Access to deductive logic depends on a right ventromedial prefrontal area devoted to emotion and feeling: evidence from a training paradigm

Probabilistic and Deductive Reasoning in the Human Brain

Reasoning is a process of inference from given premises to new conclusions. Deductive reasoning is truth-preserving and conclusions can only be either true or false. Probabilistic reasoning is based on degrees of belief and conclusions can be more or less likely. While deductive reasoning requires people to focus on the logical structure of the inference and ignore its content, probabilistic reasoning requires the retrieval of prior knowledge from memory. Recently, however, some researchers have denied that deductive reasoning is a faculty of the human mind. What looks like deductive inference might actually also be probabilistic inference, only with extreme probabilities. We tested this assumption in an fMRI experiment with two groups of participants: one group was instructed to reason deductively, the other received probabilistic instructions. They could freely choose between a binary and a graded response to each problem. The conditional probability and the logical validity of the inferences were systematically varied. Results show that prior knowledge was only used in the probabilistic reasoning group. These participants gave graded responses more often than those in the deductive reasoning group and their reasoning was accompanied by activations in the hippocampus. Participants in the deductive group mostly gave binary responses and their reasoning was accompanied by activations in the anterior cingulate cortex, inferior frontal cortex, and parietal regions. These findings show that (1) deductive and probabilistic reasoning rely on different neurocognitive processes, (2) people can suppress their prior knowledge to reason deductively, and (3) not all inferences can be reduced to probabilistic reasoning.

Sex and strategy effects on brain activation during a 3D-navigation task

Sex differences in navigation have often been attributed to the use of different navigation strategies in men and women. However, no study so far has investigated sex differences in the brain networks supporting different navigation strategies. To address this issue, we employed a 3D-navigation task during functional MRI in 36 men and 36 women, all scanned thrice, and modeled navigation strategies by instructions requiring an allocentric vs. egocentric reference frame on the one hand, as well as landmark-based vs. Euclidian strategies on the other hand. We found distinct brain networks supporting different perspectives/strategies. Men showed stronger activation of frontal areas, whereas women showed stronger activation of posterior brain regions. The left inferior frontal gyrus was more strongly recruited during landmark-based navigation in men. The hippocampus showed stronger connectivity with left-lateralized frontal areas in women and stronger connectivity with superior parietal areas in men. We discuss these findings in the light of a stronger recruitment of verbal networks supporting a more verbal strategy in women compared to a stronger recruitment of spatial networks supporting a more spatial strategy use in men. In summary, this study provides evidence that different navigation strategies activate different brain areas in men and women.

The 'Self' Aspects: the Sense of the Existence, Identification, and Location

The present article is limited to research studies focused on understanding the phenomenon and construction of the concept of 'Self.' When we look at one's experience of the Self, as a whole, it involves various components associated with different aspects like self-identification, self-location and the sense of the existence of oneself or the sense of Self. While exploring the Self phenomenon, many scientific studies consider only partial aspects of the experience, and hence any understanding resulting from such an evaluation makes it difficult to comment on the nature of the Self. We emphasize that while studying the Self, to understand it totally, one would need to include all the components of the Self. In this connection, we raise the following two theses: a) Ontologically, the Self is conceived as a sentient entity, the bearer of the "what it is like to be" type of feeling, and b) Phenomenologically, we do not have a direct apprehension of the Self, but experience various aspects of the Self through the Senses of Existence, Identification, and Location.

How minimal executive feedback influences creative idea generation

The fixation effect is known as one of the most dominant of the cognitive biases against creativity and limits individuals' creative capacities in contexts of idea generation. Numerous techniques and tools have been established to help overcome these cognitive biases in various disciplines ranging from neuroscience to design sciences. Several works in the developmental cognitive sciences have discussed the importance of inhibitory control and have argued that individuals must first inhibit the spontaneous ideas that come to their mind so that they can generate creative solutions to problems. In line with the above discussions, in the present study, we performed an experiment on one hundred undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychology at Paris Descartes University, in which we investigated a minimal executive feedback-based learning process that helps individuals inhibit intuitive paths to solutions and then gradually drive their ideation paths toward creativity. Our results provide new insights into novel forms of creative leadership for idea generation.

