Body orientation and face orientation: two factors controlling apes? begging behavior from humans

Object use in communication of semi-wild chimpanzees

Object interactions play an important role in human communication but the extent to which nonhuman primates incorporate objects in their social interactions remains unknown. To better understand the evolution of object use, this study explored how objects are used in social interactions in semi-wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). We used an observational approach focusing on naturally occurring object actions where we examined their use and tested whether the production of object actions was influenced by the recipients' visual attention as well as by colony membership. The results show that chimpanzees adjusted both the type of object used, and the modality of object actions to match the visual attention of the recipient, as well as colony differences in the use of targeted object actions. These results provide empirical evidence highlighting that chimpanzees use objects in diverse ways to communicate with conspecifics and that their use may be shaped by social factors, contributing to our understanding of the evolution of human nonverbal communication, language, and tool use.

Bottlenose dolphins are sensitive to human attentional features, including eye functionality

The ability to attribute attentional states to other individuals is a highly adaptive socio-cognitive skill and thus may have evolved in many social species. However, whilst humans excel in this ability, even chimpanzees appear to not accurately understand how visual attention works, particularly in regard to the function of eyes. The complex socio-ecological background and socio-cognitive skill-set of bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops sp.), alongside the specialised training that captive dolphins typically undergo, make them an especially relevant candidate for an investigation into their sensitivity to human attentional states. Therefore, we tested 8 bottlenose dolphins on an object retrieval task. The dolphins were instructed to fetch an object by a trainer under various attentional state conditions involving the trainer's eyes and face orientation: 'not looking', 'half looking', 'eyes open', and 'eyes closed'. As the dolphins showed an increased latency to retrieve the object in conditions where the trainer's head and eyes cued a lack of attention to the dolphin, particularly when comparing 'eyes open' vs 'eyes closed' conditions, we demonstrate that dolphins can be sensitive to human attentional features, namely the functionality of eyes. This study supports growing evidence that dolphins possess highly complex cognitive abilities, particularly those in the social domain.

The Begging Strategy of Andean Dogs: An Exploratory Study

In this study, we report a particular begging strategy by Andean dogs and by humans on the unsurfaced road between the villages of Parotani and Cahiuasi in Bolivia. The positions of the dogs and humans begging and their behavioral displays were recorded. In dogs, the distance from each other was also recorded. Begging locations, for both dogs and humans, were permuted with a score, according to the higher probability of receiving food. The highest scores were assigned to the positions where cars had to slow down and the subjects were well visible, thus meriting a score corresponding to the higher probability of receiving a treat. The occurrences of the correct positioning at the external and internal parts of the bend were compared by a chi-square test. On a range of 93.3 km, the dogs were observed to always lie down at the border of the road, mainly alone (96.3%) and on hairpin bends, present due to the steep slope, obliging the vehicles to slow down. Humans were observed mainly in groups. The percentage of dogs lying on the external part of the bends was 81.2%, which was above the level of chance (p < 0.01). Humans were observed at external bends in 63.6% of cases, which was at chance level. Begging locations, for both dogs and humans, were permuted with a score according to the higher probability of receiving food. The mean scores were 1.48 and 0.65 for dogs and humans, respectively, and the difference was highly significant (p < 0.001).

Visual bodily signals as core devices for coordinating minds in interaction

The view put forward here is that visual bodily signals play a core role in human communication and the coordination of minds. Critically, this role goes far beyond referential and propositional meaning. The human communication system that we consider to be the explanandum in the evolution of language thus is not spoken language. It is, instead, a deeply multimodal, multilayered, multifunctional system that developed-and survived-owing to the extraordinary flexibility and adaptability that it endows us with. Beyond their undisputed iconic power, visual bodily signals (manual and head gestures, facial expressions, gaze, torso movements) fundamentally contribute to key pragmatic processes in modern human communication. This contribution becomes particularly evident with a focus that includes non-iconic manual signals, non-manual signals and signal combinations. Such a focus also needs to consider meaning encoded not just via iconic mappings, since kinematic modulations and interaction-bound meaning are additional properties equipping the body with striking pragmatic capacities. Some of these capacities, or its precursors, may have already been present in the last common ancestor we share with the great apes and may qualify as early versions of the components constituting the hypothesized interaction engine. This article is part of the theme issue 'Revisiting the human 'interaction engine': comparative approaches to social action coordination'.

