Monkeys exhibit prospective memory in a computerized task

Towards an animal model of consciousness based on the platform theory

The evolution of intellectual capacities has brought forth a continuum of consciousness levels subserved by neuronal networks of varying complexity. Brain pathologies, neurodegenerative, and mental diseases affect conscious cognition and behavior. Although impairments in consciousness are among the most devastating consequences of neurological and mental diseases, valid and reliable animal models of consciousness, that could be used for preclinical research are missing. The platform theory holds that the brain enters a conscious operation mode, whenever mental representations of stimuli, associations, concepts, memories, and experiences are effortfully maintained (in working memory) and actively manipulated. We used the platform theory as a framework and evaluation standard to categorize behavioral paradigms with respect to the level of consciousness involved in task performance. According to the platform theory, a behavioral paradigm involves conscious cognitive operations, when the problem posed is unexpected, novel or requires the maintenance and manipulation of a large amount of information to perform cognitive operations on them. Conscious cognitive operations are associated with a relocation of processing resources and the redirection of attentional focus. A consciousness behavioral test battery is proposed that is composed of tests which are assumed to require higher levels of consciousness as compared to other tasks and paradigms. The consciousness test battery for rodents includes the following tests: Working memory in the radial arm maze, episodic-like memory, prospective memory, detour test, and operant conditioning with concurrent variable-interval variable-ratio schedules. Performance in this test battery can be contrasted with the performance in paradigms and tests that require lower levels of consciousness. Additionally, a second more comprehensive behavioral test battery is proposed to control for behavioral phenotypes not related to consciousness. Our theory could serve as a guidance for the decryption of the neurobiological basis of consciousness.

Capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) failed to seek information for their potential forgetting in a computerized task

Memory is always vulnerable to loss because it fades over time. To avoid the potential loss of a particular memory, individuals who can anticipate this loss might seek an opportunity to re-encode the information at the later point. Evidence shows that animals engage in online memory monitoring, but few studies have addressed whether they seek information prospectively to guard against potential forgetting. In the present study, to address this issue three capuchin monkeys were tested using a delayed matching-to-sample task with a cue signaling delay length (short or long). In the tests, subjects could choose at the onset of the delay whether or not to seek a re-presentation of a sample after the delay. Results showed that two monkeys sought re-presentation in the long delay more frequently than in the short delay, suggesting knowledge of the necessity of re-presentation based on knowing the length of the delay. However, further tests provided no evidence that this response was based on metacognitive cues. Whether capuchin monkeys are capable of prospective information-seeking for own potential forgetting remains to be established.

Prospective but not retrospective tool selection in the Goffin’s cockatoo (Cacatua goffiniana)

The ability to select the necessary means for a familiar task while the task itself or the respective tools are out of sight suggests a rudimentary form of planning. Here we investigated if and how a non-specialized tool using bird, the Goffin’s cockatoo, can prospectively or retrospectively select the functional tool in a decision-making task featuring two different types of apparatuses and their corresponding tools. Each apparatus could only be employed with one specific type of tool. Either the apparatus was presented and occluded prior to the presentation of the tools (prospective condition) or the tools were presented and occluded prior to the presentation of the apparatus (retrospective condition). Our results suggest the birds can prospectively but not retrospectively select the correct tool, paralleling previous research in tool using apes, and indicate at least simple forms of prospective selection in the tool use of a species distantly related to primates.

Precrastination: The fierce urgency of now

Procrastination is a familiar and widely discussed proclivity: postponing tasks that can be done earlier. Precrastination is a lesser known and explored tendency: completing tasks quickly just to get them done sooner. Recent research suggests that precrastination may represent an important penchant that can be observed in both people and animals. This paper reviews evidence concerned with precrastination and connects that evidence with a long history of interest in anticipatory learning, distance reception, and brain evolution. Discussion unfolds to encompass several related topics including impulsivity, planning, and self-control. Precrastination may be a new term in the psychological lexicon, but it may be a predisposition with an extended evolutionary history. Placing precrastination within the general rubric of anticipatory action may yield important insights into both adaptive and maladaptive behavior.

Of Men and Mice: Modeling the Fragile X Syndrome

The Fragile X Syndrome (FXS) is one of the most common forms of inherited intellectual disability in all human societies. Caused by the transcriptional silencing of a single gene, the fragile x mental retardation gene FMR1, FXS is characterized by a variety of symptoms, which range from mental disabilities to autism and epilepsy. More than 20 years ago, a first animal model was described, the Fmr1 knock-out mouse. Several other models have been developed since then, including conditional knock-out mice, knock-out rats, a zebrafish and a drosophila model. Using these model systems, various targets for potential pharmaceutical treatments have been identified and many treatments have been shown to be efficient in preclinical studies. However, all attempts to turn these findings into a therapy for patients have failed thus far. In this review, I will discuss underlying difficulties and address potential alternatives for our future research.

