) and methylphenidate (3.0 mg/kg) selectively increased risky choice, whereas higher doses of amphetamine (0.5 and 1.0 kg/mg) and each dose of methamphetamine impaired stimulus control (i.e., flattened the discounting function). These results show that dependent schedules can be used to measure risk-taking behavior and that psychostimulants promote suboptimal choice when this schedule is used. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Stress-related changes in financial risk taking: Considering joint effects of cortisol and affect

Many decisions under risk and uncertainty are made under physical or emotional stress. A recent meta-analysis suggested that stress reliably influences risk taking but did not find a relation between single measures of stress such as cortisol and risk taking. One reason for the conflicting findings could be that the influence of stress on risk taking depends not only on physiological but also on psychological stress responses, in particular affective valence. We tested this hypothesis in an exploratory empirical study: Seventy participants worked on a financial risk-taking task. In half of the participants acute stress was induced with a cold pressor task. For all participants we measured cortisol and α-amylase levels, blood pressure, subjective arousal, and affective valence before and after the task. The stress induction increased participants' levels of cortisol, subjective arousal, and systolic blood pressure but did not directly influence negative affect or risky decision making. Examining the interplay between physiological and psychological stress responses, a moderation analysis revealed an interaction between stress induction and affect valence: Negative affect predicted an increase in risk-seeking decision making in the stress condition, but not in the control group. A similar moderation was found with cortisol reactivity, that is, negative affect predicted an increase in risk-seeking decision making in participants with high cortisol reactivity but not in participants with low cortisol reactivity. These results suggest that the effect of stress on risky decision making depends on the interplay of affective valence and cortisol reactivity.

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex computes task-invariant relative subjective value for self and other

Few studies have addressed the neural computations underlying decisions made for others despite the importance of this ubiquitous behavior. Using participant-specific behavioral modeling with univariate and multivariate fMRI approaches, we investigated the neural correlates of decision-making for self and other in two independent tasks, including intertemporal and risky choice. Modeling subjective valuation indicated that participants distinguished between themselves and others with dissimilar preferences. Activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was consistently modulated by relative subjective value. Multi-voxel pattern analysis indicated that activity in the dmPFC uniquely encoded relative subjective value and generalized across self and other and across both tasks. Furthermore, agent cross-decoding accuracy between self and other in the dmPFC was related to self-reported social attitudes. These findings indicate that the dmPFC emerges as a medial prefrontal node that utilizes a task-invariant mechanism for computing relative subjective value for self and other.

Examining the neurochemical underpinnings of animal models of risky choice: Methodological and analytic considerations

Because risky choice is associated with several psychiatric conditions, recent research has focused on examining the underlying neurochemical processes that control risk-based decision-making. Not surprisingly, several tasks have been developed to study the neural mechanisms involved in risky choice. The current review will briefly discuss the major tasks used to measure risky choice and will summarize the contribution of several major neurotransmitter systems to this behavior. To date, the most common measures of risky choice are the probability discounting task, the risky decision task, and the rat gambling task. Across these three tasks, the contribution of the dopaminergic system has been most studied, although the effects of serotonergic, adrenergic, cholinergic, and glutamatergic ligands will be discussed. Drug effects across these tasks have been inconsistent, which makes determining the precise role of neurotransmitter systems in risky choice somewhat difficult. Furthermore, procedural differences can modulate drug effects in these procedures, and the way data are analyzed can alter the interpretations one makes concerning pharmacological manipulations. By taking these methodological/analytic considerations into account, we may better elucidate the neurochemistry of risky decision-making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Neural Dynamics of Processing Probability Weight and Monetary Magnitude in the Evaluation of a Risky Reward

Risky decision-making involves risky reward valuation, choice, and feedback processes. However, the temporal dynamics of risky reward processing are not well understood. Using event-related brain potential, we investigated the neural correlates of probability weight and money magnitude in the evaluation of a risky reward. In this study, each risky choice consisted of two risky options, which were presented serially to separate decision-making and option evaluation processes. The early P200 component reflected the process of probability weight, not money magnitude. The medial frontal negativity (MFN) reflected both probability weight and money magnitude processes. The late positive potential (LPP) only reflected the process of probability weight. These results demonstrate distinct temporal dynamics for probability weight and money magnitude processes when evaluating a risky outcome, providing a better understanding of the possible mechanism underlying risky reward processing.

