Pretense in chimpanzees

Role playing in human evolution: from life to art, and everything in between

Role playing is a central, but underappreciated, process in human evolution. It is a feature not only of the theatrical arts, but of everyday social interactions. While some role playing is limited to enacting various personas of the self (e.g., wife, accountant, mother), others involve an impersonation of people. The most basic form of impersonation is proto-acting, which refers to a transient engagement in character portrayal, such as when we quote a friend during a conversation. During proto-acting, we "act as" some other person. However, there are other means of acting in a similar manner to another person in which we do not impersonate them, but merely emulate their behavior. This might happen when we learn a motor skill from a teacher or conform to the consumer choices of the masses. This follower-based process of "acting like" is a critically important mechanism in cultural evolution since it leads to social conformity and the homogenization of group behavior. I argue that the evolutionary transition from "acting like" (emulation) to "acting as" (impersonation) occurred via the emergence of pantomime and its narrative depiction of the actions of other people. This was probably the first step toward impersonating someone, leading initially to proto-acting and later to theatrical performance in human cultures. Overall, the study of human evolution needs to give greater consideration to role playing and its diverse manifestations in life and art.

Taking the unreal seriously: enriching cognitive science with the notion of fictionality

Fictionality and fictional experiences are ubiquitous in people's everyday lives in the forms of movies, novels, video games, pretense and role playing, and digital technology use. Despite this ubiquity, though, the field of cognitive science has traditionally been dominated by a focus on the real world. Based on the limited understanding from previous research on questions regarding fictional information and the cognitive processes for distinguishing reality from fiction, we argue for the need for a comprehensive and systematic account that reflects on related phenomena, such as narrative comprehension or imagination embedded into general theories of cognition. This is important as incorporating cognitive processing of fictional events into memory theory reshapes the conceptual map of human memory. In this paper, we highlight future challenges for the cognitive studies of fictionality on conceptual, neurological, and computational levels. Taking on these challenges requires an interdisciplinary approach between fields like developmental psychology, philosophy, and the study of narrative comprehension. Our aim is to build on such interdisciplinarity and provide conclusions on the ways in which new theoretical frameworks of fiction cognition can aid understanding human behaviors in a wide range of aspects of people's daily lives, media consumption habits, and digital encounters. Our account also has the potential to inform technological innovations related to training intelligent digital systems to distinguish fact and fiction in the source material.

Children's beliefs in invisible causal agents-Both religious and scientific

Against the proposal that children have a natural disposition for supernatural or religious beliefs, we review the decades-old evidence showing that children typically invoke naturalistic causes-even in the face of unusual outcomes. Instead, we propose that children's tendency to endorse supernatural agents reflects their capacity for cultural learning rather than an inherent inclination to believe in divine powers. We support this argument by reviewing the findings that religious exposure in childhood, not individual cognitive or personality factors, is the major determinant of religiosity in adulthood. We highlight the role of cultural learning in children's endorsement of invisible divine agents by drawing on cross-cultural evidence that children are equally receptive to claims regarding the existence of invisible natural agents. We end by introducing a hypothesis to explain how children come to endorse religious beliefs despite their bias toward naturalistic explanation.

Young children share imagined possibilities: evidence for an early-emerging human competence

Children's ability to reason about junctures leading to two different destinations emerges slowly, with convergent evidence for a conceptual watershed at approximately 4 years. Young children and great apes misrepresent such junctures, planning for only one expected outcome. However, singular possibilities, as opposed to two mutually exclusive possibilities, are readily imagined, shared and acted upon by 2- and 3-year-olds. Analysis of three domains supports this claim. First, 2- and 3-year-olds respond appropriately to pretend spatial displacements enacted for them by a play partner. Second, they not only respond accurately to claims regarding an alleged but unwitnessed spatial displacement, they also ask their interlocutors about the possible whereabouts of missing objects and absent persons. Third, in ordinary conversation, they appropriately mark some of their assertions as possibilities rather than actualities. In summary, although the ability to reason about mutually inconsistent possibilities develops slowly in the preschool years, the ability to imagine and share information about possibilities is evident among 2- and 3-year-olds. Nothing comparable has been observed in great apes. Young children's ability to entertain shared possibilities diverges from that of non-human primates well before any potential watershed at 4 years with respect to the understanding of mutually exclusive possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Narrative as co-regulation: A review of embodied narrative in infant development

We review evidence of non-verbal, embodied narratives in human infancy to better understand their form and function as generators of common experience, regulation, and learning. We examine their development prior to the onset of language, with a view to improve understanding of narrative as regular motifs or schemas of early experience in both solitary and social engagement. Embodied narratives are composed of regular patterns of interest, arousal, affect, and intention that yield a characteristic four-part structure of (i) introduction, (ii) development, (iii) climax, and (iv) resolution. Made with others these form co-created shared acts of meaning, and are parsed in time with discreet beginnings and endings that allow a regular pattern to frame and give predictive understanding for prospective regulation (especially important within social contexts) that safely returns to baseline again. This characteristic pattern, co-created between infant and adult from the beginning of life, allows the infant to contribute to, and learn, the patterns of its culture. We conclude with a view on commonalities and differences of co-created narrative in non-human primates, and discuss implications of disruption to narrative co-creation for developmental psychopathology.

New indices to characterize drawing behavior in humans (Homo sapiens) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Techniques used in cave art suggest that drawing skills emerged long before the oldest known representative human productions (44,000 years bc). This study seeks to improve our knowledge of the evolutionary origins and the ontogenetic development of drawing behavior by studying drawings of humans (N = 178, 3- to 10-year-old children and adults) and chimpanzees (N = 5). Drawings were characterized with an innovative index based on spatial measures which provides the degree of efficiency for the lines that are drawn. Results showed that this index was lowest in chimpanzees, increased and reached its maximum between 5-year-old and 10-year-old children and decreased in adults, whose drawing efficiency was reduced by the addition of details. Drawings of chimpanzees are not random suggesting that their movements are constrained by cognitive or locomotor aspect and we cannot conclude to the absence of representativeness. We also used indices based on colors and time and asked children about what they drew. These indices can be considered relevant tools to improve our understanding of drawing development and evolution in hominids.