Gorilla ( Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and orangutan ( Pongo abelii) understanding of first- and second-order relations

Stimulus-dependent emergence of understanding the 'same-different' concept in budgerigars

The ability to understand relational concepts, such as 'same' and 'different', is a critical feature of human cognition. To what extent non-human animals can acquire such concepts and which factors influence their learning are still unclear. We examined the acquisition and the breadth of understanding the 'same-different' concept in budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulatus). Budgerigars trained to discriminate stimulus pairs in which two identical figures were either the same or different size (Experiment 1) successfully generalized the discrimination to novel stimuli belonging to various categories (size, colour, shape, geometric type and number of dots). The results of Experiment 1 thus demonstrate that budgerigars can perceive and generalize the same-different concept across dimensions after training with a limited set of stimuli differing along a single dimension. In contrast, while most budgerigars trained to discriminate two pairs of discs that were either the same or different in colour (Experiment 2) could generalize the discrimination to novel stimuli within the training category (colour), only few generalized the discrimination to another category suggesting a generalization based on perceptual similarity. The results thus show that whether budgerigars generalize a relationship by conceptual or perceptual similarity depends on the nature of the training stimuli.

How can I find what I want? Can children, chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys form abstract representations to guide their behavior in a sampling task?

concepts are a powerful tool for making wide-ranging predictions in new situations based on little experience. Whereas looking-time studies suggest an early emergence of this ability in human infancy, other paradigms like the relational match to sample task often fail to detect abstract concepts until late preschool years. Similarly, non-human animals show difficulties and often succeed only after long training regimes. Given the considerable influence of slight task modifications, the conclusiveness of these findings for the development and phylogenetic distribution of abstract reasoning is debated. Here, we tested the abilities of 3 to 5-year-old children, chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys in a unified and more ecologically valid task design based on the concept of "overhypotheses" (Goodman, 1955). Participants sampled high- and low-valued items from containers that either each offered items of uniform value or a mix of high- and low-valued items. In a test situation, participants should switch away earlier from a container offering low-valued items when they learned that, in general, items within a container are of the same type, but should stay longer if they formed the overhypothesis that containers bear a mix of types. We compared each species' performance to the predictions of a probabilistic hierarchical Bayesian model forming overhypotheses at a first and second level of abstraction, adapted to each species' reward preferences. Children and, to a more limited extent, chimpanzees demonstrated their sensitivity to abstract patterns in the evidence. In contrast, capuchin monkeys did not exhibit conclusive evidence for the ability of abstract knowledge formation.

Similarity and structured representation in human and nonhuman apes

How we judge the similarity between objects in the world is connected ultimately to how we represent those objects. It has been argued extensively that object representations in humans are 'structured' in nature, meaning that both individual features and the relations between them can influence similarity. In contrast, popular models within comparative psychology assume that nonhuman species appreciate only surface-level, featural similarities. By applying psychological models of structural and featural similarity (from conjunctive feature models to Tversky's Contrast Model) to visual similarity judgements from adult humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas, we demonstrate a cross-species sensitivity to complex structural information, particularly for stimuli that combine colour and shape. These results shed new light on the representational complexity of nonhuman apes, and the fundamental limits of featural coding in explaining object representation and similarity, which emerge strikingly across both human and nonhuman species.

Generalized, cross-modal, and incrementing non-matching-to-sample in rats

Same/different concept learning has been demonstrated in previous research in rats using matching- and non-matching-to-sample procedures with olfactory stimuli. In Experiment 1, rats were trained on the non-matching-to-sample procedure with either three-dimensional (3D plastic objects; n = 3) or olfactory (household spices, n = 5) stimuli, then tested for transfer to novel stimuli of the same, and then the alternate, modality. While all three rats trained with olfactory stimuli showed generalized non-matching to novel odors, only one rat learned the 3D relation and showed generalized transfer to novel objects. Importantly, in this rat the 3D non-matching relation then immediately transferred to odors. In contrast, rats trained with scents did not show transfer to novel 3D stimuli until after training with one or two 3D stimulus sets. In Experiment 2, four rats were trained on an incrementing non-matching-to-sample task featuring 3D plastic objects as stimuli (3D Span Task). Responses to session-novel stimuli resulted in reinforcement. Only two rats learned the 3D Span Task; one rat performed with high accuracy even with up to 17 session-novel objects in a session. While these findings emphasize the exceptional olfactory discrimination of rats relative to that with 3D/tactile/visual cues, they also show that relational learning can be demonstrated in another modality in this species. Further, the present study provides some evidence of cross-modal transfer of relational responding in rats.