Development and Plasticity of Cognitive Flexibility in Early and Middle Childhood

Cognitive flexibility, the ability to flexibly switch between tasks, is a core dimension of executive functions (EFs) allowing to control actions and to adapt flexibly to changing environments. It supports the management of multiple tasks, the development of novel, adaptive behavior and is associated with various life outcomes. Cognitive flexibility develops rapidly in preschool and continuously increases well into adolescence, mirroring the growth of neural networks involving the prefrontal cortex. Over the past decade, there has been increasing interest in interventions designed to improve cognitive flexibility in children in order to support the many developmental outcomes associated with cognitive flexibility. This article provides a brief review of the development and plasticity of cognitive flexibility across early and middle childhood (i.e., from preschool to elementary school age). Focusing on interventions designed to improve cognitive flexibility in typically developing children, we report evidence for significant training and transfer effects while acknowledging that current findings on transfer are heterogeneous. Finally, we introduce metacognitive training as a promising new approach to promote cognitive flexibility and to support transfer of training.

Neuromodulation, Emotional Feelings and Affective Disorders

Affective disorders such as anxiety, phobia and depression are a leading cause of disabilities worldwide. Monoamine neuromodulators are used to treat most of them, with variable degrees of efficacy. Here, we review and interpret experimental findings about the relation of neuromodulation and emotional feelings, in pursuit of two goals: (a) to improve the conceptualisation of affective/emotional states, and (b) to develop a descriptive model of basic emotional feelings related to the actions of neuromodulators. In this model, we hypothesize that specific neuromodulators are effective for basic emotions. The model can be helpful for mental health professionals to better understand the affective dynamics of persons and the actions of neuromodulators - and respective psychoactive drugs - on this dynamics.

How can we study reasoning in the brain?

The brain did not develop a dedicated device for reasoning. This fact bears dramatic consequences. While for perceptuo-motor functions neural activity is shaped by the input's statistical properties, and processing is carried out at high speed in hardwired spatially segregated modules, in reasoning, neural activity is driven by internal dynamics and processing times, stages, and functional brain geometry are largely unconstrained a priori. Here, it is shown that the complex properties of spontaneous activity, which can be ignored in a short-lived event-related world, become prominent at the long time scales of certain forms of reasoning. It is argued that the neural correlates of reasoning should in fact be defined in terms of non-trivial generic properties of spontaneous brain activity, and that this implies resorting to concepts, analytical tools, and ways of designing experiments that are as yet non-standard in cognitive neuroscience. The implications in terms of models of brain activity, shape of the neural correlates, methods of data analysis, observability of the phenomenon, and experimental designs are discussed.

Fundamental Concepts Bridging Education and the Brain

Although a number of papers have already discussed the relevance of brain research for education, the fundamental concepts and discoveries connecting education and the brain have not been systematically reviewed yet. In this paper, four of these concepts are presented and evidence concerning each one is reviewed. First, the concept of neuroplasticity is proposed as asine qua nonfor linking education and the brain. Then, the concepts of neuronal recycling and inhibition are presented as two fundamental mechanisms of school learning that emphasize the importance of knowing the initial brain structure of learners and, finally, the concept of attention is discussed as a central concept for linking teaching and the brain.

Helping reasoners succeed in the Wason selection task: when executive learning discourages heuristic response but does not necessarily encourage logic

Reasoners make systematic logical errors by giving heuristic responses that reflect deviations from the logical norm. Influential studies have suggested first that our reasoning is often biased because we minimize cognitive effort to surpass a cognitive conflict between heuristic response from system 1 and analytic response from system 2 thinking. Additionally, cognitive control processes might be necessary to inhibit system 1 responses to activate a system 2 response. Previous studies have shown a significant effect of executive learning (EL) on adults who have transferred knowledge acquired on the Wason selection task (WST) to another isomorphic task, the rule falsification task (RFT). The original paradigm consisted of teaching participants to inhibit a classical matching heuristic that sufficed the first problem and led to significant EL transfer on the second problem. Interestingly, the reasoning tasks differed in inhibiting-heuristic metacognitive cost. Success on the WST requires half-suppression of the matching elements. In contrast, the RFT necessitates a global rejection of the matching elements for a correct answer. Therefore, metacognitive learning difficulty most likely differs depending on whether one uses the first or second task during the learning phase. We aimed to investigate this difficulty and various matching-bias inhibition effects in a new (reversed) paradigm. In this case, the transfer effect from the RFT to the WST could be more difficult because the reasoner learns to reject all matching elements in the first task. We observed that the EL leads to a significant reduction in matching selections on the WST without increasing logical performances. Interestingly, the acquired metacognitive knowledge was too "strictly" transferred and discouraged matching rather than encouraging logic. This finding underlines the complexity of learning transfer and adds new evidence to the pedagogy of reasoning.

