Integration is key in consumer-centric approaches

America is in the midst of a consumer revolution. Whereas consumers used to rely on experts to make decisions on their behalf, expertise mediated by technology is increasingly put in the hands of consumers so that they can take control of factors that influence their lives. It has become clear that there is value in a benefit design strategy that encourages consumers to take advantage of the information available to them and to take more control over their care. Benefit design that incorporates clinical evidence and thoughtful incentives for the consumer can be a strategy for achieving both clinical appropriateness and cost effectiveness.

Supplemental health insurance: did Croatia miss an opportunity?

Croatia continues to face a health-funding crisis. A recent supplemental health insurance law increases revenues through first increasing co-payments, then raising the payroll tax to cover those co-payments. This public finance "slight-of-hand" will not solve the system's structural issues and may worsen system performance both in terms of efficiency and equity. Should Croatia have considered private supplemental insurance as an alternative? There is a new single private supplemental health insurance market now evolving over the EU countries and into Eastern Europe. Croatians could take advantage of lowered costs due to larger risk pooling and the lower administrative overhead of mature insurance organizations. Private supplemental insurance, when designed well, can address several objectives, including a) increased revenues into the health sector; b) removal of the public burden of coverage of selected services for certain population groups; and c) encourage new management and organizational innovations into the sector. Private and multiple company insurance markets are thought to be superior in terms of consumer responsiveness; choice of benefits; adoption of new, more expensive technology; and use of private sector providers. Private sector insurers may also encourage "spillover" effects encouraging reforms with public sector insurance performance. There is already an emerging private insurance market in Croatia, but can it be expanded and properly regulated? The private insurance companies might capture as much as 30-70% of the market for certain services, such as high cost procedures, preferred providers, and hotel amenities. But the Government will need to strengthen the regulatory framework for private insurance and assure that there is adequate regulatory capacity.

The nongroup health insurance market: short on facts, long on opinions and policy disputes

Individual health insurance is more administratively costly and more prone to adverse selection (especially in the presence of community rating) than group health coverage is. In this paper we show that the individual market has been shrinking over time but that it might be stimulated if tax credits for such insurance were made available. The primary areas of factual disagreement have to do with the frequency with which individual insurers charge some applicants higher premiums than others (based on health risk), and the effect that premiums related to risk have on the likelihood of insurance purchase at different income levels. The primary area of policy disagreement concerns the value of offering insurance at lower premiums to higher risks relative to the value of making voluntary insurance attractive to lower risks. We argue that a major market failure for individual coverage may be caused by insurers' inability to distinguish some truly low risks. We conclude that the individual market works acceptably well for about 80 percent of potential buyers, but its performance for the remaining 20 percent of low-income or high-risk persons is controversial.

Using tax credits and state high-risk pools to expand health insurance coverage

There are practical proposals now on the public policy table to reduce the number of Americans without health coverage. While they won't make health care free or eliminate the forty million uninsured persons, they would help millions of Americans acquire or improve their health insurance. Practical strategies can also be taken to address access issues for unhealthy persons in the nongroup market through federal assistance to states to establish and improve state high-risk health insurance pools, as well as to make health insurance more affordable for low-income Americans.

Of magic wands and kaleidoscopes: fixing problems in the individual market

Policy analysts sometimes imagine that problems in the individual market can be fixed by waving a magic wand that makes the individual market function more like the group market. However, prior studies reveal that purchasing cooperatives fail to achieve substantial economies of scale; market reforms that reduce the impact of medical underwriting are difficult to implement in the individual market; and it may not be as easy as imagined to induce people to purchase over the Internet or from new or smaller companies that are at higher risk for exiting the market. The best solution is to limit the use of subsidies to certain purchasing options, such as with purchasing cooperatives that abide by rating, issuance, and renewability rules. What is not acceptable is to hand people subsidies and send them to the unstructured and relatively unregulated individual market, nor will it work to give people unhindered choice between two basically different market segments.