In search for consciousness in animals: Using working memory and voluntary attention as behavioral indicators

Whether animals have subjective experiences about the content of their sensory input, i.e., whether they are aware of stimuli, is a notoriously difficult question to answer. If consciousness is present in animals, it must share fundamental characteristics with human awareness. Working memory and voluntary/endogenous attention are suggested as diagnostic features of conscious awareness. Behavioral evidence shows clear signatures of both working memory and voluntary attention as minimal criterium for sensory consciousness in mammals and birds. In contrast, reptiles and amphibians show no sign of either working memory or volitional attention. Surprisingly, some species of teleost fishes exhibit elementary working memory and voluntary attention effects suggestive of possibly rudimentary forms of subjective experience. With the potential exception of honeybees, evidence for conscious processing is lacking in invertebrates. These findings suggest that consciousness is not ubiquitous in the animal kingdom but also not exclusive to humans. The phylogenetic gap between animal taxa argues that evolution does not rely on specific neural substrates to endow distantly related species with basic forms of consciousness.

Orangutan strategies for solving a visuospatial memory task

The popular game known as Concentration (also commonly referred to as Memory), in which players search for matching pairs among a grid of face-down cards, provides a robust platform for examining visuospatial memory in a simple and nonverbal way. Five orangutans (Pongo ssp.) at the Indianapolis Zoo were given a modified version of the Concentration Game in which three cards were shown face-down on a computer screen, two of which matched each other while the third was a foil. Subjects overturned two cards at a time by touching them, with trials terminating in a food reward if the overturned cards matched, or reverting to their face-down position if they did not. A constraint was experimentally imposed on the game whereby the first two cards touched would never match, resulting in an optimal strategy composed of touching the first two cards, followed by the third, followed by the card among the first two cards that matched the third. We aimed to measure the extent to which orangutans would memorize and utilize visuospatial cues to solve the task in the optimal manner. Findings showed that three of five subjects utilized an optimal strategy more often than would be expected by chance, but also over utilized specific patterns of choices instead of adjusting their strategies to minimize the overall number of card flips. Visuospatial recall played a role in several of the participants' strategies for completing the task, but not to an extent that was necessary to achieve optimal gameplay.

Rainbow trout discriminate 2-D photographs of conspecifics from distracting stimuli using an innovative operant conditioning device

Cognitive abilities were studied in rainbow trout, the first continental fish production in Europe. Increasing public concern for the welfare of farmed-fish species highlighted the need for better knowledge of the cognitive status of fish. We trained and tested 15 rainbow trout with an operant conditioning device composed of self-feeders positioned in front of visual stimuli displayed on a screen. The device was coupled with a two-alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) paradigm to test whether rainbow trout can discriminate 2-D photographs of conspecifics (S+) from different visual stimuli (S-). The S- were applied in four stages, the last three stages representing increasing discrimination difficulty: (1) blue shapes; (2) black shape (star); (3) photograph of an object (among a pool of 60); (4) photograph of another fish species (among a pool of 60). Nine fish (out of 15) correctly managed to activate the conditioning device after 30-150 trials. The rainbow trout were able to discriminate images of conspecifics from an abstract shape (five individuals out of five) or objects (four out of five) but not from other fish species. Their ability to learn the category "fish shape" rather than distinguishing between conspecifics and heterospecifics is discussed. The successful visual discrimination task using this complex operant conditioning device is particularly remarkable and novel for this farmed-fish species, and could be exploited to develop cognitive enrichments in future farming systems. This device can also be added to the existing repertoire of testing devices suitable for investigating cognitive abilities in fish.

Breaking the perceptual-conceptual barrier: Relational matching and working memory

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been interested in humans' and animals' ability to respond to abstract relations, as this ability may underlie important capacities like analogical reasoning. Cross-species research has used relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which participants try to find stimulus pairs that "match" because they both express the same abstract relation (same or different). Researchers seek to understand the cognitive processes that underlie successful matching performance. In the present RMTS paradigm, the abstract-relational cue was made redundant with a first-order perceptual cue. Then the perceptual cue faded, requiring participants to transition from a perceptual to a conceptual approach by realizing the task's abstract-relational affordance. We studied participants' ability to make this transition with and without a working-memory load. The concurrent load caused participants to fail to break the perceptual-conceptual barrier unless the load was abandoned. We conclude that finding the conceptual solution depends on reconstruing the task using cognitive processes that are especially reliant on working memory. Our data provide the closest existing look at this cognitive reorganization. They raise important theoretical issues for cross-species comparisons of relational cognition, especially regarding animals' limitations in this domain.