Evidence for an inhibitory-control theory of the reasoning brain

In this article, we first describe our general inhibitory-control theory and, then, we describe how we have tested its specific hypotheses on reasoning with brain imaging techniques in adults and children. The innovative part of this perspective lies in its attempt to come up with a brain-based synthesis of Jean Piaget’s theory on logical algorithms and Daniel Kahneman’s theory on intuitive heuristics.

Brain imaging, forward inference, and theories of reasoning

This review focuses on the issue of how neuroimaging studies address theoretical accounts of reasoning, through the lens of the method of forward inference (Henson, 2005, 2006). After theories of deductive and inductive reasoning are briefly presented, the method of forward inference for distinguishing between psychological theories based on brain imaging evidence is critically reviewed. Brain imaging studies of reasoning, comparing deductive and inductive arguments, comparing meaningful versus non-meaningful material, investigating hemispheric localization, and comparing conditional and relational arguments, are assessed in light of the method of forward inference. Finally, conclusions are drawn with regard to future research opportunities.

Framing deductive reasoning with emotional content: an fMRI study

In the literature concerning the study of emotional effect on cognition, several researches highlight the mechanisms of reasoning ability and the influence of emotions on this ability. However, up to now, no neuroimaging study was specifically devised to directly compare the influence on reasoning performance of visual task-unrelated with semantic task-related emotional information. In the present functional fMRI study, we devised a novel paradigm in which emotionally negative vs. neutral visual stimuli (context) were used as primes, followed by syllogisms composed of propositions with emotionally negative vs. neutral contents respectively. Participants, in the MR scanner, were asked to assess the logical validity of the syllogisms. We have therefore manipulated the emotional state and arousal induced by the visual prime as well as the emotional interference exerted by the syllogism content. fMRI data indicated a medial prefrontal cortex deactivation and lateral/dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation in conditions with negative context. Furthermore, a lateral/dorsolateral prefrontal cortex modulation caused by syllogism content was observed. Finally, behavioral data confirmed the influence of emotional task-related stimuli on reasoning ability, since the performance was worse in conditions with syllogisms involving negative emotions. Therefore, on the basis of these data, we conclude that emotional states can impair the performance in reasoning tasks by means of the delayed general reactivity, whereas the emotional content of the target may require a larger amount of top-down resources to be processed.

[The neural impact of cognitive training]

Tracing the connections from brain functions to education is a major goal of modern neuroscience. By providing insights into the abilities and constraints of the learning brain, neuroscience can help to explain why some learning environments work while others fail. The results presented here provide the first insights into neuropedagogy of reasoning.

Neural Correlates of Species-typical Illogical Cognitive Bias in Human Inference

The ability to think logically is a hallmark of human intelligence, yet our innate inferential abilities are marked by implicit biases that often lead to illogical inference. For example, given AB (“if A then B”), people frequently but fallaciously infer the inverse, BA. This mode of inference, called symmetry, is logically invalid because, although it may be true, it is not necessarily true. Given pairs of conditional relations, such as AB and BC, humans reflexively perform two additional modes of inference: transitivity, whereby one (validly) infers AC; and equivalence, whereby one (invalidly) infers CA. In sharp contrast, nonhuman animals can handle transitivity but can rarely be made to acquire symmetry or equivalence. In the present study, human subjects performed logical and illogical inferences about the relations between abstract, visually presented figures while their brain activation was monitored with fMRI. The prefrontal, medial frontal, and intraparietal cortices were activated during all modes of inference. Additional activation in the precuneus and posterior parietal cortex was observed during transitivity and equivalence, which may reflect the need to retrieve the intermediate stimulus (B) from memory. Surprisingly, the patterns of brain activation in illogical and logical inference were very similar. We conclude that the observed inference-related fronto-parietal network is adapted for processing categorical, but not logical, structures of association among stimuli. Humans might prefer categorization over the memorization of logical structures in order to minimize the cognitive working memory load when processing large volumes of information.