Sensitivity to the communicative partner's attentional state: A developmental study on mother-infant dyads in wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii)

Gestural communication permeates all domains of chimpanzees' social life and is intentional in use. However, we still have only limited information on how young apes develop the sociocognitive skills needed for intentional communication. In this cross-sectional study, we document the development of behavioral adjustment to the recipient's visual attention-considered a hallmark of intentional communication-in wild immature chimpanzees' gestural communication. We studied 11 immature chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii): three infants, four juveniles, and four adolescents gesturing towards their mother. We quantified silent-visual, audible, and contact gestures indexed to maternal visual attention and inattention. We investigated unimodal adjustment, defined by the capacity of young chimpanzees to deploy fewer silent-visual signals when their mothers did not show full visual attention towards them as compared with when they did. We then examined cross-modal adjustment, defined as the capacity of chimpanzees to deploy more audible-or-contact gestures than silent-visual gestures in the condition where their mothers did not show full visual attention as compared to when they did. Our results show a gradual decline in the use of silent-visual gestures when the mother is not visually attentive with increasing age. The absence of silent-visual gesture production toward a visually inattentive recipient (complete unimodal adjustment) was not fully in place until adolescence. Immature chimpanzees used more audible-or-contact gestures than silent-visual ones when their mothers did not show visual attention and vice-versa when they did. This cross-modal adjustment was expressed in juveniles and adolescents but not in infants. Overall, this study shows that infant chimpanzees were limited in their sensitivity to maternal attention when gesturing, whereas adolescent chimpanzees adjusted their communication appropriately. Juveniles present an intermediate pattern with cross-modal adjustment preceding unimodal adjustment and with variability in the age of onset.

Red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus) adapt their interspecific gestural communication to the recipient's behaviour

Sensitivity to recipient’s attention and responsiveness are critical markers of intentional communication. Although previous research showed that ape gestures can be intentional, few studies have yet addressed this question concerning monkeys. Here, we characterise the effect of a recipient’s presence, attentional state and responsiveness on the interspecific gestural communication of captive red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus). Previous reports showed that they produced learnt begging gestures towards a human recipient preferentially when the latter was facing them. We used here a novel setup that allows subjects to move around an experimenter and to use different modalities (visual and acoustic) to communicate. We found that when the recipient was not facing them, mangabeys moved to a position in the visual field of their recipient rather than using attention-getters. Interestingly, unlike apes, they did not elaborate their communication visually or acoustically when the experimenter did not respond favourably to their begging. However, our results may suggest that begging gestures were goal-directed, since mangabeys inhibited them when the experimenter was not available to answer immediately (i.e. give a reward). Overall, red-capped mangabeys’ interspecific visual communication presented intentionality features, but their use of begging gestures was less flexible than that of great apes in similar situations.

Human children, but not great apes, become socially closer by sharing an experience in common ground

To create social closeness, humans engage in a variety of social activities centered around shared experiences. Even simply watching the same video side by side creates social closeness in adults and children. However, perhaps surprisingly, a similar psychological mechanism was recently shown in great apes. Here we asked whether the process by which this social closeness is created is the same for children and great apes. Each participant entered a room to see an experimenter (E1) watching a video. In one condition, E1 looked to the participant at the start of the video to establish common ground that they were watching the video together. In another condition, E1 did not look to the participant in this way so that the participant knew they were watching the same video, but the participant did not know whether E1 was aware of this as well, so there was no common ground (E1 looked to the participant later in the procedure). Children, but not great apes, approached the experimenter faster after the common ground condition, suggesting that although both humans and great apes create social closeness by co-attending to something in close proximity, creating social closeness by sharing experiences in common ground may be a uniquely human social-cognitive process.

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not "One Cognition"

Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally "smart" species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term "cognition" has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not "one cognition". Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which-although always at the forefront of biology-has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.

