Cognitive consequences of cooperative breeding in primates?

Zoon politikon: The evolutionary origins of human socio-political systems

We deploy the most up-to-date evidence available in various behavioral fields in support of the following hypothesis: The emergence of bipedalism and cooperative breeding in the hominin line, together with environmental developments that made a diet of meat from large animals adaptive, as well as cultural innovations in the form of fire, cooking, and lethal weapons, created a niche for hominins in which there was a significant advantage to individuals with the ability to communicate and persuade in a moral context. These forces added a unique political dimension to human social life which, through gene-culture coevolution, became Homo ludens-Man, the game player-with the power to conserve and transform the social order. Homo sapiens became, in the words of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, a zoon politikon.

The role of extragroup encounters in a Neotropical, cooperative breeding primate, the common marmoset: a field playback experiment

In cooperatively breeding species, encounters with intruders may serve multiple functions ranging from reaffirming group territory ranges to facilitating assessments for additional breeding opportunities. While these distinctive events offer the opportunity to investigate the delicate balance of these social dimensions within animal societies, their unpredictable occurrence makes witnessing and controlling these events in the wild particularly challenging. Here we used a field playback approach to simulate conspecific territorial incursions in cooperatively breeding common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) to distinguish between the three following non-mutually exclusive functions of intergroup encounters in this species of New World primate: territorial defense, mate defense, and assessment of breeding opportunities. For these experiments, we systematically broadcast species-typical long-distance contact calls - phees - commonly used in intergroup interactions from the core and periphery of the groups' territories using either male or female vocalizations. Consistent with a territorial defense hypothesis, a group's reaction was independent of the simulated intruder's sex and the response strength was greater when the playback stimulus was broadcast from the core areas of groups' territories relative to stimulus broadcast from periphery areas. However, sex differences in some facets of their responses suggest that this is not the only potential function for these encounters. Mated males and females started to move first in response to simulated intruders of the opposite sex, suggesting that these events offered opportunities to assess extra-pair breeding opportunities, while the occurrence of females' piloerection towards simulated female intruders is suggestive of mate-guarding. These data provide unique experimental evidence for the theory that excursions by conspecific intruders may serve multiple functions in a cooperatively breeding vertebrate and are reflective of the known complexities of common marmoset sociobiology.

Developmental trajectories of macroanatomical structures in common marmoset brain

Morphometry studies of human brain development have revealed characteristics of some growth patterns, such as gray matter (GM) and white matter (WM), but the features that make human neurodevelopment distinct from that in other species remain unclear. Studies of the common marmoset (Callithrix jacchus), a small New World primate, can provide insights into unique features such as cooperative behaviors complementary to those from comparative analyses using mouse and rhesus monkey. In the present study, we analyzed developmental patterns of GM, WM, and cortical regions with volume measurements using longitudinal sample (23 marmosets; 11 male, 12 female) between the ages of one and 30months. Regional analysis using a total of 164 magnetic resonance imaging datasets revealed that GM volume increased before puberty (5.4months), but subsequently declined until adulthood, whereas WM volume increased rapidly before stabilizing around puberty (9.9months). Cortical regions showed similar patterns of increase and decrease, patterns with global GM but differed in the timing of volume peak and degree of decline across regions. The progressive-regressive pattern detected in both global and cortical GM was well correlated to phases of synaptogenesis and synaptic pruning reported in previous marmoset studies. A rapid increase in WM in early development may represent a distinctive aspect of human neurodevelopment. These findings suggest that studies of marmoset brain development can provide valuable comparative information that will facilitate a deeper understanding of human brain growth and neurodevelopmental disorders.

The Role of Ontogeny in the Evolution of Human Cooperation

To explain the evolutionary emergence of uniquely human skills and motivations for cooperation, Tomasello et al. (2012, in Current Anthropology 53(6):673-92) proposed the interdependence hypothesis. The key adaptive context in this account was the obligate collaborative foraging of early human adults. Hawkes (2014, in Human Nature 25(1):28-48), following Hrdy (Mothers and Others, Harvard University Press, 2009), provided an alternative account for the emergence of uniquely human cooperative skills in which the key was early human infants' attempts to solicit care and attention from adults in a cooperative breeding context. Here we attempt to reconcile these two accounts. Our composite account accepts Hrdy's and Hawkes's contention that the extremely early emergence of human infants' cooperative skills suggests an important role for cooperative breeding as adaptive context, perhaps in early Homo. But our account also insists that human cooperation goes well beyond these nascent skills to include such things as the communicative and cultural conventions, norms, and institutions created by later Homo and early modern humans to deal with adult problems of social coordination. As part of this account we hypothesize how each of the main stages of human ontogeny (infancy, childhood, adolescence) was transformed during evolution both by infants' cooperative skills "migrating up" in age and by adults' cooperative skills "migrating down" in age.

