Evolutionary classification of toxin mediated interactions in microorganisms

The effect of territorial awareness in a three-species cyclic predator-prey model

Recognizing territories is essential to decide behavior of population either human or animals, and interaction between groups or individuals according to the territorial awareness is universal. Understanding various mechanisms which affect on such species behaviors can be possible by evolutionary games, and in particular, the rock–paper–scissors (RPS) game has been played a key role as a paradigmatic model to explore biodiversity from microbiota to societies. Among paramount mechanisms in systems of RPS, the role of intraspecific interaction has been recently noted in terms of promoting biodiversity. Since intraspecific interaction is defined by an invasive reaction between individuals in the same group, the interaction may be also sensitive to the territorial awareness. To explore how territorial awareness-based intraspecific interaction can affect species biodiversity, we endow species with the mechanism in the classic RPS game. By means of the Monte-Carlo method, we find the phenomenon that the presence of species’ territorial awareness has an impact on intraspecific interaction which ultimately affects species biodiversity. At the same time, we also find that territorial awareness can play a significant role to the average waiting time for extinction which is numerically elucidated by exploiting the quantity: interface width statistic. Unlike prior research that concentrated solely on the relationship between interaction frequency and species diversity, our results shed lights on the important role of territorial awareness in models of RPS, and they reveal fascinating evolutionary outcomes in structured populations that are a unique consequence of such awareness behavior.

Biodiversity in models of cyclic dominance is preserved by heterogeneity in site-specific invasion rates

Global, population-wide oscillations in models of cyclic dominance may result in the collapse of biodiversity due to the accidental extinction of one species in the loop. Previous research has shown that such oscillations can emerge if the interaction network has small-world properties, and more generally, because of long-range interactions among individuals or because of mobility. But although these features are all common in nature, global oscillations are rarely observed in actual biological systems. This begets the question what is the missing ingredient that would prevent local oscillations to synchronize across the population to form global oscillations. Here we show that, although heterogeneous species-specific invasion rates fail to have a noticeable impact on species coexistence, randomness in site-specific invasion rates successfully hinders the emergence of global oscillations and thus preserves biodiversity. Our model takes into account that the environment is often not uniform but rather spatially heterogeneous, which may influence the success of microscopic dynamics locally. This prevents the synchronization of locally emerging oscillations, and ultimately results in a phenomenon where one type of randomness is used to mitigate the adverse effects of other types of randomness in the system.

A Five-Species Jungle Game

In this paper, we investigate the five-species Jungle game in the framework of evolutionary game theory. We address the coexistence and biodiversity of the system using mean-field theory and Monte Carlo simulations. Then, we find that the inhibition from the bottom-level species to the top-level species can be critical factors that affect biodiversity, no matter how it is distributed, whether homogeneously well mixed or structured. We also find that predators' different preferences for food affect species' coexistence.

Zealots tame oscillations in the spatial rock-paper-scissors game

The rock-paper-scissors game is a paradigmatic model for biodiversity, with applications ranging from microbial populations to human societies. Research has shown, however, that mobility jeopardizes biodiversity by promoting the formation of spiral waves, especially if there is no conservation law in place for the total number of competing players. First, we show that even if such a conservation law applies, mobility still jeopardizes biodiversity in the spatial rock-paper-scissors game if only a small fraction of links of the square lattice is randomly rewired. Secondly, we show that zealots are very effective in taming the amplitude of oscillations that emerge due to mobility and/or interaction randomness, and this regardless of whether the later is quenched or annealed. While even a tiny fraction of zealots brings significant benefits, at 5% occupancy zealots practically destroy all oscillations regardless of the intensity of mobility, and regardless of the type and strength of randomness in the interaction structure. Interestingly, by annealed randomness the impact of zealots is qualitatively the same as by mobility, which highlights that fast diffusion does not necessarily destroy the coexistence of species, and that zealotry thus helps to recover the stable mean-field solution. Our results strengthen the important role of zealots in models of cyclic dominance, and they reveal fascinating evolutionary outcomes in structured populations that are a unique consequence of such uncompromising behavior.

Evolutionary game theory: cells as players

In two papers we review game theory applications in biology below the level of cognitive living beings. It can be seen that evolution and natural selection replace the rationality of the actors appropriately. Even in these micro worlds, competing situations and cooperative relationships can be found and modeled by evolutionary game theory. Also those units of the lowest levels of life show different strategies for different environmental situations or different partners. We give a wide overview of evolutionary game theory applications to microscopic units. In this first review situations on the cellular level are tackled. In particular metabolic problems are discussed, such as ATP-producing pathways, secretion of public goods and cross-feeding. Further topics are cyclic competition among more than two partners, intra- and inter-cellular signalling, the struggle between pathogens and the immune system, and the interactions of cancer cells. Moreover, we introduce the theoretical basics to encourage scientists to investigate problems in cell biology and molecular biology by evolutionary game theory.

Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review

Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors and scissors are crushed by rock. This simple game is popular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that have no obvious winner, but cyclic dominance is also at the heart of predator-prey interactions, the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards, the overgrowth of marine sessile organisms and competition in microbial populations. Cyclical interactions also emerge spontaneously in evolutionary games entailing volunteering, reward, punishment, and in fact are common when the competing strategies are three or more, regardless of the particularities of the game. Here, we review recent advances on the rock-paper-scissors (RPS) and related evolutionary games, focusing, in particular, on pattern formation, the impact of mobility and the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. We also review mean-field and zero-dimensional RPS models and the application of the complex Ginzburg-Landau equation, and we highlight the importance and usefulness of statistical physics for the successful study of large-scale ecological systems. Directions for future research, related, for example, to dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules and invasion reversals owing to multi-point interactions, are also outlined.

From pairwise to group interactions in games of cyclic dominance

We study the rock-paper-scissors game in structured populations, where the invasion rates determine individual payoffs that govern the process of strategy change. The traditional version of the game is recovered if the payoffs for each potential invasion stem from a single pairwise interaction. However, the transformation of invasion rates to payoffs also allows the usage of larger interaction ranges. In addition to the traditional pairwise interaction, we therefore consider simultaneous interactions with all nearest neighbors, as well as with all nearest and next-nearest neighbors, thus effectively going from single pair to group interactions in games of cyclic dominance. We show that differences in the interaction range affect not only the stationary fractions of strategies but also their relations of dominance. The transition from pairwise to group interactions can thus decelerate and even revert the direction of the invasion between the competing strategies. Like in evolutionary social dilemmas, in games of cyclic dominance, too, the indirect multipoint interactions that are due to group interactions hence play a pivotal role. Our results indicate that, in addition to the invasion rates, the interaction range is at least as important for the maintenance of biodiversity among cyclically competing strategies.