Effects of set size on identity and oddity abstract-concept learning in rats

Match (MTS) and non-match-to-sample (NMTS) procedures are used to assess concepts of identity and oddity across species and are measured by transfer performance to novel stimuli. The number of exemplars used in training (set size) has been shown to affect learning with evidence of larger set sizes promoting concept learning in several species. The present study explored the effects of set size and procedure on concept learning in rats using olfactory stimuli. Concept learning was assessed for 20 rats via transfer tests consisting of novel stimuli after rats were initially trained to either MTS or NMTS with two or ten stimuli as exemplars. No difference was found in acquisition or transfer between MTS and NMTS, but rats trained with ten stimuli performed better on novel transfer tests than rats trained with two. When set size was expanded for rats originally trained with two stimuli and rats were re-tested with ten novel stimuli, performance showed full transfer demonstrating that training with multiple exemplars facilitates concept learning.

Death among primates: a critical review of non-human primate interactions towards their dead and dying

For the past two centuries, non-human primates have been reported to inspect, protect, retrieve, carry or drag the dead bodies of their conspecifics and, for nearly the same amount of time, sparse scientific attention has been paid to such behaviours. Given that there exists a considerable gap in the fossil and archaeological record concerning how early hominins might have interacted with their dead, extant primates may provide valuable insight into how and in which contexts thanatological behaviours would have occurred. First, we outline a comprehensive history of comparative thanatology in non-human primates, from the earliest accounts to the present, uncovering the interpretations of previous researchers and their contributions to the field of primate thanatology. Many of the typical behavioural patterns towards the dead seen in the past are consistent with those observed today. Second, we review recent evidence of thanatological responses and organise it into distinct terminologies: direct interactions (physical contact with the corpse) and secondary interactions (guarding the corpse, vigils and visitations). Third, we provide a critical evaluation regarding the form and function of the behavioural and emotional aspects of these responses towards infants and adults, also comparing them with non-conspecifics. We suggest that thanatological interactions: promote a faster re-categorisation from living to dead, decrease costly vigilant/caregiving behaviours, are crucial to the management of grieving responses, update position in the group's hierarchy, and accelerate the formation of new social bonds. Fourth, we propose an integrated model of Life-Death Awareness, whereupon neural circuitry dedicated towards detecting life, i.e. the agency system (animate agency, intentional agency, mentalistic agency) works with a corresponding system that interacts with it on a decision-making level (animate/inanimate distinction, living/dead discrimination, death awareness). Theoretically, both systems are governed by specific cognitive mechanisms (perceptual categories, associative concepts and high-order reasoning, respectively). Fifth, we present an evolutionary timeline from rudimentary thanatological responses likely occurring in earlier non-human primates during the Eocene to the more elaborate mortuary practices attributed to genus Homo throughout the Pleistocene. Finally, we discuss the importance of detailed reports on primate thanatology and propose several empirical avenues to shed further light on this topic. This review expands and builds upon previous attempts to evaluate the body of knowledge on this subject, providing an integrative perspective and bringing together different fields of research to detail the evolutionary, sensory/cognitive, developmental and historical/archaeological aspects of primate thanatology. Considering all these findings and given their cognitive abilities, we argue that non-human primates are capable of an implicit awareness of death.

Foraging in a social setting: a comparative analysis of captive gorillas and chimpanzees

This study was designed to investigate the foraging behavior of zoo-housed western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and compare it with that of zoo-housed chimpanzees (Pan trogloydytes) tested previously in a similar paradigm. Specifically, we aimed to document how a group of zoo-housed gorillas foraged within a familiar environment to discover novel food sources and whether they sought out more preferred foods, even if they had to travel further to reach them, as they do in the wild. Gorillas were provided plastic tokens to exchange with researchers at two locations-at the same location as the tokens (close) for carrot pieces and another 6.5 m away (far) for grapes. Over the course of 30 sessions, a single individual-the silverback male-accounted for 96% of the 1546 tokens exchanged, all of which took place at the far location. Inter-individual distance measures collected during each session, as well as during matched control sessions, showed that while both gorillas and chimpanzees express similar patterns of social association across the two conditions, the average dyadic association for chimpanzees was stronger than that for gorillas. Together, these findings provide an example of the value of employing identical methodologies to compare cognition and behavior across species as well highlight the importance of the social context in which studies take place.

A review of zoo-based cognitive research using touchscreen interfaces

In the past few decades, there has been an increase in the number of zoo-based touchscreen studies of animal cognition around the world. Such studies have contributed to the field of comparative cognition despite the fact research has only been performed at a relatively small number of institutions and with a narrow range of species. Nonetheless, zoo-based touchscreen studies are increasingly recognized as both having the potential to be enriching for captive animals by providing them with opportunities for choice, as well as potentially being a tool with which to measure changes in welfare. Zoo-based touchscreen research on public display also has the potential to impact zoo visitors; encouraging them not only learn more about the cognitive abilities of animals, but also potentially promoting increased respect for these species. Given the lack of a comprehensive review of this scope of specialized research, and the broad potential impacts on animals and programs, here we discuss the history, implementation, and potential outcomes of touchscreen research in zoo settings.