Cooperative problem solving in giant otters (Pteronura brasiliensis) and Asian small-clawed otters (Aonyx cinerea)

Cooperative problem solving has gained a lot of attention over the past two decades, but the range of species studied is still small. This limits the possibility of understanding the evolution of the socio-cognitive underpinnings of cooperation. Lutrinae show significant variations in socio-ecology, but their cognitive abilities are not well studied. In the first experimental study of otter social cognition, we presented two species—giant otters and Asian small-clawed otters—with a cooperative problem-solving task. The loose string task requires two individuals to simultaneously pull on either end of a rope in order to access food. This task has been used with a larger number of species (for the most part primates and birds) and thus allows for wider cross-species comparison. We found no differences in performance between species. Both giant otters and Asian small-clawed otters were able to solve the task successfully when the coordination requirements were minimal. However, when the temporal coordination demands were increased, performance decreased either due to a lack of understanding of the role of a partner or due to difficulty inhibiting action. In conclusion, two species of otters show some ability to cooperate, quite similar to most other species presented with the same task. However, to draw further conclusions and more nuanced comparisons between the two otter species, further studies with varied methodologies will be necessary.

Isotocin neuronal phenotypes differ among social systems in cichlid fishes

Social living has evolved numerous times across a diverse array of animal taxa. An open question is how the transition to a social lifestyle has shaped, and been shaped by, the underlying neurohormonal machinery of social behaviour. The nonapeptide neurohormones, implicated in the regulation of social behaviours, are prime candidates for the neuroendocrine substrates of social evolution. Here, we examined the brains of eight cichlid fish species with divergent social systems, comparing the number and size of preoptic neurons that express the nonapeptides isotocin and vasotocin. While controlling for the influence of phylogeny and body size, we found that the highly social cooperatively breeding species (n = 4) had fewer parvocellular isotocin neurons than the less social independently breeding species (n = 4), suggesting that the evolutionary transition to group living and cooperative breeding was associated with a reduction in the number of these neurons. In a complementary analysis, we found that the size and number of isotocin neurons significantly differentiated the cooperatively breeding from the independently breeding species. Our results suggest that isotocin is related to sociality in cichlids and may provide a mechanistic substrate for the evolution of sociality.

Stick-weaving: Innovative behavior in tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

Some captive cotton-top tamarins spontaneously weave sticks in the mesh of their enclosures so that the stick is lodged between two mesh openings. Sticks are broken from natural branches placed in the enclosures and often modified by biting them in the center before weaving through the mesh. To investigate this further, we systematically surveyed all animals in our colony and found that all successful stick-weaving tamarins were descendants from only 2 of the 16 breeding groups contributing to the colony membership at the time of surveying or were the mates of these descendants, suggesting stick-weaving is a socially learned behavior. Successful stick-weavers were presented with pipe cleaners, soda straws, and wooden dowels to see if they would generalize stick-weaving to novel objects. Seven of 10 animals successfully wove with straws or pipe cleaners, showing that they could generalize the behavior to objects that were physically different but had the same affordances as the sticks. Data from a father-daughter pair suggest a form of coaching. Innovative behavior is needed for the emergence of culture with subsequent social transmission. Although innovative behavior in primates is mainly associated with foraging and is more likely to occur among males, stick-weaving has no obvious reward and appeared equally in both sexes. Stick-weaving behavior and its probable social transmission across generations suggest the possibility of cultural traditions emerging in this species. (PsycINFO Database Record

The importance of the altricial - precocial spectrum for social complexity in mammals and birds - a review

Various types of long-term stable relationships that individuals uphold, including cooperation and competition between group members, define social complexity in vertebrates. Numerous life history, physiological and cognitive traits have been shown to affect, or to be affected by, such social relationships. As such, differences in developmental modes, i.e. the ‘altricial-precocial’ spectrum, may play an important role in understanding the interspecific variation in occurrence of social interactions, but to what extent this is the case is unclear because the role of the developmental mode has not been studied directly in across-species studies of sociality. In other words, although there are studies on the effects of developmental mode on brain size, on the effects of brain size on cognition, and on the effects of cognition on social complexity, there are no studies directly investigating the link between developmental mode and social complexity. This is surprising because developmental differences play a significant role in the evolution of, for example, brain size, which is in turn considered an essential building block with respect to social complexity. Here, we compiled an overview of studies on various aspects of the complexity of social systems in altricial and precocial mammals and birds. Although systematic studies are scarce and do not allow for a quantitative comparison, we show that several forms of social relationships and cognitive abilities occur in species along the entire developmental spectrum. Based on the existing evidence it seems that differences in developmental modes play a minor role in whether or not individuals or species are able to meet the cognitive capabilities and requirements for maintaining complex social relationships. Given the scarcity of comparative studies and potential subtle differences, however, we suggest that future studies should consider developmental differences to determine whether our finding is general or whether some of the vast variation in social complexity across species can be explained by developmental mode. This would allow a more detailed assessment of the relative importance of developmental mode in the evolution of vertebrate social systems.