Competitive markets for individual health insurance

A more dynamic individual insurance market could match benefits with individual preferences, provide more portable and permanent coverage, and stimulate consumer-focused service. Necessary reforms, such as tax parity and targeted assistance to high-risk pools, would enable individual coverage to expand efficiently. In contrast, requirements for guaranteed issue and community rating drive low-risk persons out of voluntary individual markets and raise overall premiums. Guaranteed renewability and switching costs would stabilize individual-market risk pools. As the individual market becomes more representative of the overall population, insurers' perceived needs to underwrite and market selectively will lessen, making administrative loading factors less significant.

Options and opportunities for individuals and families in the private health insurance market

A variety of options exist for coverage in the individual health insurance market. Coverage is state-regulated; this provides consumers with important access and benefit protection and ensures stability of insurers. Coverage for individuals is based on health history in most states, and most individuals either qualify for coverage or are able to find it through state high-risk pools and other state mechanisms. Since individual-market purchasers do not have an employer contribution to offset the cost of coverage, proposals for refundable tax credits offer great potential for making health insurance coverage more affordable for eligible persons.

One hundred and eighteen years of the German health insurance system: are there any lessons for middle- and low-income countries?

A number of low and middle income countries (LMICs) are considering social health insurance (SHI) for adoption into their social and economic environment or striving to sustain and improve already existing SHI schemes. SHI was first introduced in Germany in 1883. An analysis of the German system from its inception up to today may yield lessons relevant to other countries. Such an analysis, however, is largely lacking, especially with regard to LMICs. This paper attempts to fill this gap. For each of the following lessons, it considers if and under which conditions they may be of relevance to LMICs. First, small, informal, voluntary health insurance schemes may serve as learning models for fund administration and solidarity, but in order to achieve universal coverage government action is needed to formalise these schemes and to introduce a principle of compulsion. Once compulsory health insurance exists for some people, incremental expansion of coverage to other regions and social groups may be feasible to achieve universality. Second, in order to ensure sustainability of SHI, the mandated benefit package should be adapted incrementally in accordance with changing needs, values and economic circumstances. Third. in a pluralistic SHI system equity, as well as risk pooling and spreading, can be enhanced if funds merge. The optimal number of funds, however, will depend on the stage of development of the SHI system as well as on other objectives of the system, including choice and competition. A risk equalisation scheme may prevent the adverse effects of risk selection, if competition between insurance funds is introduced into the system. Fourth, as an alternative to both state and market regulation, self-governance may serve as a source of stability and sustainability as well as a means of decentralising and democratising a health care system. Finally, costs can be successfully contained in a fee-for-service system, if cost-escalating provider behaviour is constrained by either political pressure or technical means.

Is German long-term care insurance a model for the United States?

German long-term care insurance, implemented in 1995, significantly extends the coverage of care-related risks. Given the similarities of German and U.S. institutional features, the German social insurance approach has been put forward as a possible model for long-term care in the United States. Using a political economy framework, the authors conducted a policy analysis that compares the main shortfalls of long-term care (LTC) provision in the United States and Germany, examines the responses provided by LTC insurance in Germany, and relates them to broader trends and proposals for change in welfare policy in both countries. German LTC insurance includes a high degree of consumer direction and compensation and protection for informal caregivers; it supports the extension of community-based services. Its shortfalls include the continued split between health and LTC insurance. In both countries, decentralization and institutional and financial fragmentation are some of the characteristics responsible for the failure to promote egalitarian social policy and substantially expand social protection to family- and care-related risks. The German LTC program is a good model for the United States. With a social insurance approach to LTC, costs are spread across the largest possible risk pool. Major goals that can be reached with such a program include establishment of universal entitlements to LTC benefits, consumer choice, and equitability and uniformity.

The prevalence of formal risk adjustment in health plan purchasing

This paper describes the prevalence of formal risk adjustment of payments made to health plans by Medicare, Medicaid, state governments, and private payers. In this paper, 'formal risk adjustment" is defined as the adjustment of premiums paid to health plans based on individual-level diagnostic or demographic information. We find that formal risk adjustment is used for about one-fifth of all enrollees in capitated health plans. While the Medicare and Medicaid programs rely on formal risk adjustment for virtually all their health plan enrollees, the practice is used for only about 1% of privately insured health plan enrollees. Ourfindings raise the question of why regulators have adopted formal risk adjustment, but private purchasers for the most part have not.