Children's representation of abstract relations in relational/array match-to-sample tasks

Five experiments compared preschool children's performance to that of adults and of non-human animals on match to sample tasks involving 2-item or 16-item arrays that varied according to their composition of same or different items (Array Match-to-Sample, AMTS). They establish that, like non-human animals in most studies, 3- and 4-year-olds fail 2-item AMTS (the classic relational match to sample task introduced into the literature by Premack, 1983), and that robust success is not observed until age 6. They also establish that 3-year-olds, like non-human animal species, succeed only when they are able to encode stimuli in terms of entropy, a property of an array (namely its internal variability), rather than relations among the individuals in the array (same vs. different), whereas adults solve both 2-item and 16-item AMTS on the basis of the relations same and different. As in the case of non-human animals, the acuity of 3- and 4-year-olds' representation of entropy is insufficient to solve the 2-item same-different AMTS task. At age 4, behavior begins to contrast with that of non-human species. On 16-item AMTS, a subgroup of 4-year-olds induce a categorical rule matching all-same arrays to all-same arrays, while matching other arrays (mixed arrays of same and different items) to all-different arrays. These children tend to justify their choices using the words "same" and "different." By age 4 a number of our participants succeed at 2-item AMTS, also justifying their choices by explicit verbal appeals using words for same and different. Taken together these results suggest that the recruitment of the relational representations corresponding to the meaning of these words contributes to the better performance over the preschool years at solving array match-to-sample tasks.

The evolutionary dynamics of language

The well-established framework of evolutionary dynamics can be applied to the fascinating open problems how human brains are able to acquire and adapt language and how languages change in a population. Schemas for handling grammatical constructions are the replicating unit. They emerge and multiply with variation in the brains of individuals and undergo selection based on their contribution to needed expressive power, communicative success and the reduction of cognitive effort. Adopting this perspective has two major benefits. (i) It makes a bridge to neurobiological models of the brain that have also adopted an evolutionary dynamics point of view, thus opening a new horizon for studying how human brains achieve the remarkably complex competence for language. And (ii) it suggests a new foundation for studying cultural language change as an evolutionary dynamics process. The paper sketches this novel perspective, provides references to empirical data and computational experiments, and points to open problems.

Successive odor matching- and non-matching-to-sample in rats: A reversal design

There is a growing body of research on matching- and non-matching-to-sample (MTS, NMTS) relations with rats using olfactory stimuli; however, the specific characteristics of this relational control are unclear. In the current study we examine MTS and NMTS in rats with an automated olfactometer using a successive (go, no-go) procedure. Ten rats were trained to either match- or non-match-to-sample with common scents (apple, cinnamon, etc.) as olfactory stimuli. After matching or non-matching training with four odorants, rats were tested for transfer twice with four new odorants on each test. Most rats trained on MTS showed immediate transfer to new stimuli, and most rats trained on NMTS showed full transfer by the second set of new odors. After meeting criterion on the second transfer test, the contingencies were reversed with four new odor stimuli such that subjects trained on matching were shifted to non-matching and vice versa. Following these reversed contingencies, the effects of the original training persisted for many trials with new odorants. These data extend previous studies on same-different concept formation in rats, showing strong generalization requiring few exemplars. The critical role of olfactory stimuli is discussed.

When things are not the same: A review of research into relations of difference

Responding to stimuli as same and different can be considered a critical component of a variety of language and academic repertoires. Whereas responding to "sameness" and generalized identity matching (i.e., coordination) have been studied extensively, there appears to be a significant gap in behavior analytic research and educational programs with regard to nonmatching relations or relations of difference. We review research on difference relations from a variety of domains, including comparative psychology, as well as experimental, and translational behavior analysis. We examine a range of studies, including research on the perception of difference and oddity responding, as well as investigations on establishing relational frames of distinction. We present suggestions for future research and describe potential methods for teaching skills related to relations of difference.

Corvid cognition: something to crow about?

New research indicates that crows are capable of matching stimuli on the basis of analogical relations: that is, similarity of size, color and shape. This may be the first evidence for spontaneous analogical reasoning outside of the primate order.

Comparison of discrete ratios by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Perceiving and comparing ratios are crucial skills for humans. Little is known about whether other animals can compare ratios. We trained two rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) to choose arrays that contained the greater ratio of positive to negative stimuli, regardless of the absolute number of stimuli in each of the two choice arrays. Subjects learned this task, and their performance generalized to novel ratios. Moreover, performance was modulated by the ratio between ratios; subjects responded more quickly and accurately when the ratio between ratios was higher. Control conditions ruled out the possibility that subjects were relying on surface area, although the ratio between ratios of surface area did seem to influence their choices. Our results demonstrate that rhesus monkeys can compare discrete ratios, demonstrating not only proportional reasoning ability but also the ability to reason about relations between relations.