The nature of prosociality in chimpanzees

An important debate centres around the nature of prosociality in nonhuman primates. Chimpanzees help other individuals in some experimental settings, yet they do not readily share food. One solution to this paradox is that they are motivated to help others provided there are no competing interests. However, benefits to recipients could arise as by-products of testing. Here we report two studies that separate by-product from intended helping in chimpanzees using a GO/NO-GO paradigm. Actors in one group could help a recipient by releasing a food box, but the same action for another group prevented a recipient from being able to get food. We find no evidence for helping-chimpanzees engaged in the test regardless of the effects on their partners. Illusory prosocial behaviour could arise as a by-product of task design.

Primate empathy: three factors and their combinations for empathy-related phenomena

Empathy as a research topic is receiving increasing attention, although there seems some confusion on the definition of empathy across different fields. Frans de Waal (de Waal FBM. Putting the altruism back into altruism: the evolution of empathy. Annu Rev Psychol 2008, 59:279-300. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093625) used empathy as an umbrella term and proposed a comprehensive model for the evolution of empathy with some of its basic elements in nonhuman animals. In de Waal's model, empathy consists of several layers distinguished by required cognitive levels; the perception-action mechanism plays the core role for connecting ourself and others. Then, human-like empathy such as perspective-taking develops in outer layers according to cognitive sophistication, leading to prosocial acts such as targeted helping. I agree that animals demonstrate many empathy-related phenomena; however, the species differences and the level of cognitive sophistication of the phenomena might be interpreted in another way than this simple linearly developing model. Our recent studies with chimpanzees showed that their perspective-taking ability does not necessarily lead to proactive helping behavior. Herein, as a springboard for further studies, I reorganize the empathy-related phenomena by proposing a combination model instead of the linear development model. This combination model is composed of three organizing factors: matching with others, understanding of others, and prosociality. With these three factors and their combinations, most empathy-related matters can be categorized and mapped to appropriate context; this may be a good first step to discuss the evolution of empathy in relation to the neural connections in human and nonhuman animal brains. I would like to propose further comparative studies, especially from the viewpoint of Homo-Pan (chimpanzee and bonobo) comparison. WIREs Cogn Sci 2017, 8:e1431. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1431 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

How institutions shaped the last major evolutionary transition to large-scale human societies

What drove the transition from small-scale human societies centred on kinship and personal exchange, to large-scale societies comprising cooperation and division of labour among untold numbers of unrelated individuals? We propose that the unique human capacity to negotiate institutional rules that coordinate social actions was a key driver of this transition. By creating institutions, humans have been able to move from the default 'Hobbesian' rules of the 'game of life', determined by physical/environmental constraints, into self-created rules of social organization where cooperation can be individually advantageous even in large groups of unrelated individuals. Examples include rules of food sharing in hunter-gatherers, rules for the usage of irrigation systems in agriculturalists, property rights and systems for sharing reputation between mediaeval traders. Successful institutions create rules of interaction that are self-enforcing, providing direct benefits both to individuals that follow them, and to individuals that sanction rule breakers. Forming institutions requires shared intentionality, language and other cognitive abilities largely absent in other primates. We explain how cooperative breeding likely selected for these abilities early in the Homo lineage. This allowed anatomically modern humans to create institutions that transformed the self-reliance of our primate ancestors into the division of labour of large-scale human social organization.

Survival of the Friendliest: Homo sapiens Evolved via Selection for Prosociality

The challenge of studying human cognitive evolution is identifying unique features of our intelligence while explaining the processes by which they arose. Comparisons with nonhuman apes point to our early-emerging cooperative-communicative abilities as crucial to the evolution of all forms of human cultural cognition, including language. The human self-domestication hypothesis proposes that these early-emerging social skills evolved when natural selection favored increased in-group prosociality over aggression in late human evolution. As a by-product of this selection, humans are predicted to show traits of the domestication syndrome observed in other domestic animals. In reviewing comparative, developmental, neurobiological, and paleoanthropological research, compelling evidence emerges for the predicted relationship between unique human mentalizing abilities, tolerance, and the domestication syndrome in humans. This synthesis includes a review of the first a priori test of the self-domestication hypothesis as well as predictions for future tests.