The goal of ape pointing

Captive great apes regularly use pointing gestures in their interactions with humans. However, the precise function of this gesture is unknown. One possibility is that apes use pointing primarily to direct attention (as in “please look at that”); another is that they point mainly as an action request (such as “can you give that to me?”). We investigated these two possibilities here by examining how the looking behavior of recipients affects pointing in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus). Upon pointing to food, subjects were faced with a recipient who either looked at the indicated object (successful-look) or failed to look at the indicated object (failed-look). We predicted that, if apes point primarily to direct attention, subjects would spend more time pointing in the failed-look condition because the goal of their gesture had not been met. Alternatively, we expected that, if apes point primarily to request an object, subjects would not differ in their pointing behavior between the successful-look and failed-look conditions because these conditions differed only in the looking behavior of the recipient. We found that subjects did differ in their pointing behavior across the successful-look and failed-look conditions, but contrary to our prediction subjects spent more time pointing in the successful-look condition. These results suggest that apes are sensitive to the attentional states of gestural recipients, but their adjustments are aimed at multiple goals. We also found a greater number of individuals with a strong right-hand than left-hand preference for pointing.

The Pertinence of Studying Neuroethology in Nonhuman Primates for Human Behavior in Groups and Organizations

Are we the only living beings endowed with a complex communicative system and sharp sociocognitive skills? How did these remarkable abilities develop? Even raised several centuries ago, those questions are still nourishing the current research and debates. A relevant approach for identifying the dynamics in the evolution of humans’ social and communicative abilities appears to study our closest living relatives, the nonhuman primates. In this article I focus on two abilities that drove the building of our unique sociality and are still playing a crucial role in daily human behaviors in groups and organizations: (a) the origins of human language, through the study of nonhuman primates gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions and (b) the precursors and underpinning neural mechanisms of our ability to assess others’ mental states, that is, theory of mind. In each part, examples illustrate the advantages and limitations of the different methodological approaches used in research on nonhuman primates’ communication and social abilities and discuss the results in light of the current hypotheses and still open debates on what make the singularity of our species.

Chimpanzees gesture to humans in mirrors: using reflection to dissociate seeing from line of gaze

There is much experimental evidence suggesting that chimpanzees understand that others see. However, previous research has never experimentally ruled out the alternative explanation that chimpanzees are just responding to the geometric cue of 'direct line of gaze', the observable correlate of seeing in others. Here, we sought to resolve this ambiguity by dissociating seeing from direct line of gaze using a mirror. We investigated the frequency of chimpanzees' visual gestures towards a human experimenter who could see them (as a result of looking into a mirror) but who lacked a direct line of gaze to them (as a result of having his/her head turned away). Chimpanzees produced significantly more visual gestures when the experimenter could see them than when he/she could not, even when the experimenter did not have a direct line of gaze to them. Results suggest that chimpanzees, through a possible process of experience projection based on their own prior experience with mirrors, infer that an experimenter looking at the mirror can see them. We discuss our results in relation to the theory of mind hypothesis that chimpanzees understand seeing in others, and we evaluate possible alternative low-level explanations.

Potential for social involvement modulates activity within the mirror and the mentalizing systems

Processing biological motion is fundamental for everyday life activities, such as social interaction, motor learning and nonverbal communication. The ability to detect the nature of a motor pattern has been investigated by means of point-light displays (PLD), sets of moving light points reproducing human kinematics, easily recognizable as meaningful once in motion. Although PLD are rudimentary, the human brain can decipher their content including social intentions. Neuroimaging studies suggest that inferring the social meaning conveyed by PLD could rely on both the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) and the Mentalizing System (MS), but their specific role to this endeavor remains uncertain. We describe a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment in which participants had to judge whether visually presented PLD and videoclips of human-like walkers (HL) were facing towards or away from them. Results show that coding for stimulus direction specifically engages the MNS when considering PLD moving away from the observer, while the nature of the stimulus reveals a dissociation between MNS -mainly involved in coding for PLD- and MS, recruited by HL moving away. These results suggest that the contribution of the two systems can be modulated by the nature of the observed stimulus and its potential for social involvement.