Quantification acuity in spontaneous shoaling decisions of three-spined sticklebacks

The ability to discriminate between different quantities is widespread throughout the animal kingdom, and the underlying mechanisms of quantity discrimination are currently intensely discussed. In contrast, questions elucidating the limits of quantity estimation received rather little attention so far. Here, we examined fine-tuned quantity estimation in the three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) in a natural context, i.e. during shoaling decisions. Wild-caught focal fish were given the spontaneous choice between two shoals which differed in group size by 1 fish (0 vs. 1, 1 vs. 2, 2 vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, 4 vs. 5, 5 vs. 6 and 6 vs. 7), based on visual assessment. The results show that sticklebacks generally prefer to shoal with the larger group. They discriminated numerical contrasts up to 6 versus 7, equalling a numerical ratio of 0.86. Preference patterns followed Weber's law, i.e. decreased with increasing numerical ratio. This pattern was found across all numerical conditions as well as within the small number range (ranging from 1 vs. 2 to 3 vs. 4). The results suggest that wild-caught three-spined sticklebacks are spontaneously able (i.e. without prior learning) to detect subtle differences in shoal sizes. Further, they confirm findings of previous studies highlighting the contribution of the analogue magnitude system to quantity estimation in fishes.

Analogical reasoning in amazons

Two juvenile orange-winged amazons (Amazona amazonica) were initially trained to match visual stimuli by color, shape, and number of items, but not by size. After learning these three identity matching-to-sample tasks, the parrots transferred discriminative responding to new stimuli from the same categories that had been used in training (other colors, shapes, and numbers of items) as well as to stimuli from a different category (stimuli varying in size). In the critical testing phase, both parrots exhibited reliable relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) behavior, suggesting that they perceived and compared the relationship between objects in the sample stimulus pair to the relationship between objects in the comparison stimulus pairs, even though no physical matches were possible between items in the sample and comparison pairs. The parrots spontaneously exhibited this higher-order relational responding without having ever before been trained on RMTS tasks, therefore joining apes and crows in displaying this abstract cognitive behavior.

Does presentation format influence visual size discrimination in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.)?

Most experimental paradigms to study visual cognition in humans and non-human species are based on discrimination tasks involving the choice between two or more visual stimuli. To this end, different types of stimuli and procedures for stimuli presentation are used, which highlights the necessity to compare data obtained with different methods. The present study assessed whether, and to what extent, capuchin monkeys' ability to solve a size discrimination problem is influenced by the type of procedure used to present the problem. Capuchins' ability to generalise knowledge across different tasks was also evaluated. We trained eight adult tufted capuchin monkeys to select the larger of two stimuli of the same shape and different sizes by using pairs of food items (Experiment 1), computer images (Experiment 1) and objects (Experiment 2). Our results indicated that monkeys achieved the learning criterion faster with food stimuli compared to both images and objects. They also required consistently fewer trials with objects than with images. Moreover, female capuchins had higher levels of acquisition accuracy with food stimuli than with images. Finally, capuchins did not immediately transfer the solution of the problem acquired in one task condition to the other conditions. Overall, these findings suggest that--even in relatively simple visual discrimination problems where a single perceptual dimension (i.e., size) has to be judged--learning speed strongly depends on the mode of presentation.

Crows spontaneously exhibit analogical reasoning

Analogical reasoning is vital to advanced cognition and behavioral adaptation. Many theorists deem analogical thinking to be uniquely human and to be foundational to categorization, creative problem solving, and scientific discovery. Comparative psychologists have long been interested in the species generality of analogical reasoning, but they initially found it difficult to obtain empirical support for such thinking in nonhuman animals (for pioneering efforts, see [2, 3]). Researchers have since mustered considerable evidence and argument that relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) effectively captures the essence of analogy, in which the relevant logical arguments are presented visually. In RMTS, choice of test pair BB would be correct if the sample pair were AA, whereas choice of test pair EF would be correct if the sample pair were CD. Critically, no items in the correct test pair physically match items in the sample pair, thus demanding that only relational sameness or differentness is available to support accurate choice responding. Initial evidence suggested that only humans and apes can successfully learn RMTS with pairs of sample and test items; however, monkeys have subsequently done so. Here, we report that crows too exhibit relational matching behavior. Even more importantly, crows spontaneously display relational responding without ever having been trained on RMTS; they had only been trained on identity matching-to-sample (IMTS). Such robust and uninstructed relational matching behavior represents the most convincing evidence yet of analogical reasoning in a nonprimate species, as apes alone have spontaneously exhibited RMTS behavior after only IMTS training.

