Exploring the role of verbal-semantic overlap in response-effect compatibility

Learning and transfer of response-effect relations

Acting means changing the environment according to one's own goals, and this often requires bodily movements as responses. How these responses are selected is a central question in contemporary cognitive psychology. The ideomotor principle offers a simple answer based on two assumptions: An agent first learns an association between a response and its effects. Later, this association can be used in a reverse way: When the agent wants to achieve a desired effect and activates its representation, the associated response representation becomes activated as well. This reversed use of the learned association is considered the means to select the required response. In three experiments, we addressed two questions related to the first assumption: First, we tested whether effect representations generalise to more abstract conceptual knowledge. This is important, because outside the laboratory and in novel situations, effects are variable and not always exactly identical, such that generalisation is necessary for successful actions. Second, the nature of the response-effect relation has been debated recently, and more data are necessary to put theorising on firm empirical ground. Results of our experiments suggest that (a) abstraction to conceptual knowledge seems to occur only under very restricted situations, and (b) it seems that no (implicit) associations between responses and effects are learned, but rather (explicit) propositional knowledge in the form of rules.

Generalisation of unpredictable action-effect features: Large individual differences with little on-average effect

Ideomotor theory suggests that selecting a response is achieved by anticipating the consequences of that response. Evidence for this is the response-effect compatibility (REC) effect, that is, responding tends to be faster when the (anticipated) predictable consequences of a response (the action effects) are compatible rather than incompatible with the response. The present experiments investigated the extent to which the consequences must be exactly versus categorically predictable. According to the latter, an abstraction from particular instances to the categories of dimensional overlap might take place. For participants in one group of Experiment 1, left-hand and right-hand responses produced compatible or incompatible action effects in perfectly predictable positions to the left or right of fixation, and a standard REC effect was observed. For participants in another group of Experiment 1, as well as in Experiments 2 and 3, the responses also produced action effects to the left or right of fixation, but the eccentricity of the action effects (and thus their precise location) was unpredictable. On average, the data from the latter groups suggest that there is little, if any, tendency for participants to abstract the critical left/right features from spatially somewhat unpredictable action effects and use them for action selection, although there were large individual differences in these groups. Thus, at least on average across participants, it appears that the spatial locations of action effects must be perfectly predictable for these effects to have a strong influence on the response time.

Modal and amodal cognition: an overarching principle in various domains of psychology

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

Action-effect knowledge transfers to similar effect stimuli

The ability to anticipate the sensory consequences of our actions (i.e., action-effects) is known to be important for intentional action initiation and control. Learned action-effects can select the responses that previously have been associated with them. What has been largely unexplored is how learned action-effect associations can aid action selection for effects that have not previously associated with an action but are similar to learned effects. In two studies, we aimed to show that when presented new, unknown action-effects, participants select the responses that have previously been associated with similar action-effects. In the first study (n = 27), action-effect similarity was operationalized via stimuli belonging to the same or different categories as the previously learned action-effects. In the second study (n = 31), action-effect similarity was realized via stimuli that require comparable motor responses in real life. Participants first learned that specific responses are followed by specific visual effect stimuli. In the test phase, learned effect stimuli, new but similar effect stimuli and new but dissimilar effect stimuli were presented ahead of the response. The findings revealed that both learned effect stimuli and new similar effect stimuli affected response times, whereas new dissimilar effects did not. When a learned or a new similar effect was followed by a learned response, compared to an unlearned response, the responses were faster. We interpret these findings in terms of action-effect learning. The action-effect once bound to an action is used to select an action if a similar effect for which no action has been learned yet is presented. However, it is noteworthy that, due to our design, other explanations for the found transfer are conceivable. We address these limitations in the General Discussion.

Perception and action as viewed from the Theory of Event Coding: a multi-lab replication and effect size estimation of common experimental designs

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus-response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well.

Is there hierarchical generalization in response-effect learning?

Ideomotor theory is an influential approach to understand goal-directed behavior. In this framework, response-effect (R-E) learning is assumed as a prerequisite for voluntary action: Once associations between motor actions and their effects in the environment have been formed, the anticipation of these effects will automatically activate the associated motor pattern. R-E learning is typically investigated with (induction) experiments that comprise an acquisition phase, where R-E associations are presumably learned, and a subsequent test phase, where the previous effects serve as stimuli for a response. While most studies used stimuli in the test phase that were identical to the effects in the acquisition phase, one study reported generalization from exemplars to their superordinate category (Hommel et al., Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003, Exp. 1). However, studies on so-called R-E compatibility did not report such generalization. We aimed to conceptually replicate Experiment 1 of Hommel et al. (Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003) with a free-choice test phase. While we did observe effects consistent with R-E learning when the effects in the acquisition phase were identical to the stimuli in the test phase, we did not observe evidence for generalization. We discuss this with regard to recent studies suggesting that individual response biases might rather reflect rapidly inferred propositional knowledge instead of learned R-E associations.