A formal model of fuzzy-trace theory: Variations on framing effects and the Allais paradox

Fuzzy-trace theory assumes that decision-makers process qualitative "gist" representations and quantitative "verbatim" representations in parallel. We develop a lattice model of fuzzy-trace theory that explains both processes. Specifically, the model provides a novel formalization of how: 1) decision-makers encode multiple representations of options in parallel; 2) representations compete or combine so that choices often turn on the simplest representation of encoded gists; and 3) choices between representations are made based on positive vs. negative valences associated with social and moral principles stored in long-term memory (e.g., saving lives is good). The model integrates effects of individual differences in numeracy, metacognitive monitoring and editing, and sensation seeking. We conducted a systematic review of variations on framing effects and the Allais Paradox, both core phenomena of risky decision-making, and tested whether our model could predict observed choices: The model successfully predicted 82 out of 88 (93%) pairs of studies (comparing gain to loss conditions) demonstrating 16 variations on effects, theoretically critical manipulations that eliminate or exaggerate framing effects. When examining these conditions individually, the model successfully predicted 153 (90%) out of 170 eligible studies. Parameters of the model varied in theoretically meaningful ways with differences in numeracy, metacognitive monitoring, and sensation seeking, accounting for risk preferences at the group level. New experiments show similar results at the individual level. The model is also shown to be scientifically parsimonious using standard measures. Relations to current theories, such as Cumulative Prospect Theory, and potential extensions are discussed.

Cognitive Style and Frame Susceptibility in Decision-Making

The susceptibility of decision-makers' choices to variations in option framing has been attributed to individual differences in cognitive style. According to this view, individuals who are prone to a more deliberate, or less intuitive, thinking style are less susceptible to framing manipulations. Research findings on the topic, however, have tended to yield small effects, with several studies also being limited in inferential value by methodological drawbacks. We report two experiments that examined the value of several cognitive-style variables, including measures of cognitive reflection, subjective numeracy, actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition, and hemispheric dominance, in predicting participants' frame-consistent choices. Our experiments used an isomorph of the Asian Disease Problem and we manipulated frames between participants. We controlled for participants' sex and age, and we manipulated the order in which choice options were presented to participants. In Experiment 1 (N = 190) using an undergraduate sample and in Experiment 2 (N = 316) using a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, we found no significant effect of any of the cognitive-style measures taken on predicting frame-consistent choice, regardless of whether we analyzed participants' binary choices or their choices weighted by the extent to which participants preferred their chosen option over the non-chosen option. The sole factor that significantly predicted frame-consistent choice was framing: in both experiments, participants were more likely to make frame-consistent choices when the frame was positive than when it was negative, consistent with the tendency toward risk aversion in the task. The present findings do not support the view that individual differences in people's susceptibility to framing manipulations can be substantially accounted for by individual differences in cognitive style.

Leave or Stay as a Risky Choice: Effects of Salary Reference Points and Anchors on Turnover Intention

Within a risky choice framework, we examine how multiple reference points and anchors regulate pay perception and turnover intentions in real organizational contexts with actual employees. We hypothesize that the salary range is psychologically demarcated by three reference points into four regions, the minimum requirement (MR), the status quo (SQ), and the goal (G). Three studies were conducted: Study 1 analyzed the relationship between turnover intention and the subjective likelihood of falling into each of four expected salary regions; Study 2 tested the mediating effect of pay satisfaction on salary reference point-dependent turnover intention; and Study 3 explored the anchoring effect of estimated peer salaries. The results show that turnover intention was higher in the region below MR or between SQ and G but lower in the region above G or between MR and SQ. That is, turnover intention can be high even in situations of salary raise, if the raise is below a salary goal (i.e., leaving for a lack of opportunity) and low even in situations of salary loss, if the expected salary is still above the MR (i.e., staying for security). In addition, turnover intention was regulated by pay satisfaction and peer salaries. In conclusion, turnover intention can be viewed as a risky choice adapted to salary reference points.

Mechanisms Underlying Dopamine-Induced Risky Choice in Parkinson's Disease With and Without Depression (History)

Patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) are often treated with dopaminergic medication. Dopaminergic medication is known to improve both motor and certain nonmotor symptoms, such as depression. However, it can contribute to behavioral impairment, for example, by enhancing risky choice. Here we characterize the computational mechanisms that contribute to dopamine-induced changes in risky choice in PD patients with and without a depression (history). We adopt a clinical–neuroeconomic approach to investigate the effects of dopaminergic medication on specific components of risky choice in PD. Twenty-three healthy controls, 21 PD patients with a depression (history), and 22 nondepressed PD patients were assessed using a well-established risky choice paradigm. Patients were tested twice: once after taking their normal dopaminergic medication and once after withdrawal of their medication. Dopaminergic medication increased a value-independent gambling propensity in nondepressed PD patients, while leaving loss aversion unaffected. By contrast, dopaminergic medication effects on loss aversion were associated with current depression severity and with drug effects on depression scores. The present findings demonstrate that dopaminergic medication increases a value-independent gambling bias in nondepressed PD patients. Moreover, the current study raises the hypothesis that dopamine-induced reductions in loss aversion might underlie previously observed comorbidity between depression and medication-related side effects in PD, such as impulse control disorder.