Effects of brief time delays on matching-to-sample abilities in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.)

Traditionally, studies of delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) tasks in nonhuman species have focused on the assessment of the limits of the retrieval of information stored in short- and long-term memory systems. However, it is still unclear if visual recognition in these tasks is affected by very brief delay intervals, which are typically used to study rapidly decaying types of visual memory. This study aimed at evaluating if tufted capuchin monkeys' ability to recognise visual stimuli in a DMTS task is affected by (i) the disappearance of the sample stimulus and (ii) the introduction of delay intervals (0.5, 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0s) between the disappearance of the sample and the presentation of the comparison stimuli. The results demonstrated that the simple disappearance of the sample and the introduction of a delay of 0.5s did not affect capuchins' performance either in terms of accuracy or response time. A delay interval of 1.0s produced a significant increase in response time but still did not affect recognition accuracy. By contrast, delays of 2.0 and 3.0s determined a significant increase in response time and a reduction in recognition accuracy. These findings indicate the existence in capuchin monkeys of processes enabling a very accurate retention of stimulus features within time frames comparable to those reported for humans' sensory memory (0.5-1.0s). The extent to which such processes can be considered analogous to the sensory memory processes observed in human visual cognition is discussed.

Analogical reasoning in baboons (Papio papio): flexible reencoding of the source relation depending on the target relation

Analogical reasoning is a cornerstone of human cognition, but the extent and limits of analogical reasoning in animals remains unclear. Recent studies have demonstrated that apes and monkeys can match relations with relations, suggesting that these species have the basic abilities for analogical reasoning. However, analogical reasoning in humans entails two additional cognitive processes that remain unexplored in animals. These include the ability to (1) flexibly reencode the relations instantiated by the source domain as a function of the relational properties of the target domain, and (2) to match relations across different stimulus dimensions. Using a two-dimensional relational matching-to-sample task, the present study demonstrates that these two abilities are in the scope of baboons, given appropriate training. These findings unveil the richness of the cognitive processes implicated during analogical reasoning in nonhuman primates and further reduce the apparent gap between animal and human cognition.

Transfer of the nonmatch-to-goal rule in monkeys across cognitive domains

To solve novel problems, it is advantageous to abstract relevant information from past experience to transfer on related problems. To study whether macaque monkeys were able to transfer an abstract rule across cognitive domains, we trained two monkeys on a nonmatch-to-goal (NMTG) task. In the object version of the task (O-NMTG), the monkeys were required to choose between two object-like stimuli, which differed either only in shape or in shape and color. For each choice, they were required to switch from their previously chosen object-goal to a different one. After they reached a performance level of over 90% correct on the O-NMTG task, the monkeys were tested for rule transfer on a spatial version of the task (S-NMTG). To receive a reward, the monkeys had to switch from their previously chosen location to a different one. In both the O-NMTG and S-NMTG tasks, there were four potential choices, presented in pairs from trial-to-trial. We found that both monkeys transferred successfully the NMTG rule within the first testing session, showing effective transfer of the learned rule between two cognitive domains.

Effects of training condition on the contribution of specific items to relational processing in baboons (Papio papio)

Relational processing involves learning about the relationship between or among stimuli, transcending the individual stimuli, so that abstract knowledge generalizable to novel situations is acquired. Relational processing has been studied in animals as well as in humans, but little attention has been paid to the contribution of specific items to relational thinking or to the factors that may affect that contribution. This study assessed the intertwined effects of item and relational processing in nonhuman primates. Using a procedure that entailed both expanding and contracting sets of pictorial items, we trained 13 baboons on a two-alternative forced-choice task, in which they had to distinguish horizontal from vertical relational patterns. In Experiment 1, monkeys engaged in item-based processing with a small training set size, and they progressively engaged in relation-based processing as training set size was increased. However, in Experiment 2, overtraining with a small stimulus set promoted the processing of item-based information. These findings underscore similarities in how humans and nonhuman primates process higher-order stimulus relations.

Matching based on biological categories in Orangutans (Pongo abelii) and a Gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla)

Following a series of experiments in which six orangutans and one gorilla discriminated photographs of different animal species in a two-choice touch screen procedure, Vonk & MacDonald (2002) and Vonk & MacDonald (2004) concluded that orangutans, but not the gorilla, seemed to learn intermediate level category discriminations, such as primates versus non-primates, more rapidly than they learned concrete level discriminations, such as orangutans versus humans. In the current experiments, four of the same orangutans and the gorilla were presented with delayed matching-to-sample tasks in which they were rewarded for matching photos of different members of the same primate species; golden lion tamarins, Japanese macaques, and proboscis monkeys, or family; gibbons, lemurs (Experiment 1), and subsequently for matching photos of different species within the following classes: birds, reptiles, insects, mammals, and fish (Experiment 2). Members of both Great Ape species were rapidly able to match the photos at levels above chance. Orangutans matched images from both category levels spontaneously whereas the gorilla showed effects of learning to match intermediate level categories. The results show that biological knowledge is not necessary to form natural categories at both concrete and intermediate levels.