Inside the sausage factory: improving estimates of the effects of health insurance expansion proposals

The fate of a proposal to expand health insurance is influenced by predictions of the proposal's effects on the number of newly insured and the cost of new coverage. Estimates vary widely, for reasons that are often hard to discern and evaluate. This article describes and compares the frameworks and parameters used for insurance modeling. It examines conventions and controversies surrounding a series of modeling parameters: how individuals respond to a change in the price of coverage, the extent of participation in a new plan by those already privately insured, firms' behavior, and the value of public versus private coverage. The article also suggests ways of making models more transparent and proposes "reference case" guidelines for modelers so that consumers can compare modeling results.

Markets for individual health insurance: can we make them work with incentives to purchase insurance?

Simple income-based incentives to purchase health insurance (tax credits or deductions, or subsidies) are unlikely to succeed in significantly reducing the number of uninsured because income is not a good predictor of the extent to which individuals use medical service. Proposals to provide incentives to low-income people so they will purchase individual health insurance need to address the inherent tension between the interests of low-risk and high-risk people who rely on individual coverage. If carriers are forced to cover all applicants and to community rate premiums, low-risk people will drop coverage or not apply for it because premiums will exceed their expected need for insurance. Concern for people who currently have access to individual coverage calls for careful examination of options to permit incentive programs to succeed with the individual insurance markets. In particular, attention should focus on using alternatives to simple income-based subsidies to spread the burden of high-risk people's costs broadly, rather than impose the costs on low-risk people who purchase individual coverage. This paper describes three such alternatives. One uses risk adjustments and two rely on reinsurance so that carriers are compensated for the higher costs of covering high-risk people who use incentives to buy insurance. One alternative also permits risk selection by insurance carriers.

Increasing health insurance coverage through an extended Federal Employees Health Benefits Program

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) could be combined with health insurance tax credits to extend coverage to the uninsured. An extended FEHBP, or "E-FEHBP," would be open to all individuals who were not covered through work or public programs and who also were eligible for the tax credits on the basis of income. E-FEHBP also would be open to employees of very small firms, regardless of their eligibility for tax credits. Most plans available to FEHBP participants would be required to offer enrollment to E-FEHBP participants, although premiums would be rated separately. High-risk individuals would be diverted to a separate high-risk pool, the cost of which would be subsidized by the federal government. E-FEHBP would be administered by the states, or if a state declined, by an entity that contracted with the Office of Personnel Management. While E-FEHBP would provide group insurance to people who otherwise could not get it, premiums could exceed the tax-credit amount and some people still might find the coverage unaffordable.

A descriptive framework for country-level analysis of health care financing arrangements

Health financing policies are marked by confusion between policy tools and policy objectives, especially in low and middle income countries. This paper attempts to address this problem by providing a conceptual framework that is driven by the normative objective of enhancing the 'insurance function' (access to needed care without financial impoverishment) of health care systems. The framework is proposed as a tool for descriptive analysis of the key functions, policies, and interactions within an existing health care system, and equally as a tool to assist the identification and preliminary assessment of policy options. The aim is to help to clarify the policy levers that are available to enhance the insurance function for the population as efficiently as possible, given the 'starting point' of a country's existing institutional and organizational arrangements. Analysis of health care financing systems using this framework highlights the interactions of various policies and the need for a coherent package of coordinated reforms, rather than a focus on particular organizational forms of 'health insurance'. The content of each main health care system function (revenue collection, pooling of funds, purchasing of services, provision of services) and the market structure with which the implementation of each is organized are found to be particularly important, as are policies with respect to the benefit package and user fees.

China in transition: the new health insurance scheme for the urban employed

China has been very successful in achieving good health at a low cost, mostly through national programs for health promotion and illness prevention. However, increased prosperity in recent years has led to higher expectations for therapeutic care, and the change to a socialist market economy has created new risks and opportunities for both financing and care provision. After several years of experimentation, China committed itself in 1996 to a major reform program which includes implementation of a new method of financing of care for the urban employed population. It comprises a mix of government-operated compulsory basic insurance, individual health savings accounts, and optional private health insurance. This paper outlines the new Scheme, and notes some tactical and strategic issues. I conclude that the Chinese government is correctly choosing to balance new and old ideas, but that there are many challenges to be faced including integration of the new Scheme with the rest of the health care system.