An Observational Investigation of Behavioral Contagion in Common Marmosets (Callithrix jacchus): Indications for Contagious Scent-Marking

Behavioral contagion is suggested to promote group coordination that may facilitate activity transitions, increased vigilance, and state matching. Apart from contagious yawning, however, very little attention has been given to this phenomenon, and studies on contagious yawning in primates have so far only focused on Old World monkeys and apes. Here we studied behavioral contagion in common marmosets, a species for which group coordination and vigilance are paramount. In particular, we investigated the contagiousness of yawning, stretching, scratching, tongue protrusion, gnawing, and scent-marking. We coded these behaviors from 14 adult marmosets, from two different social groups. During testing sessions, animals were separated into groups of four individuals for 20-min observation periods, across three distinct diurnal time points (morning, midday, and afternoon) to test for circadian patterns. We observed almost no yawning (0.12 yawns/h) and very little stretching behavior. For all other behaviors, which were more common, we found several temporal and inter-individual differences (i.e., sex, age, dominance status) predictive of these responses. Moreover, we found that gnawing and scent-marking, which almost always co-occurred as a fixed-action pattern, were highly temporally clustered within observation sessions. We discuss the relative absence of yawning in marmosets as well as the possible function of contagious scent-marking, and provide suggestions for future research into the proximate and ultimate functions of these behaviors in marmosets.

The evolution of general intelligence

The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this question and to explore the implications for current theories about the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals (rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometric g factor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength.

Infants Prefer Female Body Phenotypes; Infant Girls Prefer They Have an Hourglass Shape

Adolescents and adults show preferences for male and female body shapes consistent with evolutionary theories of reproductive fitness and mate selection. However, when these preferences for females with narrow waists (i.e., 0.7 waist-to-hip ratio) and men with broad shoulders (i.e., mesomorphic body shape) emerge during the lifespan is largely unknown. To address this knowledge gap, eye-movements were tracked in 146 infants (3-18 months of age) during computer presentation of three-dimensional human figures varying in body features thought relevant for reproductive success (e.g., secondary sex characteristics, waist-to-hip ratio). When presented with pairs of figures differing in apparent sex, male and female infants looked significantly longer at the female figure compared to the male figure, a new finding that extends previous research showing preferences for female faces in infancy. When presented with same-sex figures differing in characteristics associated with mate value, male and female infants looked longer at a low mate value male (i.e., an endomorphic body type) compared to a high mate value male (i.e., a mesomorphic body type), a finding that replicates the results of previous research. In addition, the novel use of high and low mate value female figures showed a sex difference in visual attention, such that female infants looked longer at the high mate value female figure compared to the low mate female figure whereas male infants showed the opposite pattern of results. In sum, these findings suggest that infants generally do not possess preferences for adult-defined attractive male body shapes. However, infant girls' greater attention to a female figure with an adult-preferred waist-to-hip ratio raises the possibility that evolved preferences for 0.7 waist-to-hip ratio influence girls' later preference for toys representing females with an hourglass shape, perhaps supporting elaboration of adult social behaviors that enhance reproductive success (e.g., cooperative breeding).

Fundamental problems with the cooperative breeding hypothesis. A reply to Burkart & van Schaik

The cooperative breeding hypothesis (CBH) states that cooperative breeding, a social system in which group members help to rear offspring that are not their own, has important socio‐cognitive consequences. Thornton & McAuliffe (2015; henceforth T&M) critiqued this idea on both conceptual and empirical grounds, arguing that there is no reason to predict that cooperative breeding should favour the evolution of enhanced social cognition or larger brains, nor any clear evidence that it does. In response to this critique, Burkart & van Schaik (2016 henceforth B&vS) attempt to clarify the causal logic of the CBH, revisit the data and raise the possibility that the hypothesis may only apply to primates. They concede that cooperative breeding is unlikely to generate selection pressures for enhanced socio‐cognitive abilities, but argue instead that the CBH operates purely through cooperative breeding reducing social or energetic constraints. Here, we argue that this revised hypothesis is also untenable because: (1) it cannot explain why resources so released would be allocated to cognitive traits per se rather than any other fitness‐related traits, (2) key assumptions are inconsistent with available evidence and (3) ambiguity regarding the predictions leaves it unclear what evidence would be required to falsify it. Ultimately, the absence of any compelling evidence that cooperative breeding is associated with elevated cognitive ability or large brains (indeed data suggest the opposite is true in non‐human primates) also casts doubt on the capacity of the CBH to explain variation in cognitive traits.

Do gray wolves (Canis lupus) support pack mates during aggressive inter-pack interactions?