Same/different concept learning by capuchin monkeys in matching-to-sample tasks

The ability to understand similarities and analogies is a fundamental aspect of human advanced cognition. Although subject of considerable research in comparative cognition, the extent to which nonhuman species are capable of analogical reasoning is still debated. This study examined the conditions under which tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) acquire a same/different concept in a matching-to-sample task on the basis of relational similarity among multi-item stimuli. We evaluated (i) the ability of five capuchin monkeys to learn the same/different concept on the basis of the number of items composing the stimuli and (ii) the ability to match novel stimuli after training with both several small stimulus sets and a large stimulus set. We found the first evidence of same/different relational matching-to-sample abilities in a New World monkey and demonstrated that the ability to match novel stimuli is within the capacity of this species. Therefore, analogical reasoning can emerge in monkeys under specific training conditions.

Great apes' strategies to map spatial relations

We investigated reasoning about spatial relational similarity in three great ape species: chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans. Apes were presented with three spatial mapping tasks in which they were required to find a reward in an array of three cups, after observing a reward being hidden in a different array of three cups. To obtain a food reward, apes needed to choose the cup that was in the same relative position (i.e., on the left) as the baited cup in the other array. The three tasks differed in the constellation of the two arrays. In Experiment 1, the arrays were placed next to each other, forming a line. In Experiment 2, the positioning of the two arrays varied each trial, being placed either one behind the other in two rows, or next to each other, forming a line. Finally, in Experiment 3, the two arrays were always positioned one behind the other in two rows, but misaligned. Results suggested that apes compared the two arrays and recognized that they were similar in some way. However, we believe that instead of mapping the left-left, middle-middle, and right-right cups from each array, they mapped the cups that shared the most similar relations to nearby landmarks (table's visual boundaries).

Conceptual thresholds for same and different in old-(Macaca mulatta) and new-world (Cebus apella) monkeys

Learning of the relational same/different (S/D) concept has been demonstrated to be largely dependent upon stimulus sets containing more than two items for pigeons and old-world monkeys. Stimulus arrays containing several images for use in same/different discrimination procures (e.g. 16 identical images vs. 16 nonidentical images) have been shown to facilitate and even be necessary for learning of relational concepts (Flemming et al., 2007; Wasserman et al., 2001; Young et al., 1997). In the present study, we investigate the threshold at which a new world primate, the capuchin (Cebus apella) may be able to make such a discrimination. Utilizing a method of increasing entropy, rather than conventional procedures of decreasing entropy, we demonstrate unique evidence that capuchin monkeys are readily capable of making 2-item relational S/D conditional discriminations. In another experiment, we examine the supposed level of difficulty in making S/D discriminations by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Whereas pigeons (Columba livia) and baboons (Papio papio) have shown marked difficulty simultaneously discriminating same from different arrays at all when composed of fewer than 8 items each, rhesus monkeys seem to understand that pairs of stimuli connote sameness and difference just the same (Flemming et al., 2007). With sustained accurate performance of 2-item S/D discriminations, both experienced and task-naïve rhesus monkeys appear quite certain in their conceptual knowledge of same and different. We conclude that learning of the same/different relational concept may be less dependent upon high levels of entropy contrast than originally hypothesized for nonhuman primates.

Great apes' performance in discriminating weight and achromatic color

Much work has been done on visual discrimination in primates over the past decade. In contrast, very little is known about the relevance of non-visual information in discrimination learning. We investigated weight and achromatic color (color, henceforth) discrimination in bonobos, gorillas and orangutans, using the exchange paradigm in which subjects have to give objects to the experimenter in order to receive a reward. Unlike previous studies, subjects were not trained to lift objects because lifting the objects was an integral part of the exchange procedure. This methodology also allowed us a direct comparison between visual and weight discrimination. We presented 12 subjects (5 bonobos, 2 gorillas and 5 orangutans) with two sets of objects corresponding to two conditions. The objects in the color condition (white/black) differed only in color and those in the weight condition (light/heavy) differed only in weight. Five apes learned to discriminate weight and six to discriminate color. Subjects learned color discrimination faster than weight discrimination. Our results suggest that bonobos and orangutans are sensitive to differences in weight and able to learn discriminating objects that differ in this property.