Children, chimpanzees, and bonobos adjust the visibility of their actions for cooperators and competitors

Chimpanzees and bonobos are highly capable of tracking other's mental states. It has been proposed, however, that in contrast to humans, chimpanzees are only able to do this in competitive interactions but this has rarely been directly tested. Here, pairs of chimpanzees or bonobos (Study 1) and 4-year-old children (Study 2) were presented with two almost identical tasks differing only regarding the social context. In the cooperation condition, players' interests were matched: they had to make corresponding choices to be mutually rewarded. To facilitate coordination, subjects should thus make their actions visible to their partner whose view was partially occluded. In the competition condition, players' interests were directly opposed: the partner tried to match the subject's choice but subjects were only rewarded if they chose differently, so that they benefited from hiding their actions. The apes successfully adapted their decisions to the social context and their performance was markedly better in the cooperation condition. Children also distinguished between the two contexts, but somewhat surprisingly, performed better in the competitive condition. These findings demonstrate experimentally that chimpanzees and bonobos can take into account what others can see in cooperative interactions. Their social-cognitive skills are thus more flexible than previously assumed.

Acquisition of joint attention by olive baboons gesturing toward humans

Joint attention is a core ability of human social cognition which broadly refers to the coordination of attention with both the presence and activity of social partners. In both human and non-human primates, joint attention can be assessed from behaviour; gestures and gaze alternation between the partner and a distal object are standard behavioural manifestations of joint attention. Here we examined the acquisition of joint attention in olive baboons as a function of their individual experience of a human partner's attentional states during training regimes. Eleven olive baboons (Papio anubis) were observed during their training to perform food-requesting gestures, which occurred either by (1) a human facing them (face condition), or (2) by a human positioned in profile who never turned to them (profile condition). We found neither gestures nor gaze alternation were present at the start of the training but rather developed over the training period. Only baboons in the face condition showed an increase in the number of gaze alternations, and their gaze pattern progressively shifted to a coordinated sequence in which gazes and gestures were coordinated in time. In contrast, baboons trained by a human in profile showed significantly less coordination of gazes with gestures but still learned to request food with their gestures. These results suggest that the partner's social attention plays an important role in the acquisition of visual joint attention and, to a lesser extent, in gesture learning in baboons. Interspecific interactions appear to offer rich opportunities to manipulate and thus identify the social contexts in which socio-communicative skills develop.

New perspectives in gaze sensitivity research

Attending to where others are looking is thought to be of great adaptive benefit for animals when avoiding predators and interacting with group members. Many animals have been reported to respond to the gaze of others, by co-orienting their gaze with group members (gaze following) and/or responding fearfully to the gaze of predators or competitors (i.e., gaze aversion). Much of the literature has focused on the cognitive underpinnings of gaze sensitivity, namely whether animals have an understanding of the attention and visual perspectives in others. Yet there remain several unanswered questions regarding how animals learn to follow or avoid gaze and how experience may influence their behavioral responses. Many studies on the ontogeny of gaze sensitivity have shed light on how and when gaze abilities emerge and change across development, indicating the necessity to explore gaze sensitivity when animals are exposed to additional information from their environment as adults. Gaze aversion may be dependent upon experience and proximity to different predator types, other cues of predation risk, and the salience of gaze cues. Gaze following in the context of information transfer within social groups may also be dependent upon experience with group-members; therefore we propose novel means to explore the degree to which animals respond to gaze in a flexible manner, namely by inhibiting or enhancing gaze following responses. We hope this review will stimulate gaze sensitivity research to expand beyond the narrow scope of investigating underlying cognitive mechanisms, and to explore how gaze cues may function to communicate information other than attention.

Do monkeys have a theory of mind? How to answer the question?

Since Premack and Woodruf (1978), the study of mindreading abilities in nonhumans, especially primates, has been thoroughly investigated. But attempts to understand the evolution of this aspect of human intelligence have mainly focused on comparisons between apes and human infants, while relatively little is known about the abilities of monkeys. This lack of data on monkeys seems mainly due to the hypothesis of a cognitive "gap" between apes and monkeys. However, in recent years monkeys have been featuring more prominently in the landscape of social cognition research, and some of these systematic studies appear promising. This paper reviews i) current knowledge about monkeys' socio-cognitive abilities, especially regarding gaze processing, attention and intention reading, and perspective-taking, ii) alternative hypotheses regarding the underlying mechanisms of such complex behaviors, and iii) potential new perspectives and future directions for studying ToM in monkeys.