For group-living mammals, social coordination increases success in everything from hunting and foraging (Crofoot and Wrangham in Mind the Gap, Springer, Berlin, 2010; Bailey et al. in Behav Ecol Sociobiol 67:1-17, 2013) to agonism (Mosser and Packer in Anim Behav 78:359-370, 2009; Wilson et al. in Anim Behav 83:277-291, 2012; Cassidy et al. in Behav Ecol 26:1352-1360, 2015). Cooperation is found in many species and, due to its low costs, likely is a determining factor in the evolution of living in social groups (Smith in Anim Behav 92:291-304, 2014). Beyond cooperation, many mammals perform costly behaviors for the benefit of group mates (e.g., parental care, food sharing, grooming). Altruism is considered the most extreme case of cooperation where the altruist increases the fitness of the recipient while decreasing its own fitness (Bell in Selection: the mechanism of evolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008). Gray wolf life history requires intra-pack familiarity, communication, and cooperation in order to succeed in hunting (MacNulty et al. in Behav Ecol doi: 10.1093/beheco/arr159 2011) and protecting group resources (Stahler et al. in J Anim Ecol 82: 222-234, 2013; Cassidy et al. in Behav Ecol 26:1352-1360, 2015). Here, we report 121 territorial aggressive inter-pack interactions in Yellowstone National Park between 1 April 1995 and 1 April 2011 (>5300 days of observation) and examine each interaction where one wolf interferes when its pack mate is being attacked by a rival group. This behavior was recorded six times (17.6 % of interactions involving an attack) and often occurred between dyads of closely related individuals. We discuss this behavior as it relates to the evolution of cooperation, sociality, and altruism.

Early development of turn-taking with parents shapes vocal acoustics in infant marmoset monkeys

In humans, vocal turn-taking is a ubiquitous form of social interaction. It is a communication system that exhibits the properties of a dynamical system: two individuals become coupled to each other via acoustic exchanges and mutually affect each other. Human turn-taking develops during the first year of life. We investigated the development of vocal turn-taking in infant marmoset monkeys, a New World species whose adult vocal behaviour exhibits the same universal features of human turn-taking. We find that marmoset infants undergo the same trajectory of change for vocal turn-taking as humans, and do so during the same life-history stage. Our data show that turn-taking by marmoset infants depends on the development of self-monitoring, and that contingent parental calls elicit more mature-sounding calls from infants. As in humans, there was no evidence that parental feedback affects the rate of turn-taking maturation. We conclude that vocal turn-taking by marmoset monkeys and humans is an instance of convergent evolution, possibly as a result of pressures on both species to adopt a cooperative breeding strategy and increase volubility.

No evidence for larger brains in cooperatively breeding cichlid fishes

The social brain hypothesis posits that frequent social interactions, characteristic of group living species, select for greater socio-cognitive abilities and the requisite neural machinery. An extension of the social brains hypothesis, known as the cooperative breeding brain hypothesis, postulates that cooperatively breeding species, which live in stable social groups and provide allocare, face particularly pronounced cognitive demands because they must recognize, remember, and differentially respond to multiple group members. These socio-cognitive challenges are thought to have selected for increased cognitive capacity, supported by a bigger brain. To test the prediction that cooperative breeders have larger brains, we performed a phylogenetically controlled comparison of the whole brain masses of adult fish from 16 closely related species of cooperatively and independently breeding lamprologine cichlid species from Lake Tanganyika. We collected data on brain mass from males of eight species of lamprologine cichlids and added this to brain mass data from eight more species found in the published literature. Controlling for body size and phylogeny, we found that cooperative breeding species did not have larger brains, and this was true of for both our field-collected data set and the expanded data set including published values. This study adds to a growing body of literature from other taxa that cast doubt on the cooperative breeding brain hypothesis.

Marmosets: A Neuroscientific Model of Human Social Behavior

The common marmoset (Callithrix jacchus) has garnered interest recently as a powerful model for the future of neuroscience research. Much of this excitement has centered on the species' reproductive biology and compatibility with gene editing techniques, which together have provided a path for transgenic marmosets to contribute to the study of disease as well as basic brain mechanisms. In step with technical advances is the need to establish experimental paradigms that optimally tap into the marmosets' behavioral and cognitive capacities. While conditioned task performance of a marmoset can compare unfavorably with rhesus monkey performance on conventional testing paradigms, marmosets' social behavior and cognition are more similar to that of humans. For example, marmosets are among only a handful of primates that, like humans, routinely pair bond and care cooperatively for their young. They are also notably pro-social and exhibit social cognitive abilities, such as imitation, that are rare outside of the Apes. In this Primer, we describe key facets of marmoset natural social behavior and demonstrate that emerging behavioral paradigms are well suited to isolate components of marmoset cognition that are highly relevant to humans. These approaches generally embrace natural behavior, which has been rare in conventional primate testing, and thus allow for a new consideration of neural mechanisms underlying primate social cognition and signaling. We anticipate that through parallel technical and paradigmatic advances, marmosets will become an essential model of human social behavior, including its dysfunction in neuropsychiatric disorders.

The cooperative breeding perspective helps in pinning down when uniquely human evolutionary processes are necessary

The cultural group selection (CGS) approach provides a compelling explanation for recent changes in human societies, but has trouble explaining why our ancestors, rather than any other great ape, evolved into a hyper-cooperative niche. The cooperative breeding hypothesis can plug this gap and thus complement CGS, because recent comparative evidence suggests that it promoted proactive prosociality, social transmission, and communication in Pleistocene hominins.