Noisy preferences in risky choice: A cautionary note

We examine the effects of multiple sources of noise in risky decision making. Noise in the parameters that characterize an individual's preferences can combine with noise in the response process to distort observed choice proportions. Thus, underlying preferences that conform to expected value maximization can appear to show systematic risk aversion or risk seeking. Similarly, core preferences that are consistent with expected utility theory, when perturbed by such noise, can appear to display nonlinear probability weighting. For this reason, modal choices cannot be used simplistically to infer underlying preferences. Quantitative model fits that do not allow for both sorts of noise can lead to wrong conclusions. (PsycINFO Database Record

Children's preference for mixed- versus fixed-ratio schedules of reinforcement: A translational study of risky choice

Laboratory research has shown that when subjects are given a choice between fixed-ratio and bi-valued mixed-ratio schedules of reinforcement, preference typically emerges for the mixed-ratio schedule even with a larger ratio requirement. The current study sought to replicate and extend these findings to children's math problem completion. Using an ABCBC reversal design, four fourth-grade students were given the choice of completing addition problems reinforced on either a fixed-ratio 5 schedule or one of three mixed-ratio schedules; an equivalent mixed-ratio (1, 9) schedule, a mixed-ratio (1, 11) schedule with a 20% larger ratio requirement, and an equally lean mixed-ratio (5, 7) schedule without the small fixed-ratio 1 component. This was followed by a reversal back to the preceding phase in which preference for the mixed-ratio schedule had been observed, and a final reversal back to the mixed-ratio (5, 7) phase. Findings were consistent with previous research in that all children preferred the mixed-ratio (1, 9) schedule over the equivalent fixed-ratio 5 schedule. Preference persisted for the leaner mixed-ratio (1, 11) schedule for three of the four children. Indifference or preference for the fixed-ratio 5 alternative was observed in phases containing the mixed-ratio (5, 7) schedule. These results extend previous research on risky choice to children's math problem completion and highlight the importance of a small ratio component in the emergence of preference for bi-valued mixed-ratio schedules. Implications of these results for arranging reinforcement to increase children's academic responding are discussed.

ERP Correlates of Verbal and Numerical Probabilities in Risky Choices: A Two-Stage Probability Processing View

Two kinds of probability expressions, verbal and numerical, have been used to characterize the uncertainty that people face. However, the question of whether verbal and numerical probabilities are cognitively processed in a similar manner remains unresolved. From a levels-of-processing perspective, verbal and numerical probabilities may be processed differently during early sensory processing but similarly in later semantic-associated operations. This event-related potential (ERP) study investigated the neural processing of verbal and numerical probabilities in risky choices. The results showed that verbal probability and numerical probability elicited different N1 amplitudes but that verbal and numerical probabilities elicited similar N2 and P3 waveforms in response to different levels of probability (high to low). These results were consistent with a levels-of-processing framework and suggest some internal consistency between the cognitive processing of verbal and numerical probabilities in risky choices. Our findings shed light on possible mechanism underlying probability expression and may provide the neural evidence to support the translation of verbal to numerical probabilities (or vice versa).

Greater decision-making competence is associated with greater expected-value sensitivity, but not overall risk taking: an examination of concurrent validity

Decision-making competence reflects individual differences in the susceptibility to committing decision-making errors, measured using tasks common from behavioral decision research (e.g., framing effects, under/overconfidence, following decision rules). Prior research demonstrates that those with higher decision-making competence report lower incidence of health-risking and antisocial behaviors, but there has been less focus on intermediate processes that may impact real-world decisions, and, in particular, those implicated by normative models. Here we test the associations between measures of youth decision-making competence (Y-DMC) and one such process, the degree to which individuals make choices consistent with maximizing expected value (EV). Using a task involving hypothetical gambles, we find that greater EV sensitivity is associated with greater Y-DMC. Higher Y-DMC scores are associated with (a) choosing risky options when EV favors those options and (b) avoiding risky options when EV favors a certain option. This relationship is stronger for gambles that involved potential losses. The results suggest that Y-DMC captures decision processes consistent with standard normative evaluations of risky decisions.

