Taking the unreal seriously: enriching cognitive science with the notion of fictionality

Fictionality and fictional experiences are ubiquitous in people's everyday lives in the forms of movies, novels, video games, pretense and role playing, and digital technology use. Despite this ubiquity, though, the field of cognitive science has traditionally been dominated by a focus on the real world. Based on the limited understanding from previous research on questions regarding fictional information and the cognitive processes for distinguishing reality from fiction, we argue for the need for a comprehensive and systematic account that reflects on related phenomena, such as narrative comprehension or imagination embedded into general theories of cognition. This is important as incorporating cognitive processing of fictional events into memory theory reshapes the conceptual map of human memory. In this paper, we highlight future challenges for the cognitive studies of fictionality on conceptual, neurological, and computational levels. Taking on these challenges requires an interdisciplinary approach between fields like developmental psychology, philosophy, and the study of narrative comprehension. Our aim is to build on such interdisciplinarity and provide conclusions on the ways in which new theoretical frameworks of fiction cognition can aid understanding human behaviors in a wide range of aspects of people's daily lives, media consumption habits, and digital encounters. Our account also has the potential to inform technological innovations related to training intelligent digital systems to distinguish fact and fiction in the source material.

Young Children's Interactions with Objects: Play as Practice and Practice as Play

Objects permeate human culture and saturate the imagination. This duality offers both opportunity and challenge. Here we ask how young human children learn to exploit the immense potential afforded by objects that can exist simultaneously in both physical and imaginary realms. To this end, we advance a new framework that integrates the presently siloed literatures on manual skill and play development. We argue that developments in children's real and imagined use of objects are embodied, reciprocal and intertwined. Advances in one plane of action influence and scaffold advances in the other. Consistent with this unified framework, we show how real and imagined interactions with objects are characterized by developmental parallels in how children a) gradually move beyond objects' designed functions, b) extend beyond the self, and c) transcend the present to encompass future points in time and space. As well, we highlight how children's real and imagined interactions with objects are intertwined and reciprocally influence each other throughout development: Play engenders practice and skill in using objects, but just the same, practice using objects engenders advances in play. We close by highlighting the theoretical, empirical and translational implications of this embodied and integrated account of manual skill and play development.

Imagining Others' Minds: The Positive Relation Between Children's Role Play and Anthropomorphism

Children’s role playing, whether personifying toys or imagining invisible friends, involves imagining others’ minds and internal states. Similarly, anthropomorphism – the attribution of internal states to non-human others (e.g., animals, inanimate nature, or technologies) – also involves imagining others’ minds and internal states. We propose that the imaginative process of simulating and projecting internal states is common to both role play and anthropomorphism. The current study investigated the relation between children’s role play and anthropomorphism. Ninety children (5, 7, and 9 years) were administered Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire – Child Form (IDAQ-CF), comprised of the technology-inanimate nature and animal subscales, and the Role Play Scale, which assessed (a) impersonation of animals, people, and/or machines and (b) imaginary companions (ICs), including invisible friends and personified toys. Results indicated that the imaginative act of impersonating an animal, person, and/or machine was positively related to anthropomorphism, and specifically anthropomorphism of inanimate nature and technology. Second, anthropomorphism of animals was highest amongst children with invisible ICs, followed by those with toy ICs and those who impersonated. Finally, children who frequently engaged with an invisible ICs more readily anthropomorphized in general and technology and inanimate nature in particular relative to all other children. Results are discussed in terms of the differing degrees of imagination involved in anthropomorphism of animals versus technology and inanimate nature.

The Development of Anthropomorphism in Interaction: Intersubjectivity, Imagination, and Theory of Mind

Human beings frequently attribute anthropomorphic features, motivations and behaviors to animals, artifacts, and natural phenomena. Historically, many interpretations of this attitude have been provided within different disciplines. What most interpretations have in common is distinguishing children’s manifestations of this attitude, which are considered “natural,” from adults’ occurrences, which must be explained by resorting to particular circumstances. In this article, I argue that anthropomorphism is not grounded in specific belief systems but rather in interaction. In interaction, a non-human entity assumes a place that generally is attributed to a human interlocutor, which means that it is independent of the beliefs that people may have about the nature and features of the entities that are anthropomorphized. This perspective allows us to explain the problems that emerge if we consider anthropomorphism as a belief: (i) adults under certain circumstances may anthropomorphize entities even if they perfectly know that these entities have no mental life; (ii) according to the situation, the same entity may be anthropomorphized or treated as an object; (iii) there is no consistency among the entities that are anthropomorphized; (iv) there is individual variability in anthropomorphization, and this variability derives from affective states rather than from different degrees of knowledge about the entity that is anthropomorphized or greater or lesser naivety of the person who anthropomorphizes. From this perspective, anthropomorphism is a basic human attitude that begins in infants and persists throughout life. The difference between adults and children is not qualitative but rather a matter of complexity.