The evolution of altruistic social preferences in human groups

In this paper, we consider three hypotheses to account for the evolution of the extraordinary capacity for large-scale cooperation and altruistic social preferences within human societies. One hypothesis is that human cooperation is built on the same evolutionary foundations as cooperation in other animal societies, and that fundamental elements of the social preferences that shape our species' cooperative behaviour are also shared with other closely related primates. Another hypothesis is that selective pressures favouring cooperative breeding have shaped the capacity for cooperation and the development of social preferences, and produced a common set of behavioural dispositions and social preferences in cooperatively breeding primates and humans. The third hypothesis is that humans have evolved derived capacities for collaboration, group-level cooperation and altruistic social preferences that are linked to our capacity for culture. We draw on naturalistic data to assess differences in the form, scope and scale of cooperation between humans and other primates, experimental data to evaluate the nature of social preferences across primate species, and comparative analyses to evaluate the evolutionary origins of cooperative breeding and related forms of behaviour.

Subjectivity may hinder the application of Kline's teaching framework in comparative contexts

We welcome Kline's attempt to develop an overarching framework to allow much needed collaboration between fields in the study of teaching. While we see much utility in this enterprise, we are concerned that there is too much focus on the behavior of the teacher, without examining results or costs, and the categories within the framework are not sufficiently distinct.

Endocrine and Cognitive Adaptations to Cope with Stress in Immature Common Marmosets (Callithrix jacchus): Sex and Age Matter

Phenotypic sex differences in primates are associated with body differentiation during the early stages of life, expressed in both physiological and behavioral features. Hormones seem to play a pivotal role in creating a range of responses to meet environmental and social demands, resulting in better reactions to cope with challenges to survival and reproduction. Steroid hormones actively participate in neuroplasticity and steroids from both gonads and neurons seem to be involved in behavioral modulation in primates. Indirect evidence suggests the participation of sexual steroids in dimorphism of the stress response in common marmosets. This species is an important experimental model in psychiatry, and we found a dual profile for cortisol in the transition from juvenile to subadult, with females showing higher levels. Immature males and females at 6 and 9 months of age moved alone from the family group to a new cage, over a 21-day period, expressed distinct patterns of cortisol variation with respect to range and duration of response. Additional evidence showed that at 12 months of age, males and females buffered the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis during chronic stress. Moreover, chronic stressed juvenile marmoset males showed better cognitive performance in working memory tests and motivation when compared to those submitted to short-term stress living in family groups. Thus, as cortisol profile seems to be sexually dimorphic before adulthood, age and sex are critical variables to consider in approaches that require immature marmosets in their experimental protocols. Moreover, available cognitive tests should be scrutinized to allow better investigation of cognitive traits in this species.

The forgotten role of consonant-like calls in theories of speech evolution

Ackermann et al. provide an informative neurological road-map to primate call communication. However, the proposed model for speech evolution inadequately integrates comparative primate evidence. Critically, great ape voiceless calls are explicitly rendered unimportant, leaving the proposed model deprived of behavioral feedstock and proximate selective drivers capable of triggering the neurological transformations described by the authors in the primate brain.

Cooperative vocal control in marmoset monkeys via vocal feedback

Humans adjust speech amplitude as a function of distance from a listener; we do so in a manner that would compensate for such distance. This ability is presumed to be the product of high-level sociocognitive skills. Nonhuman primates are thought to lack such socially related flexibility in vocal production. Using predictions from a simple arousal-based model whereby vocal feedback from a conspecific modulates the drive to produce a vocalization, we tested whether another primate exhibits this type of cooperative vocal control. We conducted a playback experiment with marmoset monkeys and simulated "far-away" and "nearby" conspecifics using contact calls that differed in sound intensity. We found that marmoset monkeys increased the amplitude of their contact calls and produced such calls with shorter response latencies toward more distant conspecifics. The same was not true in response to changing levels of background noise. To account for how simulated conspecific distance can change both the amplitude and timing of vocal responses, we developed a model that incorporates dynamic interactions between the auditory system and limbic "drive" systems. Overall, our data show that, like humans, marmoset monkeys cooperatively control the acoustics of their vocalizations according to changes in listener distance, increasing the likelihood that a conspecific will hear their call. However, we propose that such cooperative vocal control is a system property that does not necessitate any particularly advanced sociocognitive skill. At least in marmosets, this vocal control can be parsimoniously explained by the regulation of arousal states across two interacting individuals via vocal feedback.