Comparing species decisions in a dichotomous choice task: adjusting task parameters improves performance in monkeys

In comparative psychology, both similarities and differences among species are studied to better understand the evolution of their behavior. To do so, we first test species in tasks using similar procedures, but if differences are found, it is important to determine their underlying cause(s) (e.g., are they due to ecology, cognitive ability, an artifact of the study, and/or some other factor?). In our previous work, primates performed unexpectedly poorly on an apparently simple two-choice discrimination task based on the natural behavior of cleaner fish, while the fish did quite well. In this task, if the subjects first chose one of the options (ephemeral) they received both food items, but if they chose the other (permanent) option first, the ephemeral option disappeared. Here, we test several proposed explanations for primates' relatively poorer performance. In Study 1, we used a computerized paradigm that differed from the previous test by removing interaction with human experimenters, which may be distracting, and providing a more standardized testing environment. In Study 2, we adapted the computerized paradigm from Study 1 to be more relevant to primate ecology. Monkeys' overall performance in these adapted tasks matched the performance of the fish in the original study, showing that with the appropriate modifications they can solve the task. We discuss these results in light of comparative research, which requires balancing procedural similarity with considerations of how the details of the task or the context may influence how different species perceive and solve tasks differently.

Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) exhibit the decoy effect in a perceptual discrimination task

The asymmetric dominance effect (or decoy effect) is a form of context-dependent choice bias in which the probability of choosing one of two options is impacted by the introduction of a third option, also known as the decoy. Decoy effects are documented widely within the human consumer choice literature, and even extend to preference testing within nonhuman animals. Here, we extended this line of research to a perceptual discrimination task with rhesus monkeys to determine whether decoy stimuli would impact size judgments of rectangular stimuli. In a computerized task, monkeys attempted to choose the larger of two rectangles that varied in size and orientation (horizontally or vertically oriented). In probe trials, a third stimulus (the decoy) was presented that was smaller than the other two rectangles but matched the orientation of one of them. On half of the probe trials, the presented decoy matched the orientation of the larger stimulus, and on the other half, the decoy matched the orientation of the smaller stimulus. Monkeys rarely selected the decoy stimulus. However, their performance (selection of the largest rectangle) increased relative to the baseline trials (with only two choices) when the decoy was congruent in its orientation with the largest rectangle, but decreased relative to baseline when the decoy was incongruent with the largest rectangle. Thus, a decoy stimulus impacted monkeys' perceptual choice behavior even when it was not a viable choice option itself. These results are explained with regard to comparative evaluation mechanisms.

Looking ahead? Computerized maze task performance by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), and human children (Homo sapiens)

Human and nonhuman primates are not mentally constrained to the present. They can remember the past and-at least to an extent-anticipate the future. Anticipation of the future ranges from long-term prospection such as planning for retirement to more short-term future-oriented cognition such as planning a route through a maze. Here we tested a great ape species (chimpanzees), an Old World monkey species (rhesus macaques), a New World monkey species (capuchin monkeys), and human children on a computerized maze task. All subjects had to move a cursor through a maze to reach a goal at the bottom of the screen. For best performance on the task, subjects had to "plan ahead" to the end of the maze to move the cursor in the correct direction, avoid traps, and reverse directions if necessary. Mazes varied in difficulty. Chimpanzees were better than both monkey species, and monkeys showed a particular deficit when moving away from the goal or changing directions was required. Children showed a similar pattern to monkeys regarding the effects of reversals and moves away from the goal, but their overall performance in terms of correct maze completion was similar to the chimpanzees. The results highlight similarities as well as differences in planning across species and the role that inhibitory control may play in future-oriented cognition in primates.

The relationship between event-based prospective memory and ongoing task performance in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Prospective memory is remembering to do something at a future time. A growing body of research supports that prospective memory may exist in nonhuman animals, but the methods used to test nonhuman prospective memory differ from those used with humans. The current work tests prospective memory in chimpanzees using a method that closely approximates a typical human paradigm. In these experiments, the prospective memory cue was embedded within an ongoing task. Tokens representing food items could be used in one of two ways: in a matching task with pictures of items (the ongoing task) or to request a food item hidden in a different location at the beginning of the trial. Chimpanzees had to disengage from the ongoing task in order to use the appropriate token to obtain a higher preference food item. In Experiment 1, chimpanzees effectively matched tokens to pictures, when appropriate, and disengaged from the ongoing task when the token matched the hidden item. In Experiment 2, performance did not differ when the target item was either hidden or visible. This suggested no effect of cognitive load on either the prospective memory task or the ongoing task, but performance was near ceiling, which may have contributed to this outcome. In Experiment 3, we created a more challenging version of the task. More errors on the matching task occurred before the prospective memory had been carried out, and this difference seemed to be limited to the hidden condition. This finding parallels results from human studies and suggests that working memory load and prospective memory may have a similar relationship in nonhuman primates.