Social manipulation in nonhuman primates: Cognitive and motivational determinants

Social interactions are the result of individuals' cooperative and competitive tendencies expressed over an extended period of time. Although social manipulation, i.e., using another individual to achieve one's own goals, is a crucial aspect of social interactions, there has been no comprehensive attempt to differentiate its various types and to map its cognitive and motivational determinants. For this purpose, we survey in this article the experimental literature on social interactions in nonhuman primates. We take social manipulation, illustrated by a case study with orangutans (Pongo abelii), as our starting point and move in two directions. First, we will focus on a flexibility/sociality axis that includes technical problem solving, social tool-use and communication. Second, we will focus on a motivational/prosociality axis that includes exploitation, cooperation, and helping. Combined, the two axes offer a way to capture a broad range of social interactions performed by human and nonhuman primates.

'Goats that stare at men'--revisited: do dwarf goats alter their behaviour in response to eye visibility and head direction of a human?

Being able to recognise when one is being observed by someone else is thought to be adaptive during cooperative or competitive events. In particular for prey species, this ability should be of use in the context of predation. A previous study reported that goats (Capra aegagrus hircus) alter their behaviour according to the body and head orientation of a human experimenter. During a food anticipation task, an experimenter remained in a particular posture for 30 s before delivering a reward, and the goats' active anticipation and standing alert behaviour were analysed. To further evaluate the specific mechanisms at work, we here present two additional test conditions. In particular, we investigated the effects of the eye visibility and head orientation of a human experimenter on the behaviour of the goats (N = 7). We found that the level of the subjects' active anticipatory behaviour was highest in the conditions where the experimenter was directing his head and body towards the goat ('Control' and 'Eyes closed' conditions), but the anticipatory behaviour was significantly decreased when the body ('Head only') or the head and body of the experimenter were directed away from the subject ('Back' condition). For standing alert, we found no significant differences between the three conditions in which the experimenter was directing his head towards the subject ('Control', 'Eyes closed' and 'Head only'). This lack of differences in the expression of standing alert suggests that goats evaluate the direction of a human's head as an important cue in their anticipatory behaviour. However, goats did not respond to the visibility of the experimenter's eyes alone.

Bonobos modify communication signals according to recipient familiarity

Human and nonhuman primate communication differs in various ways. In particular, humans base communicative efforts on mutual knowledge and conventions shared between interlocutors. In this study, we experimentally tested whether bonobos (Pan paniscus), a close relative to humans, are able to take into account the familiarity, i.e. the shared interaction history, when communicating with a human partner. In five experimental conditions we found that subjects took the recipients' attentional state and their own communicative effectiveness into account by adjusting signal production accordingly. More importantly, in case of communicative failure, subjects repeated previously successful signals more often with a familiar than unfamiliar recipient, with whom they had no previous interactions, and elaborated by switching to new signals more with the unfamiliar than the familiar one, similar to what has previously been found in two year-old children. We discuss these findings in relation to the human capacity to establish common ground between interlocutors, a crucial aspect of human cooperative communication.

African elephants (Loxodonta africana) recognize visual attention from face and body orientation

How do animals determine when others are able and disposed to receive their communicative signals? In particular, it is futile to make a silent gesture when the intended audience cannot see it. Some non-human primates use the head and body orientation of their audience to infer visual attentiveness when signalling, but whether species relying less on visual information use such cues when producing visual signals is unknown. Here, we test whether African elephants (Loxodonta africana) are sensitive to the visual perspective of a human experimenter. We examined whether the frequency of gestures of head and trunk, produced to request food, was influenced by indications of an experimenter's visual attention. Elephants signalled significantly more towards the experimenter when her face was oriented towards them, except when her body faced away from them. These results suggest that elephants understand the importance of visual attention for effective communication.

Contrasting the social cognition of humans and nonhuman apes: the shared intentionality hypothesis

Joint activities are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom, but they differ substantially in their underlying psychological states. Humans attribute and share mental states with others in the so-called shared intentionality. Our hypothesis is that our closest nonhuman living relatives also attribute some psychological mechanisms such as perceptions and goals to others, but, unlike humans, they are not necessarily intrinsically motivated to share those psychological states. Furthermore, it is postulated that shared intentionality is responsible for the appearance of a suite of behaviors, including joint attention, declarative communication, imitative learning, and teaching, that are the basis of cultural learning and the social norms and traditions present in every human culture.