Goal-directed, habitual and Pavlovian prosocial behavior

Although prosocial behaviors have been widely studied across disciplines, the mechanisms underlying them are not fully understood. Evidence from psychology, biology and economics suggests that prosocial behaviors can be driven by a variety of seemingly opposing factors: altruism or egoism, intuition or deliberation, inborn instincts or learned dispositions, and utility derived from actions or their outcomes. Here we propose a framework inspired by research on reinforcement learning and decision making that links these processes and explains characteristics of prosocial behaviors in different contexts. More specifically, we suggest that prosocial behaviors inherit features of up to three decision-making systems employed to choose between self- and other- regarding acts: a goal-directed system that selects actions based on their predicted consequences, a habitual system that selects actions based on their reinforcement history, and a Pavlovian system that emits reflexive responses based on evolutionarily prescribed priors. This framework, initially described in the field of cognitive neuroscience and machine learning, provides insight into the potential neural circuits and computations shaping prosocial behaviors. Furthermore, it identifies specific conditions in which each of these three systems should dominate and promote other- or self- regarding behavior.

Common marmosets show social plasticity and group-level similarity in personality

The social environment influences animal personality on evolutionary and immediate time scales. However, studies of animal personality rarely assess the effects of the social environment, particularly in species that live in stable groups with individualized relationships. We assessed personality experimentally in 17 individuals of the common marmoset, living in four groups. We found their personality to be considerably modified by the social environment. Marmosets exhibited relatively high plasticity in their behaviour, and showed ‘group-personality’, i.e. group-level similarity in the personality traits. In exploratory behaviour this was maintained only in the social environment but not when individuals were tested alone, suggesting that exploration tendency is subjected to social facilitation. Boldness, in contrast, showed higher consistency across the social and solitary conditions, and the group-level similarity in trait scores was sustained also outside of the immediate social environment. The ‘group-personality’ was not due to genetic relatedness, supporting that it was produced by social effects. We hypothesize that ‘group-personality’ may be adaptive for highly cooperative animals through facilitating cooperation among individuals with similar behavioural tendency.

The effect of domestication on inhibitory control: wolves and dogs compared

Inhibitory control i.e. blocking an impulsive or prepotent response in favour of a more appropriate alternative, has been suggested to play an important role in cooperative behaviour. Interestingly, while dogs and wolves show a similar social organization, they differ in their intraspecific cooperation tendencies in that wolves rely more heavily on group coordination in regard to hunting and pup-rearing compared to dogs. Hence, based on the 'canine cooperation' hypothesis wolves should show better inhibitory control than dogs. On the other hand, through the domestication process, dogs may have been selected for cooperative tendencies towards humans and/or a less reactive temperament, which may in turn have affected their inhibitory control abilities. Hence, based on the latter hypothesis, we would expect dogs to show a higher performance in tasks requiring inhibitory control. To test the predictive value of these alternative hypotheses, in the current study two tasks; the 'cylinder task' and the 'detour task', which are designed to assess inhibitory control, were used to evaluate the performance of identically raised pack dogs and wolves. Results from the cylinder task showed a significantly poorer performance in wolves than identically-raised pack dogs (and showed that pack-dogs performed similarly to pet dogs with different training experiences), however contrary results emerged in the detour task, with wolves showing a shorter latency to success and less perseverative behaviour at the fence. Results are discussed in relation to previous studies using these paradigms and in terms of the validity of these two methods in assessing inhibitory control.

Marmoset monkeys evaluate third-party reciprocity

Many non-human primates have been observed to reciprocate and to understand reciprocity in one-to-one social exchanges. A recent study demonstrated that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to both third-party reciprocity and violation of reciprocity; however, whether this sensitivity is a function of general intelligence, evidenced by their larger brain size relative to other primates, remains unclear. We hypothesized that highly pro-social primates, even with a relatively smaller brain, would be sensitive to others' reciprocity. Here, we show that common marmosets discriminated between human actors who reciprocated in social exchanges with others and those who did not. Monkeys accepted rewards less frequently from non-reciprocators than they did from reciprocators when the non-reciprocators had retained all food items, but they accepted rewards from both actors equally when they had observed reciprocal exchange between the actors. These results suggest that mechanisms to detect unfair reciprocity in third-party social exchanges do not require domain-general higher cognitive ability based on proportionally larger brains, but rather emerge from the cooperative and pro-social tendencies of species, and thereby suggest this ability evolved in multiple primate lineages.

The evolution of speech: vision, rhythm, cooperation

A full account of human speech evolution must consider its multisensory, rhythmic, and cooperative characteristics. Humans, apes, and monkeys recognize the correspondence between vocalizations and their associated facial postures, and gain behavioral benefits from them. Some monkey vocalizations even have a speech-like acoustic rhythmicity but lack the concomitant rhythmic facial motion that speech exhibits. We review data showing that rhythmic facial expressions such as lip-smacking may have been linked to vocal output to produce an ancestral form of rhythmic audiovisual speech. Finally, we argue that human vocal cooperation (turn-taking) may have arisen through a combination of volubility and prosociality, and provide comparative evidence from one species to support this hypothesis.