Mechanisms of Individual Differences in Impulsive and Risky Choice in Rats

Individual differences in impulsive and risky choice are key risk factors for a variety of maladaptive behaviors such as drug abuse, gambling, and obesity. In our rat model, ordered individual differences are stable across choice parameters, months of testing, and span a broad spectrum, suggesting that rats, like humans, exhibit trait-level impulsive and risky choice behaviors. In addition, impulsive and risky choices are highly correlated, suggesting a degree of correlation between these two traits. An examination of the underlying cognitive mechanisms has suggested an important role for timing processes in impulsive choice. In addition, in an examination of genetic factors in impulsive choice, the Lewis rat strain emerged as a possible animal model for studying disordered impulsive choice, with this strain demonstrating deficient delay processing. Early rearing environment also affected impulsive behaviors, with rearing in an enriched environment promoting adaptable and more self-controlled choices. The combined results with impulsive choice suggest an important role for timing and reward sensitivity in moderating impulsive behaviors. Relative reward valuation also affects risky choice, with manipulation of objective reward value (relative to an alternative reference point) resulting in loss chasing behaviors that predicted overall risky choice behaviors. The combined results are discussed in relation to domain-specific versus domain-general subjective reward valuation processes and the potential neural substrates of impulsive and risky choice.

Decision making in young people at familial risk of depression

BACKGROUND

Major depression is associated with abnormalities in reward processing at neural and behavioural levels. Neural abnormalities in reward have been described in young people at familial risk of depression but behavioural changes in reward-based decision making have been less studied in this group.

METHOD

We studied 63 young people (mean age 18.9 years) with a parent with a diagnosis of major depression but who had never been depressed themselves, that is with a positive family history of depression (the FH+ group). Participants performed the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT), which provides several measures of decision making including deliberation time, quality of decision making, risk taking, risk adjustment and delay aversion. A control group of 49 age- and gender-matched young people with no history of mood disorder in a first-degree relative undertook the same task.

RESULTS

Both FH+ participants and controls had low and equivalent scores on anxiety and depression self-rating scales. Compared to controls, the FH+ participants showed overall lower risk taking, although like controls they made more risky choices as the odds of a favourable outcome increased. No other measures of decision making differed between the two groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Young people at increased familial risk of depression have altered risk taking that is not accounted for by current affective symptomatology. Lowered risk taking might represent an impairment in reward seeking, which is one of several changes in reward-based behaviours seen in acutely depressed patients; however, our findings suggest that decreased reward seeking could be part of a risk endophenotype for depression.

Impulsivity, risk-taking, and distractibility in rats exhibiting robust conditioned orienting behaviors

When a neutral cue is followed by a significant event such as food delivery, some animals become engaged with the cue itself and acquire cue-directed behaviors. One type of cue-directed behavior is observed following insertion of a lever used as a conditioned stimulus (CS). Rats showing robust approach behavior to the lever also display impulsivity and altered attention, as compared to rats showing behavior directed toward the reward delivery location. The current study used a light CS to categorize rats' propensity for cue-directed behavior, and assessed whether individual differences in impulsivity and related behaviors still emerged. During the light-food pairings, some rats displayed enhanced rearing or orienting to the light (Orienters) prior to showing food cup approach behavior, while other rats only showed food cup approach behavior (Nonorienters). Our results showed that Orienters made more impulsive and risky decisions in two different choice tasks, and were quicker to leave a familiar dark environment to enter a novel bright field. Orienters also showed less accurate target detection when a visual distractor was introduced during an attentional challenge. Our current study suggests that light CS-induced rearing/orienting behavior might not necessarily share an identical mechanism with lever CS-approach behavior in predicting impulsivity-related behaviors.

Testing process predictions of models of risky choice: a quantitative model comparison approach

This article presents a quantitative model comparison contrasting the process predictions of two prominent views on risky choice. One view assumes a trade-off between probabilities and outcomes (or non-linear functions thereof) and the separate evaluation of risky options (expectation models). Another view assumes that risky choice is based on comparative evaluation, limited search, aspiration levels, and the forgoing of trade-offs (heuristic models). We derived quantitative process predictions for a generic expectation model and for a specific heuristic model, namely the priority heuristic (Brandstätter et al., 2006), and tested them in two experiments. The focus was on two key features of the cognitive process: acquisition frequencies (i.e., how frequently individual reasons are looked up) and direction of search (i.e., gamble-wise vs. reason-wise). In Experiment 1, the priority heuristic predicted direction of search better than the expectation model (although neither model predicted the acquisition process perfectly); acquisition frequencies, however, were inconsistent with both models. Additional analyses revealed that these frequencies were primarily a function of what Rubinstein (1988) called “similarity.” In Experiment 2, the quantitative model comparison approach showed that people seemed to rely more on the priority heuristic in difficult problems, but to make more trade-offs in easy problems. This finding suggests that risky choice may be based on a mental toolbox of strategies.