Intentional gestural communication and discrimination of human attentional states in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

The present study tested intentionality of a learned begging gesture and attention-reading abilities in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Subjects were trained to produce a begging gesture towards a hidden food reward that could be delivered by a human experimenter. More specifically, we investigated which attentional cues--body, face and/or eyes orientation of a human partner--were taken into account by the macaques in order to communicate with her. Our results provide strong evidence of intentional communication: the monkeys adjusted their behaviour to that of the partner. The latter's attentional state influenced the monkeys' likelihood of performing begging gestures and showing gaze alternation between the partner and the hidden food. By contrast, we found no evidence of attention-getting behaviours, persistence or elaboration of new communicative behaviours. Our results also showed that rhesus macaques discriminated gross cues including the presence, body and face orientation of the human experimenter but not her eyes. However, the monkeys emitted more gaze alternation and monitored the human's attentional state more closely when she also displayed gaze alternation, suggesting an important role of joint attention in gestural communication.

An intentional vocalization draws others' attention: a playback experiment with wild chimpanzees

A vital step in the evolution of language is likely to have been when signalers explicitly intended to direct recipients' attention to external objects with the use of referential signals. Although animal signals can direct the attention of others to external events, such as in monkey predator alarm calls, there is little evidence that this is the result of an intention to inform the recipient. Two recent studies, however, indicate that the production of chimpanzee quiet alarm calls, given to snakes, complies with some standard behavioral markers of intentional signaling, such as gaze alternation. But it is currently unknown whether the calls alone direct receivers' attention to the threat. To address this, we carried out a playback experiment with free-ranging chimpanzees in Budongo Forest, Uganda, using a within-subjects design. From a hidden speaker, we broadcast either quiet alarm 'hoos' ('alert hoos') or acoustically distinguishable hoos produced while resting ('rest hoos') and found a significant increase in search behavior after 'alert' compared with 'rest' hoos, with subjects monitoring either the call provider or the area near the call provider. In sum, chimpanzee 'alert hoos' represent a plausible case of an intentionally produced animal vocalization (other studies) that refers recipients to signalers and/or to an external event (this study).

Are dogs able to communicate with their owners about a desirable food in a referential and intentional way?

The ability of dogs to use human communicative signals has been exhaustively studied. However, few studies have focused on the production of communicative signals by dogs. The current study investigated if dogs are able to communicate by using directional signals towards some desirable object in the environment and also if they show an apparent intention to manipulate their owner’s behavior in order to receive it. Some operational criteria were used to investigate referential and intentional communication: the signal should be influenced by the audience and by the recipient’s direction of visual attention; the sender should display gaze alternations between the recipient and the object and attention-getting behaviors, and, finally, the sender should persist and elaborate the communication when attempts to manipulate the recipient failed. Aiming to investigate these criteria in dogs, 29 subjects were tested using an experimental set up in which they could see a desirable but unreachable food and they needed the cooperation of their owners in order to receive it. This study found evidence of all operational criteria, especially for gaze alternation between the owner and the food, which suggested that some dogs’ communicative behaviors could be functionally referential and intentional. Nevertheless, similar to other studies about social cognition in animals, it is not possible to distinguish if the dog’s behaviors are based on simple mechanisms or on a theory of mind about their owners.

Lack of evidence that Tonkean macaques understand what others can hear

By distinguishing the attentional cues of their mates, animals can learn what part of their environment is of potential interest. However, recognizing the attentional states of others through auditory perception appears to be difficult, since these states are generally not accompanied by ostensive signals liable to reveal them. In this context, one study found that rhesus macaques withhold their action when unobserved, then concluding that they know what others can hear. We replicated this study by testing 18 Tonkean macaques in an experimental setting where subjects had to choose between two boxes containing a food reward. One box made a noise when opened, and the other opened silently. An experimenter was present and could either have her back to subjects or be facing them. If subjects aimed to avoid attracting the experimenter's attention, they were expected to select the silent box while the experimenter's back was turned. Results showed that subjects did not discriminate between boxes, whatever the experimenter's position. We thus found no evidence that Tonkean macaques are able to take the auditory attentional states of a human into account. It is therefore premature to conclude that monkeys can establish a link between hearing and knowing.