How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: evidence from the Iowa gambling task

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased --> biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased --> logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.

Regional cerebral blood flow increases during wakeful rest following cognitive training

Positron tomography was used to investigate modulations of brain activity during the so-called resting state that may occur due to a concurrent cognitive training. Twelve subjects were repeatedly scanned during resting periods and while solving logical problems containing a bias causing them to make reasoning errors. At experiment mid-time, eight subjects were trained to inhibit the reasoning bias so that their performance in solving logical problems dramatically increased afterwards, while the other four subjects were trained to logical reasoning only which did not help improving their performance. In the subgroup of subjects who increased their performance after training, we found that during the post-training resting periods, as compared to pre-training resting periods, brain activity increases in areas not belonging to the classical resting network, namely the midbrain, thalamus, peristriate, inferior frontal, and ventromedial prefrontal cortices. Strikingly, in this subgroup of subjects, these same areas were found to be also more active during post-training successful execution of the logical task, as compared to pre-training erroneous execution of the task. Such findings were not observed in the subgroup of subjects who did not improve their performance after training to logic only. These results indicate that the brain default mode is a dynamic state during which context dependent local increases of cerebral blood flow may occur on a short-term, likely for the consolidation of newly acquired knowledge.

Anatomy of deductive reasoning

Much of cognitive research on deductive reasoning has been preoccupied with advocating for or against visuospatial (mental model theory) or linguistic/syntactic (mental logic theory) models of logical reasoning. Neuroimaging studies bear on this issue by pointing to both language-based and visuospatial systems being engaged during logical reasoning, and by raising additional issues not anticipated by these cognitive theories. Here, the literature on the neural basis of deductive reasoning from the past decade is reviewed. Although these results might seem chaotic and inconsistent, we identify several interesting patterns and articulate their implications for cognitive theories of reasoning. Cognitive neuroscience data point away from a unitary system for logical reasoning and towards a fractionated system dynamically reconfigured in response to specific task and environmental cues.

Overcoming perceptual features in logical reasoning: a parametric functional magnetic resonance imaging study

Participants experience difficulty detecting that an item depicting an H-in-a-square confirms the logical rule, "If there is not a T then there is not a circle." Indeed, there is a perceptual conflict between the items mentioned in the rule (T and circle) and in the test item (H and square). Much evidence supports the claim that correct responding depends on detecting and resolving such conflicts. One aim of this study is to find more precise neurological evidence in support of this claim by using a parametric event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm. We scanned 20 participants while they were required to judge whether or not a conditional rule was verified (or falsified) by a corresponding target item. We found that the right middorsolateral prefrontal cortex (mid-DLPFC) was specifically engaged, together with the medial frontal (anterior cingulate and presupplementary motor area [pre-SMA]) and parietal cortices, when mismatching was present. Activity in these regions was also linearly correlated with the level of mismatch between the rule and the test item. Furthermore, a psychophysiological interaction analysis revealed that activation of the mid-DLPFC, which increases as mismatching does, was accompanied by a decrease in functional integration with the bilateral primary visual cortex and an increase in functional integration with the right parietal cortex. This indicates a need to break away from perceptual cues in order to select an appropriate logical response. These findings strongly indicate that the regions involved in inhibitory control (including the right mid-DLPFC and the medial frontal cortex) are engaged when participants have to overcome perceptual mismatches in order to provide a logical response. These findings are also consistent with neuroimaging studies investigating the belief bias, where prior beliefs similarly interfere with logical reasoning.