Young Children and Adults' Sensitivity to Contexts for Social Conventions in Make-Believe Play

The author focused on how young children understand the nature of social conventions relating to pretend play. Twenty 4-year-olds, fifteen 6-year-olds, and 20 adults (undergraduate students) listened to vignettes in which a new child in each vignette violated a convention used by other children while playing. Participants indicated whether the violations would be corrected and whether someone needed to teach the conventions to the new children. The scope of a convention (wide versus narrow) in combination with how long the convention has been used affected 6-year-olds' responses but not the responses of younger children or adults. In addition, there were age-related differences in participants' beliefs about who could teach characters about the conventions and why characters might not need to be taught by others. These results demonstrate that children at the start of middle childhood can be sensitive to contextual differences in the conventions that shape everyday activities more so than adults and younger children.

Preschool Children Transfer Real-World Moral Reasoning into Pretense

Is it wrong to pretend to kick or pretend to steal? The current experiment examined whether preschoolers extend their moral principles from reality into pretense and whether this transfer depends on the proximity of the pretend world to the real world. Children are known to transfer their knowledge of object properties, causality, and problem solutions between pretend and real worlds. However, do children maintain their real-world moral reasoning in pretense? Preschoolers (N = 63) judged the acceptability of antisocial behaviors in pretend, fantastical, or non-pretend scenarios. Children found antisocial behaviors to be equally unacceptable in both pretend and non-pretend situations but found antisocial behaviors to be more acceptable in the fantastical situations. These results imply that children extend their real-world representations of morality in pretense, but more so for pretend scenarios that are similar to the real world. Implications for children's understanding of the reality-fantasy boundary and moral reasoning are discussed.

The Development of Representations of Pretend Object Substitutions

Many theories of how pretense is mentally represented have been posited, but none have been effectually empirically tested to date. This research is the first to explore how children and adults mentally process simple pretend actions, specifically pretend object substitutions, and whether this representation changes with age. Preschoolers, older children, and undergraduates heard or read about a variety of pretend object substitutions, and their reaction time to name an image related to the object's real identity, pretend identity, or an unrelated image was measured. To test what is unique to pretense, these reaction times were compared to those from participants who responded to the same images after reading about nonpretend versions of the same actions. Results suggest that preschoolers inhibit reality when representing a pretend action, older children activate an object's real and pretend identities equally, and adults activate the object's real identity more than the pretend one. Implications for current theories of pretense representation are discussed.

Evidence for a relation between executive function and pretense representation in preschool children

Several theoretical formulations suggest a relation between children's pretense and executive function (EF) skills. However, there is little empirical evidence for a correlation between these constructs in early development. Preschool children (N = 104; M age = 4-0) were given batteries of EF and pretense representation measures, as well as verbal, memory, and appearance-reality control tasks. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed two separable but overlapping aspects of EF (Conflict and Delay). EF was significantly related to pretense after accounting for all controls. Understanding the pretend-reality distinction was strongly related to Conflict EF, whereas performing pretend actions was more strongly related to Delay EF. These results, although correlational, are consistent with the claim that EF skills are implicated in pretense, such as inhibiting reality and flexibly manipulating dual representations, and offer a potential mechanism by which pretend play interventions may enhance childhood EF.

Conflict Inhibitory Control Facilitates Pretense Quality in Young Preschoolers

The present research explores the role of inhibitory control in young preschoolers' pretense ability using an ego depletion paradigm. In Experiment 1 (N = 56), children's pretense ability was assessed either before or after participating in conflict inhibitory control or control tasks, and in Experiment 2 (N = 36), pretense ability was measured after children engaged in either conflict or delay inhibitory control tasks. In both experiments, pretense scores were significantly higher only after engaging in conflict inhibitory control tasks. Further, pretense scores were positively correlated with inhibitory control scores when conflict inhibitory control was not experienced first. This pattern of results suggests that inhibitory control may underlie pretense, and conflict inhibitory control can boost the quality of children's subsequent pretending.

Same or different? ERP correlates of pretense and false belief reasoning in children

Pretend play, emerging at about 18 months, and explicit false belief (FB) understanding, arising around 4 years, constitute two pivotal milestones in the development of a Theory of Mind since both involve the ability to separate real from non-real content. The developmental lag has evoked vivid discussion with respect to whether or not pretense (PT) involves a metarepresentational understanding similar to FB. However, in children PT and FB have not yet been contrasted on a neural level to reveal whether they are subserved by the same neurocognitive mechanism. Therefore, the present event-related potential (ERP) study compared PT to a FB and to a non-mental control condition in 6- to 8-year-old children. Results revealed distinct ERP components for PT and FB. PT elicited a parietal P2, which was assumed to reflect the detection of incongruence, and a negative frontal slow wave (290-600 ms), which was associated with the identification of the intention underlying the pretend behavior. In contrast, FB evoked the characteristic positive fronto-central late slow wave (290-920 ms) that is supposed to indicate metarepresentation. Further, the broad distribution of the anterior slow-wave patterns associated with PT and FB reasoning was assumed to reflect the ongoing structural development and neural specialization of the respective areas, indicating the developmental progress in conceptualizing the mental domain. Given the differences in latency, polarity, and topography, PT and FB seem to rely on distinct neural substrates in children. The early negative frontal slow wave indicates that for PT reasoning children may use simple mentalizing processes such as intention processing, whereas the late positive slow-wave shows that for FB children may engage in metarepresentational processing. Therefore, the present findings seem to substantiate theoretical accounts postulating simple mentalistic reasoning for PT in children.