Great apes' capacities to recognize relational similarity

Recognizing relational similarity relies on the ability to understand that defining object properties might not lie in the objects individually, but in the relations of the properties of various object to each other. This aptitude is highly relevant for many important human skills such as language, reasoning, categorization and understanding analogy and metaphor. In the current study, we investigated the ability to recognize relational similarities by testing five species of great apes, including human children in a spatial task. We found that all species performed better if related elements are connected by logico-causal as opposed to non-causal relations. Further, we find that only children above 4 years of age, bonobos and chimpanzees, unlike younger children, gorillas and orangutans display some mastery of reasoning by non-causal relational similarity. We conclude that recognizing relational similarity is not in its entirety unique to the human species. The lack of a capability for language does not prohibit recognition of simple relational similarities. The data are discussed in the light of the phylogenetic tree of relatedness of the great apes.

What meaning means for same and different: Analogical reasoning in humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Thus far, language- and token-trained apes (e.g., D. Premack, 1976; R. K. R. Thompson, D. L. Oden, & S. T. Boysen, 1997) have provided the best evidence that nonhuman animals can solve, complete, and construct analogies, thus implicating symbolic representation as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In this study, the authors examined the role of stimulus meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed the same relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with both meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. This discrimination of relations-between-relations serves as the basis for analogical reasoning. Meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical matching for human participants, whereas individual differences among the chimpanzees suggest that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in the RMTS task regardless of stimulus meaning, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent on a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli.

Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds

Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as “one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system (PSS) (Newell 1980). We show that this symbolic-relational discontinuity pervades nearly every domain of cognition and runs much deeper than even the spectacular scaffolding provided by language or culture alone can explain. We propose a representational-level specification as to where human and nonhuman animals' abilities to approximate a PSS are similar and where they differ. We conclude by suggesting that recent symbolic-connectionist models of cognition shed new light on the mechanisms that underlie the gap between human and nonhuman minds.

Mental representation of symbols as revealed by vocabulary errors in two bonobos (Pan paniscus)

Error analysis has been used in humans to detect implicit representations and categories in language use. The present study utilizes the same technique to report on mental representations and categories in symbol use from two bonobos (Pan paniscus). These bonobos have been shown in published reports to comprehend English at the level of a two-and-a-half year old child and to use a keyboard with over 200 visuographic symbols (lexigrams). In this study, vocabulary test errors from over 10 years of data revealed auditory, visual, and spatio-temporal generalizations (errors were more likely items that looked like sounded like, or were frequently associated with the sample item in space or in time), as well as hierarchical and conceptual categorizations. These error data, like those of humans, are a result of spontaneous responding rather than specific training and do not solely depend upon the sample mode (e.g. auditory similarity errors are not universally more frequent with an English sample, nor were visual similarity errors universally more frequent with a photograph sample). However, unlike humans, these bonobos do not make errors based on syntactical confusions (e.g. confusing semantically unrelated nouns), suggesting that they may not separate syntactical and semantic information. These data suggest that apes spontaneously create a complex, hierarchical, web of representations when exposed to a symbol system.

Disconnect in concept learning by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): Judgment of relations and relations-between-relations

The authors investigated the role that entropy measures, discriminative cues, and symbolic knowledge play for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in the acquisition of the concepts of same and different for use in a computerized relational matching-to-sample task. After repeatedly failing to perceive relations between pairs of stimuli in a 2-choice discrimination paradigm, monkeys rapidly learned to discriminate between 8-element arrays. Subsequent tests with smaller arrays, however, suggested that, although important for the initial acquisition of the concept, entropy is not a variable on which monkeys are dependent. Not only do monkeys choose a corresponding relational pair in the presence of a cue, but they also choose the cue itself in the presence of the relational pair--in essence, labeling those relations. Subsequent failure in the judgment of relations-between-relations, however, suggests that perhaps a qualitatively different cognitive component exists that prevents monkeys from behaving analogically.

What does an intermediate success rate mean? An analysis of a Piagetian liquid conservation task in the great apes

The study investigates what an intermediate success rate means in bonobos, chimpanzees, and orangutans. Apes participated in liquid conservation experiments where they had to track the larger of two different quantities of juice after various kinds of transformations [Suda, C., & Call, J. (2004). Piagetian liquid conservation in the great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, and Pongo pygmaeus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 118, 265-279). When making a decision, apes sometimes demonstrated hesitant behavior, concurrently pointing to both alternatives or successively changing their choice. Moderately successful apes showed more hesitation than highly successful or unsuccessful apes. The results are consistent with the cognitive conflict model: The experiments created a higher degree of cognitive conflict on moderately successful apes than on very successful or unsuccessful apes. This indicates that an intermediate performance reflects the joint operation and potential conflict between two different cognitive strategies (identity and appearance) inherent to the Piagetian conservation task.