Cognitive inhibition of number/length interference in a Piaget-like task in young adults: evidence from ERPs and fMRI

We sought to determine whether the neural traces of a previous cognitive developmental stage could be evidenced in young adults. In order to do so, 12 young adults underwent two functional imaging acquisitions (EEG then fMRI). During each session, two experimental conditions were applied: a Piaget-like task with number/length interference (INT), and a reference task with number/length covariation (COV). To succeed at Piaget's numerical task, which children under the age of 7 years usually fail, the subjects had to inhibit a misleading strategy, namely, the visuospatial length-equals-number bias, a quantification heuristic that is often relevant and that continues to be used through adulthood. Behavioral data confirmed that although there was an automation in the young adult subjects as assessed by the very high number of accurate responses (>97%), the inhibition of the "length equals number strategy" had a cognitive cost, as the reaction times were significantly higher in INT than in COV (with a difference of 230 ms). The event-related potential results acquired during the first session showed electrophysiological markers of the cognitive inhibition of the number/length interference. Indeed, the frontal N2 was greater during INT than during COV, and a P3(late)/P6 was detected only during INT. During the fMRI session, a greater activation of unimodal areas (the right middle and superior occipital cortex) and in the ventral route (the left inferior temporal cortex) was observed in INT than in COV. These results seem to indicate that when fully automated in adults, inhibition processes might take place in unimodal areas.

Syllogistic reasoning and belief-bias inhibition in school children: evidence from a negative priming paradigm

Research on deductive reasoning in adolescents and adults has shown that errors in deductive logic are not necessarily due to a lack of logical ability but can stem from an executive failure to inhibit biases. Few studies have examined this dissociation in children. Here, we used a negative priming paradigm with 64 children (8-10 years old) to test the role of cognitive inhibition in syllogisms with belief-bias effects. On trials where negative priming was predicted, results were as follows: For the first syllogism (A), the strategy 'unbelievable-equals-invalid' had to be inhibited. The logic of the syllogism led to affirming a conclusion inconsistent with one's knowledge of the world, such as 'All elephants are light.' For the second syllogism (B), one's real-world knowledge and the syllogism's logic were congruent but the latter required affirming exactly what had been inhibited for A (i.e. that elephants are heavy). A negative priming effect on the A-B sequence was reflected in a significant drop in reasoning performance on B. This supports the idea that during cognitive development, inhibitory control is required for success on syllogisms where beliefs and logic interfere.

The effect of social content on deductive reasoning: an fMRI study

Psychological studies of deductive reasoning have shown that subjects' performance is affected significantly by the content of the presented stimuli. Specifically, subjects find it easier to reason about contexts and situations with a social content. In the present study, the effect of content on brain activation was investigated with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while subjects were solving two versions of the Wason selection task, which previous behavioral studies have shown to elicit a significant content effect. One version described an arbitrary relation between two actions (Descriptive: "If someone does ..., then he does ..."), whereas the other described an exchange of goods between two persons (Social-Exchange: "If you give me ..., then I give you ..."). Random-effect statistical analyses showed that compared to baseline, both tasks activated frontal medial cortex and left dorsolateral frontal and parietal regions, confirming the major role of the left hemisphere in deductive reasoning. In addition, although the two reasoning conditions were identical in logical form, the social-exchange task was also associated with right frontal and parietal activations, mirroring the left-sided activations common to both reasoning tasks. These results suggest that the recruitment of the right hemisphere is dependent on the content of the stimuli presented.

The neural basis of conditional reasoning with arbitrary content

Behavioral predictions about reasoning have usually contrasted two accounts, Mental Logic and Mental Models. Neuroimaging techniques have been providing new measures that transcend this debate. We tested a hypothesis from Goel and Dolan (2003) that predicts neural activity predominantly in a left parietal-frontal system when participants reason with arbitrary (non-meaningful) materials. In an event-related fMRI investigation, we employed propositional syllogisms, the majority of which involved conditional reasoning. While investigating conditional reasoning generally, we ultimately focused on the neural activity linked to the two valid conditional forms--Modus Ponens (If p then q; p//q) and Modus Tollens (If p then q; not-q//not-p). Consistent with Goel and Dolan (2003), we found a left lateralized parietal frontal network for both inference forms with increasing activation when reasoning becomes more challenging by way of Modus Tollens. These findings show that the previous findings with more complex Aristotlean syllogisms are robust and cast doubt upon accounts of reasoning that accord primary inferential processes uniquely to either the right hemisphere or to language areas.