Increments toward what?

Incremental proposals to expand health insurance coverage, such as expansions of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) or creation of new tax credits, should be examined for the values that underlie them and for how they structure future options for additional incremental coverage expansions. This paper examines five design issues in incremental reform: who determines coverage options for the newly insured; what risk pool do they enter; what is the government's contribution toward their coverage; what barriers are created by efforts to encourage efficiency; and how are issues of federalism handled? Tax credits are a departure from past approaches, while an SCHIP expansion is a continuation of current policy directions.

Reinsurance of health insurance for the informal sector

Deficient financing of health services in low-income countries and the absence of universal insurance coverage leaves most of the informal sector in medical indigence, because people cannot assume the financial consequences of illness. The role of communities in solving this problem has been recognized, and many initiatives are under way. However, community financing is rarely structured as health insurance. Communities that pool risks (or offer insurance) have been described as micro-insurance units. The sources of their financial instability and the options for stabilization are explained. Field data from Uganda and the Philippines, as well as simulated situations, are used to examine the arguments. The article focuses on risk transfer from micro-insurance units to reinsurance. The main insight of the study is that when the financial results of micro-insurance units can be estimated, they can enter reinsurance treaties and be stabilized from the first year. The second insight is that the reinsurance pool may require several years of operation before reaching cost neutrality.

Purchasing cooperatives for small employers: performance and prospects

Health insurance purchasing cooperatives were established in the early to mid-1990s for the purpose of making health insurance more affordable and accessible for small employers. Extensive interviews at six cooperatives reveal that while some cooperatives enrolled large numbers of small employers, most have won only small market shares and a number have struggled for survival, not always successfully. They have allowed small employers to offer individual employees choice of health plans, but none has been able to sustain lower prices than are available in the conventional market. Among the important impediments to their success are limited support from health plans and conflicts over the role of insurance agents.

Health insurance for the "uninsurable"

State-sponsored health insurance plans for people labeled "uninsurable" by commercial carriers provide financial lifelines for those who qualify. In 28 states, individuals suffering from cancer, AIDS, multiple sclerosis, emotional disorders, cystic fibrosis, para- or quadriplegia and other chronic or recurrent health problems receive benefits--for reasonable premiums--from innovative programs that can literally make the difference between life and death, solvency or indigence. Medical practices and other health care facilities can play a pivotal role in informing patients of these coverage options--and by doing so, increase their revenue, as well.

The Internet and managed care: a new wave of innovation

Managed care firms have been under siege in the political system and the marketplace for the past few years. The rise of the Internet has brought into being powerful new electronic tools for automating administrative and financial processes in health insurance. These tools may enable new firms or employers to create custom-designed networks connecting their workers and providers, bypassing health plans altogether. Alternatively, health plans may use these tools to create a new consumer-focused business model. While some disintermediation of managed care plans may occur, the barriers to adoption of Internet tools by established plans are quite low. Network computing may provide important leverage for health plans not only to retain their franchises but also to improve their profitability and customer service.

The evolution of hospitalist programs

In just a few years, hospitalist programs have evolved to a third generation, affording key participants an opportunity to reduce inpatient healthcare costs. Because the method of inpatient payment determines the economic winners and losers in the program, the key participants will benefit from the implementation of a program that includes shared incentives. Even though reduced payments for inpatient services might be offset by reduced variable costs for hospitals and increased office revenues for primary care physicians, a hospitalist program is more likely to achieve sustained success if it is structured so that financial rewards are distributed fairly among the participants.

Risk segmentation: goal or problem?

This paper traces the evolution of economists' views about risk segmentation in health insurance markets. Originally seen as a desirable goal, risk segmentation has come to be viewed as leading to abnormal profits, wasted resources, and inefficient limitations on coverage and services. We suggest that risk segmentation may be efficient if one takes an ex post view (i.e., after consumers' risks are known). From this perspective, managed care may be a much better method for achieving risk segmentation than limitations on coverage. The most serious objection to risk segmentation is the ex ante concern that it undermines long-term insurance contracts that would protect consumers against changes in lifetime risk.