Cashing out: The decisional flexibility of uncertainty responses in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens)

Researchers are exploring whether animals share with humans something like a metacognitive capacity. Though some results point to human-animal continuities in this domain, they face the dominant criticism that animals' performances might be associative. A persistent problem is that animal-metacognition paradigms present static environments of risk and reward that may foster inflexible and conditioned responding. Those environments do not challenge animals to show the flexibility in their decision strategies that could indicate an antecedent capacity to metacognition. Accordingly, we tested macaques and humans on an uncertainty-monitoring paradigm in which risk changed dynamically. Participants classified stimuli of different difficulties while also choosing when to use a cashout response to collect the accumulated rewards that would be forfeit on a discrimination error. Macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans flexibly adjusted their decision criteria to achieve appropriate protection against the cost of error that could differ depending on trial difficulty and the number of rewards at risk. In particular, monkeys widened their cashout-response region as their accumulated rewards increased, providing more protection against a more costly error. These findings demonstrate a new continuity between humans' and animals' uncertainty systems. They reveal a calibration by macaques of present risk to trial difficulty tolerated. They show that animals' uncertainty-monitoring and risk-management systems have substantial trial-by-trial flexibility.

Prospective memory: a comparative perspective

Prospective memory consists of forming a representation of a future action, temporarily storing that representation in memory, and retrieving it at a future time point. Here, we review the recent development of animal models of prospective memory. We review experiments using rats that focus on the development of time-based and event-based prospective memory. Next, we review a number of prospective-memory approaches that have been used with a variety of non-human primates. Finally, we review selected approaches from the human literature on prospective memory to identify targets for development of animal models of prospective memory. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: "Tribute to Tom Zentall".

The Dynamic Multiprocess Framework: evidence from prospective memory with contextual variability

The ability to remember to execute delayed intentions is referred to as prospective memory. Previous theoretical and empirical work has focused on isolating whether a particular prospective memory task is supported either by effortful monitoring processes or by cue-driven spontaneous processes. In the present work, we advance the Dynamic Multiprocess Framework, which contends that both monitoring and spontaneous retrieval may be utilized dynamically to support prospective remembering. To capture the dynamic interplay between monitoring and spontaneous retrieval, we had participants perform many ongoing tasks and told them that their prospective memory cue may occur in any context. Following either a 20-min or a 12-h retention interval, the prospective memory cues were presented infrequently across three separate ongoing tasks. The monitoring patterns (measured as ongoing task cost relative to a between-subjects control condition) were consistent and robust across the three contexts. There was no evidence for monitoring prior to the initial prospective memory cue; however, individuals who successfully spontaneously retrieved the prospective memory intention, thereby realizing that prospective memory cues could be expected within that context, subsequently monitored. These data support the Dynamic Multiprocess Framework, which contends that individuals will engage monitoring when prospective memory cues are expected, disengage monitoring when cues are not expected, and that when monitoring is disengaged, a probabilistic spontaneous retrieval mechanism can support prospective remembering.

Prospective memory in children and chimpanzees

Prospective memory (PM) involves remembering to do something at a specific time in the future. Here, we investigate the beginnings of this ability in young children (3-year-olds; Homo sapiens) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) using an analogous task. Subjects were given a choice between two toys (children) or two food items (chimpanzees). The selected item was delivered immediately, whereas the unselected item was hidden in an opaque container. After completing an ongoing quantity discrimination task, subjects could request the hidden item by asking for it (children) or by pointing to the container and identifying the item on a symbol board (chimpanzees). Children and chimpanzees showed evidence of prospective-like memory in this task, as evidenced by successful retrieval of the item at the end of the task, sometimes spontaneously with no prompting from the experimenter. These findings contribute to our understanding of PM from an ontogenetic and comparative perspective.

Event-based prospective memory in the rat

People plan to act in the future when an appropriate event occurs, a capacity known as event-based prospective memory. Prospective memory involves forming a representation of a planned future action, subsequently inactivating the representation, and ultimately reactivating it at an appropriate point in the future. Recent studies suggest that monkeys, chimpanzees, and rats display elements of prospective memory, but it is uncertain if the full sequence (activation-inactivation-reactivation) that occurs in humans also occurs in nonhumans. Here, we asked if rats exhibit event-based prospective memory. Rats completed an ongoing temporal-discrimination task while waiting for a large meal. To promote the use of event-based prospective memory, we created an event (tone pulses) that provided information that the meal could be obtained soon. Event-based prospective memory was suggested by the dramatic decline in ongoing-task performance after the event, with excellent performance at other times. To document that the event initiated memory activation, we arranged for the event to occur at novel times. Finally, multiple, repeated presentations of the event on the same day demonstrate that rats inactivate and reactivate the memory representation in an on-demand, event-based fashion. Development of an animal model of prospective memory may be valuable to probe the biological underpinnings of memory disorders.

Remembering the past and planning for the future in rats

A growing body of research suggests that rats represent and remember specific earlier events from the past. An important criterion for validating a rodent model of episodic memory is to establish that the content of the representation is about a specific event in the past rather than vague information about remoteness. Recent evidence suggests that rats may also represent events that are anticipated to occur in the future. An important capacity afforded by a representation of the future is the ability to plan for the occurrence of a future event. However, relatively little is known about the content of represented future events and the cognitive mechanisms that may support planning. This article reviews evidence that rats remember specific earlier events from the past, represent events that are anticipated to occur in the future, and develops criteria for validating a rodent model of future planning. These criteria include representing a specific time in the future, the ability to temporarily disengage from a plan and reactivate the plan at an appropriate time in the future, and flexibility to deploy a plan in novel conditions.