An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning

Current theories propose that reasoning comprises two underlying systems (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The systems are identified as having functionally distinct roles, differ according to the type of information encoded, vary according to the level of expressible knowledge, and result in different responses. This article evaluates the arguments and the evidence from a select number of key tasks that have been supportive of dual-reasoning theorists' proposals. The review contrasts the dualist approach with a single-system framework that conjectures that different types of reasoning arise through the graded properties of the representations that are utilized while reasoning, and the different functional roles that consciousness has in cognition. The article concludes by arguing in favor of the alternative framework, which attempts to unify thedifferent forms of reasoning identified by dual-process theorists under a single system.

How would you feel versus how do you think she would feel? A neuroimaging study of perspective-taking with social emotions

Perspective-taking is a complex cognitive process involved in social cognition. This positron emission tomography (PET) study investigated by means of a factorial design the interaction between the emotional and the perspective factors. Participants were asked to adopt either their own (first person) perspective or the (third person) perspective of their mothers in response to situations involving social emotions or to neutral situations. The main effect of third-person versus first-person perspective resulted in hemodynamic increase in the medial part of the superior frontal gyrus, the left superior temporal sulcus, the left temporal pole, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the right inferior parietal lobe. A cluster in the postcentral gyrus was detected in the reverse comparison. The amygdala was selectively activated when subjects were processing social emotions, both related to self and other. Interaction effects were identified in the left temporal pole and in the right postcentral gyrus. These results support our prediction that the frontopolar, the somatosensory cortex, and the right inferior parietal lobe are crucial in the process of self/other distinction. In addition, this study provides important building blocks in our understanding of social emotion processing and human empathy.

Dissociable concurrent activity of lateral and medial frontal lobe during negative feedback processing

External feedback on results of one's behavior guides flexible adaptation to changing environments. It has been suggested that the lateral and medial parts of the frontal lobe are responsible for cognitive and emotional functions, respectively. In the present fMRI study, multiple mental components evoked by the presentation of negative feedback were dissociated along the cognitive-emotional axis in set-shifting paradigms. The double dissociation of the concurrent feedback-related activity was observed in the right frontal lobe: the lateral frontal lobe was associated with the inferential component, whereas the medial frontal lobe was associated with the emotional component. However, among the multiple right lateral frontal regions, a region of interest (ROI) analysis indicated that the inferential component was not dominant in the region near the inferior frontal junction. The medial frontal activations were observed ventral and anterior to the presupplementary motor area, and dorsal and posterior to the anterior cingulate cortex. The double dissociation in the right frontal lobe suggests that the lateral and medial frontal lobe cooperatively but differentially contributes to the negative feedback processing, demonstrating the lateral-medial dichotomy of the frontal lobe functions suggested by previous neuropsychological studies. At the same time, the functional heterogeneity in the lateral and medial frontal lobe demands modifications of the traditional view of the functional organization of the frontal lobe.

A relation between rest and the self in the brain?

Neuroimaging techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are widely used to identify the cerebral correlates of cognitive tasks. The resting state presents the advantage to serve as a reference in all experiments but is also an ill-defined mental state because it may vary both from one subject to another and within the same subject. The most challenging question concerns the areas whose activity (revealed by PET or fMRI imaging) is greater in rest state than in an active condition. The present work reports the result of a meta-analysis including five previously published studies. The five different tasks involved are the following: attribution of intention, judgement of stimulus pleasantness, discrimination of spatial attributes, judgement of other peoples' belief and perception of gaze. For each study, the general linear model was used to assess statistical difference and a contrast resting state minus other conditions was calculated. The intersection of the five contrasts was used to search for the variation jointly observed across the different experiments. This lead to a reduced number of clusters: one cluster in the lower/anterior part of the cingulate gyrus and four clusters located in the medial/superior frontal gyrus, along the superior frontal sulcus. We discuss the location of these areas with respect to the location of activations induced by different tasks: externally focused attention, memory, general reasoning, theory of mind and self-referential tasks. We observed that medial prefrontal cortex exhibits a lower activity when the subject's attention is focused towards the external world than when the subject has to additionally refer to some internal states. By contrast, this activity is greater during resting state than during both externally directed and internally directed attention. Thus, we hypothesize that during rest, the subject is in a state where he refers only to his own self.