Using contact capitation to align payment incentives among specialists

Contact capitation is a means of paying specialists based on the number of patients managed rather than on the number of services provided or procedures performed. Payments to physicians are disbursed from budgets, or risk pools, which are established by specialty and product line (e.g., commercial coverage, Medicare). Each specialist is credited with managing a patient for a specified time period (usually 12 months) following the patient's initial visit. To ensure payments are equitable to all physicians, regardless of specialty or subspecialty, the system may be adjusted by using different contact weights for certain diagnoses or procedures, creating subpools for selected subspecialties and/or procedures, establishing separate capitation rates for different age segments, and setting aside certain specialties as fee-for-service carve-outs. Contact capitation has advantages over traditional specialist capitation of removing physicians' financial incentives to overutilize and allowing for a broad physician specialty panel. Challenges to implementing contact capitation include getting physicians to alter habitual practice patterns and managing the system's administrative complexity.

Placing the incentive on quality through contact capitation

Contact capitation is emerging as a reimbursement method of choice among capitated physician networks. It allows for a more equitable allocation of dollars and permits physicians to benefit financially from the savings they individually create through more effective, efficient care practices. However, in order to operate at peak efficiency, the contact capitation system should be designed with thorough and ongoing input from the participating physicians.

The role of government in health insurance markets with adverse selection

This paper analyzes the welfare economics of three arrangements for purchasing health insurance: competitive markets in which consumers are free to choose among options with different levels of coverage and prices; systems with compulsory partial pooling which permit private firms to sell supplementary coverage; and government-run pools that purchase comprehensive coverage at a single price for all consumers. Competitive insurance markets are assumed to face the problem of 'adverse selection'. This refers to a situation in which the insurer cannot observe characteristics of individuals that affect the cost of insurance and that are known to the individuals. Competitive markets with adverse selection are not efficient because low risks cannot purchase comprehensive insurance coverage. However, government-run pools with comprehensive coverage are an inefficient solution to the problem of adverse selection. Compulsory partial coverage may represent an attractive alternative to both competitive markets and comprehensive pools. We discover two situations when government intervention of this type will succeed: when there are not many high risks in the population, and when the risk types are similar. We discuss the implications of these results for health insurance programs in several countries. Our results also have implications for the allocation of public funds for disease-prevention projects. A project targeted at high risks will produce external benefits for low risks, even though they are not directly affected by the program. However, a successful project might eliminate the market for private insurance; in this case the government should consider mandating partial insurance coverage.

Where is the financial safety net for managed care physicians?

OBJECTIVE

Empiric research on mechanisms by which managed care physicians attempt to mitigate financial risk is lacking. We assumed the perspective of a managed care plan in investigating the relationship between risk sharing and the match between a physician's capitation payments and costs of care.

DESIGN

The study design was a family of payment simulations using 2 years of managed care claims data.

METHODS

Claims from a cohort of 82,525 managed care patients were used, with year 1 data determining a capitation rate for year 2 primary care services. The net provider payment in year 2 was examined under scenarios that might modify financial outcomes, including stop-loss insurance, age- and gender-adjustment of capitation, and risk pooling within independent practice associations.

RESULTS

The size of a provider's patient panel was positively correlated with net per capita payment (r = 0.22; P < 0.0001 without risk modification strategies). The variance of the ratio of net to total revenue was utilized as a proxy for the degree of risk assumed in caring for a panel of capitated enrollees. Risk modification strategies reduced this variance measure, with risk pooling producing the largest effect, especially for providers of panels of fewer than 135 patients. In contrast, age- and gender-adjustment of capitation payments had little effect on reimbursement outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS

Short of increasing the pool of capitated patients, risk modification strategies appear limited in their ability to produce more equitable reimbursement to providers with small patient panels. With many providers assuming substantial risk in pursuing managed care contracts, these dynamics may favor organizational forms of medical practice that facilitate large patient panels within a single plan.