Tufted titmouse (Baeolophus bicolor) calling and risk-sensitive foraging in the face of threat

Individuals often produce alarm or mobbing calls when they detect a threat such as a predator. Little is known about whether such calling is affected by the facial orientation of a potential threat, however. We tested for an effect of facial orientation of a potential threat on tufted titmice, Baeolophus bicolor, a songbird that uses chick-a-dee calls in a variety of social contexts. In two studies, a human observer wore an animal mask that either faced or faced away from the focal bird(s). In Study 1, focal birds were individual titmice captured in a walk-in trap, and the observer stood near the trapped bird. In Study 2, focal birds were titmouse flocks utilizing a feeding station and the observer stood near the station. In both studies, calling behavior was affected by mask orientation. In Study 2, foraging and agonistic behavior were also affected. Titmice can therefore perceive the facial orientation of a potential threat, and this perception affects different behavioral systems, including calling. Our results indicate sensitivity of titmice to the facial orientation of a potential predator in two quite different motivational contexts. This work suggests the possibility of strategic signaling by prey species depending upon the perceptual space of a detected predator.

Action anticipation in human infants reveals assumptions about anteroposterior body-structure and action

Animal actions are almost universally constrained by the bilateral body-plan. For example, the direction of travel tends to be constrained by the orientation of the animal's anteroposterior axis. Hence, an animal's behaviour can reliably guide the identification of its front and back, and its orientation can reliably guide action prediction. We examine the hypothesis that the evolutionarily ancient relation between anteroposterior body-structure and behaviour guides our cognitive processing of agents and their actions. In a series of studies, we demonstrate that, after limited exposure, human infants as young as six months of age spontaneously encode a novel agent as having a certain axial direction with respect to its actions and rely on it when anticipating the agent's further behaviour. We found that such encoding is restricted to objects exhibiting cues of agency and does not depend on generalization from features of familiar animals. Our research offers a new tool for investigating the perception of animate agency and supports the proposal that the underlying cognitive mechanisms have been shaped by basic biological adaptations in humans.

Using cross correlations to investigate how chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) use conspecific gaze cues to extract and exploit information in a foraging competition

In a dyadic informed forager task, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) are known to exploit the knowledge of informed subordinates; however, the behavioral mechanisms they employ are unknown. It is tempting to interpret outcome measures, such as which individual obtained the food, in a cognitively richer way than the outcomes may justify. We employed a different approach from prior research, asking how chimpanzees compete by maneuvering around each other, whether they use gaze cues to acquire information from others, and what information they use in moment-to-moment decision-making. We used cross correlations, which plot the correlation between two variables as a function of time, systematically to examine chimpanzee interactions in a series of dyadic informed forager contests. We used cross correlations as a "proof of concept" so as to determine whether the target actions were contingent on, or occurred in a time-locked pattern relative to, the referent actions. A subordinate individual was given privileged knowledge of food location. As expected, an ignorant dominant followed the informed subordinate's movement in the enclosure. The dominant also followed the subordinate's gaze direction: after she looked at the subordinate, she was more likely to gaze toward this same direction within one second. In contrast, the subordinate only occasionally followed the dominant's movement and gaze. The dominant also changed her own direction of movement to converge on the location to which the subordinate directed her gaze and movement. Cross correlation proves an effective technique for charting contingencies in social interactions, an important step in understanding the use of cognition in natural situations.

Visual attention, an indicator of human-animal relationships? A study of domestic horses (Equus caballus)

