Experience of memory: transfer of the motor feeling of fluency linked to our interaction with the environment

Making precise movements increases confidence in perceptual decisions

Perceptual decision-making often lacks explicit feedback, making confidence in our choices pivotal for guiding subsequent actions. Recent studies have highlighted the role of motor responses in modulating decision confidence. Two competing mechanisms have been proposed to elucidate this phenomenon. The "fluency hypothesis" posits that the ease and smoothness of executing a motor response can serve as a cue to enhance retrospective confidence. Conversely, the "monitoring hypothesis" suggests that the extent of action monitoring during response selection may boost retrospective confidence, with heightened monitoring potentially offsetting response fluency. We conducted a pre-registered experiment to directly test these hypotheses. Participants engaged in a perceptual task involving the discrimination of Gabor patch orientation. Perceptual responses required high or low motor precision, manipulated by the size of target circles that participants had to reach with the computer mouse to provide a response. Contrary to the "fluency hypothesis", our results showed that, in trials requiring higher precision (utilizing small circles), participants reported higher confidence levels compared to trials with less demanding responses (involving larger circles). Importantly, this increase in confidence did not coincide with any change in perceptual accuracy. These findings align with the "monitoring hypothesis," suggesting that the degree of action monitoring during response execution can indeed influence retrospective decision confidence.

Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective

Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.