Does fertility status influence impulsivity and risk taking in human females? Adaptive influences on intertemporal choice and risky decision making

Informed by the research on adaptive decision making in other animal species, this study investigated human females' intertemporal and risky choices across the ovulatory cycle. We tested the hypothesis that at peak fertility, women who are exposed to environments that signal availability of higher quality mates (by viewing images of attractive males), become more impulsive and risk-seeking in economic decision tasks. To test this, we collected intertemporal and risky choice measures before and after exposure to images of either attractive males or neutral landscapes both at peak and low fertility conditions. The results showed an interaction between women's fertility status and image type, such that women at peak fertility viewing images of attractive men chose the smaller, sooner monetary reward option less than women at peak fertility viewing neutral images. Neither fertility status nor image type influenced risky choice. Thus, though exposure to images of men altered intertemporal choices at peak fertility, this occurred in the opposite direction than predicted--i.e., women at peak fertility became less impulsive. Nevertheless, the results of the current study provide evidence for shifts in preferences over the ovulatory cycle and opens future research on economic decision making.

Risky choice in pigeons: preference for amount variability using a token-reinforcement system

Pigeons were given repeated choices between variable and fixed numbers of token reinforcers (stimulus lamps arrayed above the response keys), with each earned token exchangeable for food. The number of tokens provided by the fixed-amount option remained constant within blocks of sessions, but varied parametrically across phases, assuming values of 2, 4, 6, or 8 tokens per choice. The number of tokens provided by the variable-amount option varied between 0 and 12 tokens per choice, arranged according to an exponential or rectangular distribution. In general, the pigeons strongly preferred the variable option when the fixed option provided equal or greater numbers of tokens than the variable amount. Preference for the variable amount decreased only when the alternatives provided widely disparate amounts favoring the fixed amount. When tokens were removed from the experimental context, preference for the variable option was reduced or eliminated, suggesting that the token presentation played a key role in maintaining risk-prone choice patterns. Choice latencies varied inversely with preferences, suggesting that local analyses may provide useful ancillary measures of reinforcer value. Overall, the results indicate that systematic risk sensitivity can be attained with respect to reinforcer amount, and that tokens may be critical in the development of such preferences.

Conscious and unconscious thought in risky choice: testing the capacity principle and the appropriate weighting principle of unconscious thought theory

Daily we make decisions ranging from the mundane to the seemingly pivotal that shape our lives. Assuming rationality, all relevant information about one's options should be thoroughly examined in order to make the best choice. However, some findings suggest that under specific circumstances thinking too much has disadvantageous effects on decision quality and that it might be best to let the unconscious do the busy work. In three studies we test the capacity assumption and the appropriate weighting principle of Unconscious Thought Theory using a classic risky choice paradigm and including a "deliberation with information" condition. Although we replicate an advantage for unconscious thought (UT) over "deliberation without information," we find that "deliberation with information" equals or outperforms UT in risky choices. These results speak against the generality of the assumption that UT has a higher capacity for information integration and show that this capacity assumption does not hold in all domains. Furthermore, we show that "deliberate thought with information" leads to more differentiated knowledge compared to UT which speaks against the generality of the appropriate weighting assumption.

Risky choice in pigeons and humans: a cross-species comparison

Pigeon and human subjects were given repeated choices between variable and adjusting delays to token reinforcement that titrated in relation to a subject's recent choice patterns. Indifference curves were generated under two different procedures: immediate exchange, in which a token earned during each trial was exchanged immediately for access to the terminal reinforcer (food for pigeons, video clips for humans), and delayed exchange, in which tokens accumulated and were exchanged after 11 trials. The former was designed as an analogue of procedures typically used with nonhuman subjects, the latter as an analogue to procedures typically used with human participants. Under both procedure types, different variable-delay schedules were manipulated systematically across conditions in ways that altered the reinforcer immediacy of the risky option. Under immediate-exchange conditions, both humans and pigeons consistently preferred the variable delay, and indifference points were generally ordered in relation to relative reinforcer immediacies. Such risk sensitivity was greatly reduced under delayed-exchange conditions. Choice and trial-initiation response latencies varied directly with indifference points, suggesting that local analyses may provide useful ancillary measures of reinforcer value. On the whole, the results indicate that modifying procedural features brings choices of pigeons and humans into better accord, and that human-nonhuman differences on risky choice procedures reported in the literature may be at least partly a product of procedural differences.