As visual attention is an intrinsic part of social relationships, and because relationships are built on a succession of interactions, their establishment involves learning and attention. The emotional, rewarding or punishing, content can modulate selective attention. In horses, the use of positive/negative reinforcement during training determines short and long-term human-horse relationships. In a recent study in horses, where either food or withers' grooming were used as a reward, it appeared that only the food-rewarded horses learned the task and show better relationship with humans. In the present study, we hypothesized that this differential effect of grooming/food rewards on learning performances could be due to attentional processes. Monitoring, gazes and behaviors directed towards the trainer revealed that the use of a food reward (FR) as positive reinforcement increased horses' selective attention towards their trainer. Conversely, horses trained with grooming reward (GR) expressed more inattentive responses and did not show a decrease of “agitated” behavior. However, individual plotting of attention vs. rate of learning performances revealed a complex pattern. Thus, while all FR horses showed a “window” of attention related to faster learning performances, GR horses' pattern followed an almost normal curve where the extreme animals (i.e., highest and lowest attention) had the slowest learning performances. On the other hand, learning was influenced by attention: at the end of training, the more attentive horses had also better learning performances. This study, based on horses, contributes to the general debate on the place of attentional processes at the interface of emotion and cognition and opens new lines of thought about individual sensitivities (only individuals can tell what an appropriate reward is), attentional processes and learning.

Capuchins' (Cebus apella) sensitivity to others' goal-directed actions in a helping context

As humans, our ability to help others effectively is at least in part dependent upon our capacity to infer others' goals in a variety of different contexts. Several species of nonhuman primate have demonstrated that they will also help others in some relatively simple situations, but it is not always clear whether this helping is based on an understanding of another agent's goals. Although the results of a number of different studies support the hypothesis that chimpanzees represent others' goals in various helping contexts and are sensitive to these goals when actually helping others, less work has addressed whether more distantly related species actively represent goals when helping. To explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying helping behaviors in species less closely related to humans, we tested whether a species of New World monkey-the brown capuchin (Cebus apella)-would provide an experimenter with a desired out-of-reach object more often than an alternative object when the experimenter attempted to obtain the former object only. We found that capuchins reliably helped by providing the experimenter's goal object (Experiment 1) and that explanations based on the use of several less sophisticated strategies did not account for the overall pattern of data (Experiments 2-4). Results are thus consistent with the hypothesis that capuchins help others based on an understanding of their goals although more work is needed to address the possibility that capuchins may be responding to gestural and postural factors alone.

Cognitive and motor aging in female chimpanzees

We present the first longitudinal data on cognitive and motor aging in the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). Thirty-eight adult female chimpanzees (10-54 years old) were studied. The apes were tested longitudinally for 3 years in a modified Primate Cognition Test Battery, which comprised 12 tests of physical and social cognition. The chimpanzees were also administered a fine motor task requiring them to remove a steel nut from rods of various complexity. There was little evidence for an age-related decline in tasks of Physical Cognition: for most tasks, performance was either stable or improved with repeated testing across age groups. An exception was Spatial Memory, for which 4 individuals more than 50 years old experienced a significant performance decline across the 3 years of testing. Poorer performance with age was found in 2 tasks of Social Cognition, an attention-getting task and a gaze-following task. A slight motor impairment was also observed, with old chimpanzees improving less than younger animals with repeated testing on the simplest rod. Hormonal status effects were restricted to spatial memory, with non-cycling females outperforming cycling females independently of age. Unexpectedly, older chimpanzees were better than younger individuals in understanding causality relationships based on sound.

The Responses of Young Domestic Horses to Human-Given Cues

It has been suggested that the process of domestication, at least in some species, has led to an innate predisposition to be skilled at reading human communicative and attentional cues. Adult domestic horses (Equus caballus) are highly sensitive to subtle bodily cues when determining if a person is attending to them but they are less adept at using human communicative cues in object choice tasks. Here we provide the first study into the ontogeny of such skills in order to gain insights into the mechanisms underlying these abilities. Compared with adult horses, youngsters under the age of three could use body orientation but not more subtle cues such as head movement and open/closed eyes to correctly choose an attentive person to approach for food. Across two object choice experiments, the performance of young horses was comparable to that of adult horses – subjects were able to correctly choose a rewarded bucket using marker placement, pointing and touching cues but could not use body orientation, gaze, elbow pointing or tapping cues. Taken together these results do not support the theory that horses possess an innate predisposition to be particularly skilled at using human cues. Horses' ability to determine whether humans are attending to them using subtle body cues appears to require significant experience to fully develop and their perhaps less remarkable use of limited cues in object choice tasks, although present at a much earlier age, is likely to reflect a more general learning ability related to stimulus enhancement rather than a specific ‘human-reading’ skill.