In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning

Researchers in thinking and reasoning have proposed recently that there are two distinct cognitive systems underlying reasoning. System 1 is old in evolutionary terms and shared with other animals: it comprises a set of autonomous subsystems that include both innate input modules and domain-specific knowledge acquired by a domain-general learning mechanism. System 2 is evolutionarily recent and distinctively human: it permits abstract reasoning and hypothetical thinking, but is constrained by working memory capacity and correlated with measures of general intelligence. These theories essentially posit two minds in one brain with a range of experimental psychological evidence showing that the two systems compete for control of our inferences and actions.

Perception and judgement of physical causality involve different brain structures

One basic type of 'mechanical' causality is that which occurs between physical objects. Subjects were presented with mechanically causal events (ball collides with and causes movement of another ball) or two non-causal events (a ball either passes underneath another ball, or rolls across the screen and changes colour). We investigated which brain regions exhibit increased activity during the judgement of causality ('judged causality') as compared with judgement of movement direction ('perceived causality'). We show an increase of medial frontal cortex activity when subjects were explicitly instructed to search for causality. Moreover, this increase was specifically associated with the search for causality and not with the perception of causality because the signal increase occurs whatever the nature of the stimulus (causal or non causal). Our study provides evidence for brain regions involved in a conscious level of inference about the presence of causality.

Neural correlates of feeling sympathy

Positron emission tomography (PET) was used to investigate the neural correlates of feeling sympathy for someone else (i.e. the affinity, association, or relationship between persons wherein whatever affects one similarly affects the other). While undergoing PET scans, subjects were presented with a series of video-clips showing individuals (who were semi-professional stage actors) telling sad and neutral stories, as if they had personally experienced them. These stories were told with either congruent or incongruent motor expression of emotion (MEE). At the end of each movie, subjects were asked to rate the mood of the communicator and also how likable they found that person. Watching sad stories versus neutral stories was associated with increased activity in emotion processing-related structures, as well as in a set of cortical areas that belong to a "shared representation" network, including the right inferior parietal cortex. Motor expression of emotion, regardless of the narrative content of the stories, resulted in a specific regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) increase in the left inferior frontal gyrus. The condition of mismatch between the narrative content of the stories and the motor expression of emotion elicited a significant skin conductance response and strong rCBF increase in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and superior frontal gyrus which are involved in dealing with social conflict. Taken together, these results are consistent with a model of feeling sympathy that relies on both the shared representation and the affective networks. Interestingly, this network was not activated when subjects watched inappropriate social behavior.

Asymmetric functional roles of right and left ventromedial prefrontal cortices in social conduct, decision-making, and emotional processing

The aim of this study was to begin to parse the relative contributions of the right and left ventromedial prefrontal cortices (VMPC) in regard to social conduct, decision-making, and emotional processing. We hypothesized that the right VMPC is a critical component of the neural systems that subserve such functions, whereas the left VMPC is not. Seven participants with focal, stable unilateral lesions to the right (n = 4) or left (n = 3) VMPC were studied with procedures designed to measure social conduct, decision-making, and emotional processing and personality. The right-sided participants had profound disturbances of social and interpersonal behavior and of the ability to maintain gainful employment; they had defective performance and impaired anticipatory skin conductance responses during the Gambling Task; most had profound abnormalities of emotional processing and personality, and met criteria for "acquired sociopathy." By contrast, the left-sided participants had normal social and interpersonal behavior; they had stable employment; they performed normally and had normal skin conductance responses on the Gambling Task; they had normal emotional processing; and their personalities were unchanged from premorbid status. The marked deficits in social conduct, decision-making, and emotional processing in participants with unilateral right VMPC lesions are reminiscent in kind of those that have been reported in connection with bilateral VMPC lesions, albeit perhaps of lesser severity. The findings provide preliminary evidence that insofar as social, decision-making, and emotional functions are concerned, the right-sided component of the VMPC system may be critical, whereas the left-sided component may be less important.