Convergent evolution of vocal cooperation without convergent evolution of brain size

One pragmatic underlying successful vocal communication is the ability to take turns. Taking turns - a form of cooperation - facilitates the transmission of signals by reducing the amount of their overlap. This allows vocalizations to be better heard. Until recently, non-human primates were not thought of as particularly cooperative, especially in the vocal domain. We recently demonstrated that common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), a small New World primate species, take turns when they exchange vocalizations with both related and unrelated conspecifics. As the common marmoset is distantly related to humans (and there is no documented evidence that Old World primates exhibit vocal turn taking), we argue that this ability arose as an instance of convergent evolution, and is part of a suite of prosocial behavioral tendencies. Such behaviors seem to be, at least in part, the outcome of the cooperative breeding strategy adopted by both humans and marmosets. Importantly, this suite of shared behaviors occurs without correspondence in encephalization. Marmoset vocal turn taking demonstrates that a large brain size and complex cognitive machinery is not needed for vocal cooperation to occur. Consistent with this idea, the temporal structure of marmoset vocal exchanges can be described in terms of coupled oscillator dynamics, similar to quantitative descriptions of human conversations. We propose a simple neural circuit mechanism that may account for these dynamics and, at its core, involves vocalization-induced reductions of arousal. Such a mechanism may underlie the evolution of vocal turn taking in both marmoset monkeys and humans.

Marmosets as model species in neuroscience and evolutionary anthropology

Marmosets are increasingly used as model species by both neuroscientists and evolutionary anthropologists, but with a different rationale for doing so. Whereas neuroscientists stress that marmosets share many cognitive traits with humans due to common descent, anthropologists stress those traits shared with marmosets - and callitrichid monkeys in general - due to convergent evolution, as a consequence of the cooperative breeding system that characterizes both humans and callitrichids. Similarities in socio-cognitive abilities due to convergence, rather than homology, raise the question whether these similarities also extend to the proximate regulatory mechanisms, which is particularly relevant for neuroscientific investigations. In this review, we first provide an overview of the convergent adaptations to cooperative breeding at the psychological and cognitive level in primates, which bear important implications for our understanding of human cognitive evolution. In the second part, we zoom in on two of these convergent adaptations, proactive prosociality and social learning, and compare their proximate regulation in marmosets and humans with regard to oxytocin and cognitive top down regulation. Our analysis suggests considerable similarity in these regulatory mechanisms presumably because the convergent traits emerged due to small motivational changes that define how pre-existing cognitive mechanisms are quantitatively combined. This finding reconciles the prima facie contradictory rationale for using marmosets as high priority model species in neuroscience and anthropology.

Lack of prosociality in great apes, capuchin monkeys and spider monkeys: convergent evidence from two different food distribution tasks

Prosociality can be defined as any behaviour performed to alleviate the needs of others or to improve their welfare. Prosociality has probably played an essential role in the evolution of cooperative behaviour and several studies have already investigated it in primates to understand the evolutionary origins of human prosociality. Two main tasks have been used to test prosociality in a food context. In the Platforms task, subjects can prosocially provide food to a partner by selecting a prosocial platform over a selfish one. In the Tokens task, subjects can prosocially provide food to a partner by selecting a prosocial token over a selfish one. As these tasks have provided mixed results, we used both tasks to test prosociality in great apes, capuchin monkeys and spider monkeys. Our results provided no compelling evidence of prosociality in a food context in any of the species tested. Additionally, our study revealed serious limitations of the Tokens task as it has been previously used. These results highlight the importance of controlling for confounding variables and of using multiple tasks to address inconsistencies present in the literature.

How to learn about teaching: An evolutionary framework for the study of teaching behavior in humans and other animals

The human species is more reliant on cultural adaptation than any other species, but it is unclear how observational learning can give rise to the faithful transmission of cultural adaptations. One possibility is that teaching facilitates accurate social transmission by narrowing the range of inferences that learners make. However, there is wide disagreement about how to define teaching, and how to interpret the empirical evidence for teaching across cultures and species. In this article I argue that disputes about the nature and prevalence of teaching across human societies and nonhuman animals are based on a number of deep-rooted theoretical differences between fields, as well as on important differences in how teaching is defined. To reconcile these disparate bodies of research, I review the three major approaches to the study of teaching – mentalistic, culture-based, and functionalist – and outline the research questions about teaching that each addresses. I then argue for a new, integrated framework that differentiates between teaching types according to the specific adaptive problems that each type solves, and apply this framework to restructure current empirical evidence on teaching in humans and nonhuman animals. This integrative framework generates novel insights, with broad implications for the study of the evolution of teaching, including the roles of cognitive constraints and cooperative dilemmas in how and when teaching evolves. Finally, I propose an explanation for why some types of teaching are uniquely human, and discuss new directions for research motivated by this framework.